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 Abstract 
This thesis is a comparative study of nationalist history writing in Ireland and 
Germany between circa 1848 and circa 1930. It builds on recent historiography on 
the cross-European comparison of different national historical traditions in Europe 
and challenges the customary comparison of ‘peripheral’ national historical 
traditions with ‘mainstream’ ones. More specifically, it provides a comparative 
perspective on the development of one aspect of Irish nationalist culture, recognising 
that the comparative method is still under-used in Irish historiography and relocating 
the study of this ‘marginal’ tradition into a more comprehensive European frame of 
reference. It offers a more comprehensive understanding of the similarities and 
differences in the historical representation of the nation in different contexts by 
comparing two traditions that have been regarded as ‘mainstream’ and ‘peripheral’, 
respectively. The thesis is concerned with the question of to what extent, by way of 
this comparison, we can make judgements about a distinctive European form of 
national history writing manifested in ‘peripheral’ as well as ‘mainstream’ contexts. 
The thesis focuses on a sample of historians in both contexts whose historical work 
centred on the national past aiming to arrive at a medium between the primarily 
comparative focus and a reasonably detailed examination of the German and Irish 
national historiographical traditions. Individual chapters focus on the representation 
of the nation’s ‘origins’ of the and foundational events in the nation’s past; the 
relationship between religion and the nation in the national historical narratives; the 
application of ‘race thinking’ or the idea of race to the nation’s past; and how the 
territory of the nation was historically delineated, how the relationship between 
region and nation and regional challenges to the unified national historical narrative 
were dealt with. A final, ‘supplementary’ chapter briefly examines transnational 
connections between historical representations of the nation in these contexts. 
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 Introduction 
History and nationalism have since the first stirrings of the latter been intimately, 
even inseparably linked. Historical enquiry both underpinned nationalism, and 
developed into a modern discipline in tandem with nationalism.
1
 This thesis is a 
comparative thematic study of nationalist historical narratives in Ireland and 
Germany between the 1840s and the end of the 1920’s.2 The central question will be 
how the historical framing of the distinctive ‘special path’ of the nation’s history 
which was regarded as bearing fundamental implications for the modern nation’s 
political existence differed and paralleled. This will in turn provide an answer to the 
question of how far, in light of this comparison, it is permissible to speak of a 
specific European ‘form’ of nationalist historical narratives. The comparison will be 
framed in terms of an engagement with four crucial themes: origins, religion, 
national territory, and ‘race’ and ‘Othering’, all of which were interrelated, and all of 
which defined the writing of national history. How were the nation’s historical 
origins in each case understood? How had inter-confessional conflict shaped 
understandings of each nation’s historical identity? How had these nations become 
understood in historically in terms of their territorial extent and delineation? How 
were the identities of the peoples of these nations been historically defined? These 
are the central questions structuring this thesis.    
                                                          
1
 Ilaria Porciani and Jo Tollebeek, ‘Institutions, Networks, and Communities in a European 
Perspective’, in idem (eds.), Setting the Standards: Institutions, Networks, and Communities of 
National Historiography (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 5, 14.  
Hugo Frey and Stefan Jordan, ‘National Historians and the Discourse of the Other: France and 
Germany’, in Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (eds.), The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion 
and Gender in National Histories (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 200. Eva Gkotzaridis, 
Trials of Irish History: Genesis and Evolution of a Reappraisal, 1938-2000 (London, Routledge, 
2006), p. 19.   
2
 To speak of ‘Germany’ and ‘the Germans’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is to refer to a 
number of different territorial configurations and cultural communities, but is considered here in 
terms of the region of German-speaking Europe that comprised the non-Habsburg lands of the 
German Confederation and which became the German ‘Empire’ in 1871, with ‘the Germans’ are 
referred to in the same basic sense. 
7
 It is no new insight to identify the indispensability of historical inquiry (and, 
importantly, historical error) to nationalism or national identity. However, most 
studies of national histories have largely eschewed in-depth comparison, itself a 
reflection of how historical research remains structured along ‘national’ lines with 
relatively little systematic comparison. Yet in order to arrive at any generally-
applicable conclusions about a historical phenomenon, and about nationalism in 
particular, historians must analyse comparatively, transnationally, indeed ‘globally’.3 
The underlying argument of this thesis is in agreement with that of Joep Leerssen in 
his National Thought: A Cultural History: that despite a multiplicity of national 
paths and fine-grained differences important broad similarities in European national 
histories and nationalist historical narratives can be discerned.
4
 If significant 
similarities and parallels can be found between two ‘canons’ of historical narratives 
which developed relatively independently of each other, this may permit broader 
conclusions about the nature of national history writing across Europe during this 
time. This study is located within the context of more recent efforts to render 
systematic comparison to the study of nationalist historiographies, and to relocate 
‘marginal’ traditions from their isolated position into a more encompassing one. If 
there is a tacit assumption that the nature of European national historiography can be 
found by the appraisal of a handful of ‘mainstream’ traditions – an assumption which 
is itself arguably an echo of nineteenth century nationalist distinctions between 
                                                          
3
 John Breuilly, ‘Nationalism and National Unification in Nineteenth Century Europe’, in John 
Breuilly (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 151. Stefan Berger, ‘The Comparative History of National Historiographies in Europe: 
Some Reflections and Results’, in Susana Carvalho and Francois Gemenne (eds.), Nations and their 
Histories: Constructions and Representations (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 29-30, 
33. Benedikt Stuchtey and Peter Wende, ‘Introduction: Towards A Comparative History of Anglo-
German Historiographical Traditions and Transfers’, in idem (eds.), British and German 
Historiography, 1750-1950: Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfers (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p. 2.    
4
 Berger, ‘The Comparative History of National Historiographies’, in Nations and their Histories, p. 
42. Joep Leerssen, National Thought In Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam, Amsterdam 
University Press, 2006), pp. 18-20.  
8
 ‘historic’ and ‘history-less’ nations – this study aims to challenge it by considering a 
‘peripheral’ case on its own merits as a noteworthy part of a distinctive tradition of 
European nationalist historiographies, and by comparing it with one of the 
‘paradigmatic’ traditions.5  If historians are to proceed towards a genuinely pan-
European view of the character and development of national historiographies, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that it is necessary to take a truly diverse set of cases 
on their own merits as objects for comparison.
6
 The Irish historian Edmund Curtis, 
himself a (moderate) nationalist, thought that comparison ‘was indispensable for 
good history’, because it was needed ‘for the essence of an understanding of history 
is to put things and men in their time and place and judge them by such 
circumstances.’7 The comparative focus here, however, is on the representation of 
German and Irish history by German and Irish writers in the early nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries in terms of ‘the nation’.  
Literature on comparative history remains relatively scarce. Historians may no 
longer give credence to the notion of national ‘exceptionalism(s)’ or Sonderwege, 
but most continue to write predominantly within the national paradigm, even in the 
case of those who study nationalism or the development of nationalist mentalities. 
One of the first major studies to attempt to study nationalist historiographies on a 
comparative basis was Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800 
                                                          
5
 Monika Baar, Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 1, 2. Joseph J. Lee, ‘Some Aspects of Modern Irish 
Historiography’, in Ernst Schulin (ed.), Gedenkschrift Martin Goehring: Studien zur europäischen 
Geschichte (Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1968), p. 442. Enda Delaney, ‘Directions in Historiography: Our 
Island Story? Towards A Transnational History of late modern Ireland’, Irish Historical Studies, 37, 
148 (2011), pp. 83-84. Richard English, ‘Directions in Historiography: History and Irish 
Nationalism’, Irish Historical Studies, 37, 147 (2011), pp. 447-460, esp. p. 458.  
6
 Stuchtey and Wende, ‘Introduction’, in British and German Historiography, p. 3. Christopher L. 
Hill, National History and the World of Nations: Capital, State and the Rhetoric of History in Japan, 
France and the United States (London, Duke University Press, 2008), ix. Brian Heffernan, Marta 
Ramón, Pierre Ranger, and Zsuzsanna Zarka, ‘Introduction’, in Brian Heffernan (ed.), Life on the 
Fringe? Ireland and Europe, 1800-1922 (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2012), pp. 1-10.  
7
 Quoted in Gkotzaridis, Trials of Irish History, p. 25.   
9
 (1998), but even here the format was based on individual case studies, 
complemented with comparative introductory and concluding chapters, and the book 
focused only on Germany, Italy, France and England. Ernest Breisach’s 
Historiography: Ancient, Medieval and Modern (1983, 2007), also focuses 
exclusively on the German, British, French and American contexts in its discussion 
of the modern period. Donald Kelley’s Fortunes of History (2003) and Frontiers of 
History (2006) broadened the scope, but (the latter especially) continued to group 
national historical traditions along their ‘mainstream’ or ‘peripheral’ basis.8 In more 
recent years considerable progress has been made due to the Writing the Nation 
project and resulting collection of edited volumes, which has aimed to chart on a 
cross-continental basis the development of the historical profession, to systematically 
compare on this basis national historical traditions, and to investigate the most 
important themes and issues in the historical representation of nations. Monika 
Baár’s Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century 
(2010) is another important addition to this literature.
9
  
The paucity of comparative literature is even more pronounced with respect to Irish 
historiography, due to the relatively belated development of the discipline, a 
disinclination to apply theoretical perspectives, and the extent to which the 
‘revisionist’ controversy has framed Irish historiographical debate.10 Irish revisionist 
historians, as important as their researches were, were still captive to the dictates of 
                                                          
8
 Donald R. Kelley, Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga (London, Yale 
University Press, 2003), p. 225.  
9
 The Many Faces of Clio: Cross-Cultural Approaches to Historiography, Essays in Honor of Georg 
G. Iggers, eds. Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer (New York, Berghahn, 2007), and A Global 
History of Modern Historiography (New York, Pearson, 2008), eds. Georg G. Iggers and Q. Edward 
Wang are also important recent works in this general field.  
10
 Heffernan, Ramón, Ranger and Zarka, ‘Introduction’, in Life on the Fringe? p. 4.    
10
 ‘methodological nationalism’, as John Hutchinson commented. 11  Nonetheless, a 
more recent examination and defence of revisionism in the Irish context has drawn 
parallels with continental European historiographical trends.
12
 Richard English, in 
his history of Irish nationalism (2006), drew attention to the deficit of comparative 
studies of Irish history with respect to nationalism, as has R.F. Foster.
13
 On the other 
hand, some historians of modern Ireland have been taking the importance of the 
comparative perspective more seriously in recent years, and such works as the edited 
volume Life on the Fringe: Ireland and Europe, 1890-1922. German historiography, 
by contrast, contains more in the way of comparative study, including studies 
comparing German nationalism with that of other contexts, and studying German 
nationalism from a comparative perspective, for example, and to name only a few 
examples, in Rogers Brubaker’s Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany (1922), and in German and American Nationalism: A Comparative 
Perspective (1999), as well as British and German Historiography, 1750-1950: 
Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfers (2000). Comparisons of unification and 
nation-state building in Germany and Italy have also been pursued at length. This 
application of comparative study to German history, especially modern German 
history, has of course had much to do with debunking the nation of a German 
‘Sonderweg’. Further, the study of German nationalism has always been central to 
the study of nationalism ‘in general’, while the same cannot be said for the study of 
Irish nationalism. This thesis cannot elaborate on recent developments in the study of 
                                                          
11
 John Hutchinson, ‘Irish nationalism’, in D.G. Boyce and Alan O’Day (ed.), The Making of Modern 
Irish History: Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 100-119. 
Alan O’Day, ‘Ireland and Europe: Theoretical Perspectives’, in Colin Graham and Leon Litvack 
(eds.), Ireland and Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2006), p. 17.  
12
 Evi Gkotzaridis, Trials of Irish History: Genesis and Evolution of a Reappraisal, 1938-2000 
(London, Routledge, 2006)  
13
 R.F. Foster, ‘Forward to Methuselah’, in Terence Dooley (ed.), Ireland’s Polemical Past: Views of 
Irish History in Honour of R.V. Comerford (Dublin, University College Dublin Press, 2010)  
11
 nationalism, given the breadth of complexity in this subject, but the area of 
nationalist historiography continues to command interest, and the arguments 
advanced more recently in favour of studying nationalism as a form of ‘discourse’ 
also provide much room for the study of how nations’ histories have been 
represented and contested. In any case, the comparative study of nationalist 
historiographies in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries remains a 
relatively new and incomplete area of research, and is one to which this thesis aims 
to contribute.   
Nationalist historical narratives in Germany and Ireland shared two basic ‘structural’ 
features. Firstly, they shared a similar narrative framework of the the ‘special path’ 
of the nation’s history into modernity. This framework was defined by a recurring 
conflict between the continuity-constructing task of national historiography and the 
reality of a historical timeline distinguished by discontinuity and rupture as opposed 
to any apparent sense of continuous linear progress; on ‘shattered pasts’, particularly 
in the medieval and early modern eras, which were assumed to have caused recurring 
‘delay’ in political and cultural development of the nation and of national unity. The 
tension between the discontinuous reality of the nation’s past and the (nationalist) 
idea that the nation must necessarily possess a meaningfully continuous historical 
existence meant also that historiographical controversies in both contexts were also 
political controversies in the modern present. It is a foundational contrast, that while 
the ‘running theme’ in, for example, the national historical narratives of Britain or 
France was of continuous steady progress and political nationhood (or what came to 
be called ‘Whig history’), the historical conditions of ‘nationhood’ in these cases 
12
 were – to differing degrees – of an opposing kind. 14  Nationalist historians in 
Germany and Ireland were in the position, albeit to different degrees, of needing to 
try to ‘reassemble a glorious national history from the broken pieces of a turbulent 
past in order to provide a focus for national identity.’15 The deep divisions within 
these two societies along religious, regional, and ethnic lines prevented, or at least 
complicated considerably, the emergence of a universally acceptable historical 
master narrative that could satisfy the search for a binding, ‘universal’, national 
historical identity.  
Secondly, the nationalist historical narratives written in both contexts were defined 
by the ‘confessionalized’ nature of nineteenth and early twentieth century German 
and Irish society, in which social life was powerfully influenced by antagonisms 
between Catholic and Protestant communities. The importance of the reality of a 
‘confessionalized’ society for how nationalist historical narratives and nationalism in 
general developed in these contexts should not be underestimated. Historical 
perspectives became, in general, closely linked if not defined by the Protestant or 
Catholic affiliation of the individuals in question. In Germany, nationalism, and the 
‘master narrative’ of German history became intimately associated with 
Protestantism, and in Ireland with Catholicism (notwithstanding, of course, atypical 
though sometimes important exceptions). The ‘confessionalization’ of the nation’s 
history in both societies deeply affected the way in which numerous different 
                                                          
14
 Stefan Berger, ‘The Power of National Pasts: Writing National History in Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Century Europe’, in Stefan Berger (ed.), Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 36. Benedikt Stuchtey, ‘Literature, liberty, and the life of the nation: 
British historiography from Macaulay to Trevelyan’, in Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin 
Passsmore (eds.), Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800 (London, Routledge, 
1990), pp. 32-33. Michael Bentley, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing’, in Stuart 
Macintyre, Juan Maiguashca, Attila Pok (eds.), The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. IV: 
1800-1945 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 205.   
15
 Stuchtey and Wende, ‘Introduction’, in British and German Historiography, p. 10. Colin Kidd, 
‘Gaelic Antiquity and National Identity in Enlightenment Ireland and Scotland’, English Historical 
Review, 109, 434 (1994), p. 1210.    
13
 historical problems were treated: the Protestant-Catholic divide in Irish and German 
society during the period under investigation, the reader will note, shows its 
importance in each of the thematic chapters of this thesis, reflecting its importance.  
The distinctive features of the nationalist historical narratives of these contexts 
notwithstanding, both were framed by a common discourse and expressed common 
concerns, revealing compelling similarities in their treatment of problems such as 
social heterogeneity and the formation of national unity, and methods used to 
transform the past into stories of collective development. One of their most 
important purposes was to combat objections to the nation as a superior form of 
community and, in most cases, some form of national sovereignty as the guarantee of 
the modern nation’s existence and development.16 Heterogeneity within the nation 
(for example on religious or ethnic lines) tended to be approached as a problem or at 
least as a source of conflict, and solutions proposed for its neutralization. Prior forms 
of community which did not fit within a national narrative were to be delegitimised, 
so as to make the desired or achieved nation-state, the necessary and natural 
‘culmination’ of the past.17  A comparative study of the framing of national histories 
can be explored, then, through questions including: who are central actors of national 
histories? Who are, or what is, described as inimical to the nation? How are passing 
of time and periodization structured? What origins are constructed? In what ways 
was national history politically ‘functionalized’? What links were established 
between national history and notions of ‘national mission’?18 These are among the 
questions that will be at the fore of this thesis in the individual thematic chapters. 
                                                          
16
 Hill, National History, p. 3.  
17
 Ibid, pp. 29, 42.  
18
 Berger, ‘The Comparative History of National Historiographies’, in Nations and their Histories, pp. 
34-38. Stefan Berger, ‘The Invention of European National Traditions in European Romanticism’, in 
Oxford History of Historical Writing, IV, p. 29.  
14
 Nineteenth and early twentieth century history writing on the nation is without 
question one of the most important elements in the history of nationalism. The 
modern study of nationalism has been shaped by numerous theoretical and 
methodological problems and disagreements, even at the level of establishing 
acceptable definitions for the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. 19  In practice 
nationalism has been studied as political ideology or cultural signifier, or as a form 
of political action, with scholars less often bringing these dimensions together. 
Gellner, Anderson, and others notwithstanding, most scholars have been wary of 
attempting to posit general theories of nationalism, in favour of analyzing individual 
‘case studies’, or more rarely, pursuing comparative analysis. Others, such as 
Anthony D. Smith have made various attempts to formulate a less ambitious ‘core 
doctrine’ of nationalism which may reasonably be regarded as broadly applicable to 
all manifestations of the general phenomenon.
20
 One of the few generally accepted 
conclusions in studying nationalism, however, is that it cannot be properly conceived 
of without its political dimension.
21
 In most, though by no means all, cases, 
nationalists regard the nation-state or at least some form of national sovereignty as 
the ideal form of political organization for the nation. At a minimum they, like 
historical narratives of the nation, all emphasize collective identity: (political) 
autonomy, unity, a defining national culture; or, as the case often is in reality, 
aspiration toward these: ‘self-government, a territorial home and a distinctive ethnic 
history are the three fundamental goals of nationalist movements’. 22  National 
                                                          
19
 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1994), pp. 3-4. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (2
nd
 ed., London, Verso, 1991), p. 3.  
20
 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London, Duckworth, 1971), pp. 20-21. Peter Alter, 
Nationalism (London, Edward Arnold, 1994), pp. 1-3.  
21
 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 404.  
22
 Anthony D. Smith, ‘The Formation of Nationalist Movements’ in Anthony D. Smith (ed.), 
Nationalist Movements (London, Macmillan, 1976), p. 15.  
15
 historiographies generally possessed an overt political significance, and their study 
can demonstrate how nationalism operated both as a form of political and social 
thought and as a distinctive cultural system.
23
 In keeping in mind the vexing 
difficulties of defining ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, at this juncture the following 
‘working definition’ of nationalism is proposed: nationalism is a belief system, 
ideology and understanding of politics that seeks cultural and political autonomy for 
the nation. A polity, even one which falls short of the sovereign state, which derives 
its legitimacy from the identity and cohesion of its constituent nation, is the 
irreducible political demand of nationalists.
24
 Nationalism, furthermore, is the 
product of the interplay of often competing narratives of the nation, generally 
conceived of as a community which is defined as a historical and cultural collective 
distinguishable from other such communities and possessing, or entitled to possess, 
political autonomy and the allegiance of religious and ‘non-national’ ethnic or 
cultural collectives within its boundaries. It is no less important to note that 
nationalisms make moral and ethical claims as well, grounded upon the ‘assumption 
that the well-being and identity of individuals depend on participation in a national 
culture.’25 It is history writing of the nation as part of the ‘common rhetoric of the 
nationalist imaginary’, through a comparative focus, that is of primary interest here 
as far as this study can make a contribution to the study of nationalism.
26
  
                                                          
23
 Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany, 1800-1945 (London, Edward Arnold, 1988), 
p. 2. Lloyd Kramer, ‘Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 38, 3 (1997), p. 526. Stephen J. Larin, ‘Conceptual Debates in Ethnicity, Nationalism, and 
Migration’, in Robert Denemark (ed.), The International Studies Encyclopaedia (Malden, MA., 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 445. R.F. Foster, ‘Forward to Methuselah: the progress of nationalism’, in 
Ireland’s Polemical Past, p. 151.   
24
 Breuilly, ‘Nationalism and National Unification’, p. 150.   
25
 Lloyd S. Kramer, Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775 
(Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 2011), pp. 10-11.    
26
 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism (2nd ed., Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 205.  
16
 Early historiographical explanations of nationalism tended to be influenced by ideas 
of nations as primordial, nationalism as ubiquitous and universal.
27
 The associations 
of historians with nationalism have discredited such views, and most modern 
historians would agree that nations and especially nationalisms are actively 
developed out of cultural practices and judgements, political contestations, and 
popular solidarities and animosities. Some scholars are firm that national loyalties, 
allegiances and communities can be dated back to pre-modern and indeed ancient 
societies, and that therefore the kinship communities that become ethnicities (or 
‘ethnic cores’) or nations are natural phenomena manifested throughout history, even 
if the political ideology and movement known as nationalism is modern.
28
 However 
it is generally accepted that, whatever the ‘naturalness’ of ‘the nation’ or ‘national 
feeling’, nationalism is an always changing process, in some measure artificial and 
constructed, which is constantly reformulated and which can do as much to 
complicate and restrict allegiance to ‘the nation’ as to popularize it. ‘Nationhood,’ 
insofar as this is the outcome of nationalism, is something that is made by 
communities, rather than something inherent.
29
 The internal heterogeneity of 
individual national historiographies certainly demonstrates that the history of 
nationalism is as John Hutchinson has argued a history of conflicts over competing 
narratives that seek to define ‘national’ communities.30  
National history as a specific mode of defending and advocating for the nation 
specifically arose in the early nineteenth century out of both the Enlightenment and 
                                                          
27
 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 
3. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York, 1926), p. 6.  
28
 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London, Penguin, 1991), ix.  
29
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 57. Ernest 
Gellner, Nationalism (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), viii.    
30
 Homi K. Bhabha, ‘Introduction: Narrating the Nation’, in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and 
Narration (London, Routledge, 1990). Kramer, ‘Historical Narratives’, p. 537. John Hutchinson, 
Nations as Zones of Conflict (London, SAGE, 2005) 
17
 the Counter-Enlightenment. In reaction to both pre-modern absolutist and dynastic 
thought and the abstract universalism of the new revolutionary thought, this history 
anchored itself upon existing historical narratives as well as cultural stereotypes, and 
the insistence that history could only be understood within a context that took ‘the 
people’ to be the primary mover of all history (that is, ‘the people’ of a given 
nation).
31
 The basic characteristics of national historiography are then the 
assumption that the nation is the most important human group as either ideal or 
frame of reference, that it binds together sub-national groups while at the same time 
dividing humanity and that it comprises the source of identity and values and is the 
key historical actor.
32
 Or, briefly, the fundamental assumptions underlying national 
historiography are that the nation is essentially ‘natural’ and (usually) that its 
political existence is necessary and inevitable, and morally just. National 
historiography is a specific form of historical representation which aims usually to 
justify the formation of nation-states, accompanies their formation, or seeks to 
influence existing definitions of the nation within a nation-state.
33
 The idea that the 
nation is the central idea and the bearer of a history which shapes national identity 
has been central to the world-view of nationalists everywhere during the history of 
nationalism.
34
 The role of the national past is especially important inasmuch as it is 
seen as a repository of ‘authentic’ national values, and any nation-state will be 
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 judged by the extent of its fidelity to such values.
35
 In all cases, national history 
resulted from a selective construction of the past: ‘the sense that a nation must have a 
history ensured in all cases that unpromising material would be pummelled into the 
appropriate shape.’ This past, however, was never and obviously could never be 
completely invented; yet while the ‘raw materials’ may have already been there, the 
‘constructive’ role of nationalist historians in fashioning the past into a specific 
narrative intellectually supporting the demands of the modern nation and 
nationalism, should not be underestimated.
36
 Specific events in the nation’s history 
were contested over because of their (presumed) importance for how the modern 
nation and the political tasks facing it were understood. In any event, what ultimately 
gives these histories their continuing power is the sense of identity they embody, 
mythical or not.
37
  
The discipline and practice of historiography is regarded as scholarly historical work 
on a specialised subject or sub-discipline of history, based upon established 
methodologies and the critical treatment of primary evidence, and appropriate 
secondary sources. The ‘methodological ground rules’ or ‘hallmarks’ of professional 
historiography often argued to have taken hold in the nineteenth century were source 
criticism, objectivity, the desire to consult as many documents and primary sources 
and to read as much literature as possible to get an approximation of “how it actually 
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 happened”.’38 The history of historiography, as is the concern here, is also the study 
of the ways in which history is written, the history of historical writing, broadly 
construed. This study considers sources produced in both academic and popular, or 
‘professional’ and ‘amateur’ milieus.39 To a certain extent, these are false or at least 
questionable dichotomies where this study is concerned.
40
 In the period under 
consideration, the boundary between academic/professional and popular/amateur 
history was much more porous than today, not least because even the most reputable 
academic historians saw no necessary conflict between academic study and political 
engagement. In most of Europe, until the final decades of the nineteenth century, the 
institutionalized historical profession was still developing, at various speeds and in 
various ways. So while German historiography was particularly (perhaps peculiarly) 
university-centred, in Britain and Ireland, owing to the different status of the 
university (until 1845 there was only one university of any kind in Ireland, Trinity 
College, Dublin, which few Catholics chose to attend), and differing views of the 
cultural and social value of historical study, most notable history writing there was 
done outside of academia.
41
 The kind of exhaustive multi-volume history writing 
that seemed to distinguish German historiography was seldom pursued in the Irish 
                                                          
38
 Stefan Berger, ‘Professional and Popular Historians, 1800-1900-2000’, in Barbara Korte and Sylvia 
Palatschek (eds.), Popular History Now and Then: International Perspectives (Transcript Verlag, 
Bielefeld, 2012), p. 13.  
39
 Lee, ‘Some Aspects of Modern Irish Historiography’, in Gedenkschrift Martin Goehring, p. 442. 
Berger, ‘Professional and Popular Historians, 1800-1900-2000’, in Popular History, p. 14. Bentley, 
‘Shape and Pattern’, Oxford History of Historical Writing, IV, p. 218. Wolfgang Hardtwig ‘History 
for Readers: Popular Historiography in twentieth-century Germany’, in Sylvia Paletschek (ed.), 
Popular Historiographies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Cultural Meanings, Social 
Practices (Oxford, Berghahn, 2011).  
40
‘It is sometimes said that…the difference between “history” and “fiction” resides in the fact that the 
historian “finds” his stories, whereas the fiction writer “invents” his. This conception of the 
historian’s task, however, obscures the extent to which “invention” also plays a part in the historian’s 
operations.’ Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 6-7. Martin Nissen, Populäre 
Geschichtsschreibung: Historiker, Verleger und die deutsche Öffentlichkeit, 1848-1900 (Cologne, 
Boehlau, 2009), p. 14.  
41
 Mary O’Dowd, ‘Ireland’, in Ilaria Porciani and Lutz Raphael (eds.), Atlas of European 
Historiography: The Making of a Profession, 1800-2005 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 
172. Stuchtey and Wende, ‘Introduction’, in British and German Historiography, p. 12.   
20
 context. Without underestimating the differences between the two forms of 
historiography, this distinction does however work in favour of this comparison in 
that it directs focus onto how nationalist historiography formed and functioned in 
different contexts, regardless of variation in its practice and institutional contexts. 
The focus is primarily on this form of historiography as writing of the past, and 
though some of the writers under consideration here were frankly unsophisticated 
even as amateurs, authors of both academic and popular works dealt with similar 
concerns and often used the same strategies to write national historical narratives, 
such as the elision of past and present, construction of a national ‘telos’, the 
emphasis and de-emphasis of certain events and currents, and so forth.
42
 An 
argument made by Monika Baár on eastern and central European national historians 
holds true also for the historians considered here, especially the Irish ones: they 
‘essentially represented a “technical” school of historiography and showed more bent 
for craftsmanship itself than for ruminations on its philosophical and theoretical 
bases.’43 Yet that is not to say that the writers considered here had fundamentally 
different outlooks on the value of history for the modern nation, rather quite the 
contrary. History written by renowned academic historians such as Heinrich von 
Treitschke could be wholly tendentious, while that of non-academic ‘gentleman 
scholars’ such as W.E.H. Lecky could be judiciously balanced and researched and 
lay firmer ground for further scholarly investigation. Berger has argued that though 
popular history bore ‘clear differences to scientific history, in particular greater 
dramatization, more reduction, more narrativisation and a greater focus on public 
attention and the market’, these were nonetheless not rigid distinctions true in all 
cases. ‘The same idea of what defined good history reigned in both popular and 
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 professional forms of history writing’, Berger argues, and ‘popular and professional 
histories…were not dichotomous and mutually exclusive entities’, rather ‘the 
borderlines between them were continuously crossed.’ 44  Indeed, professional or 
academic and non-professional historians could have more in common with each 
other than with other members of their own ‘genre’. What ultimately unites the 
historians considered here was the motivation and intent to present narratives that 
gave the ‘authentic’ history of their nation. If the three most important ‘hallmarks’ of 
professional historical scholarship were source criticism, the use of as many 
documents, other primary sources and secondary sources as possible, and of course, 
objectivity in judgement, in practice few of the historians here combined all these 
hallmarks without fault. Source criticism could be employed to tendentious ends, 
historians could be biased in their choice of sources, and ‘objectivity’ did not mean 
the same thing then as it does today. Historians ‘excused’ their elisions and 
‘narrativising’ acts through their self-image as ‘guardians’ of and advocates for 
‘their’ nation.   
The principal writers under consideration here will include, in the Irish context, 
Thomas D’Arcy McGee (1825-1868), Thomas Davis (1814-1845), John Mitchel 
(1815-1875), A.M. Sullivan (1830-1884), Standish O’Grady (1846-1928), W.E.H. 
Lecky (1838-1903), Eoin MacNeill (1867-1945), and Alice Stopford Green (1847-
1929); and in the German context, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), Heinrich von 
Sybel (1817-1895), Johannes Janssen (1829-1891), Felix Dahn (1834-1912), Gustav 
Freytag (1816-1895), Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), and Johannes Haller 
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 (1865-1947).
45
 The majority of these authors and their works will appear in each of 
the individual thematic chapters. Ranke is included less for the reputation he earned 
late in life and posthumously as the ‘father’ of modern history than for his place in 
the canon of German national history writing, and his influence on subsequent 
notable German historians, whether they accepted or rejected his ‘legacy’.46 While 
the primary focus will be on these writers, in the interest of establishing context and 
attempting to trace their influence other texts in addition to those written by these 
actors will also be considered where found appropriate. As this is a comparative 
study of two national historical traditions, it cannot, nor should it attempt to be a 
comprehensive study of either one, but rather focuses on particularly important 
figures in each context. This is a restricted selection, so that the arguments of these 
historians can be given reasonably detailed attention individually, and one that offers 
a broadly representative sample. By necessity, this study has been guided by the 
secondary literature on the relationships between historiography and nationalism in 
Germany and Ireland during this period, including in the choice of the principal 
historians to be considered. This is less a comparison of two whole national 
traditions of history writing than one of how, through the contributions of two 
groups of particularly important individuals in these contexts, a particular way of 
thinking historically about the nation was arrived at, which in turn shaped 
nationalism in each of these contexts in this period. An important criterion for 
choosing this particular selection of historians was their popularity and influence, 
both in terms of the readership of their books and their involvement in contemporary 
political matters. By necessity certain important figures have been left out, owing to 
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 the constraints of this kind of comparative study. Though it is necessary to be 
cautious of a ‘rear-view mirror’ approach, what is dealt with here with respect to 
how forms and varieties of history writing informed nationalism in these countries is 
a history of ‘roads heavily travelled.’ These writers were all well-read and their 
broader influence is well-attested in both Irish and German historiography. 
Considered as a group, the periods most often focused upon by these authors were 
the early and high middle ages, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. All of the authors were actively engaged in the 
politics of their respective countries during their careers. All of them were in some 
way influenced by the reality of ‘confessionalized’ society in Ireland and Germany 
during this period; for every one of them this and the ‘confessionalized’ dimension 
of nationalist history were of fundamental importance. These authors all at least 
made conscious effort towards ‘authenticity’ and ‘authority’ to establish definitive 
interpretations of national history, or claimed the value of ‘authenticity’ as they 
understood it.
47
 Nevertheless, we will be reminded throughout of Renan’s dictum 
that ‘historical error is essential to the creation of the nation’, that the construction of 
nationalist historical narratives was the work of selective memory. The analysis of 
the reception of ideas and texts is a thorny area for historians, as there is seldom 
‘ready-made’ source material, and possession of a book is in itself no guarantee that 
the book has been read at all. National historians sometimes wrote for popular 
audiences, sometimes only for other historians, and sometimes, intentionally or 
unintentionally, they reached both audiences, with the ‘message’ of their texts being 
mediated differently by different groups of readers. This is a study that aims to 
compare how history writing shaped certain ideas of the nation in Germany and 
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 Ireland between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the principal 
concern here is comparative analysis, the focus must be firstly on the texts 
themselves. The most important ideas and assumptions of diverse groups of 
nationalists in Ireland and Germany in this period were strongly redolent of the most 
important ideas, judgements, and conclusions of the writers considered most 
prominently. By considering where appropriate the writing of less prominent 
historians, as a supplement to those of the principal protagonists we can gain some 
idea of the influence of the latter in a wider arena.     
Where comparative history is concerned, Kocka’s and Haupt’s brief definition may 
be considered as comprehensive: ‘in comparative history, two or more historical 
phenomena are systematically studied for similarities and differences in order to 
contribute their better description, explanation, and interpretation.’ 48  The task 
therefore is to address both the specificities of the individual cases under comparison 
and shed light on the broader problem at issue; in this case, the writing of national 
history in Europe between the mid-nineteenth century and the early decades of the 
twentieth.
49
 As John Breuilly has argued similarly, the comparative historian is 
necessarily dealing with questions that can and must be generalized beyond and over 
the two or more things that he or she is comparing.
50
 Or as Peter Baldwin has 
claimed: ‘At a minimum, good comparative histories should give insights into each 
particular case that would have remained unrevealed had they been studied in 
                                                          
48
 Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, ‘Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and 
Perspectives of Comparative History’, in idem (eds.), Comparative and Transnational History: 
Central European Approaches and New Perspectives (Oxford, Berghahn, 2009), p. 2.    
49
 Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor, ‘Introduction’, in idem (eds.) Comparison and History: 
Europe in Cross-National Perspective (London, Routledge, 2004), xx.  
50
 John Breuilly, Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1992), pp. 1-3.  
25
 isolation.’ 51  The principal problem when writing comparative history is that it 
sometimes leans towards or turns into juxtaposition rather than truly integrated and 
systematic comparison. This is a pitfall which this study aims to avoid through a 
focus on a restricted ‘sample’ of writers, and on certain motifs or themes in national 
history writing, though some exposition of the individual cases, and their 
particularities, cannot be avoided.  
The same essential considerations that drove nationalism in Germany did so also in 
Ireland.
52
Before ‘German unification’ nationalism in both contexts was 
‘oppositional’ or ‘emancipatory’, and had often met with violent repression. German 
nationalism, and the German historiographical tradition that gave it such weight, had 
been ‘born’ in the fire of the Napoleonic Wars and French occupation of the German 
lands.
53
 Insofar as nationalists in both contexts sought ‘liberation’ from the 
domination of large, imperial, multi-national polities, both nationalisms were to 
differing degrees anti-imperial (Ireland contra Britain, ‘Germany’ contra the 
Habsburg imperial legacy, ‘successor’ to the Holy Roman Empire 54 ), and anti-
regionalist; Ireland was one, indivisible ancient nation in its own right rather than an 
appendage of Britain, ‘Germany’ took precedence over the multiple states that 
collectively comprised the German Confederation.
55
 The mid-nineteenth century 
period and subsequent decades was in both countries a formative period in the 
development of nationalism in each of its dimensions – political, cultural, intellectual 
– and one from which can be dated with certainty the growth of a more widely 
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 popularised ‘culture of nationhood’.56 In Ireland, Catholic Emancipation in 1829 and 
the subsequent unsuccessful campaign for the repeal of the legislative union between 
Britain and Ireland were crucial events for the development of a Catholic-oriented 
political nationalism.
57
 Institutions such as the Irish Parliamentary Party, the Land 
League, the Gaelic League and others came to together comprise arguably 
components of a ‘shadow’ Irish ‘national’ democracy that would offer an 
institutional basis for independence. The catastrophic Great Famine and the socio-
economic misery of the Irish masses seemed to prove beyond doubt the failure of the 
Act of Union. In Germany, the Rhine Crisis of 1840 was a seminal event in the 
history of nationalism in Germany and seemed at least to confer it on the possibility 
of becoming a mass movement.
58
 The failures of the Revolution of 1848 and the 
Frankfurt Parliament and the refusal of Prussia to assume its ‘leading role’ played 
important roles in setting the parameters of those debates that would be ‘resolved’ in 
1871. The events of 1848 were seminal for the turning away of the German 
Bildungsbürgertum from ‘western’ liberalism. The circumstances of ‘German 
unification’ also opened a number of questions for German nationalists. The 1870’s 
in Ireland saw the beginnings of the Irish Home Rule movement, which – though the 
significance of this event can hardly compare with those of 1871 in continental 
Europe – would create a political movement which would form part of the parentage 
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 of the independent Irish state. The events of the later Vormärz period and of 1848 in 
Germany, and in Ireland Catholic Emancipation, the Repeal Campaign and the brief 
life of ‘Young Ireland’, were formative for the development of the process towards 
historiographical, political, and cultural ‘nation-building’ in these countries. With 
this periodization not only can we encompass most of the history of these two 
nationalisms, but can also attempt to consider the exact importance of the 
achievement of national statehood to national historiography.
59
 Though the 
establishment of the German and Irish nation-states occurred fifty years apart, each 
occurred within the ‘classic’ period of nationalist state-building. Further, similar 
challenges faced the governments of both new nation-states on their foundation, 
including the effects of a long-standing religious divide, disputed borders, and the 
problems posed by the challenge of oppositional nationalism.  
Nineteenth and twentieth century Ireland has often been described as having a 
‘colonial’ history, thus the ‘subaltern’ status of Irish nationalism. German 
nationalists, on the other hand, whatever the challenges they faced, opposed a 
political system within which, nonetheless, the rulers of the various German states 
were themselves of German origin, and there was no doubt that ‘the Germans’ 
possessed a rich national culture of their own. Yet whatever the ‘colonial’ features of 
Irish society, it is a simplistic exaggeration to describe modern Irish history as 
‘colonial’.60  The history of their origins notwithstanding, the social and cultural 
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 relationships between the ‘ethnic’ communities in Ireland were simply too complex 
to be reduced to a conflict of ‘settler’ vs. ‘native’.61 As we shall see, members of the 
‘settler’ community played a role in the development of Irish nationalism that could 
not be reduced to a simple ‘colonial’ understanding of their place of in Irish society. 
Irish nationalism, long before 1922, was a mass movement with a deep and 
widespread cultural sphere. For German nationalists, though the nineteenth century, 
and particularly the period since 1871, was one which witnessed the ‘triumph’ of the 
nation, there remained a widespread understanding well after 1871 that German 
unification, particularly in the cultural sphere, was a continuing process rather than a 
final event. Even if we should not receive nationalist assumptions about their nations 
unquestioningly, to dismiss them too readily is to risk obscuring the details of views 
of society which themselves did much to shape the political culture of those 
societies. While it is difficult to think about nationalism without also thinking about 
its relation to the state, the nation-state, nationalism is fundamentally a way of 
thinking about the nation primarily. The question of the nation-state was certainly an 
important one for nationalist historians, and it is true that for most the achievement 
of nation-statehood was regarded as both necessary and desirable. Yet it is debatable 
whether the achievement of ‘national statehood’ necessarily fundamentally affected 
the content of how they thought about their nations in terms of their lengthy 
historical existences. The nation, after all,  could only make sense historically in 
terms of the broad span of its existence, whether it had possessed its own ‘state’ in 
any recognizable form for any period of time, or not. The nation’s history did not 
come to an end with the achievement of statehood.  
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 The first chapter will deal with the representation of the ‘origins’ of the nation and 
foundational events in its medieval and early modern periods. The second chapter 
will deal with comparison of the relationship between religion and the nation in the 
national historical narratives, and how the narration of religious conflicts was used to 
confer a confessional identity on the nation in the present. The third chapter will 
consider and compare how the historical ‘national territory’ was defined.  The fourth 
and final thematic chapter will consider how the idea of race or ‘race thinking’ was 
applied to the national past and to national historical narratives. A final, 
‘supplementary’ chapter briefly examines transnational connections between 
historical representations of the nation in these contexts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30
 CHAPTER ONE 
The Nation and its Origins 
I 
A national historical narrative, even if it only considers a certain period in the 
nation’s past or a certain historical problem, inevitably commences with a discourse 
of origins.
1
 Narratives of the origins of the nation in Ireland and Germany were 
centred on two ‘foundational epochs’ of especial importance: the medieval period 
(up until around the mid-thirteenth century) and the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. These periods were essential to the construction of the dominant narratives 
of the Irish or German nation’s historical ‘special path’. In the Irish case, the 
historical epochs were those of medieval Gaelic Ireland before and after the first 
Anglo-Norman invasions of the late twelfth century, and the ethno-religious conflicts 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in particular the 1641 Rebellion and 
Confederate Wars of the 1640’s. In the German case, they were the rise and decline 
of the early medieval Kingdom of Germany and the Holy Roman Empire from the 
late tenth century up to the mid-thirteenth, and the religious conflicts of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, particularly the Thirty Years’ War. The medieval epoch 
functioned as an obvious ‘starting point’ of the nation’s historical trajectory for 
which there was verifiable documentary evidence, and the first place in which to 
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 trace the beginnings of the development of political nationhood.
2
 The history of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had shaped the nation’s modern history, in 
particular historical problem of the confessionalized society and the continued 
‘arrested development’ of the nation’s ‘path’ toward political sovereignty. Such was 
the importance attributed in both contexts to the events of this later period that 
developments and events prior and subsequent to them were interpreted according to 
how they either foreshadowed them or prolonged their significance.
3
 Here was the 
‘continuity-constructing’ task of both sets of narratives, one which was pursued with 
‘explaining’ the historical and modern ‘character’ of the nation. The challenge in the 
representation of origins for historians in these contexts was how to represent 
historical periods generally thought to be distinguished by disunity and dynastic and 
ethno-religious conflict, or at the very least the general failure to achieve political 
nationhood, as the foundations of a coherent national historical narrative. In German 
and Irish national historiography, narratives of origins were located in these 
‘foundational epochs’ in which the nation had ‘failed’ to secure its own unity, 
resulting in inevitable defeat and catastrophe both immediately and over the course 
of centuries. Even if one of these epochs, such as the medieval, could be presented as 
having been in some respects a ‘golden age’, for example in culture, it was also 
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 regarded as having contained within itself the germ of later national decline, because 
of the underlying ‘national disunity’.4 The ‘failure’ of the medieval nation to become 
a nation-state, and the disastrous wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
were in both contexts seen as determining the whole course of the nation’s history. 
Of course, the presentist application of the modern concept of ‘the nation’ and 
‘nationalism’ to these periods accounted for the ‘explanation’ of these ‘foundational 
epochs’. It is the ‘beginnings’ and ‘endings’ of national histories that to a large 
extent determine their main content. Nationalist historical narratives sought to 
reconcile the supposed naturalness of national origins with the novelty of the modern 
nation-state that is meant to rest upon them in the present or in an anticipated future. 
The projection of origins into the distant past endows nations with histories that are 
necessary for the legitimation of the nation-state.
5
 Narratives of origins underpinned 
in each case a ‘rise-and-decline’ scheme and periodization of the nation’s history. 
This proceeded from apparently promising beginnings and early cultural flourishing, 
and the movement towards political unity, to decline in the course of the medieval 
period – influenced to one degree or another by foreign elements – to a fleeting 
‘revival’ towards the end of the medieval period, followed by disastrous events in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – intimately connected with religious conflict – 
which conditioned the whole of the nation’s modern history.  
II 
If it is true that the nation is an ‘imagined community’ or body of ‘invented 
traditions’, perhaps nowhere is this more so than in the historiographical and 
narrative construction of national origins. National origins may be congruent with 
historical facts or patent fictions, or somewhere in between, but the ways in which 
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 they are narrated are always part of ‘setting the scene’ for national histories. ‘Myths’ 
of origins and descent do much to delineate and reinforce the boundaries between a 
particular community and outsiders.
6
 Narratives of origins in both contexts were 
often entwined with the contrasting of the characteristics of the Germans and the 
Irish from their earliest origins as against their respective ‘Others’, e.g. the French, 
the Slavs, the English (the role of ‘Othering’ will be dealt with in more detail in 
chapter four).
7
 Narratives of origins were also, naturally, very closely linked with 
those of homeland and national territory, particularly in the German context in the 
idea of Heimat.
8
 The origins of ‘the Germans’ and ‘the Irish’ were held to be 
inseparable from their geographical situations: the Germanen (presented as the 
ancestors of the modern Germans) were the first inhabitants of the land that became 
Germany, pure and unmixed, but a land that was the ‘crossroads’ of Europe with few 
‘natural’ boundaries to the west and east, and therefore vulnerable.9 In the Irish 
context, by contrast, Ireland’s insularity was similarly presented as being a 
determinant of the ethnic and national character of its ‘first’ inhabitants, the Gaels, as 
well as of all those many other groups that had settled in Ireland, peacefully or 
violently, throughout its history. The ‘Irish’ were also generally assumed, by the 
nationalists at least, to be a ‘naturally’ single and unified people by virtue of their 
domicile on one compact island, with a talent for assimilating newcomers.  
Historians were usually keen to trace the origins of ‘their’ nations back as far as 
possible, yet the further they went, the more difficult it was to separate myth from 
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 historically verifiable fact. It was questionable whether the origins of the nation 
could even provide for an unambiguous ‘beginning’.10 This was more pronounced in 
the German and Irish contexts given the recurrence and centrality of discontinuity 
and ‘rupture’ in both German and Irish histories which could not be ignored or 
glossed over.
11
 Narratives of origins in these contexts both asserted fundamental 
continuities between present and distant past, and treated periods between that past 
and the present as ‘discontinuities’ or ‘ruptures’. In part, these assumed or rather 
were ascribed with a ‘foundational’ character’, as for example the Thirty Years’ War 
in German national historiography, and the wars of the 1640s in Irish national 
historiography.
12
 Both tactics operated by shifting present debates over legitimacy to 
the past and declaring them to have been ‘settled’ or prefigured in some way in the 
past.
13
 The significance of origins lay in how the ‘singularity’ of national formation 
in one or the other context was constructed by moving back from the present into the 
past, in a kind of reverse teleology or genealogy of the modern nation.
14
 In the sense 
that arguments for national independence were based on historical precedents that 
were extended as far back as possible into history, placing too much stock on periods 
of upheaval and revolutionary change as foundational events could create problems, 
unless these periods and events could be integrated within a narrative that connected 
to the nation’s earliest origins, in the medieval period, or in an even earlier period, as 
both German and Irish historians attempted to do.  
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 ‘History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake’, so lamented the character 
of Stephen Dedalus in Joyce’s Ulysses.15 The sense not only of a deterministic path 
of history but also that, at important ‘foundational points’ the nation’s history 
‘according to the normative values of the national ideology, took a wrong turn, 
yielding disastrous results that would endure for centuries afterward and that the 
nation exists to reverse’,16 was important in both Irish and German contexts. The 
outcomes of the ‘foundational events’ of the nation’s history, more especially those 
that represented ‘defeat’ or disaster, did, in the national historical narratives of both 
countries, seem to be continuously present in the nation’s disturbed modernity. In the 
more didactic narratives, such foundational events were regarded as having 
established and/or reaffirmed a principle of (re)generative sacrifice that was to be 
fundamental to the weltanschaaung of nationalists in both Germany and Ireland. The 
emphasis on the nation’s ‘suffering’ from its temporal beginnings also served to 
confer a ‘philosophical’ or even ‘providential ‘dimension on the nation’s history.17 
One of the central criteria for inclusion in, and exclusion from, the nation in the 
modern present becomes therefore, the individual’s identification with a particular 
historical narrative of foundational struggle and sacrifice. This is why, arguably, the 
early modern period as foundational period was regarded in history writing in both 
Germany and Ireland as ultimately of greater significance than the medieval period, 
and why history became such a source of contestation in Germany and Ireland, 
especially when linked to nationalism. Opponents of this or that historical view were 
regarded in both contexts not only as incorrect, but fundamentally wrong in a moral 
as well as political sense.    
                                                          
15
 James Joyce, Ulysses (Oxford, Clarendon, 1993), p. 34.    
16
 Mock, Symbols of Defeat, p. 2.   
17
 Ibid., p. 200.    
36
  
III 
Though it is not necessarily correct to say that patriotic Irish history writing began in 
the 1840s, it was with the Young Ireland movement of this period, a collective of 
young intellectuals (mainly lawyers and journalists), that we see the first modern 
attempts to construct a theory of nationality, a cultural and not just a political idea of 
Irishness, such that this group became ‘the grammarians of Irish nationality.’18 We 
begin here with its leading member, in recognition of his fundamental influence on 
the history of Irish nationalism. It was Thomas Davis (1814-1845), perhaps more 
than any other Young Irelander who perceived the fundamental importance of 
history to nationalism; it is not an exaggeration to say that the history of modern 
Irish nationalist thought begins with him.
19
 Young Ireland’s origins lay in the 
campaign for the Repeal of the parliamentary union between Britain and Ireland led 
by the Catholic emancipationist (and British Liberal) Daniel O’Connell; and at the 
same time dissatisfaction with what was perceived as an excessively narrow focus on 
utilitarian parliamentary politics in the Repeal movement. The Young Irelanders, in 
the mainstream of nationalist movements throughout Europe at the time, set 
themselves to the task of ‘defining’ Irish nationality. While the group fragmented 
after an abortive attempted uprising in 1848 that ended in fiasco, the thinking and 
writings of its principal members would assume canonical status within Irish 
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 nationalism. Davis, himself a Protestant of Welsh ancestry
20
 who had studied law at 
Trinity College Dublin before founding The Nation newspaper (the Young Ireland 
journal), and having become familiar with nationalist currents in continental Europe, 
was also well aware of the need for a ‘modern’ form of Irish history writing that 
could combine didacticism for the purpose of national education and mobilization 
with scholarly moderation. For Davis, literature, Irish national literature, particularly 
of the historical kind, was perhaps the most powerful weapon for the national cause. 
Irishmen needed to understand their history properly to make sense of their present 
and advance their nation in the future. In his short life (Davis died just short of the 
age of thirty-one) he dealt most significantly with Irish history in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. These writings are his lectures to the Historical Society of 
Trinity College, Dublin, and his lengthy essay The Patriot Parliament of 1689.
21
 
Davis’s application of principles advanced in his lectures and his own attempts to 
ground arguments for nationhood on historical precedent focused largely on the 
record of the ‘independent’, ‘patriot’ Irish parliaments of 1689 and 1782.22 At the 
centre of Davis’s attempts to construct a coherent theory of Irish nationality for the 
modern age was his contention – again thoroughly in the mainstream of 
contemporary European thinking – that only peoples with a national history, a 
developed historical consciousness, truly deserved to be called ‘nations’. 23  The 
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 notion that the Irish, by this standard, were still an ‘incomplete’ nation would remain 
an enduring one.
24
 In one of his lectures Davis had tellingly remarked: ‘History well-
read is a series of pictures of great men and great scenes and great acts…With rare 
exceptions national history does dramatic justice, alien history is the inspiration of a 
traitor.’25 Davis’s ‘manifesto’ for Irish national history writing was based on three 
basic principles: that Irish historical works be written from original Irish sources, 
that they take the form of a ‘“graphic” narrative of what was, not a set of moral 
disquisitions’, and encompass social and cultural change as well as political events. 
He called for all historical works to be free of the ‘greatest vice’ of ‘bigotry of race 
or creed.’ The writers of Irish history must instead possess ‘a philosophical eye to 
the merits and demerits of all, and a solemn and haughty impartiality”. 26  This 
reflected his own sense that Irish nationalism must be non-confessional and not 
establish itself in ‘racial’ differences between Irishmen. In the first issue of the 
Young Ireland journal The Nation, of 15 October 1842, this credo was expressed: 
‘Nationality is our great object…which may embrace Protestant, Catholic, and 
Dissenter…the Irishmen of a hundred generations and the stranger who is within our 
gates.’ Davis was himself not averse to drawing moral lessons from history, 
regretting that there seemed to have been so little ‘application of political philosophy 
to our history.’27 His colleague Charles Gavan Duffy wrote in similar terms in The 
Nation: ‘the history of Ireland abounded in noble lessons, and had the unity and 
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 purpose of an epic poem. It exhibited an unbroken determination to maintain their 
national existence, which every generation of Irishmen took up anew’.28  
The significance of The Patriot Parliament, in terms of its context and objectives, 
indeed that of Davis’s choice to write about it, showed how in the nineteenth century 
Irish historiography continued to be centred on the events of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries and their long-term effects.
29
 This work, which dealt with a 
political ‘precedent’ for contemporary demands for Irish independence, an historical 
institution that could be represented as both Irish and ‘national’, 30  was also a 
challenge to claims that granting autonomy to Ireland would inevitably lead to the 
establishment of an intolerant Catholic and anti-English polity.
31
 Davis presented the 
Irish Parliament of 1689, a Catholic assembly which had gathered to support the 
cause of King James II against his rival William of Orange, as mostly moderate and 
tolerant in its measures, opposed to the oppressive ascendancy of any Church, as 
authentically national, while still faithful to the connection of the Crown with 
Britain. In having ‘established the principal parts of a code needful for the permanent 
liberty and prosperity of Ireland’,32 it offered not only a precedent for Irish political 
freedom, but also past vindication of Davis’s own conception of what the Irish 
nation should be: tolerant and moderate in matters of religion, and composed of all 
patriotic Irish people regardless of their differing ancestries. This Parliament was 
presented as one of a number of organized attempts made by Irishmen in their 
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 modern history to reaffirm the justice and distinctness of Irish political nationhood.
33
 
In this way it was situated by Davis within the broader narrative of Irish history 
going back to the resistance of the Irish to the first Anglo-Norman incursions of the 
late twelfth century, at which point Irish history began to deviate from the ‘desired’ 
course. In more recent terms, the ‘Patriot Parliament’s’ significance was also 
inextricably linked – though Davis was neither a Catholic nor inclined to define 
Irishness in confessional terms – to the bleak historical experience of the Catholic 
Irish people since the sixteenth. ‘It is no pedantry’, as Davis himself wrote, ‘which 
leads one to the English invasion, for the tap-root of the transactions of the 
seventeenth century.’ 34  Davis’s representation of the Patriot Parliament as a 
foundational event in modern Irish history is situated within a conception of Irish 
history as a struggle to realize an Irish nation, one composed of both Protestant and 
Catholic, Gaelic Irish and Irish of English descent, politically free of England and 
culturally free of Anglicization. These goals, and any past movement toward them, 
have been repeatedly thwarted by the reality of Irish disunity, itself a legacy of 
English oppression in Ireland. In Davis’s account, situated within the ‘rise-and-
decline’ path of the Irish historical ‘special path’, the episode of the ‘patriot 
parliament’ manifests as an episode of ‘revival’ preceding one of ‘catastrophe’ (the 
re-conquest of Ireland by King William followed by more than a hundred years of 
anti-Catholic oppression), but an episode well-situated within the course of earlier 
history. Its historical background expressed all the historical contradictions and 
problems of Ireland’s past, while also offering a model for ‘redemption’ from that 
tortured history. Davis’s essay on the Patriot Parliament also demonstrated that Irish 
nationalist historians, like their German counterparts, saw the importance in 
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 attempting to find institutional precedents for their claims that the Irish possessed a 
national history in their own right.   
Nationalism in Ireland developed somewhat later than on the continent. What Davis 
and the other Young Irelanders were to Irish nationalism, men of a previous 
generation had been to German nationalism: its ‘founding fathers’.35 In the period of 
the Napoleonic Wars, the ‘national’ disaster that was the French occupation of 
Germany and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and the subsequent revival 
of the ‘War of Liberation’, philosophers and popular thinkers such as J.G. Fichte, 
and Ernst Moritz Arndt were articulating new ideas of the German nation that would 
earn them (from a later generation) that reputation.
36
 They each played a leading role 
in defining the German nation as a community of homogeneous (or rather 
homogenized) descent and language, rooting the history of the Germanic peoples 
firmly in antiquity and the early medieval era.
37
 As Davis regarded the unsullied and 
original ‘Celt’ as the truest polestar of authentic Irish nationality (this will be dealt 
with in more detail in chapter four), so in the Fichte-Arndt view of German history, 
antiquity and the medieval period up to around the mid-thirteenth century 
represented the ‘golden age’ of that history. Herein was the source of true German 
values, of purity, the first point of reference for German nationality, culturally and 
politically.
38
  In their origins the Germanen had been ancient, pure, unmixed, and 
sharing a natural unity, unlike other peoples that coalesced from accident or need, or 
were forced together by the sword. The ideas of the nature of the Germanen and the 
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 German-speaking peoples of the Holy Roman Empire communicated by such figures 
as Arndt and Fichte would be paralleled by Davis’s ideas on the nature of ‘the Gaels’ 
or Irish ‘Celts’. In the course of the later middle ages and after ‘Germany’ entered 
into an age of decline that found its latest culmination in the humiliating dissolution 
of the Holy Roman Empire. In Arndt’s view, from the fifth century to the mid-
thirteenth the Germans, under such great rulers as Charlemagne, Henry I, and Otto I, 
all founders of the German Reich,
39
 had been a ‘world power’, before its later decline 
thank to the various failures of later Emperors. While the Reformation had offered 
the opportunity for a short-lived national rally, it had failed in this respect. The 
Thirty Years’ War of the seventeenth century represented the reasonable culmination 
of the long decline of Germany over the later medieval and early modern era, and the 
commencement of at least two hundred years of powerlessness before the territorial 
ambitions of other powers and cultural penetration. The invasion and humiliation of 
Germany by the French under Napoleon was another disastrous low point of German 
history and confirmed once more the necessity of future German unity. The yearning 
for lost Germanic glory and freedom and a virulent Francophobia were the two great 
pillars of Arndt’s historical perspective of the German nation.40 These narratives 
were expressed through a perception of German history as beset by a constant yet 
repeatedly frustrated aspiration to national ‘self-determination’, owed to both foreign 
enemies and the internal foe of disunity. The same determination to achieve and 
preserve ‘national existence’ that Charles Gavan Duffy had identified as the 
supposed leitmotif of Irish history defined the German nationalist historical narrative 
from its ‘Arndtian’ beginnings. With modifications, the ‘Arndtian’ view of German 
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 history would, to a degree, become the basic narrative of German history during the 
nineteenth century.  
The German Middle Ages, the Deutsches Mittelalter, continued throughout the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth to be regarded as one of the central axes of 
German history;
41
 whether it was regarded as representing a period in which ‘the 
German nation’ had reached over the course of three centuries reached the height of 
greatness or one in which it had failed in its most elementary task: to consolidate and 
defend its own unity.
42
 For both sympathetic and sceptical observers of the medieval 
Reich, its decline in unity and power from the thirteenth century and eventual fall 
represented a lamentable ‘failure’ in German history. Where they differed was in the 
causes attributed to the Empire’s decline and how ‘German’ it could really be called. 
To some, such as Wilhelm von Giesebrecht, the glorious ‘Kaiserzeit’ had been an 
age in which the German Emperors controlled the destiny of Europe and the German 
nation had been the greatest of nations.
43
 To others, if not most commentators, 
German medieval history represented a succession of failed opportunities to establish 
on a permanent basis a unified German nation-state. For all their differences 
however, there was no doubt among Germans historians about the formative 
importance of the medieval Reich, and most were in agreement on its ‘failure’ to 
develop as a nation-state.
44
 The notion of Germany as a Reich remained an important 
and widespread one until 1945, and it was an inspiring idea that the medieval 
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 emperors had ‘headed the bravest and most excellent of European peoples.’45 For 
Irish  historians too, the medieval Gaelic past remained an ambivalent legacy: while 
its cultural heritage remained prized until well into the twentieth century, even 
among nationalist historians few overlooked its fundamental shortcomings, such as 
its ‘failure’ to provide the basis of a unified nation-state. Only seldom, however, was 
Ireland’s medieval history rejected as having no positive lessons to offer to the 
modern nation.
46
 Yet it was Ireland’s early modern period that was more seen as 
fixing the nation’s course since the seventeenth century, than a medieval past which 
bore little continuity with modern Ireland, or better put, few continuities that 
nationalist historians would care to boast about. Discussions of Germany’s medieval 
past also had a more ‘state-centred’ character than those of Ireland’s medieval past, 
among nationalist historians. In the former case, historians contested over how 
authentically national (or not) the medieval Reich and its rulers had been; this framed 
most views of that history. Since Irish historians had no equivalent historical 
institution to look back on – Ireland had possessed an ancient High Kingship of its 
own from before the medieval period, but from the late twelfth century the island’s 
government was closely tied and subject to that of England – their discussions of the 
medieval Irish nation oriented more on significance of Irish cultural distinctiveness 
and ‘resistance’ to English domination. Irish historians of nationalist stamp did not 
attempt to present the advance of English power into medieval Ireland as a positive 
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 development.
47
 Ultimately, however, what should always be remembered is that the 
German or Irish medieval past was in large part only as ‘national’ as modern 
observers thought and argued it to be.    
Leopold von Ranke, in the first chapter of his Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der 
Reformation, perhaps the most popular and influential of his works on German 
history, and the most ‘nationalistic’ of his work as far as many of his readers were 
concerned, surveyed in the first part of the book medieval German history from the 
reign of Charlemagne up to the Reformation. He argued that the earliest point at 
which the Germans could be spoken of as a nation was the unification of the 
different Stämme (literally, ‘tribes’) under Charlemagne into his Empire.48 After the 
dissolution of this Empire it would be Otto I of the House of Saxony who would 
come close to realising the idea of a German Empire. The birth of the German nation 
had its political origin in the incorporation of the Volk into the Reich, and its cultural 
origin in the Germans’ ‘inheritance’ of the Rome’s cultural legacy, particularly, in 
Ranke’s view, the ‘mission’ to ‘civilise’ and Christianise Europe. The German 
nation, under Otto and his successors, carried forth this ‘Aufgabe’, particularly in 
‘the East’. 49  Nevertheless, during the medieval period, ‘Germany did not fully 
understand her position, nor fulfil her mission’; namely, to consolidate the empire as 
a nation, as the surrounding kingdoms and realms were establishing themselves as 
‘nation-states’. This ‘failure’ was due in large measure to the disregard of the 
powerful princes for the authority of the Emperor, the office of which was filled 
from their ranks. By the mid-thirteenth century, ‘It required matchless vigour and 
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 fortitude in an emperor even to hold his seat…The German nobles aspired after the 
sort of independence which those of France had just acquired.’50 The princes not 
only undermined the power of the Emperor and in doing so made the Pope the 
greater source of political power over Germany, but in constantly contesting against 
each other, ensured that none of them were able to gain a leading position within the 
Empire, further worsening its disunity.
51
 The political life of the German nation was, 
by the end of the medieval period, facing extinction as the position of Emperor and 
the glory of the Reich became emptier, as the independence of the princes increased, 
and the power of the Popes over Germany increased. For the nation ‘a revolution in 
both its spiritual and temporal affairs’ was necessary and coming. The revolution, 
however, as important as it was, would also bring forth epochal trauma on the nation 
for centuries, borne as it was out of the original ‘failure’ of the medieval German 
‘nation’ to consolidate unity and independence. Thus, the two ‘foundational epochs’ 
of German history, that of the medieval Reich and that of the Reformation and the 
Thirty Years’ War, are brought together, to account for why the Germans had 
‘failed’, unlike other European peoples, to develop their own political nationhood.   
The themes of a civilising Christianizing mission fatally undermined by the 
damaging effects of constant disunity, dynastic struggles and over-fed dynastic pride, 
the conflict of Church and State, and the disparity of ‘Kulturnation’ and 
‘Staatsnation’ are nonetheless common to both Irish and German historical 
narratives in the particular discourses of national origins.  
In the original Young Ireland circle only one former Young Irelander (not Thomas 
Davis) actually produced a comprehensive narrative history of Ireland from medieval 
origins to the present. This was Thomas D’Arcy McGee (1825-1868), whose 
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 magnum opus was the two-volume Popular History of Ireland from the Earliest 
Times to the Emancipation of the Catholics.
52
 As a young man within the Young 
Ireland circle, having come under Davis’s influence, McGee had become deeply 
interested in Irish history, and through his studies of old Irish manuscripts in the 
Library of the Royal Irish Academy, had become familiar with the leading 
antiquarians Eugene O’Curry and George Petrie. At this time he also became 
familiar with James Duffy, the publisher who disseminated Young Irelanders’ 
historical and literary writings to a large audience. Like all of the leading Young 
Irelanders, he also became deeply influenced by Thomas Carlyle.
53
 The writing of 
the Popular History would be  a particularly important accomplishment for McGee.  
McGee begins his History in the early, pre-Christian past, but it is only with the 
conversion of the Irish to Christianity that there appears ‘a unity and purpose to the 
history of that nation’.54 Hereafter McGee begins to give serious consideration to the 
‘Celtic constitution’, his recurrent references to which indicated his intention to 
present early medieval Ireland, for all its faults, as exhibiting characteristics of at 
least a potential nation-state.
55
  The sixth to the eighth centuries represented the 
‘Golden Age’ of early medieval Ireland, now ‘the intellectual leadership of Western 
Europe – the glorious ambition of the greatest nations…devolved on Ireland’.56 
Ireland’s civilising ‘mission’ in this respect was linked to the ‘nation’s’ uniquely 
receptive conversion to Christianity. The conflicts of the Gaels with the Norse 
invaders in the early medieval period are presented as both a struggle to unify the 
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 Irish under one nascent ‘nation-state’ and the defence of Christianity in Ireland and 
Christian civilisation in Europe in general. Yet not even the greatest of the kings of 
this time, Brian Boru of the southern kingdom of Dál Cais, could complete the task 
of unifying the nation under one ruler, one dynasty, and he left no worthy successors 
who would follow him. ‘Herein’, McGee judged, ‘we have the origin of Irish 
disunion with all its consequences, good, bad, and indifferent.’57 From the end of 
‘golden age’, around the beginning of the eleventh century, through the rest of 
Ireland’s medieval history, ‘the same provincialized spirit, the same family 
ambitions, feuds, hates, and coalitions, with some exceptional passages, characterize 
the whole history...the land remained a tempting prey to such adventurers, foreign 
and native’.58 When such power came to appear in Ireland in the late twelfth century, 
it ‘was embodied in an invading host, and patriot zeal could discern nothing good, 
nothing inimitable in the laws and customs of an enemy, whose armed presence in 
the land was an insult to its inhabitants.’59 While the Gaelic Irish idea of national 
unity (in the political sense) seemed to fade away while that of the English and other 
nations grew ever stronger; nonetheless Irish devotion to the faith remained ardent, 
and their culture’s vitality endured. 60 The degenerating effects of the wars between 
the early medieval Irish and their Norse enemies remained a favoured them of 
nationalist historians and way of accounting for the shortcomings of Irish unity in 
that period. Thirty years after McGee the moderate nationalist writer P.W. Joyce 
recorded in his Short History of Ireland: ‘…the annals present a pitiful picture of 
strife and bloodshed all over the country’, after the death of Brian Boru in 1014.61  
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 In McGee’s narrative it was not until the reign of Henry VIII that the relationship 
between Ireland and England fundamentally changed. Henry had himself declared 
King of Ireland (previous English monarchs held a claim of suzerainty over Ireland, 
but not one of kingship), and with the ensuing extension of the Reformation to 
Ireland. This, in McGee’s opinion, had been a ‘contract’ between Henry and the 
lords of Ireland, though ‘several of the most distinguished [Gaelic Irish] chiefs 
withheld their concurrence.
62
 This was a creative interpretation meant to suggest the 
actuality and effective independence of the Irish nation at the time before Henry 
assumed the Kingship of Ireland, a ‘contract’ subsequently ‘nullified’ by English 
tyranny, including the attempt to enforce the Reformation in Ireland
63
 The Ulster 
Irish lord Hugh O’Neill, the most powerful Gaelic lord and the descendant of 
medieval High Kings of Ireland, attempted a rebellion during the reign of Elizabeth I 
which ultimately failed, but it was only in the mid-seventeenth century that the ‘Old 
English’ of Ireland, the descendants of medieval English colonists and settlers, threw 
in their lot with their Gaelic compatriots as the campaign to extirpate Catholicism 
and Anglicize Ireland reached its culmination. In the 1640s the Catholic 
Confederation, ‘a national organization’, fought ‘that illustrious war which Ireland 
waged for her religious and civil liberties’, against England’s constant enmity 
towards ‘the religious belief and the political independence of the Irish people.’64 
The ‘modern’ Irish nation had in a sense therefore been born in the seventeenth 
century with the Catholic and national struggle for ‘independence’. It is important 
for the reader to note the importance in McGee’s writing of Irish history of the 
Catholic dimension of Irishness, which is perhaps all that holds together the pieces 
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 of an otherwise fractured history – besides the periodic attempts made by the Irish 
people to rid themselves of foreign rule.  
Even more popular than McGee for Irish nationalist literary culture in terms of pure 
popularity – though very much indebted to McGee and his Popular History – was 
his contemporary Alexander Martin Sullivan (1830-1884), politician, barrister, and 
journalist. A moderate nationalist of the Home Rule variety, he was one of the most 
influential writers, editors, and advocates in the history of Irish nationalism. 
Sullivan’s popular narrative history The Story of Ireland, that aimed to overarch the 
division ‘between imaginative literature and factual history’ was extremely well-
received, perhaps the single most important and influential work of Irish history (and 
Irish nationalist text) of the nineteenth century, going through at least twenty-five 
editions.
65
 A book intended primarily for ‘young people’ – the content of which he 
admitted owed much to McGee’s work – it nonetheless clearly invited a wide-
ranging readership, in respect of the political purpose to which history is put 
throughout the book, and in its sequence of events and what is emphasized and 
downplayed.
66
 The central themes of an ancient and early medieval ‘golden age’ – 
where kings had ruled as great sovereigns as ‘liberal patrons of art, science, and 
commerce’, within a ‘Celtic constitution’ over one thousand years before the birth of 
Christ – followed by a period of disunity and repeated foreign incursions, before a 
disastrous final conquest in the seventeenth century, with these eras interspersed by 
occasional ‘national rallies’, were all there, along with confident assertions that a 
redeemed future would come. The themes are legitimate independence and the right 
to it, subsequently denied by foreign oppressors, equal status with other nations, and 
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 an advanced capacity for liberal, enlightened self-government.
67
 Sullivan claimed 
that the ancient Irish possessed political institutions which foreshadowed those of the 
contemporary age of parliamentary democracy, and ‘numerous facts’ testified to the 
‘high order of political, social, industrial, and intellectual intelligence [that] prevailed 
in the country,’68 which prevailed undisturbed for several centuries. The return to 
Irish legislative independence would therefore be merely a return to what had 
originally been.
69
 The course of Irish history was presented quite straightforwardly 
as a redemptive saga and moral story, one of repeated trials, in which the Irish 
people were time and again forced to resist foreign aggressors, often as a cause of 
their faltering patriotism, manifesting their nation anew with each struggle.
70
 The 
perennial problem of Irish disunity had found its sure punishment in subjugation,
71
 
completed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, beginning with the 
Reformation, the commencement of ‘a savage war upon the Irish nation.’72  The 
significance of this period, one of ‘the most peculiar importance’; was that it 
represented ‘the last struggle of the ancient native rule’. The epoch of Gaelic Ireland 
had ended, another; that of ‘the nation in captivity’ had begun. The indiscriminate 
ethno-religious violence of the English in enforcing the Reformation in Ireland is 
represented as leading directly to the seventeenth century alliance between Gaelic 
and ‘Old English’ nobility73 in the Catholic Confederation of the 1640s, and with it – 
so the narrative goes – the forging of a new Irish nation, which forgot earlier ethnic 
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 distinctions, and was therefore a truly foundational event: ‘Few chapters of Irish 
history are more important, none have been more momentous in their results’, 
Sullivan claimed, ‘than that which chronicles the career of the confederation of 
1642’, the ‘national government and legislature under which Ireland fought a 
formidable struggle for three years’ until its bloody fall under Cromwell’s armies. 
Sullivan concluded confidently that Providence destined the ‘nation for a great 
purpose, for a glorious destiny.’74 What was important, for Sullivan, was that the 
Irish be reminded of the truth of their history and that they never allow it to be 
submerged into England’s history of ‘falsehood, rapine and cruelty’.75 Sullivan’s 
Story of Ireland ‘presented Irish history as a self-enclosed liberation narrative, in the 
style of European Romantic nationalism, a story whose ending was preordained, 
with separation from Britain both a moral imperative and historical necessity.’76 
Writers such as McGee and Sullivan were successful and influential, but were never, 
unlike their German counterparts, academic historians. Academic status was often 
not, however, in itself a particularly meaningful differentiating factor if we consider 
the political, national-pedagogic character of national history writing. Heinrich von 
Sybel (1817-1895), one of the most prominent German academic historians of the 
nineteenth century, founder of the Historische Zeitschrift and one of Ranke’s most 
distinguished pupils, once described himself as ‘four-sevenths historian and three-
sevenths politician’,77  and throughout his career strove for ‘an alliance between 
history and politics’, to advance ‘progress in national consciousness.’ Sybel held no 
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 doubt that the origins of modern historiography in Germany lay in the age of 
‘national rebirth and liberation’ at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
energy and elegance of modern German historiography were owed precisely to love 
of fatherland and political conviction. He believed strongly, at least later in his 
career, that historians should aim to write readable works for large audiences, to 
produce national historical narratives in every sense of the term.
78
 In the 1860s, 
when he turned his attention to modern history (his first major work had been a 
history of the crusades) Sybel became noteworthy for his trenchant critiques of the 
medieval Reich, arguing that not only had the medieval empire failed to develop the 
basis of a modern German nation-state, but had actively impeded such 
development.
79
 The great achievements of the ‘Kaiserzeit’, such as the Ostsiedlung, 
the medieval German ‘colonisation’ of Eastern Europe, had been a counterbalance 
achieved less through the strength of the empire than in contrast to its weakness.
80
 
The disunity of the Empire, after failed attempts to place its government on a 
stronger footing, was deepened during the sixteenth century with the coming of the 
Reformation: the Habsburg Emperors remained true to the Catholic Church and the 
ancient principle of the ‘universal’ Christian empire, while the vast majority of the 
German ‘Kulturnation’ was with Martin Luther. The ‘Spaniard’ Emperor Charles V 
was more concerned with his sprawling dynastic empire and his loyalty to the 
Papacy than his German subjects. The final blow to the medieval Empire, to the 
Empire as a cohesive entity, came with the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of 
Westphalia. This had been a historical rupture almost without parallel and one which 
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 had carried enormous costs, but had nonetheless been necessary for a modern 
German nation was to be come into existence. Henceforth Catholic Austria, the 
Habsburg Monarchy, assumed the legacy, substance and form of the old empire, a 
part of Germany in name only, in every other sense the Habsburg Empire developed 
outside of the ‘constitution’ and ‘laws’ of the nation.81 Germany’s ‘centre of gravity’ 
moved to the north-east, to the rising state of Brandenburg-Prussia. This kind of 
discussion in the early 1860’s about the medieval empire was of course a thinly-
veiled commentary on contemporary politics: any German nation-state could not 
develop under Austrian leadership; the future of Germany lay with the modern 
Kingdom of Prussia.
82
 Not until the victory of Prussia would German history 
restored back on the ‘right’ course, a legacy of centuries of interrupted, 
discontinuous national development overcome. In this way Sybel determines the 
legitimacy of German unification under Prussian leadership through explicating the 
‘failures’ of the medieval empire and its modern heir, the Habsburg Empire, and the 
supposed greater ‘Germanness’ of Prussia. The Thirty Years’ War, however 
catastrophic, had ‘cleared the decks’ for Germany’s modern history, which, in this 
regard, bore many positive developments, culminating in the crowning achievement 
of unification.  
These themes and conclusions reappear in Sybel’s history of German ‘unification’, 
his The Founding of the German Empire, written after the Prussian state archives 
had been opened to him by Bismarck’s unification in 1871, in which he frankly 
acknowledged in the opening pages his nationalist standpoint.
83
 In the opening pages 
he outlined the halting progress of German nationhood since its beginnings: ‘In the 
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 very earliest times there seems to have been among the Germans no trace of a 
national consciousness…long training in politics, in economics, and in mental 
discipline was needed before the Germans succeeded in establishing a German 
national government.’84 Here, in contrast to the outlook of most Irish nationalist 
historians, a view of nationalism focused on politics and the state, is apparent. The 
ancient Germans had known a strong sense of comradeship manifesting in a 
powerful sense of loyalty, but they had possessed little if any conception of the 
political unity and particularity of their nationality (there was apparently, for Sybel, 
no ‘Teutonic constitution’ to parallel the ‘Celtic constitution’). The old Reich too, he 
reaffirmed had failed to forge a nation-state, and with the Hohenstaufen dynasty’s 
downfall in the mid-thirteenth century, ‘The victory of the universal spiritual and 
temporal sovereign [the Pope] was complete.’85 The history of the Ostsiedlung – in 
which lay the origins of Prussia – only offered any evidence of a German national 
sentiment.
86
 Still, no unified German nation could arise without the basis of a strong 
German state, and the failure of the Germans to match the intellectual and spiritual 
revival of the Reformation with a political one was perhaps the greatest of all 
stumbles on the path towards German nationhood. In the disastrous Thirty Years’ 
War ‘the last gasps of a national consciousness were smothered.’  
Germany became Europe’s battleground during the conflict, the German people the 
prey of cruel foreign enemies, and victims of their own disunity and deficiency of 
national consciousness. As the Catholic Irish had lain crushed under the feet of 
foreign invaders and conquerors at the end of their seventeenth century war, failed 
by their own disunity, so did the Germans, both Protestant and Catholic, but thanks 
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 to the oppressions of a Catholic dynasty. The Empire, amidst all this, fell to pieces, 
and henceforth the Habsburgs turned to building up their domains outside of 
Germany itself while still claiming supremacy among the Germans. He reasserted 
the one positive long-term consequence of the War: that it made impossible the 
restoration of the old imperial authority and laid the basis for the modern conflict 
between Prussia and Austria for German unity.
87
 For both Irish and German 
historians, there was scarcely any doubt that the modern histories of their respective 
nations began in the mid-seventeenth century after the ending of catastrophic wars. 
Sybel was highly influential, but in terms of enduring popular influence, no German 
historian of the late nineteenth century, particularly no academic historian, could 
stand as a rival to Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896).
88
 Treitschke was, 
particularly with respect to his most notable work, Deutsche Geschichte im 
neunzehnten Jahrhundert, a popularizer of history. This five-volume, unfinished 
work, begun in the 1860’s and the first volume published in 1879, was another 
account of the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, but also a wider 
political and cultural history of Germany up to 1848. The work was probably the 
single most influential specimen of the ‘orthodox’ perspective of German national 
history between the late nineteenth century and 1945.
89
 As a historian and political 
figure of note, Treitschke’s influence was such that ‘his political and social ideas 
helped to mould the thinking of the men who guided the destinies’ of his era.90 ‘No 
nation has greater cause than we to hold in honour the memory of its struggling 
fathers, or recalls so seldom…[that] the blessing of its unity has been achieved’, he 
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 had written in the preface to the first volume.
91
 This attitude, both triumphalist and 
insecure about the nation, permeated Treitschke’s work: after the foundation of the 
Wilhelmine Reich, Treitschke observed with increasing apprehension the suppposed 
decline of patriotism and revival of its old enemy, German particularism.
92
 The 
History, on which Treitschke first began work several years before the events of 
1871, became a ‘literary battlefield of the struggle for German unity’, the story of a 
struggle ‘the most arduous’ of its kind ever known.93 Treitschke was convinced that 
where the Germans were concerned, ‘National character is exactly what they lack in 
comparison with their neighbours, for their unity is so young.’ 94  It was the 
historian’s duty ‘to win from knowledge of past experiences light for the guidance of 
the present.’95 The book, though written by an academic historian, was an openly 
popular and partisan one. It was not based on anything like the kind of exhaustive 
archival research demanded by Ranke, and its conclusions clearly did not even aim 
at the pretence of ‘objectivity.’  
The Deutsche Geschichte was designed merely to serve as a historical guide for 
German patriots, not as a ‘bloodless’ piece of history, and in this goal it was a model 
of success. Treitschke began with a lengthy survey of German history up to 1648, 
and during the eighteenth century. He opened his narrative with a paragraph that 
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 encapsulates the importance of both discontinuity in German national histories and a 
sense of teleological progression, the importance and difficulty of making 
Kulturnation and Staatsnation congruent in Germany: ‘Despite the antiquity of her 
history, Germany is the youngest of the great nations of Europe…twice has she been 
through the struggle for the principles of national power and free civilisation…first 
in our own days did she as a unified power resume her place in the ranks of 
nations.’ 96  Treitschke too connected the old imperial ideals with the frustrated 
progression of German nationhood,
97
 and the Reformation with another failed effort 
towards national sovereignty and unity. German nationhood would from hereon be 
threatened by a Germanic power – the Habsburg Empire – though one that had 
turned its back on the Germanic world in its fidelity to Catholicism and its ‘multi-
national’ character. With the Reformation the whole political nature of Germany as it 
existed at the time was changed, the ‘territorial princes justified their right to 
existence by their work as protectors of the German faith.’ This linking of legitimate 
political power and authority with fidelity to the ‘national’ faith was also found in 
Irish nationalist historical writing, particularly in how the Catholic Confederation of 
the 1640’s was regarded as a ‘national’ alliance, its leaders as national heroes. The 
conflicts of the sixteenth century paved the way for ‘the most deplorable period of 
German history’, in which ‘the empire voluntarily quitted the circle of the great 
powers and renounced all share in European politics’, and with the Thirty Years’ 
War, ‘in a disturbance without parallel, the old Germany passed away…The entire 
life of Germany lay open without defence to the influence of the superior civilisation 
of the foreigner.’98 Though Germany, more than any other nation had been ‘forcibly 
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 estranged from itself and from its own past’, though ‘this horrible confusion seemed 
to foreshadow the destruction of the German name’, the end of the medieval Empire 
‘proved the beginning of a new life.’ The modern history of Germany, and the 
resurgence of Germany as a nation, would be owed to two forces deriving from the 
conflicts of the early modern period: ‘the force of religious freedom, and the force of 
the Prussian state.’99  It would be in Prussia, in fact, that would take place ‘the 
necessary reconstruction of the ancient national state of the Germans…the long and 
bloody task of the liberation of Germany from foreign dominion.’100 Here is the 
identification of Prussia with Germany that so characterized Treitschke’s history 
writing.
101
 Whatever faith the younger Treitschke may have had in ‘the people’ as 
the engine of German unity had faded away by 1866, when it became clear that 
Prussia would be completing the work of unification.
102
 The origins of the modern 
German nation, as Treitschke saw it, were also those of the Prussian state. For 
Treitschke, insofar as his magnum opus was a history of nineteenth-century 
Germany, the age of unification, it necessarily had to be one written from the 
Prussian ‘Standpunkt’: nineteenth-century German history was that of the final end 
of the two-hundred year struggle between the House of Austria and the German 
states led by Prussia.’103  
It was not necessary, even in nineteenth century Germany, to be a professor in order 
to be a popular and respected historian. The career of Gustav Freytag bore that out, 
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 and his writing underlines the degree to which even in the country of Ranke, there 
was much overlap between professional/academic and popular history.
104
Freytag left 
no doubt that the Germans, as with any other Volk, were obliged to explain and judge 
the past in accordance with the needs and demands of their present.
105
His five 
volume cultural history Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit (1859-1867) was 
one of the most popular and widely-read histories in Germany during the nineteenth 
century, running to thirty editions after its initial publication, by the century’s end.106 
In contrast to the works of Treitschke, Sybel, and others, it gave far more attention to 
the experiences of ‘ordinary Germans’ throughout history than to the deeds of kings 
and princes. In the first chapter, where he deals with the Germanen of antiquity, 
Freytag draws a line of continuity between their struggles against the Roman Empire 
and those of Luther and his adherents against the Papacy. This sixteen-hundred year 
stretch of history encompassed the ‘adolescence’ of the German nation, a history full 
of blood and massacre, incredible deeds and immeasurable sufferings.
107
 Freytag was 
confident that his readers had the right to consider themselves as the ‘sons’ of the 
Germanen;
108
 who had been a Volk of ‘unlimited vitality’: they possessed a limitless 
love of freedom and an innate willingness to sacrifice for moral ideals. In the reign 
of Charlemagne the Germans became for the first time a single political 
community,
109
 Charlemagne was a great German king and his rule was a ‘golden 
age’ for the Germans, in its way, but still contained within itself ‘the same great 
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 historical tragedy’. Charlemagne, though a German ruler, had not founded a truly 
German Empire, much less a nation-state. By the early thirteenth century, under the 
Hohenstaufen emperors, the medieval Reich had attained a glory that it had not 
known since Charlemagne. Yet the fall of that same dynasty would mark the 
beginning of the Reichs decline and the end of the first period of German history.
110
 
The medieval period saw the ‘feeling of national cohesion and honour of duty’ in 
relation to the Reich nearly completely disappear, even though the Germans in this 
time carried forth their culture to ‘the East’. The Germans still possessed ‘the 
unbroken energy of a Volk of great ideas and strong wills’, even if they were 
politically disunited.
111
 
If the medieval era between the fall of Rome and the demise of the Hohenstaufen 
marked the first foundational epoch of German history in the Bilder, the period 
between the beginning of the Reformation and the end of the Thirty Years’ War 
marked the second, and arguably the more important, one. Freytag’s narration of 
German history from 1648 to 1848 pivots on how the German ‘nation’ overcame the 
devastation inflicted by the Thirty Years’ War and its baneful legacies which had for 
two hundred years locked the nation into ‘political paralysis.’112 For Freytag the 
steady rise of Prussia after and as a consequence of the Thirty Years’ War was the 
single most convincing demonstration of the vitality of the Germans (the Protestant 
Germans) as much as it was of the Hohenzollern dynasty.
113
 German struggle and 
sacrifice in that war, as he told the story, was a way to confer additional glory on 
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 Prussian leadership of a unified Germany.
114
 The War, for all its horror, had finally 
forced the Germans to abandon the obsolete forms of the medieval Empire.
115
 
Freytag’s idea of Germanness was firmly rooted in what he regarded as the history of 
the German struggle for liberty that had begun with the Reformation. The War, 
despite its terrible consequences had, in the sense of forcing a confrontation between 
Germany and the Empire in fact led in the long-term led to the revival and 
anticipated eventual victory of a unified German nation-state. The War ‘gave 
peculiar tendency to the character of the people.’ It ‘shattered into ruins the popular 
strength, but it also certainly removed the dangers which threatened German 
development’. In this way a story of catastrophe became one of triumph, how the 
Germans became ‘politische Männer’, the beginning of a long test of German 
strength that culminated in the nineteenth century.
116
 The struggle of German history 
up to that point from the Reformation had been as much one against foreign enemies 
as against German disunity and particularism.
117
 The obverse of Freytag’s sense of 
optimism and triumph was an inclination to remind his readers of the troubled and 
violent path that the Germans had been forced to take towards cultural unity, the 
historical consequences of particularism as opposed to unity.
118
 Rupture and 
discontinuity continued to cast their long shadows, yet Freytag also thought that the 
German ‘character’, despite all this, had remained remarkably consistent: ‘the 
                                                          
114
 Gustav Freytag, Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit, Bd. IV: Aus dem Jahrhundert des 
grossen Krieges, 1600-1700, in idem, Gesammelte Werke, XVII, p. 242.    
115
  Ibid., pp. 11-12.  
116
 Ibid., p. 188. Gustav Freytag, Pictures of the German Past in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and 
Seventeenth Centuries, vol. II (London, 1862), pp. 200-202, 383. Cramer, The Thirty Years’ War, pp. 
193, 194. Freytag, Bilder, V, pp. 1-8. Cramer, The Thirty Years’ War, p. 195. 
117
 Gustav Freytag, Pictures of the German Past in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth 
Centuries, vol. I (London, 1862), pp. 162-166. Gustav Freytag, Pictures of the German Past in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, vol. II (London, 1863), pp. 305-306.    
118
 Cramer, The Thirty Years’ War, pp. 195-196.  
63
 Germans have changed far less than commonly thought, over the two thousand years 
of our history.’119 
The purpose of this survey has been to show that nationalist historians in both 
Germany and Ireland in the mid and later nineteenth century were confronted with 
similar challenges when it came to writing of the foundational events of their 
histories, dealt with them in similar ways, and that certain ‘themes’ were recurrent in 
both contexts. In particular, these included a tendency to dwell on disunity during the 
‘foundational epochs’ as a means of explaining the interrupted character of the 
nation’s history, which carried with an assumption that ‘national unity’ was broadly 
the norm in these periods. The medieval nation, lacking a political centre and rent 
apart by its own lords and princes and overawed by foreign rulers, had not developed 
as neighbouring nations had. National history was therefore assumed to be deficient 
if not wholly lacking in a sense of permanence, even as it was argued to possess 
continuity as well. In responding to the apparent incongruence of the cultural nation 
and the political nation, they also highlighted, however, the cultural achievements of 
their respective nations at the beginning of the Middle Ages, which themselves 
served to accentuate the woefulness of political disunity and weakness in relation to 
the nation’s ‘Others’. They looked for precedents for political nationhood as much in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the form of the various ‘national’ 
movements of that period and so linked national identity with religious allegiance (as 
will be seen in more detail in the second chapter). Though the burden of the foreign 
‘Other’ with respect to the origins narrative was far heavier for Irish historians given 
the nature of the medieval Anglo-Irish relationship, German historians also 
associated foreignness with those historical influences that had arrested the ‘natural’ 
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 progress of ‘the Germans’ towards unified nationhood. While for most German 
historians who dealt with it, the Thirty Years’ War was regarded as the prologue to 
the story of ‘Germany’s’ modern revival and rise to greatness, it was also regarded 
as the most telling example of the consequences of German disunity, which seemed 
to be ever present, even after the great days of 1871. In contrast, the events of the 
1640s in Ireland, though they were equally foundational for Irish history as the 
Thirty Years’ War was for German history, could hardly be presented as the 
prologue of a narrative of revival and rise to greatness, given that their most 
immediate consequence was two further centuries of oppression; though they could 
be, and were, presented as having comprised a first ‘national’ movement for Irish 
freedom. Yet this only underlines how in both contexts the past, however traumatic 
and unpromising was made to serve the needs of the present. But in both 
interpretations of these events in German and Irish history, as shall be seen in more 
detail in chapter two, the national community was identified closely with allegiance 
to a particular confessional one, which had profound consequences for how 
nationalism was conceived of in both contexts. 
IV 
So far, the historians that have been considered all belonged to the mid- and late 
nineteenth century. Of course, however, some of the most important historians in 
these two traditions were twentieth century figures. In Ireland and Germany both, 
and throughout Europe, the ways in which national historians viewed the past could 
change in the context of concerns of changing political circumstances. The second 
decade of the twentieth century was a period of particularly significant change for 
both Germany and Ireland. Ireland had by 1922 finally achieved independence 
(albeit at the cost of partition and continuing constitutional links to Britain and the 
65
 Commonwealth) and could begin formally institutionalizing the historical narrative 
that had been formed and popularized since the previous century in such texts as not 
only the ones above but also in Alice Stopford Green’s History of the Irish State and 
the works of Eoin MacNeill, and through state control of education. MacNeill also 
wrote a fourteen page sketch of Irish history for the Official Handbook of the Irish 
Free State (in which he cited both ‘professional’ and ‘popular’ sources), of which all 
but just under three pages was concerned with pre-seventeenth century history. This 
reflected that MacNeill was a medievalist rather than a modern historian and as a 
nationalist thought the medieval period of Gaelic Ireland to be far more meaningful 
than the ‘conquered’, ‘Anglicized’ Ireland of the modern period.120  
Germany at this time was faced with an uncertain future as a truncated, weakened, 
politically fragmented republic. German historians were confronted with the biggest 
rupture or upheaval since Prussia’s defeat of Austria in 1866 and the establishment 
of the ‘second’ Reich in 1871. In reality, or at least until 1933 and the beginnings of 
the ‘racial state’, these events did not bring about any fundamental re-evaluation 
among most German historians of the ‘master narrative’ of their history. German 
historians remained almost entirely committed to nationalism broadly similar in 
complexion to how it had been before 1914, now flavoured with a powerful sense of 
grievance and victimhood that had not been present since the early nineteenth 
century. There was also an appropriately more pronounced tendency toward 
‘racialized’ Othering and in that sense a degree of overlap with völkisch nationalism. 
In the context of Germany’s post-1918 misery, it was naturally not uncommon for 
German historians to open themselves to a more positive evaluation of the medieval 
Reich than had been the custom of their predecessors, of the previous and self-
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 satisfied ‘Wilhelmine’ generation. Germany’s imperial past now held a particular 
appeal in a new period of internal disunity and ‘foreign domination’, The same of 
course went for the attempt to somehow restore Ireland’s Gaelic heritage in the Irish 
context after the achievement of independence in 1922, in order to accentuate the 
new state’s cultural distinctiveness. This tendency vis-à-vis the medieval German 
Reich was manifested in one of the most popular and widely-read (if not the single 
most popular and widely-read) German histories of the 1920’s and 1930’s, the 
medievalist Johannes Haller’s (1865-1947), Epochen der deutschen Geschichte, first 
published in 1923.
121
 Haller was one of the most significant, and certainly the most 
widely read, representative of the ‘traditional’ nationalist historical narrative in his 
generation. First, however, we shall take note of one of the foremost Irish historians 
of the period, also a medievalist, Alice Stopford Green.
122
 The daughter of a wealthy 
Protestant family that had produced many clergymen, Green never became an 
academic historian, though became well-regarded as a ‘gentlewoman scholar’, 
having been formatively influenced and mentored by W.E.H. Lecky (though he 
preferred to discuss with her avenues of research on seventeenth and eighteenth-
century history, Green became known as a medievalist) and Eoin MacNeill, the 
Professor of Early Irish History at University College, Dublin,
123
  as well as her 
deceased husband, the English historian J.R. Green, a social historian known for his 
radical democratic, libertarian views.
124
 The most important mark of distinction as 
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 not only a historian but a nationalist historian that she gained was her elevation to the 
Senate of the Irish Free State in 1922.
125
  
Green’s major works on Irish history all argued for the sophistication and richness of 
Irish ancient and medieval civilisation and by implication for the independence of 
contemporary Ireland.
 126
 It was Green’s opinion that ‘the history of the Irish people 
has been left unrecorded, as though it had never been’.127 Her aim was to chart the 
‘rise and fall’ of medieval Ireland, counteracting a heritage of historical writing 
centuries old which framed Irish history in terms of constant disorder and 
backwardness, and Ireland as a kind of colony rather than a nation in its own right.
128
 
In evoking Thomas Davis, she noted that historical consciousness was for the Irish 
‘the very condition of thought’,129 which made it utterly imperative that they possess 
the right understanding of history. Green hoped that ‘Ireland will have a history like 
other nations’; that Irish history ‘will not always remain to the modern nation an 
unknown world.’130 Green argued that in spite of the constant predations of the 
Anglo-Normans and later the medieval English, and their arresting influence on Irish 
historical development, the Irish had possessed and preserved a historically 
continuous nationality. It was only with the ‘calamity’ of the Tudor conquest did the 
defeated Irish begin to lose ‘the memory of their former civilisation [which] was 
deliberately blotted out as though it had never existed.’ The history of English rule in 
Ireland was one of a continuous onslaught against Irish nationhood.
131
 It was 
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 primarily in Irish Nationality, her most popular work, a volume of around 250 pages 
published in 1911 (on the eve of the 1912 Home Rule Crisis), in which the essentials 
of Green’s narrative of Irish history are most strongly distilled. In beginning the 
narrative Green affirmed the Gaelic Irish as the first historical inhabitants of Ireland, 
and the long continuity of Irish life over five centuries outside the boundaries of the 
Roman Empire. ‘To the Irish’ – the contemporary Irish, Green’s readers – it is stated, 
tellingly, that ‘interest in the Gaels lies in their conception of how the create an 
enduring state or nation.’ The Gaelic Irish had developed a distinctive idea, one of 
the earliest in history, of nation and state, one fundamentally democratic. ‘Irish 
history’, Green claimed, ‘can only be understood by realising this intense national 
life with its sure basis on the broad self-government of the people.’ Besides a 
‘democratic’ polity, in the institution of the High Kingship, brought to greatness at 
the beginning of the eleventh century by Brian Boru, the Irish had possessed a 
visible symbol of their ‘national’ unity, a recognisable unified state form. The early 
Irish had attained, according to Green, a sense of nationality unequalled anywhere 
else outside of Greece and Rome: ‘one race, obedient to one law, united in one 
culture and belonging to one country.’ 132  The Irish, Alice Stopford Green 
maintained, had until the late twelfth century, at least, retained the essential 
continuity of their culture, civilisation, and polity, and foreign elements, ‘gradually 
absorbed into the Irish population, lost the sense of separate nationality.’ On the 
other hand, these foreign influences had presented a constant threat. The incursions 
of the Anglo-Normans marked a far greater point of discontinuity and rupture, the 
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 first real stunting of the development of the Irish nation, though the Irish remained 
unconquered until the seventeenth century, ‘astonishing proof of the vitality of Irish 
culture, the firm structure of their law, and the cohesion of the people’, and ‘the rich 
national civilisation which the Irish genius had built up’. The English still remained 
a malign influence, frustrating full coalescence of the Gaelic Irish and Irish of 
English descent, even as the ‘drift of the peoples to a common patriotism’ gradually 
occurred. The Tudor conquest and the wars of the seventeenth century brought the 
downfall of the Gaelic polity and the old Gaelic society and high culture. Throughout 
this period, the ‘great object of the [English] government was to destroy the whole 
tradition [of the Irish], wipe out the Gaelic memories, and begin a new English life.’ 
Yet still, in spite of all these disasters, Green maintained that, among the mass of the 
people ‘the national tradition was still maintained with unswerving fidelity’, 133 
particularly in rejecting the Reformation and continuing to adhere to Catholicism, 
despite the terrible cost of their national self-assertion in the seventeenth century. 
This sustained the new Irish nation, composed of the defeated Gaelic and Old 
English peoples, in its later abasement. For Green, Irish history offered one enduring 
lesson: the continuous demand of the nation for self-government and the striving for 
unity. The Irish had proven in their history that there was no necessary relationship 
between a history of statehood and the right to be recognized as a nation. It is no 
surprise that this work, Irish Nationality, was most popular during the War of 
Independence.
134
 In her final major work, History of the Irish State to 1014, Green 
restated many of the conclusions of her earlier works, such as the authentic Gaelic 
identity of the ancient Irish, and the early and medieval past as the ages in which 
Irish nationality had displayed its purest expression. Now, what Green had been 
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 saying and writing of the medieval Irish for twenty years could be vindicated with 
reference to their recent achievement of independence, to a nation-state that could 
(and did) claim itself as the successor of Gaelic Ireland, before its downfall.
135
 Green 
herself played an active role in Irish nationalist politics between 1912 and 1921, and 
supported the independence movement, though she was not a radical republican and 
willingly accepted the Irish Free State, despite its limitations.  
Johannes Haller, a native of the ethnic German community of Russian Estonia, was 
like most German historians of note an academic, yet his most popular works were 
brief, single-volume surveys, aimed at a popular audience, the most popular and 
influential being the often reprinted Epochen der deutschen Geschichte.
136
 He began 
this work by noting the importance of certain ‘critical turning points…when the new 
begins, the old is abandoned; the direction changes.’ 137  Haller was hopeful that 
through the study of these most fundamental turning-points the German people could 
arrive at a historically-informed understanding of their present parlous state, and 
hopefully derive some positive response.
138
 At the same time, a tone of pessimism 
overlaid this first edition of the work: he seemed to be of the opinion, as expressed 
both in the introduction and ending, that the normal course of German history had 
really been a series of frustrations in the path to national statehood rather than 
continuous progress towards this goal, and a final ‘end’ of German history. This was 
how German history continuously repeated itself, as reflected in all of the key 
turning points he identified: the rise of the early medieval Empire, its later decline 
and the period of territorial fragmentation, German colonisation in the East, the rise 
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 of the Habsburgs, the reformation and the religious schism, the Thirty Years’ War, 
the rise of Prussia, the Napoleonic conquest, and the movement towards unification. 
While Haller expressed the opinion in one of his essays that ‘the history of the world 
is the work of the Völker’, one in which they struggled amongst each other and rose 
and fell (and despite his later support for Nazism, which was enthusiastic compared 
to that of other historians), he did not accept that there was a specific trans-historical, 
timeless racial ‘essence’ to German nationality. Rather, German nationality was what 
Germany’s peculiar history had made of it, and had been particularly shaped by 
external influences.
139
 He even denied that the Germans had ever been an ‘unmixed’ 
people – on the contrary, they had been strongly mixed with other ‘national’ 
elements from their earliest history
140
 – but also maintained that nations had a lasting 
and unchangeable character derived from centuries-long experience of common 
history and culture.
141
 Finally, not least had German history – and nationality – been 
shaped by the contentious and indistinct nature of German territory and borders, 
Germany’s geographical particularity.142 These notions were of course far from new 
and had great currency during the First World War and the inter-war period. 
Haller had an at least sympathetic view of the medieval Reich; he thought that the 
failure of the empire was as much to be blamed on the particularism and myopia of 
the German territorial princes, their challenges to the Emperors and dalliances with 
foreign rulers.
143
 The later medieval era did not present a completely dismal picture, 
either, for this period also saw the Ostsiedlung, and ‘The beginning of this 
movement marks an epoch which must count among those of the most far-reaching 
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 importance in German history.’ 144  The Ostsiedlung was nothing less than ‘the 
greatest achievement of the German people, one which alone would assure the 
Germans ‘a place among the pioneers of civilisation...one might well say – if it is 
permissible to speak of a mission in life of whole peoples, specially assigned to them 
– that history tells us that the German people was called to civilise its eastern 
neighbours.’145 On the other hand, he does credit the enduring significance of the 
Ostsiedlung with the fact that, he claimed, Kaiser and Reich had nothing to do with 
it. The upheavals of the sixteenth century and seventeenth centuries were but the 
logical conclusion to the events of the thirteenth in the Empire, its decline after the 
extinction of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. The sixteenth century, particularly from the 
time of the Reformation, had presented an opportunity, again one frustrated, for 
national revival, but Germany became mired in violent confessional conflict, this 
being probably the most important factor in modern German history; still affecting 
Germany in the present.
146
 Events that occurred later, such as the final dissolution of 
the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, rather than being ‘epochal’ were rather 
‘aftershocks’ of the events of the seventeenth century. Haller sought to chart the 
development of German nationality through more than a thousand years of history, 
from their earliest origin, to the miserable present, which had been punctuated by 
less then fifty years of strength and power. The leading role of Prussia had been 
necessary for German unification, for due to the particular circumstances of German 
history the national movement could only have succeeded under the leadership of the 
strongest of the ‘national’ German states, but Prussia’s achievement in 1871 had 
unfortunately not defined German history. Germany, after a brief period of greatness, 
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 had seemed by 1922 to have sunk back into the mire of disunity and weakness. The 
least the German nation could do, must do, if it was ever to recover its strength was, 
for Haller, to understand where and why their national development had repeatedly 
‘gone wrong’ during their history.  
V 
The historical texts surveyed so far were among the most important contributions in 
both countries to the delineation of the dominant narrative of Irish or German 
national history. However they form only part of the story, and historical works 
produced ‘outside’ of these ‘traditions’ were also significant, either for becoming 
popularly accepted and incorporated in the dominant narrative, or indeed by being 
rejected. This section will deal with two later nineteenth century histories, one of 
Ireland and one of Germany, that were exemplars of texts written from outside the 
dominant tradition that had the above effects. These were W.E.H. Lecky’s (1838-
1903) History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century (1892), and Johannes Janssen’s 
History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages (Geschichte des 
deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters, 8 vols., 1878-1894).  
For W.E.H. Lecky, as for many writers of Irish history before and since, the direct 
impetus for his engagement with Irish history was his dissatisfaction with the 
immoderate, intemperate nature of so much of its discussion.
147
 He was spurred in 
particular by his anger with the Scottish historian James Anthony Froude, who wrote 
a two-volume History of the English in Ireland (1872, 1874), which portrayed Irish 
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 history in the blackest of terms and did just about everything possible not only to 
offend Irish readers. Lecky highlighted in the preface to his History of Ireland in the 
Eighteenth Century (five volumes, comprising the sections in Lecky’s earlier History 
of England on Irish history) that ‘furious partisanship’ that distinguished most Irish 
historiography.
148
 Lecky, personally unsympathetic to political nationalism by the 
time he wrote his Irish history (though he had not been so earlier in life) nonetheless 
criticised in powerful terms centuries of English and British misrule for failing to 
establish a stable government over Ireland, impeding the growth of a stable Irish 
national sentiment, and for mercilessly exploiting the country. While Lecky saw no 
necessary link between the tenor of his history and his own (non-nationalist) 
judgement of the state of contemporary Irish politics and society, his whole 
engagement in contemporary politics can be said to have arisen directly from his 
immersion in Irish history and a compulsion to defend Irish history from 
‘Hibernophobic’ calumnies. Lecky’s interpretation of Irish history was admired, to 
his occasional irritation, by virtually all strands of contemporary Irish nationalist 
public opinion.
149
 He considered the unthinking application of English ideas to Irish 
problems as one of the continuing sources of evil in Irish affairs. In an early essay he 
had asserted that patriotism and national feeling existed independently of class and 
circumstance, being inspired by history, common memories and common hopes.
150
 
Lecky’s history would not (could not) be a ‘Whiggish’-accented one of a twisted 
path towards the (inevitable) triumph of the nation-state, but rather dealt with the 
‘degrading influences of great legislative injustices, and the manner in which they 
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 affect every element of national well-being.’151  He could at any rate study Irish 
history as ‘morbid anatomy’, as the story of missed chances for progress frustrated 
by centuries of bad English and British misgovernment and sectarianism, and in 
some way he could speak for reconciliation of the different historical strains of Irish 
society and Irishness. 
 
Lecky began his History by conceding that had Ireland been left to herself in the 
medieval period a stable and unified Irish state would probably have developed 
along wider European lines. English invasions prevented the establishment of an 
Irish kingdom, ‘which would necessarily have taken place if the Anglo-Normans had 
not arrived, and, instead of that peaceful and almost silent amalgamation of races, 
customs, laws and languages which took place in England…the two nations 
remained in Ireland for centuries in hostility.’152 Ireland’s political development had 
been stunted, but the country had not been conquered as England had been in 1066. 
Thus the country remained stuck in a state of ‘arrested development’. The reality of 
continuous, direct English rule over all of Ireland did not appear until the reigns of 
Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, and Lecky likens the methods and effects of their reigns 
in Ireland to what would now be called genocide.
153
 Lecky made no apologies 
whatsoever for the means by which English rule had become a reality in Ireland.
154
 
From the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries ‘traditions were slowly 
forming which coloured the whole texture of Irish thought’, traditions irrevocably 
conditioned by the brutal ferocity and injustice of the English subjugation of Ireland. 
In Lecky’s judgement, however, it was not until the mid-seventeenth century, that 
critical period of Irish history, that the conflict between Irish and English gained a 
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 recognizably national aspect. Lecky described the uprising of the Irish Catholics, 
rebels and later Confederates, in the 1640’s as not the outcome of ‘any single cause, 
but represented the accumulated wrongs and animosities of two generations’, as ‘a 
defensive religious war entered into for the purpose of securing toleration, and 
ultimately an establishment, of the religion of the Irish people’, and he contrasted the 
behaviour of the Irish armies in the Confederate Wars favourably with that of the 
English (though he does note the ‘inferior civilisation’ of the Gaelic soldiery). 
Lecky’s concern to correct various misconceptions of Irish history in the early 
modern period was itself indicative of their importance in contemporary Irish 
political debate.
155
 In the first volume’s introduction, the conflicts of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries appear as a furious whirlwind in which the forces of race, 
nationality and religion and contests for land were all of varying importance, but 
what defined them all was the mutual incomprehension of the opposing forces, Irish 
and English, and the furious brutality of the English towards the Irish in their 
determination to bring the latter to heel, so as they could never again be a threat. 
Lecky’s History secured him a place – whether he wanted it or not – in the eyes of 
many of his Irish contemporaries as an intellectual supporter of Irish nationalism.
156
 
His contentions that Irish history demonstrated that national character was formed by 
political and social circumstances, and the folly of attempting to govern by the same 
methods and institutions nations wholly different in character and civilisation, were 
useful.
157
 The highly influential book The Framework of Home Rule (1911) authored 
by the nationalist writer and politician Erskine Childers’s credits Lecky’s judgements 
extensively in its historical sections. His History of Ireland in the Eighteenth 
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 Century, Childers was sure, counted among the ‘Nationalist textbooks’.158 Though 
Lecky was a Protestant and brought a ‘Protestant angle’ to his writing, his History 
achieved considerable popularity among Catholic readers.  
German national historiography was, as we have noted, a mostly Protestant affair, so 
much so that sincere Catholic allegiance and competence as a historian were seen as 
mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, a few Catholic German historians were able to 
exercise some influence. Sybel had conducted a kind of historiographical quarrel 
with the Catholic historian Julius von Ficker over the medieval Reich. Ficker 
maintained that the medieval empire had provided an appropriate political 
framework for the development of German nationhood, the only such framework 
possible for the Germans in the Middle Ages, and indeed its only meaningful 
expression. Therefore the Germans could not claim any real historical sense of 
nationality, political or cultural, distinct from the development of the Empire or 
without reference to the importance of the imperial idea. To Ficker, nothing could be 
more wrong than the idea that the founding of the old empire had in some way 
frustrated the development of the German nation or caused its decline; the old Reich 
could not conceivably be regarded as ‘un-German’. 159 The kind of views expressed 
by Ficker, who had none of the inclination towards public historico-political 
controversy that Sybel possessed, find a much more popular expression in the 
twelve-volume history of medieval Germany written by the leading Catholic 
historian Johannes Janssen (1829-1891).  
Janssen held the Reformation responsible for the general unrest and the fracturing of 
German society that occurred during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
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 including the political emasculation of the Empire as would occur in the seventeenth 
century. He sought to demonstrate how the Reformation had wrecked the German 
Kulturnations most glorious age.
160
 It had been the Catholic intellectuals and 
reformers of the sixteenth century who had by contrast, so Janssen argued, opposed 
the ‘separatism’ of the German princes and who had upheld ‘Germany’s mission to 
be the defender of the universal Church and as such the leading realm of 
Christendom.
161
 For Janssen, the Germans had derived whatever claim to nationhood 
they had possessed from the historical grounding of the empire. To the empire alone 
the Germans owed their status as a nation, they had not been one prior to its 
founding. The empire’s ruler had been both King of Germany and Holy Roman 
Emperor. The imperial age was the golden age of German history, until its decline 
the Empire ‘was the centre of all European national life’.162  The decline of the 
Empire happened as a result of the power struggles between the Hohenstaufen 
emperors and the territorial princes. The result was that ‘the general interests of the 
nation suffered’, and ‘the ties which bound the different German races were 
slackened’. The Habsburgs attempted to restore the unity and strength of the Empire, 
but were frustrated by the German territorial princes ‘who, indifferent to the glory of 
the Empire, thought only of themselves and their own interests.’163 The Empire had 
been the true bulwark of peace and culture in Europe. With the Empire’s decline, 
‘Germany not only lost its European supremacy, but became a stranger to all the 
great questions of European politics.’ With the decline of the empire, swathes of 
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 historically German territory were lost.
164
 While the (Habsburg) Emperor 
Maximilian I took it as his duty to restore the empire, the princes remained 
indifferent. Janssen took this as a contrast to the sentiments of the mass of the 
people, and he blamed the princes not only for hindering Maximilian’s efforts, but 
for ‘conspiring to place the sceptre in the hands of the French King…most prominent 
among them who promoted this scheme was the House of Hohenzollern, the very 
one which of all the princely houses he had especially favoured.’165 The contrast 
with the likes of Sybel, Freytag and Treitschke could hardly be more marked: the 
princes, especially the Protestant Prussian Hohenzollerns, had been pro-French 
traitors; the Habsburg Maximilian was a patriotic nation-builder. Even in his reply to 
his critics Janssen freely admitted his feelings of sympathy towards the Empire, and 
regarded the personage of the Holy Roman Emperor as having embodied, in victory 
and defeat, the fate of the German nation, and repeated his charge of ‘the 
conspiracies of German princes with the foreigners’.166 Janssen professed to have 
merely written, without any theological or political goal whatsoever in mind, the 
‘Geschichte unseres Volkes’ from a standpoint of social and cultural history.167 This 
claim of objectivity reflected rather Janssen’s view of the kind of history he was 
writing against. In contrasting the anti-national motives of the princes and positing 
the Reformation as an aberration in the course of German history, the central actor of 
Janssen’s work, pointedly entitled Geschichte des deutschen Volkes is ‘the German 
people’ (assumed to have been in natural sympathy with the Habsburgs and the old 
Church) and its cultural creativity, which the Protestant Reformers, allied with the 
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 princes, maimed with their ‘reformation from above’. Luther had been, at least at one 
point, Ranke admitted, ‘the most popular man in Germany’, but after the Peasants’ 
War the Reformation became the ally of the particularist state and the possession of 
the princes rather than the people.
168
 Janssen, while accepting the ‘from Luther to 
Bismarck’ thesis, turned it on its head, seeing in it the explanation of the ‘wrong 
path’ German history had taken since the foundational events of the sixteenth 
century. It suffices to say that Janssen’s History was not written to undergird the 
national claims of the new German state established under a Protestant dynasty in 
1871. Though his book ran to many editions, it did not succeed outside of its 
‘intended’ audience the way Lecky’s History did, and underlined the way in which 
German historiography was arguably more ‘pillarized’ along confessional lines than 
Irish historiography. Janssen’s Geschichte underlined how not even when it came to 
the question of origins, could historians arrive at an agreed narrative. 
VI 
‘The search for origins whether in a universal or particular setting, represented’, as    
Monika Baár argues, ‘a perennially popular theme …Origins provide a cornerstone 
of every nation’s self-legitimization and consequently historians have shown a keen 
dedication to this theme’. 169 For the historians considered here origins and 
foundational events were of the utmost importance, opening up as they did the 
‘perennial themes’ of German or Irish history, such as the failure of the cultural 
nation and the political nation to develop in tandem, the role of outside forces in the 
nation’s history, and the effects of a confessional division formed in the context of 
violent conflict. The search for origins was also, however, the search for unity,
170
 
                                                          
168
 Janssen, An meine Kritiker, pp. 116-122. Brady, Communities, Politics, and Reformation, p. 361.  
169
 Baar, Historians and Nationalism, p. 193.  
170
 Edmund Curtis, A History of Ireland (5th ed., London, Methuen and Co., 1945), vi.   
81
 more specifically for a ‘golden age’ in which the nation had been one and powerful, 
rather than weak and fragmented.
171
 This seeking of unity may be regarded as a 
characteristic of nationalism ‘in general’, yet it was an especially pressing matter for 
nations that had been very much lacking for unity, political and cultural, for much of 
their history, as was the case for ‘Germany’ and ‘Ireland’. The search for unity was 
in this sense necessarily an ‘inventive’ act, common to both ‘scholarly’ and 
‘amateur’ historians. The object of this search remained at all times elusive, and it 
was for this reason that the significance of manifestations of unity in the 
foundational epochs was often overestimated. Irish historians sometimes over-
emphasised the ‘unified’ quality of Gaelic Ireland and more often the ‘unity’ 
apparent among the (Catholic) Irish of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
German historians over-emphasised the national ‘unity’ manifested by the 
Ostseidlung, and in a later age brought by the Reformation and the defence of the 
Protestant cause. Some over-emphasised the ‘national unity’ conferred by the 
medieval Reich. That which did not fit into the narrative, was of course a target for 
exclusion, whether on ‘ethnic’ or religious grounds. The ‘ancestors’ of the modern 
nation in the early medieval past were held to have created a political or social 
community which expressed in some way the national spirit or the nation’s needs, 
yet also to have ‘failed’ in their goal to establish a unified ‘national’ state. Influences 
outside of the nation had played a part in this, whether the Roman imperial legacy 
which seemed to have bewitched the medieval German Emperors or the Norse and 
Anglo-Norman invaders whose incursions had arrested the development of an Irish 
state in the medieval period. The views held by these historians of the nation’s 
origins were also linked with those of the significance of the nation’s geographic 
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 nature: Irish insularity and Germany as Mitteleuropa had both determined the 
nation’s political and cultural history from its origins. In both contexts, the cultural 
achievements and ‘mission’ of the early medieval ‘nation’ were positively 
emphasised. Medieval kings and princes and early modern heroes were seen as being 
constitutive of the nation’s historical character, herein lay the ‘ancestry’ of the 
modern nation.
172
 If the shortcomings of the Irish or the Germans under these rulers 
were not glossed over, on the other hand the examples of ‘national independence’ 
and the cultural sophistication of the nation to be in their time offered both a defence 
against charges of cultural backwardness and thereby an argument of sorts for 
national sovereignty. The early modern foundational period of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries saw the beginnings of a national community deeply entwined 
with a particular religious or confessional identity, be it Catholicism in the Irish 
context or Protestantism in the German context, and had been a period distinguished 
by epochal violence and upheaval which irreducibly affected the subsequent history 
of the nation. Narratives of origins in both contexts underpinned a broader narrative 
based on rupture and a cyclical process of ‘rise-and-decline’ and the idea of a 
‘broken’ development which needed to be recovered for national regeneration.173 
This meant that even the teleological accent of nationalist histories in these contexts 
was uncertain; even the nation’s historical telos was seen as vulnerable to those 
characteristics of the nation’s history that made it a cycle of disaster and revival. So, 
even the fall of the Kaiserreich in 1918 could be accounted for in the larger frame of 
German history, as was argued by Haller. Political as well as cultural precedents for 
national statehood of some sort also had to be found, whether in medieval Gaelic 
Ireland, the Kingdom of Germany, the Irish Catholic Confederation of the 1640’s, or 
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 the different Protestant German princes’ leagues founded in defiance of the Holy 
Roman Emperor, or indeed the German states that had formed on the ruins of the 
medieval Reich, in particularly Austria and Prussia. This act of ‘precedent-seeking’ 
in the foundational periods of the nation’s history expressed the basic act behind 
origins narratives: the attempt to establish or overlay continuity over rupture, to 
establish a history of national unity over a highly fractured and heterogeneous 
past.
174
 The nation was held in its origins, regardless of any failings to establish or 
consolidate a political existence, to possess a lasting character derived from 
centuries-long experience of common history and culture and the enduring nature of 
national enmities.
175
 From the discourses of origins they propounded, these 
historians, Irish and German, believed that Irish or German political nationality was 
expressed less in ‘abstract’ or ‘universal’ ideas of ‘the State’ than ties of ethno-
cultural fellowship and community that were linked to a particular form of political 
organization. In the German case, this usually meant a particularly ‘national’ form of 
monarchy which owed something to the concept of the Reich; in the Irish case, a 
‘national’ concept of democratic self-rule identified with the political forms and 
traditions of Gaelic Ireland up to their ‘catastrophic’ demise at the end of the 
sixteenth century, or on the independent parliaments of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries for those more sceptical about Gaelic Ireland, or indeed on both 
for those wishing to bring together the two great cultural streams of Irish history. 
Historians in both countries over numerous generations, in response to the 
humiliations and despair of the nation in past and the present, turned to ‘golden ages’ 
of unity and prosperity, and attempted to draw lessons from periods of decline and 
disaster. The dominant narrative of national history writing in both contexts departed 
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 from recollection of an early medieval ‘golden age’ towards later decline, brief 
‘national’ rally in the context of the Reformation or opposition to the Reformation, 
and then disastrous, yet nonetheless foundational, seventeenth century conflict. 
German historians, like their Irish counterparts, fashioned a narrative of the past that 
suggested a sense of common fate, focused political energies on the nation-state, 
commanded individual sacrifice for the greater whole, and rejected foreign 
influences. As in the ‘Irish mode of historical thought’, a central theme in the 
‘German conception of history’ was the idea of a tortured history leading to a telos 
of redemption, national renewal and greatness.
176
 The historical writings explored 
here illustrate also how national historical narratives are always contested within, 
and can be used to frame differing ideas of nationality, by recourse to different 
periods of the nation’s history, and particularly with respect to the period which had 
introduced the element of religious division into the historical national identity 
equation, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It may also be argued that the 
medieval past had greater modern political significance and historiographical 
importance in the German conception of history than in the Irish mode of historical 
thought’, because of the greater gulf that seemed to exist between the medieval and 
modern past in Ireland. It could at least be said that medieval German history 
maintained a tangible legacy in the form of the states of Austria and Prussia and the 
idea of the Reich; whereas in Ireland the medieval Gaelic past was more distant, had 
left behind no institutional heritages as in central Europe, and was of course 
inaccessible for another reason: the moribund state of the literary Irish language from 
the seventeenth century, and the near-death of the language altogether in the 
nineteenth century. The role of foreign actors in the nation’s history was also 
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 obviously quite different in both countries: the German lands had never been so 
deeply and continuously subjected to the rule of another country as Ireland had, even 
if German nationalist historians associated the ‘villains’ of their narratives with 
foreign ‘Others’. It is a further irony, however, that while Ireland as a European state 
(the Kingdom of Ireland) and institutions such as the Parliament of Ireland were 
creations of centuries of English rule, pride was still taken in them by numerous 
historians insofar as they were markers of Irish distinctiveness and historical foci of 
national politics, even though in their (medieval) origins they were distinctively 
foreign and the work of hostile outsiders.
177
 German historians were also, however, 
whether they stood for Austria or Prussia as the ‘authentic’ modern embodiment of 
the ‘original’ character of the nation, faced with the need to ‘write out’ the ‘un-
German’ aspects of these territories’ histories. Irish historians for the most part did 
not actively reject such institutions as the Catholic Confederation, the Patriot 
Parliament, or ‘Grattan’s Parliament’, as precedents, perhaps as they were the only 
possible examples of ‘political’ nationality. Nonetheless, discourses of origins were 
more state-centred in the German context, given that the Germans had possessed 
some form of political organization of longer than the Irish had.   
In the most important regards the challenge of the medieval period was essentially 
the same in each context: accounting for the failure to achieve political nationhood 
while presenting eventual achievement of national sovereignty as the necessary or 
desirable outcome of that same history, forging a past of warring dynasties and petty 
territories into a ‘national’ history. The often fractious ‘origins’ of the modern 
nation, the ‘setting of the scene’, cast long and often troublesome shadows over the 
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 nation’s envisioning in the modern age. A recurrent sense, in both sets of narratives 
throughout the period in diverse authors, though in differing degrees, was that in part 
because of the forms the origins and foundational events of the nation’s history took 
the nation’s history as process kept falling short of a final culmination. If anything, 
the return to origins and foundational events, however much it was a search for unity 
and explanation of the particular ‘character’ of German or Irish history, opened as 
many questions as it could resolve. The question of origins, finally, related directly 
to all the other central problems of German and Irish history: the Protestant-Catholic 
divide, the question of the historical delineation of the nation’s territory, and the 
matter of ‘race’ and ‘Othering’ in regards to the nationalist historical narrative. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
The Nation and Religion in History 
I 
Ranke, in the opening to his Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation 
wrote – in words that could apply to the histories of Germany and Ireland equally – 
that religious and political histories of a given nation were ‘indissolubly connected, 
fused into one indivisible whole.’1 It is difficult to imagine an Irish historian of the 
same period, either Protestant or Catholic, disagreeing with this statement if applied 
to Irish history. This chapter will investigate the significance of representations of 
religion and confessional identity and antagonism – Protestant or Catholic allegiance 
and Protestant-Catholic conflict – in German and Irish national historical narratives 
and their relevance to how the nation’s historical identity was defined. It will 
examine how the historiographies treated confessional allegiance as fundamental to 
the definition of the nation.
2
 This chapter considers more closely the significance of 
the historical Protestant-Catholic divide in the Irish and German historiographical 
contexts. What is distinctive here in these contexts is not the experience of a 
confessional divide but how deeply that division in these countries penetrated to the 
core of the question of national identity.
3
 In Ireland, politico-religious difference 
came to be conceptualised not just as a division within a nation but as one between 
nationalities, on one island;
4
 but in Germany too, Konfession became a battleground 
of national identity. An important source of the heterogeneity that existed in the 
nation’s past and which complicated the delineation of a single dominant national 
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 historical narrative was religious or confessional identity and conflict.
5
 The chapter 
compares how within the historical narratives ‘Irishness’ became associated with 
Catholicity (or at least a kind of cultural anti-Protestantism) and ‘Germanness’ with 
Protestantism (and anti-Catholicism).
6
 The common nineteenth-century conception 
of nations as ‘God-given’, with a central role in ‘God’s design’ often gave national 
historical narratives an implicitly religious character. Historical narratives inspired 
by Christian motifs of virtuous suffering and resurrection, where a past of sacrifice 
and suffering led to a future or present of freedom, independence, and greatness were 
also popular.
7
 The importance of the early modern era for the historical 
‘nationalisation’ of religion meant specifically that the national religious identity 
became closely associated with resistance to foreign aggression, defence of unity, 
and national revival after some period of decline or defeat, or even survival.  
One particular contrast should be noted early on: the historiographical 
‘Catholicization’ of Irishness had had as much to do with English perceptions and 
stereotyping of the Irish as any effort made in this cause by Irish writers themselves. 
English commentators were content for their own reasons to accentuate the historical 
Catholicity or rather ‘Popery’ of the Irish. A parallel in the German context is harder 
to detect, and it could not have had quite the same significance. Yet it should be 
remembered that the historical ‘nationalization’ of Irish Catholicism or 
‘Catholicization’ of Irishness in the nineteenth century was not a foregone 
conclusion; insofar as this identification was pioneered by nationalist historians, it 
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 involved an active choice to represent Catholicity as a unifying element of national 
history and to downplay that which tended against this. In Germany, not too 
dissimilarly, historians, whether Protestant or Catholic, seemed determined to keep 
the old cultural antagonism of their ‘confessions’ alive and relevant for the definition 
of ‘Germanness’. In general terms, those historians who sought to take confessional 
affiliation out of definitions of ‘Irishness’, significantly, usually themselves 
Protestant, did so by downplaying the actual importance of specifically religious 
conflict in Irish history (John Mitchel was an exemplar) while others such as Lecky 
and Standish James O’Grady, were more prepared to criticise the ‘deficiencies’ of 
Irish Catholicism, and to defend sometimes rather patrician claims for Protestant 
leadership of the modern nation. Of the Irish historians considered in this thesis, only 
O’Grady could be regarded as having had an anti-Christian perspective on Irish 
history, believing that Christianity had weakened the vitality of the ancient heroic 
nation and that a revived code of virtues derived from Ireland’s heroic pre-Christian 
age was needed for a revival of the nation in general.
8
  
II 
In both Ireland and Germany, nationalism was from the start closely tied to religious 
or confessional identity. From its beginnings German nationalism was self-
consciously Protestant.
9
 Ernst Moritz Arndt had declared that ‘Germany is the land 
of Protestantism’, because ‘Protestantism seems to be purely Germanic…it 
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 effortlessly attracts all things Germanic.’10 In the nineteenth century most proponents 
of the German Kultur- and Staatsnation regarded the reality of the confessional 
division in the German lands as an especially important problem in creating the 
German nation-state.
11
 At the same time, however, the confessional division, 
originating in early modern ethno-religious conflicts, was seen to underpin the 
demand for the Staatsnation, as those conflicts had set the course of the particular 
cultural developments that created the modern German Kulturnation.
12
 The history 
of the Reformation offered a possible basis for a national narrative, but such a 
narrative was inherently exclusionary of Catholic Germans.
13
 Catholic Germans 
would be led to oppose the outcomes of German unification not simply because they 
feared becoming a minority in a Kleindeutschland, but also because they had a 
specific historical idea of their own of the German nation making them averse to 
German nationalism as then generally understood. What defined the worldview of 
almost all German nationalists at the time was a certainty that the route to personal 
and national Bildung was Protestantism.
14
 Catholics’ Grossdeutsche allegiance, and 
that towards the memory of the old Reich was ‘continued’ in the nineteenth century 
in the sense of an orientation towards the Habsburg Empire; at any rate the certainty 
among Protestants that this was so contributed to their view of Catholicism.
15
 While 
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 in German history Catholicism was identified with supra-national, cosmopolitan 
ideas, and much was made of how the opposition of the Papacy, in its political 
ambitions, had frustrated the goals of the early medieval emperors and brought the 
old empire to its decline, Protestantism originated – supposedly – in a context of 
national resistance.
16
 Thus the contemporary distrust of Catholicism, and the 
political campaign of the Kulturkampf, could be presented as manifesting ‘truths’ of 
German history. There is a parallel here to the historical ‘nationalisation’ of Irish 
Catholicism in historical narratives, which was based not only on the reality of 
persecution of Irish Catholics and the image of the Protestant Reformation as merely 
an arm of English statecraft; but also on the more tenuous idea that Irish Catholicism 
had inspired the development of a sense of Irish nationalism since the sixteenth 
century. Thus ‘being Catholic’ or at least a certain distrust of Protestantism became 
closely associated with being Irish, and Protestant-Catholic conflict could be claimed 
to represent a deeper ‘national’ antagonism. The historical narrative of the Protestant 
Irish became, at least outside of the northern region of Ulster, marginalized within 
one that emphasised Irish history as one of a conflict between noble ‘Catholic 
Ireland’ and villainous Protestant England.  
This is an irony given that not only were many notable Irish nationalist thinkers and 
writers from Protestant backgrounds, but also because the first stirrings of Irish 
nationalism in the eighteenth century came from the Protestant minority, with a 
‘patriot’ conception of the Irish nation that had been, for all its non-sectarianism, in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
protestantischer, und katholischer Kreise’, in Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte, p. 
355. Christopher Clark, ‘The New Catholicism and the European Culture Wars’, in Culture Wars, p. 
35.  
16
 Frank Becker, ‘Protestantische Euphorien: 1870/71, 1914 und 1933’, in Hartmut Lehmann (ed.), 
Nationalprotestantische Mentalitäten in Deutschland, 1870-1970: Konturen, Entwicklungslinien und 
Umbrüche eines Weltbildes (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), p. 24.     
92
 reality, culturally and intellectually, a product of the same.
17
 This Protestant heritage 
was taken both as demonstration of the comprehensive character of Irishness as well 
as increasingly obscured in the nineteenth century within a narrative that stressed the 
sacrifices and sufferings of the Irish Catholic nation throughout history. This was 
also of course influenced by the increasing activity of the Irish Catholic Church in 
the nineteenth century after Emancipation. In contrast to Germany, the Protestant 
dimension of nationality in Ireland lost much of its importance during the nineteenth 
century, though the ‘confessionalized society’ in Ireland survived much longer than 
in Germany. In Germany, nonetheless, confessional alignments with respect to one’s 
view of the ‘national question’, were usually more straightforward.18  
In both the Irish and German contexts, the significance of religion in the nation’s 
history, as well as specific developments, and events, were crucial for the overall 
shaping of the historical narrative, specifically in the second of the ‘foundational 
epochs’ of each ‘national tradition’. In the dominant narrative scheme of German 
history, historians conceived of the Reformation as a point of origins for modern 
Germany. It was a historical rupture, was also argued to bear continuity with much 
earlier history, with Protestantism being linked to older and more authentic German 
religious devotion, freed from the corrupting influences of Papal power and non-
German culture. Continuities were drawn sometimes between the spartan purity and 
rough-hewn virtue of the religious practices of the ancient Germanic tribes and the 
simplicity of Protestantism.
19
 It was a short step towards Martin Luther being 
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 conceived of as another in the succession of German patriots, which remained a 
highly popular trope even in highly differing histories.
20
 If Germanness was 
somehow perfectly suited to Protestantism and vice versa, then the Reformation 
could only have originated in the Germanic lands,
21
 thus the German nation had a 
claim to the cultural leadership of all Europe. Catholic German historians, on the 
other hand, regarded the Reformation as a profound rupture with centuries of 
German history in which the Germans had been the leading power of Western 
Christendom, and regarded Luther as a revolutionary rather than a nation-builder. 
Both sides thought in ‘national’ and indeed European terms about the Reformation, 
and agreed on its foundational importance, or at least that it gave a new dimension to 
older antagonisms (for example Germany vs. Rome, the regions of Germany vs. 
Kaiser and Reich, and so on).
22
 The conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, as Kevin Cramer has argued, comprised a subject that allowed historians to 
describe the course of German history as being anchored in the Kleindeutsch vs. 
Grossdeutsch conflict, a subject with which historians could delineate lines of 
internal and external exclusion.
23
 For Protestant and Catholic German historians 
alike, their respective confessional identities were regarded as being more 
authentically German than the other. Catholic and Protestant German historians alike 
saw in German religious profundity part of the substance of German ‘superiority’ 
over other nations.  
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 As in German writing, Irish historians emphasised the significance of the nation’s 
religious history in conferring a sense of continuity on the national narrative that was 
otherwise lacking, as well as the ‘alienness’ of the ‘other’ religion or confessional 
allegiance. In the Irish context, Catholic historians in particular could take pride in 
Ireland’s role in the flourishing of Christianity in the early medieval period and the 
nation’s ‘unique’ devotion to the Church since its conversion, as well as the ‘unique’ 
receptivity shown by the medieval Gaels and their descendants to Christianity. The 
near-complete failure of the Reformation in Ireland, among the native Irish (Gaelic 
or otherwise) was often remarked upon, sometimes by Protestant writers. As the 
Catholic Counter-Reformation was associated in German Protestant historiography 
with the attempts by the ‘Spanish’ Habsburg Emperor Charles V to tighten his 
control over his German lands, regardless of the confessional allegiance of his 
German subject; Protestantism in Ireland was generally dismissed as having sprung 
from English expansion and land-grabbing. The Tudor and Stuart rulers of Ireland 
and the Cromwellians could be seen as a latter day reincarnations of the pagan Norse 
marauders who had wrought havoc on the early Irish church.
24
 To the extent that 
Catholic historians had critical things to say about the Catholic Church’s role in Irish 
politics, these tended to be balanced against the importance attributed to the people’s 
Catholic devotion in the preservation of their cultural identity and the oppressive 
character exhibited by Protestantism in Ireland. So it was possible for Protestant or 
secular-minded historians, therefore, like W.E.H. Lecky, to contextualise Irish 
devotion to Catholicism within a long history of Irish resistance to oppressive 
English rule and to acknowledge the ‘special position’ of Catholicism without 
associating it with Irishness in an exclusionary way, i.e., without excluding 
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 Protestants as Protestants. ‘Religious opinions’, Lecky acknowledged, ‘grow out of 
different states of society, reflect their civilisation, and are altogether moulded and 
coloured by their modes of thought.’ 25  Even as convinced a Protestant as he, 
generally quite disdainful of Catholicism in general, could find worthy qualities in 
Irish Catholicism, and he was a trenchant critic of much of what had been done 
under the banner of Protestantism in Irish history. Some Catholic historians and 
writers did, of course, saw no reason to defend or contextualize the Irish association 
with Catholicism and associated Irishness and Catholicity in a way that left little 
room for Protestants in their conception of the Irish nation. As the Thirty Years’ War 
was refashioned through history writing into a German war, into an epic 
confrontation between the forces of reaction and liberty, legitimacy and revolution; 
the early modern ethno-religious conflicts of the Irish became a story in which a new 
Irish nation was condemned by foreign tyranny to a long night of oppression, 
hopefully to be ended in the future. Patrick Pearse, though not a dogmatic Catholic, 
expressed in his writings a view of national freedom conceived in near ‘theological’ 
terms.
26
 The truly Irish were the descendants of those who suffered righteously 
throughout the long, sorrowful course of Irish history; Pearse’s nationalism, or at any 
rate his rhetoric, cannot be understood without reference to the bleak historical 
experience of the Irish Catholic people.
27
 In both contexts, therefore, the religious 
dimension of the nation’s history was one which, interpreted in a certain way, could 
undergird conclusions about the national ‘character’ and the cultural ‘mission’ of the 
modern nation in the wider world.  
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 III 
We have seen that at the centre of the Young Ireland ‘project’ for Irish history was a 
determination to remove from its writing ‘the bigotry of race and creed.’ Thomas 
Davis set an example for a more generous-minded writing of Irish history, but he had 
not quite ‘de-confessionalized’ that history either. In a (unpublished) lecture on the 
history of the seventeenth century he attributed Irish rebellion of that era to English 
tyranny and referred to the contempt for the Irish people and furious hatred of 
Catholicism that distinguished the English Reformation in Ireland, and then to ‘the 
Catholics that is the people of Ireland.’28 While this comment does not itself exactly 
identify Irishness and Catholicity as one and the same, it certainly does associate the 
two allegiances as being closely connected and is all the more significant for having 
come from the pen of a mid-century Protestant of the Church of Ireland. Still, 
elsewhere Davis attempted to accentuate the ‘national’ dimensions of Protestantism 
as they arose in the eighteenth century by focusing on the Protestant ‘Patriot’ 
movement of the time, and to present the Protestant presence as another one of those 
historic ‘migrations’ which formed the Irish nation – not native to the country, but 
inescapably a part of its historical development, for better or worse.
29
 In any case, 
however much Davis may have been motivated to expunge ‘bigotry’ from the 
writing of Irish history, it seems that he nonetheless regarded allegiance to 
Catholicism or Protestantism as meaningful factors in Irish history.
30
 Even more than 
that, perhaps, as Boyce has argued, that behind Davis’s non-confessional nationalism 
lay a fear of the possible consequences of a Catholic ascendancy in Ireland, and a 
sense of the ‘leadership’ of Protestants in the cause of Irish nationalism.31 
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 The most stridently Catholic nationalist of Davis’s Young Ireland contemporaries 
was probably Thomas D’Arcy McGee, though the force of his Catholic partisanship 
and sense of anti-Protestantism varied over time, lessening towards his writing of the 
Popular History of Ireland. Still, one of the keystones of D’Arcy McGee’s 
nationalism, throughout his life, was a basic sense that the Irish were in their 
innermost nature a Catholic people. He produced some of the strongest, most 
unambiguous historiographical interpretations of the synthesis of Irishness and 
Catholicism in the nationalist canon, not just in his tellingly titled Popular History of 
Ireland from the Earliest Times to the Emancipation of the Catholics,
32
 but also in 
his earlier (more stridently anti-Protestant) History of the Attempts to Establish the 
Protestant Reformation in Ireland (1853), published five years into his American 
exile.
33
 On the first page of this work he laid down explicitly the alien, foreign nature 
of Protestantism in Ireland: ‘The Anglican church is as far from the hearts of that 
people as ever...In Ulster it still flourishes; but we must remember that it was 
transplanted in its maturity to that confiscated soil.’ Of the Protestant confessions he 
said, ‘all have been tried in Irish soil, and all have failed.’34 McGee’s agenda here 
was to construct the synthesis of Irishness and Catholicism and explicate the 
inescapable ‘foreignness’ of Protestantism in the Irish nation. McGee, in his 
writings, elided sixteenth century inter-confessional conflict into a conflict of 
nationalities. Protestantism in Ireland is presented as having in its roots been about 
nothing more than oppression and land-grabbing.  Henry VIII is compared to pagan 
tyrants who had slaughtered the early Christians, just as the Norse barbarians of old 
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 had slaughtered Irish Christians and ransacked their holy places, and responsible for 
having ‘introduced that vicious confusion into the civil affairs of Ireland which has 
not yet been eliminated.’35 Henry VIII had few defenders among Irish historians, but 
P.W. Joyce, comparing him to other English rulers the Irish had suffered under, and 
noted that had Henry’s successors followed his ‘considerate and conciliatory’ policy 
and methods, they may not have made their sovereignty over Ireland totally alien to 
the people; such as in trying to force Protestantism and English culture on the Irish.
36
 
By the mid-seventeenth century, the Irish church hierarchy was all that remained of 
the old Gaelic order – McGee noted with satisfaction that the Irish Church, unlike 
the Irish nobility, had never accepted Henry VIII’s legitimacy as King of Ireland37 – 
and was alone the authentic leadership of the nation (the only remaining estate of the 
‘Celtic constitution’) and it was under its auspices that the Catholic Confederation of 
the 1640’s was formed.38 The rebellions and wars of the Irish between the 1540’s 
and the 1640’s were merely defensive, motivated by the desire to maintain 
Catholicism and resist Protestant oppression. When the ‘Old English’ Catholic lords 
finally decided to make common cause with their Gaelic counterparts, it was because 
they finally ‘began to feel the general glow of an outraged people, too long 
submissive under every species of provocation.’39 The narrative of massacres of Irish 
Protestants by Catholics during the Rebellion of 1641, one of the principal weapons 
in the historico-political armoury of English and anti-nationalist Irish Protestant 
writers was, on the other hand, to McGee, pure fabrication designed to expedite the 
Protestant’s work of land-grabbing and persecution. 40  His old Young Ireland 
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 contemporary, Charles Gavan Duffy agreed that the rebellion was simply the natural 
result of the tyranny that preceded it.
41
 McGee’s brand of narrative synthesis of 
Irishness with Catholicism and ‘othering’ of Protestantism – though more muted in 
Popular History
42
 – became highly popular and influential. It was not unpopular 
among those nationalist writers who contributed to the Nation newspaper and whose 
nationalism had been moulded in the Young Ireland movement and the ideas of 
Thomas Davis, such as A.M. Sullivan. A memoir written of him by his brother 
Timothy Daniel (‘T.D.’) Sullivan noted that A.M. had written in The Nation in 1853: 
‘in the history of our country’s past nationality and Catholicity are inextricable.’ In 
T.D.’s own words, ‘Nationality and Catholicity are the two lamps of his soul.’43 
Writings of this kind, like Sullivan’s, often presented a rather romanticised picture of 
an the unifying force of Irish Catholicity in associating different ethnic groups with 
varying and often rival interests, presenting for example the Catholic Confederation 
in this manner. Nevertheless, the historical example of the Catholic Confederation, at 
least for Catholic writers, was an attractive one insofar as it could be presented in 
such a way as to support the claim that allegiance to Catholicism had shaped the 
national self-understanding of the Irish. Another clerical nationalist writer, Thomas 
Nicholas Burke,
44
 a particularly determined opponent of James Anthony Froude, had 
expressed such inferences more boldly in his Lectures on Faith and Fatherland: ‘no 
people on the face of the earth have been so thoroughly formed into their national 
character as the Irish’ by Catholicism.45 
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 What authors such as McGee and Sullivan and even Davis demonstrated was that the 
difficulty in attempting to produce a national narrative in the Irish context that did 
not involve the nation’s religious past and religious conflicts in that past lay in the 
fact that because the nation lacked a history of continuous political existence, the 
meaning of its history had to be found in its cultural dimension. Religion, of course, 
was an integral part of that dimension. An appreciation of the same dilemma in 
relation to German history shapes Ranke’s Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der 
Reformation, in which the Reformation is judged early on to be ‘the most important 
event of our fatherland’. Here also he addressed the historical causes for the modern 
social division in Germany between Catholics and Protestants and the particular 
importance of religious affairs in German history. This History sought to investigate 
and reconstruct historical processes through which the German Kulturnation had 
developed from the Reformation. Ranke believed that only the development of the 
centuries-old potentialities and forces inherent in the historical foundations of 
German life could form the basis for any ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ modern German 
nation.
46
 Whatever his rejection of German political nationalism – at least before the 
events of 1866-1871 – his history of Germany in the age of the Reformation is one 
of the historical development of German cultural particularity. Even for Ranke the 
historical conception of the nation, indeed the idea of the nation, the nation as a 
timeless and eternal value, a kind of telos, stood at the centre of his conception of 
history, thus, according to Hayden White, he ‘required that every other form of 
social organization be regarded as an imperfect attempt to realize what he conceived 
actually to have been achieved in his own present…he considered it the task of the 
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 historian to write history in such a way as to re-enforce the principle of nationality as 
the sole safeguard against a fall into barbarism.’47  
The central argument staked out in the opening pages of the book is that the 
particularity of German history rested most of all in the depth of German 
involvement in religious or ecclesiastical matters and their relationship to the state.
48
 
It was apparent that since the Germans had lacked any form of unified political 
existence that might be regarded as national since the mid-thirteenth century, so 
German national particularity had to be established upon other grounds.
49
 Since 
straightforward political history was in itself insufficient to give the Germans ‘a 
harmonious and vivid narrative of their own past history’,50 another centre of gravity 
for the national narrative had to be found. This appears as the Protestant 
Reformation. The national mind, as it came to be expressed in the Reformation and 
Protestantism, had to be substituted for the absent political constitution of the 
nation.
51
 This is what was meant by his claim that the history of Germany possessed 
to an unparalleled degree ‘the outstanding characteristic of traversing all the 
centuries in an unbroken continuity’ a statement then qualified by the observation 
that historical continuity as such could be ‘narrated’ but never ‘proved’. 52  The 
‘unbroken continuity’ he referred to was the Germans’ perennial concern with the 
importance of religion for the national community and the relations of church and 
state. The investigation of this form of continuity could help to ‘reveal the content of 
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 German history and to experience the effective vital spirit of the nation within it’, 
and ‘to give body to an otherwise vague national consciousness’.53 On the first page 
of this History Ranke asserted: ‘it is impossible to conceive a nation worthy of the 
name…whose political existence is not constantly guided by religious ideas.’54 He 
argued, ‘Germany is a striking example to what an extent the popular mind of a 
Western nation received direction from ecclesiastical principles.’55  
This History is concerned not only with the relationship between religion and the 
development of national consciousness, but how politico-religious conflicts both 
supported and impeded this development. The course of German history had turned 
on the conflict between the Emperors and the Papacy, between the German 
Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Ranke expressly denied, early in the text, 
that the Papacy had ever held legitimate authority over the Holy Roman Empire. The 
contest between Popes and Emperors had not advanced the power of the Emperors 
and the Empire: as the Emperors’ power waned, the Papacy’s increased, which 
weakened the Empire further.
56
 By 1300, Rome ‘avowed her claim to hold the reins 
of secular as well as spiritual authority.’ ‘What trace of independence can a nation 
retain after submitting to receive its head from the hands of a foreign power?’ asked 
Ranke. Now the Papacy possessed, having prevailed over the German Emperors 
‘uncontested, the supreme sovereignty of Europe.’ Even as the Middle Ages waned 
‘circumstances at length occurred which awakened in the German nation a 
consciousness of the position for which nature designed it’, ‘the nation’ would 
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 remain ‘exasperated by a constant sense of wrong and injustice’, attempts made ‘to 
constitute the Germanic body’ repeatedly came to nothing.57 The imperial idea had 
become an anti-national influence; and the same influence of Papal power an 
enduring force in German history.
58
 The decline of imperial authority and growing 
might of the Popes had precipitated ‘a grave discussion on spiritual affairs had 
become inevitable.’59  The discussion became the Reformation, the most epochal 
event of German history. In its early days, Ranke claimed, ‘A nobler prospect for the 
unity of the nation and for the further progress of the German people…certainly 
never presented itself.’ 60  Naturally, the Papacy opposed any attempt to forge a 
compact between Protestants and Catholics in Germany, not because it could have 
no accommodation with heretics, but because the prospect of German unity ‘was 
threatening and disastrous’ to Rome.61 German attempts to judge on ‘the important 
affair which occupied the whole mind of the nation’ were sabotaged by the Papacy, 
and ‘such was the origin of a division which has never been healed; which has 
constantly been kept open by the same foreign influences that originally caused it.’62 
At length and repeatedly German disunity is identified with damaging foreign 
influences and disunity with weakness of the German people. The History closes 
with the reminder that the history of the Reformation was followed by that of the 
Counter-Reformation, and in Germany, a catastrophic conflict.
63
 Yet despite this, 
and though ‘the original efforts filled the age which we have considered, could not 
with complete freedom and energy be resumed again’, the Reformation had 
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 nonetheless been indispensable to an independent development for the nation in the 
future, and had indeed ‘connected the beginnings of our history with its farthest 
future.’64 At the centre of the History stands the continuity-building effect of the age-
old antagonism between Germany and Rome and the Reformation, and the 
intellectually and politically emancipating power of German Protestantism. Martin 
Luther, appropriately, was the hero of Ranke’s narrative. Luther’s career resonated 
with the historical demands of the German national genius for self-determination and 
self-expression, while Catholic actors are associated with foreignness and mere 
political motives.
65
 Germany had made its bid in the sixteenth century to become an 
organized political self under the guidance of universal moral values had been 
internalized in the Protestant religious conscience.
66
 On the other hand, as Ranke 
conceded, the confessional divide, even if it was largely aggravated by foreigners, 
remained a problem among present-day Germans for ‘national consciousness.’ The 
Reformation, for better or worse, had defined the epoch in which Kaiser and Reich 
became separated, with whatever remained of German imperial unity from the 
medieval era transforming into a system of territorial states joined only by nominal 
allegiance to the Empire.
67
 Still, having been the result of ‘peculiar German genius’, 
it could not have attained the success it did without the rise of the princely states.
68
 
Through the Reformation the German nation had continued its historic task to defend 
Christianity from its enemies. Ranke’s history of the Reformation left two great 
certainties to the reader: the German nation was a Protestant one, and German 
national freedom depended on the breaking of the power of ‘Rome’ over Germany. 
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 It was a commonplace tactic among both German and Irish historians, therefore, to 
attribute the confessional divide in the nation’s past to the effects of foreign 
interference and predations in the past, rather than admit the possibility that that the 
primary cause lay within some ‘deficiency’ of the nation. The Irish historian John 
Mitchel (1815-1875), as a Protestant who rejected so many of the political and social 
notions and ideas of his community, was determined to neutralize confessional 
difference as a source of conflict within Ireland and to make Irishness independent of 
one’s own confessional allegiance. In doing this he attributed, with near complete 
certainty, past conflicts of Protestants and Catholics in entirety to the malignancy of 
British rule in Ireland. Mitchel became one of the most influential Irish nationalists 
of the century, rivalling even Davis, not least because of his unrestrained militancy 
and hatred of Britain and all that comprised ‘British civilisation’.69 While Lecky 
would condemn him for his ‘blind, savage, and stupid hatred of England’,70 Patrick 
Pearse, leader of the Easter Rising of 1916, would regard him as one of the most 
important of all Irish nationalists. As the son of a Presbyterian and later Unitarian 
minister in Ulster who may have taken part in the 1798 Rebellion, and formerly a 
lawyer who had defended Ulster Catholics in court after violent clashes with 
Protestants and experienced the anti-Catholicism of the British state for himself, 
John Mitchel was by any measure an unusual figure as Irish Protestants went. In his 
years of exile in America Mitchel had authored his History of Ireland from the 
Treaty of Limerick to the Present Time (1868-1869), which, interestingly, was itself 
a continuation to the history of Ireland up to 1690 that had been written by a 
seventeenth-century Catholic Irish Jacobite cleric called MacGeoghegan. Mitchel 
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 rejected the grand historical narratives of his age which took for granted the onward 
march of human progress and perfectibility. He took a more cyclical view of world 
events, believing that the powerful would inevitably one day be brought down, and 
that their place would be taken by nations presently weak or oppressed (the Christian 
accent of such a view of history seems obvious). In Mitchel’s History animosity 
between the confessional communities in Ireland appears as the enemy of all the 
people of Ireland, but the narrative itself is generally unsympathetic to the historical 
narrative of Irish Protestants and suffused with a kind of religious language that 
identified Ireland’s true enemy, ‘England’, as the source of all evil in Irish history.  
Mitchel began his History in the eighteenth century, with the close of the ethno-
religious conflicts of the seventeenth, and he noted early the gradual rise through the 
eighteenth century of ‘a strong sentiment of Irish nationality’. The Protestant 
minority, ‘having now totally put down the ancient nation under their feet’, aspired 
‘to rise from a colony to a nation, and to assert the dignity of an independent 
kingdom.’ This early colonial patriotism aspired only to the defence of Protestant 
rights in Ireland; yet it held the ancient Catholic nation in contempt. Mitchel did not 
miss an opportunity to highlight Protestant hypocrisy. Their object ‘was not so much 
to convert Catholics to Protestantism, as to convert the goods of Catholics to 
Protestant use.’ Writing of the first half of the eighteenth century Mitchel judged: ‘It 
is impossible to exaggerate, and hard to conceive in all its horror, the misery and 
degradation of the Catholic people throughout this whole period’. 71  Mitchel 
associates the increased liberality of some elite Protestant attitudes towards Catholics 
in the 1780s with the growth of national sentiment among Protestants.
72
 The efforts 
from this time of Protestant nationalists eventually came to constitute ‘the charter of 
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 Irish freedom, embracing all the points necessary for the perfect independence of the 
country…enlightened liberality made a wonderfully rapid progress in our native 
Parliament during the era of its glory.’ The Protestants of Ireland had realized, for 
the first time that their true enemy was not their Catholic countrymen, but their 
British co-religionists. Mitchel, regarding the problem of Protestant-Catholic conflict 
as merely a manifestation of ‘English’ tyranny and not as a deeper Irish problem 
referred, to the ‘grand English policy of sowing dissensions and bad feelings 
between Catholics and Dissenters.’ Those few Protestant leaders who endeavoured 
‘to heal the animosities of ages’,73 represented a singly important truth: that Britain 
would never tolerate a union of confessions in Ireland. Ultimately, they were a 
minority even among their own: ‘…This radical vice is enough to account for the 
short life of Ireland as an independent nation.’74 Regarding the inter-confessional 
violence that took place during the Rebellion of 1798, the great event in the history 
of Protestant involvement in Irish nationalism, Mitchel accounted for it as simply the 
regrettable effect of rebellion among a brutalized people, and highlighted the 
violence of the government troops and loyalist militia.
75
 
In Mitchel’s History, neither Protestantism nor Catholicism is associated with 
Irishness so as to ‘exclude’ the other. The principal point to grasp is that Mitchel 
wants to make clear that much of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Irish 
Protestantism was simply a cloak to cover mere rapacity and tyranny, and that the 
true source of division in Irish society was not really religious antagonism, which 
could be reconciled and in any case had been caused by ‘foreign’ influence, but a 
clash of cultures which was permanent; one between the Irish and the British. 
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 Protestant-Catholic hatred in Ireland was in fact an arm of British oppression, to 
uphold religious bigotry and inequality was to stand as an enemy against the Irish 
nation. The Irish nation could only be emancipated and realized through the end of 
Protestant-Catholic antagonism, which could only be made possible through 
unrelenting opposition to British rule. There was absolute certainty in Mitchel that 
Britain, and only Britain, had been the source and the cause of all religiously-
inspired hatred in Irish history. Mitchel both identified himself with the ancient – 
Gaelic and Catholic – Irish nation that had resisted and suffered throughout his 
history, and he railed against those ‘Catholic writers who are so determined to be 
impartial, that they lean to the party to which they abhor’,76 while also taking pride 
in the Protestant contribution. Mitchel was not a secular nationalist but it was his 
hope that the disuniting implications of religious or confessional allegiance in 
Ireland could be overcome by a commitment to Irish culture and nationalism.
77
 In an 
earlier work Mitchel had remarked: ‘Whatever god or demon may have led the first 
of them to these shores; the [Protestant] Anglo-Irish and Scottish Ulstermen have 
now far too old a title to be questioned’. While the origins of Irish Protestantism may 
have been ‘too sanguinary’, he added, ‘yet, now, amongst the national 
institutions…the church, so far as it is a spiritual teacher, must positively be 
reckoned.’78 The possible implication of this was that Irish Protestants ‘excused’ 
themselves from the burden of the past when they stopped playing the role of 
Britain’s ‘garrison’ in Ireland. In Mitchel’s History Britain was nothing less than a 
force for evil in Irish history – ‘While England lives and flourishes, Ireland must die 
a daily death, and suffer an endless martyrdom’, ‘If Irishmen are ever to enjoy their 
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 rights as human beings, the British Empire must first perish’79 – and the Irish nation 
is the ‘martyr-nation’, the subject of an epic story of trial, redemption, and eventual 
justice.
80
 Mitchel, like most other Irish historians of his time, ‘would not let go of the 
penal days’,81 being either unwilling or unable, or both. In very clearly blaming 
Ireland’s sectarian past on British misrule and on Britain’s loyalists in Ireland, he 
sought to eliminate confessional allegiance as a factor in national identity. If his 
position was somewhat ambivalent in the Irish context, it hardly had any parallel in 
the German context, where both Protestant and Catholic historians were generally 
much more forthright in ‘confessionalizing’ Germanness.  
The position of W.E.H. Lecky on Ireland’s religious history was not entirely 
dissimilar to Mitchel’s. Lecky saw much to criticise in Catholicism. Even if it had 
‘contributed much both to the attractive charm and the sterling excellence of the Irish 
character’, it was still ‘on the whole a lower type of religion.82 However, Lecky did 
not blame the problems of Irish history on the Catholicism of the Irish, at least not 
nearly as much as he did on the record of English and British (Protestant) policy in 
Ireland.
83
 He regarded the confessional division as perhaps the worst element 
working to hinder progress in Irish history, yet regarded its primary cause as the 
persecution of Catholicism.
84
 He could hardly have been called sparing in his 
condemnations of the record of Irish Protestantism, from its arrival in Ireland up to 
the nineteenth century.
85
 As a direct result of Protestant oppression, ‘Catholicism 
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 acquired an almost undivided empire over the affections and imaginations of the 
people.’ In contrast to the intolerance of Irish Protestantism, ‘it is a memorable fact 
that not a single Protestant suffered for his religion in Ireland’.86 While he sometimes 
claimed that in truth Protestant-Catholic conflict had had far less to do with Anglo-
Irish conflict than was commonly supposed, he did not dispute that the war of the 
1640s had been an ethno-religious one, and more interestingly, he argued that the 
principle of Irish independence had first been effectively established by the Catholic 
rebels and Confederates of the 1640’s and later the Catholic Irish Jacobites. It was 
after the crushing of these Catholic parties ‘the banner which dropped from their 
hands was caught up by Protestants’.87  
When he came to the eighteenth century, his favourite period of Irish history, 
Lecky’s warm approval of Grattan’s late eighteenth-century parliament was 
precisely because of its tolerance and developing liberality towards the Catholics. He 
hammered the Protestant clergy in his writings for their anti-national hostility, while 
at the same time attacking the Catholic bishops for handing over the country as a 
weapon in the service of the Vatican in its conflict with Protestant England.
88
 In 
Lecky’s History of Ireland, at least, the problem of confessional animosity in Ireland 
appears less as the result of a cultural antagonism than as one of oppressive, 
tyrannical government, but the measure of ‘blame’ for the extent of Protestant-
Catholic antagonism within Ireland is weighted against the Protestants’ historical 
record. The significance of religion and religious conflict in Irish history is 
emphasized and downplayed at various points, so that it becomes an important part 
of that history but nonetheless influenced and conditioned more by the nature of the 
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 political relationships between Ireland and Britain. Thus for example Lecky 
downplays, perhaps surprisingly, the importance of religion and confessional conflict 
in the sixteenth century (in this period land ownership was the more important issue, 
Lecky thought), while emphasizing it for history during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. It is also worth remembering that despite his relatively tolerant 
frame of mind, as expressed in his Leaders of Public Opinion of Ireland, his History 
of Ireland, and in other works; his own idea of the Irish nation remains culturally 
Protestant and Anglo-Irish, taking for granted Protestantism’s intellectual superiority 
and aptitude for political and social leadership (not entirely unlike Protestant German 
historians did). In the Irish context, however, the choice of a Protestant writer could 
result in that writer being regarded as the ‘defender’ of the historical record of Irish 
Catholicism, as happened to Lecky, who ended up in the strange company of the 
writers who regarded English anti-Catholicism as just another manifestation of an 
ingrained, centuries-old, irreconcilable English hatred of the Irish that had been the 
continuous guiding element of English policy in Ireland, and Irishness and 
Catholicity is indivisible.
89
 A selective mixing of Catholic and certain Protestant 
views of Irish history would express much of the character of Irish nationalists’ 
disposition towards Irish confessional antagonism as the nineteenth century 
advanced. By contrast, as we shall see, the ‘battle lines’ were drawn much more 
clearly in the German context.  
In both Irish and German contexts, the significance of Protestant-Catholic 
antagonism and confessional antagonism was linked with the question of which 
community bore responsibility for the important events of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. In Ireland, this debate centred on the 1641 Rebellion, the 
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 Protestant ‘massacre narrative’ of the Rebellion and the motives of both the Rebels 
and the later Catholic Confederates; and in Germany, on the causes of the 
Reformation, responsibility for the Thirty Years’ War and the motivations of the 
various parties in the conflict. The question of whether or not the Irish Catholic 
rebels of 1641 had indeed planned and executed, as generations of Protestant 
commentators and historians had maintained since, a general massacre of Irish 
Protestants in Ulster, was regarded as central to the historical ‘case’ for Irish 
nationalism, and indeed that against it.
90
 The partisans of each side tended either to 
accept the veracity of the ‘massacre’ narrative wholly, or reject it entirely as 
propaganda and justification for English persecution of the Irish, with little nuance. 
Even Lecky, who came the closest to providing nineteenth-century Ireland with a 
‘professional’ historian of note and considerable scholarship, when carrying out his 
research on the 1641 Rebellion failed to examine the original text of Protestant 
testimonies on the rebellion, apparently regarding them as too untrustworthy to merit 
attention.
91
 In A.M. Sullivan’s account, however, the Rebellion of 1641 is 
represented simply as natural and just retribution for the Plantation of Ulster and the 
depredation of the old Gaelic and ‘Old English’ Catholic nobility, gentry, and 
common people of the province over the course of decades. The defensive nature of 
the rebellion is emphasized, and contrasted with the disloyalty and avarice of the 
rebels’ enemies. Sullivan dismissed out of hand the alleged wholesale massacres of 
Protestants in Ulster by the Catholic rebels. He referred to them as ‘monstrous 
fictions’, and  agreed with Thomas D’Arcy McGee’s judgement that not a single 
‘public document or private letter [at the outset of the rebellion]…so much as allude 
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 to those tales of blood and horror afterwards so industriously circulated and so 
greedily swallowed.’92 McGee, for his part, had practically glossed over completely 
even the accusation of a massacre of Protestants by Catholics in his Popular History. 
In his earlier History of the Attempts to Establish the Protestant Reformation in 
Ireland he had conceded that in some instances the Catholics had ‘certainly showed 
a revengeful and merciless spirit in refusing quarter’ to Protestants, but insisted that 
such actions had occurred in the context of far worse massacres of Catholic civilians 
by Protestant soldiery. He added, ‘Instances of individual revenge, of unnecessary 
bloodshed, no doubt there were…but a general or even local ‘massacre’ never 
occurred.’93 In Sullivan’s judgement the reports of massacres of Protestants were 
fabricated in their entirety to ‘justify’ already conceived plans for more plantations in 
Ireland, for more robbery of the native Irish, whether Gaelic or ‘Old English’.94 In a 
lengthy footnote he reasserts his denial that there was any planned massacre of 
Protestants by Catholics, highlighting ‘the baseness and wickedness of the massacre 
story’, conceding only that there may have been excesses normal in wartime, citing 
the work of two eighteenth Protestant historians in his defence, who apparently did 
not lend the ‘massacre story’ very much credence. He does not go into specifics 
regarding those ‘recent historians’ who were ‘citing original documents’. Against the 
deceitful machinations of the English, Sullivan contrasts the Irish commitment to 
‘righteous ends by righteous means’, and to ‘fair and honourable warfare’,95 and in 
contrast to his dismissal of massacres of Protestants by the Irish, he makes much of 
the ferocious and wholesale massacres of the Catholic Irish by the Protestant English 
and Scottish soldiery. John Mitchel, in his The Crusade of the Period, in which he 
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 tore into Froude’s The English in Ireland, scornfully denied the veracity of the 
massacre narrative.
96
 Another noted Protestant historian, J.P. Prendergast, also 
seemed to agree that in its substance the massacre narrative was an English 
invention, adding that the Irish of the time ‘lacked gall to supply a wholesome 
animosity to the eternal enemies and revilers of their name and nation.’97 Lecky 
reiterated that fear had been the most central motivation for the Rebellion of 1641, 
and even when the Rebellion came, its immediate objectives were merely tolerance 
for Catholics and a just land settlement. Lecky denied that the Rebellion was 
distinguished in its beginning by a planned massacre of tens of thousands of 
Protestants, yet he conceded that there were individual outrages,
98
 and argued that 
certain Irish historians diminished themselves when they attempted to deny that there 
were any outrages at all, or dealt only with the crimes of the English. Still, ‘the most 
savage national and religious hatred predisposed the English [at the time] to 
exaggerate to the utmost the crimes of their enemies’. It could not be forgotten that 
the Protestant ‘massacre’ narrative had been circulated ‘for the purpose of preventing 
the subsequent peace by representing the whole Irish nation as so infamous that any 
attempt to make terms with them was criminal.’ 99  It embodied just the sort of 
‘history’ that offended Lecky, but that history could be just as easily written by 
Catholics as Protestants, which too attracted Lecky’s complaint. It was ultimately 
however, the writings of individuals like Mitchel, Sullivan, and McGee that had the 
most popular and lasting influence. It was they (and others) who maintained that the 
Catholic Confederation of the 1640’s had been, for all its shortcomings, a ‘national’ 
government; Lecky, by contrast, paid it less attention in the introduction to the first 
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 volume of the History of Ireland. However, Lecky had no doubt that the 
‘Cromwellian Settlement’ was ‘the foundation of that deep and lasting division’ that 
was ‘the chief cause of the political and social evils of Ireland.’100  
In parallel to the debates in Irish historiography about causation and responsibility 
for the Rebellion of 1641 and the ‘national’ significance of the Catholic 
Confederation, causes of the German Reformation, responsibility for the Thirty 
Years’ War, and the actions of historical personalities involved in these events, were 
causes of dispute in German nationalist historiography. We have noted that the 
writing of Irish nationalist history was to a certain extent non-confessional in respect 
of the influence achieved by writers of Protestant background. In the German 
context, even if their influence was restricted, Catholic historians did not allow the 
conventional Protestant narrative to go wholly uncontested, as for example in 
disputes regarding the history of the Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War. The 
Protestant narrative had practically invited a Catholic counter-narrative. The 
principal fault-line in German national historiography, at least in the nineteenth 
century, was more than anything the Protestant-Catholic antagonism. Janssen’s 
Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, strongly disliked as it was by Protestant historians, 
had in its own way contributed to that deep ‘chasm’ 101  between Protestant and 
Catholic history writing described by Weber as the ‘most passionate struggle’ within 
the bounds of Bismarck-era historiography.
102
 Janssen described the reformers of the 
sixteenth century as ‘the revolutionary party’, who exploited the ‘anarchy’ in the 
Empire preceding the election of Charles V as Emperor, and maintained that already 
before this happened ‘Luther’s alliance with the revolution party was [now] an 
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 accomplished fact.’ 103 Luther’s famous 1520 Address to the Christian Nobility of the 
German Nation, which Protestant commentators regarded as a kind of sixteenth-
century declaration of German national independence against Rome, Janssen 
regarded as ‘the actual declaration of war of the Lutheran-Hutten revolutionary 
party…With unsparing energy Luther endeavoured to stir up German national 
feeling against Italy and in favour of his own cause…Luther’s address to the German 
nobility was a martial summons to the fiercest onslaught.’104 Protestant historians, 
for their part, regarded Janssen’s History as proof that there could be no such thing 
as national German Catholic historiography. Janssen was accused of ‘religious 
fanaticism’, ‘refined tendentiousness’, ‘systematic sophistry’, and the purveyance of 
‘poisonous bouquets’, as ‘ultramontane’.105  It was not even well-received by all 
Catholic historians, Martin Spahn, for one, regarded it as too partisan. He rather, 
more like Protestant historians, had regarded the Reformation as the result of the 
moral Verdorbenheit and the Wissenschaftsfeindlichkeit of the medieval Church, and 
his conclusions were gratefully received by Protestant historians.
106
 Still, Janssen, 
along with others such as Julius von Ficker and Onno Klopp (1822-1903) were 
among the sharpest critics of the idea that Protestant Prussia was historically 
destined to lead German unification (which they found mendacious) and that 
Catholicism was an anti-national element in German history.
107
 The Holy Roman 
Empire, up to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at any rate, was regarded as a 
fundamentally sound political system which had preserved German liberty and 
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 defended German interests, and the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years’ War had 
been one of rebellion (in league with the French) and despotism.
108
 Catholicism was 
a guarantee of national unity against Protestantism, which had always pursued 
particularistic interests to the expense of the nation,
109
 German Catholics had the 
more historically valid claim to be the heirs of true historical ‘Germanness’, and the 
empire as having been the institution that had given expression to German national 
identity.
110
 Their writings ‘mirrored a prevailing mood of apprehension among 
Germany’s Catholics about the fate of the German Confederation’111 up to and after 
the foundation of the Kaiserreich under a Protestant dynasty and the perception that 
German Catholics were ‘second-class citizens’, looked down upon as a backward 
and ‘foreign’ element within the nation (which seemed to be confirmed by the anti-
Catholic measures of the Kulturkampf).  
The figures of Emperor Charles V and Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, and of 
course later figures such as Frederick the Great, excited particular controversy 
between Protestant and Catholic writers. Charles was regarded by Protestant writers 
as a foreigner, a scion of the dynasties of Spain and Burgundy, who had thwarted the 
Reformation in Germany from the start, rejected the German national 
‘Sonderbildung’ of the Reformation, betraying his German subjects and condemning 
them to terrible ethno-religious warfare and centuries of political impotence and 
disunity.
112
 Catholic writers saw him quite simply, in contrast, as a just and faithful 
ruler who had been beset by power-hungry, opportunistic traitors who had wrecked 
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 any prospect for German unity within the Empire – the German princes. Gustavus 
Adolphus of Sweden was seen among Protestant writers as a Germanic hero who had 
tried to rescue Germany from Catholic tyranny, or at least as a defender of Protestant 
Germany, and through his enshrinement as a Protestant hero the claim could be put 
forth that the Protestant cause had been not just a German cause but a supra-national, 
European one, for the spiritual and political freedom of all European lands from the 
Roman yoke.
113
 German Protestantism, wrote Johannes Haller in 1932, could write 
‘no better name on its shield than that of the Swedish king who three hundred years 
ago fought and fell for the survival of the Protestant faith.’ 114  Even Ranke had 
claimed that the Protestant German princes had entered into an alliance with 
Gustavus Adolphus, ‘because it was his mission to save Protestantism and to restore 
the old state of affairs in the Reich’.115  So Gustav Freytag could write, prior to 
unification of the new German state that would be led by Protestant Prussia, that 
Germany eventually ‘would inevitably take its rightful place alongside Great Britain 
in the forefront of a hegemonic Protestant civilisation.’116 ‘In the year 1813’, he went 
on, ‘we find the conclusion of that great struggle which began in 1517…From this 
life and death struggle of 300 years, Germany passed from the bondage of the 
Middle Ages into Freedom…From the time [of Martin Luther] to the march of the 
German volunteers against Napoleon’, he continued, ‘the German spirit carried on a 
great defensive war against foreign influence, which issuing from Rome well-nigh 
overwhelmed those who had once been the conquerors of the Roman Empire.’117 For 
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 Freytag, German history took the form of a stark and inescapable confrontation 
between Protestant (native Germanic) and Catholic (foreign, Latin, degenerate) 
cultures, and Luther had revealed more than any other before or since the greatness 
of the German Wesen. To reduce him to nothing much more than the leader of a 
faction was a great error.
118
 As Larry Ping has put it, ‘It is scarcely an exaggeration 
to describe sections of the Bilder as a Kulturkampf in print.’119 To Catholic writers 
Gustavus Adolphus had been merely a foreign invader in league with France whose 
only real concern was the expansion of his own power, into northern Germany.
120
 In 
a brief pamphlet on Gustav Adolf in Deutschland (1865), Johannes Janssen reflected 
on the first page that Gustavus Adolphus, who had ‘put his foot on the neck’ of the 
Germans, had become a ‘celebrated national hero’ and ‘ideal hero of belief’, who 
had given his life for the cause of ‘German independence’ among the Germans of the 
nineteenth century, or at any rate, the Protestant historians. This judgement was of 
course closely linked with the error that perceived the Thirty Years’ War as a war of 
religions for Protestant freedom rather than the foreign-backed civil war and 
rebellion against the legitimate authority of the Kaiser and Reich. Both sides, in both 
contexts, had usable heroes on which to project their own ideological statements,
121
 
and both sides, in both contexts, consistently portrayed the other in their assessments 
of the early modern era as having been motivated more by power-political than 
sincerely religious concerns, as so many Catholic Irish historians did when they 
wrote of the Reformation in Ireland. In the Irish context, writers (generally Catholic 
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 ones) emphasised the ‘national’ character of the rebellion of the sixteenth century 
Catholic hero Hugh O’Neill and the ‘faith and fatherland’ motives of the ‘rank-and-
file’ participants of the 1798 Rebellion. For German historians, Charles V stood for 
continuity, either for a glorious old empire or German decline under foreign 
influences; Gustavus Adolphus for new beginnings, either of a ‘modern’ and truly 
German nation – which might also be seen as the ‘recovery’ of the ancient Germanic 
spirit of freedom – and a link to the rise of Hohenzollern Prussia, or the sundering of 
Germany from the political and cultural world in which it had been anchored for 
centuries. As in Irish nationalist (or anti-nationalist) historiography, German 
historians, whether Protestant or Catholic, could not, for the most part, divorce 
historical judgement of the religio-political events of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries from contemporary political (and cultural) judgements.  
The link drawn between Catholicism and ‘anti-German’ forces in past and present, 
itself an expression of a more general fear of ‘German disunity’, even after 
‘unification’, was perhaps nowhere more belligerently expressed (in the milieu of the 
cultured Bildungsbürgertum) than in the writing of Heinrich von Treitschke.
122
 For 
Treitschke, the political and cultural unity of Germany only appeared conceivable in 
contrast to Catholicism. He did fully believe that the Germans were peculiarly suited, 
even destined, to be the people of the Reformation and of Protestantism. In an essay 
on ‘Martin Luther and the German Nation’, he made clear that the Reformation had 
created the moral and intellectual backbone of the idea of the German nation, the 
new religion being rooted in ‘the innermost centre of the people’s nature’.123 The 
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 Reformation represented, excepting only perhaps the medieval Ostsiedlung, the first 
truly collective effort of the entire German nation.
124
 Though Luther came to occupy 
the status of a leader of the nation that supplanted either Kaiser or Reich,
125
 the 
national resurgence of the Reformation was not fully realised: ‘the nation was unable 
to secure the universal victory on German soil of its own special work, the 
Reformation, and was likewise unable to rejuvenate its own national state’.126 In his 
Politics, in the essay on religion, Treitschke claimed that,  
‘A nation without religion has never existed, nor ever can exist...without the community 
of religion the consciousness of national unity is impossible...though confessional 
differences can by endured by a great Volk, if not without great difficulty – how much 
blood has this cost us in Germany! – continued existence of several religions within one 
nationality, involving an irreconcilabe and ultimately intolerable difference of outlook 
upon life, can only be a transitional phenomenon.’127  
The German national religion could only be Protestant Christianity, as Germany, 
culturally and intellectually, was Protestant, to such a degree that even German 
Catholicism had been formed by its exposure to German Protestantism. German 
Protestantism could claim the unique achievement of having ‘nationalised’ 
Catholicism, in Germany. ‘Protestantism is the form of Christianity suited to 
Germany’, yet ‘the educated German Catholic stands nearer to his Protestant 
compatriot in his religious conceptions than he does to his Spanish or South 
American co-religionist.’ 128  Protestantism embodied ‘the actual setting free of 
Germany’ from the foreign yoke of the Papacy, and ‘was the direct outcome of an 
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 internal conflict waged in an honest conscience.’129 Treitschke is referring here of 
course to Luther, who deserved to be honoured as the hero and teacher of the entire 
German nation.
130
 He represented a kind of general, transhistorical symbol of 
German defiance to all enemies of the nation.
131
 Modern Germans had Luther and 
the Reformation to thank for Wissenschaft, the separation of Church and State, the 
liberation of Germany from ‘foreign’ domination, the German language, and German 
culture.
132
 Through Luther, the Germans had laboured for the cause of all peoples, as 
well. To Treitschke, Luther, or the image of Luther as the adversary of Rome, gave 
form to the truth that ‘the historical world is the world of the will, because the 
destiny of a people is fixed not in thought but in the deed.’133 The Reformation and 
Protestantism satisfied ‘the untamable independence of the German character.’134 
German devotion to Protestantism embodied what German history otherwise lacked 
in continuity, and the conceit of a defiant stand throughout centuries of history 
against foreignness and rootless, degenerate cosmopolitanism, and a strong means of 
ethnic and cultural ‘Othering’. The eighteenth and nineteenth century ‘awakening’ of 
the German nation in the nineteenth century and its prelude was rooted in 
Protestantism. Frederick the Great, Treitschke’s other great hero, had been the 
resolute defender of German Protestantism throughout his reign, whose 
‘establishment of the Protestant-German power was the most serious reverse that the 
Roman See had experienced since the rise of Luther. King Frederick had in 
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 truth...been fighting for the freedom of the human race.’135 The Catholic German 
dynasties, by contrast, were ‘estranged from German life by hereditary association 
with France as well as the rigidity of Catholic unity.’136 For the Prussians who led 
the liberation of Germany from the godless Napoleon, Treitschke was certain, ‘The 
old German God, to whom they prayed, was the God of the Protestants.’137 There 
was little space left for Catholic Germans in Treitschke’s writing, if any at all, as 
indicated by his hostility to Catholicism.  
Yet it is of certain note that the conventional Protestant German historical narrative 
found some acceptance among Catholic writers towards the end of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth, an example of this being Martin Spahn, a 
leading figure in the Catholic Zentrum Party and later among the ‘Rechtskatholiken’, 
and one of the most important representatives of ‘borussischen Katholizismus.’138 
His conception of German history had been shaped by his reading of the great 
Protestant national historians of the late nineteenth century, particularly Treitschke. 
As part of his own efforts to integrate Prussian history into the narrative of German 
history and represent it as the Vorgeschichte of the Reichsgründung, he argued for 
the Hohenzollern Empire as the direct continuation of the medieval empire, of the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and sought to find a reconciling middle 
way between Protestant and Catholic historiographies of German history. In the 
controversy over Janssen’s Geschichte he took an oppositional position to his fellow 
Catholic, and his judgements of Germany’s history during the Reformation, the 
seventeenth century, and the post-Westphalia age were well-received by Protestant 
contemporaries. As much as he hoped for the re-inclusion of Catholics into the 
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 contemporary life of the nation he desired a revival of the creative energies of 
Catholicism in Germany and a strengthening of Catholic influences in the cultural 
life of the nation.  
On the other hand, however, Spahn had also written a number of lengthy articles for 
the Catholic Encyclopedia on German historical matters, including entries on the 
Thirty Years’ War, Prussia, Emperor Charles V, the Kulturkampf and a very lengthy 
and comprehensive entry on German history from 1556 to 1618 Here one can detect 
a definite Catholic inflection in his writing of German history, as when he explains 
the primary cause of the Thirty Years’ War has having been the decay of imperial 
unity thanks to the ‘gross lack of patriotism’, and consequently, other nations began 
to prey on German territory.’139  Charles V’s abdication of the imperial throne in 
1556 was ‘a serious break in the continuity of the political and religious history of 
the German people.’ It resulted from the ‘separatist tendencies of the princes’, the 
supposed defenders of the Protestant German nation: ‘the common consciousness of 
nationality was…dulled in the princes by political selfishness.’140 His judgment of 
Gustavus Adolphus was not overly friendly: the Swedish king was a mere conqueror, 
and an unwanted one at that.
141
 In any case, it suffices to say that Spahn did not 
regard Catholicism and Germanness as incompatible; yet he also prioritized his own 
version of the conventional narrative, regarding the Kaiserreich as ‘a development 
that had been in progress for many centuries’.142   
The Mitchel-McGee-Sullivan influence finds strong expression in the writing of 
Patrick Pearse, the twentieth-century Irish nationalist, militant separatist 
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 revolutionary, and leader of the Easter Rising of 1916. This in itself is a neat 
historical irony, as Sullivan and McGee at any rate, by the time they wrote their 
histories, were though nationalists firmly opposed to violence on moral and 
pragmatic grounds, which earned them much detestation from revolutionary-minded 
nationalists. Yet their historical writings would form an important part of the 
ideological ‘armoury’ of the successful militant separatists of the twentieth century. 
In the last several months of his life, between Christmas 1915 and early 1916, Pearse 
had sought to establish a historical-moral precedent for the national uprising he had 
committed himself to in four brief pamphlets (each only around twenty pages long): 
Ghosts, The Separatist Idea, The Spiritual Nation, and The Sovereign People.
143
 In 
these pamphlets the ‘sacralization’ of the Irish nation, and an implicit association 
between the history of the Irish nation with that of the Irish Catholic people, finds its 
strongest expression. Pearse outlined his conception of nationhood and national 
freedom as literally sacred: ‘national freedom bears the marks of unity, of sanctity, 
of catholicity, of apostolic succession.’144 His brief sketch of the unbroken continuity 
of Irish resistance to England since the late twelfth century further on, during the 
‘eight hundred years of oppression’, while studiously avoiding mention of the words 
‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’ had the ‘Sullivanite’ character of a redemptive saga of 
struggle and sacrifice, which had ensured the continued existence of the Irish 
nation.
145 In Pearse’s words, ‘Irish nationality is an ancient spiritual 
tradition…Politically, Ireland’s claim has been for freedom…any undertaking made 
in the name of Ireland to accept in full satisfaction of Ireland’s claim anything less 
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 than the generations of Ireland have stood for is null and void, binding on Ireland 
neither by the law of God nor by the law of nations.’146 Those who had repudiated 
the need for separation had failed not only ignobly but shamefully, immorally, even 
evilly.
147
 Pearse sought not only to retrace the historical experience of the supposed 
unbroken continuity of Irish resistance but also to condemn the shameful, sinful 
failure of those who thought nationhood could be achieved without separation. 
Pearse was always motivated by the certainty that, ‘nationality is spirituality...a 
spiritual unity’, no ‘mere agglomeration of individuals, but a living organic thing, 
with a body and a soul’.148 The nation was the most natural of human associations, 
God-given while empires (i.e. Britain’s) were profane, if not the work of evil.149 This 
is language taken straight from Mitchel. Pearse permits no discontinuity in Irish 
history as far as the timeless idea of ‘Separatism’ is concerned. To a remarkable 
degree, in Pearse’s writing, historical change is removed from Irish history; 
everything worth commenting on has its place in relation to the idea of 
‘Separatism’. 150  A reading of these pamphlets shows that Pearse’s final and 
unequivocal acceptance of the necessity of the use of physical force, of violent 
struggle, was in no small measure owed to his own view of Irish history, which had 
been owed to Mitchel in particular.
151
 Yeats, during a debate with Pearse at Trinity 
College in 1914, had lamented that he seemed to elevate hatred of England over love 
of Ireland.
152
 Pearse, however, with his view of history, could confidently assert that 
a love of good is a hate of evil. Such evils as England’s rule in Ireland, England’s 
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 empire, needed to be destroyed, and destruction could open the way to the building 
of greater things.
153
 
Pearse succeeded in giving a strikingly new religiosity to definitions of Irishness. 
While he was not intolerantly Catholic, he and the other leaders placed their 
Catholicism at the centre of their thought and action and did not deny the ‘special 
nature’ of the Irish Catholic people.154  The steadfast belief of Irishmen in their 
religious convictions was to Pearse ‘one of the main strands of the long-tormented 
chronicle of Ireland’s history’.155 Whatever it had been before 1916, Catholicism 
was to be ‘a binding and defining force for Irish Republicans’.156 Aodh de Blacam, a 
prominent Irish nationalist writer during the War of Independence – and Protestant 
convert to Catholicism – was dismissive of the historical record of both Protestant 
nationalists and anti-nationalist Ulster Protestants. ‘Irish Protestants’, he made clear, 
‘have to accept the fact that they live in a country where the Catholic religion colours 
the lives of the people’.157 Few of his Catholic contemporaries would, probably, have 
disagreed with him.  
 
IV 
There was at least in one quarter in German and Irish history writing of this period 
where serious attempt was made to genuinely ‘de-confessionalize’ the nation’s 
history: socialist history writing of the nation. Two exemplars of this in Ireland and 
Germany were the long-standing stalwart of German socialism Franz Mehring and 
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 his Zur deutschen Geschichte and James Connolly’s Labour in Irish History 
(1910).
158
 In these writings, both authors produced comprehensive narrative histories 
of their countries along the lines of their common socialist ideology. As such both 
historiographies were extremely political, intended to shape popular socialist views 
of the modern nation in both Ireland and Germany (and Connolly at least became a 
popular influence far outside the narrow bounds of early twentieth-century Irish 
socialism). Both authors located the beginning of their histories in the period of the 
Reformation, and both argued that the Protestant-Catholic conflicts of the period, as 
they had been ever since, were in fact the result of contests for control over land and 
wealth rather than truly being conflicts over religion, and much less the religious 
‘identity’ of either the German or Irish nation. Thus in the foreword to Labour in 
Irish History Connolly associated the beginnings of the encroachment of the ‘feudal-
capitalist system’ into Irish society and culture with the Tudor ‘conquest’ of Ireland, 
a system ‘as foreign to the genius of the Gael as was the English ruler to Irish soil.’159 
Its success in penetrating ‘the Irish mind’, however, meant that in Connolly’s 
estimation ‘the whole concept of orthodox Irish history for the last 200 years was a 
betrayal and abandonment of the best traditions of the Irish race.’ 160  Mehring, 
beginning his German history properly with the German Reformation, maintained 
however that ‘the basis of Catholic culture was the ignorance and exploitation of the 
popular masses’, and that the Papacy’s power was that of the suppression of ‘German 
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 particularity’, which ‘would have to be kept poor and ignorant if art and science were 
to flourish under Papal protection in Italy’. What the Catholic German Humanists of 
the period had failed to grasp was that ‘only the victory of German barbarism over 
Latin civilisation could open the way to the historic rise of the German nation.’ They, 
to their further guilt, ‘deeply detested the Reformation as a movement of the masses. 
They did not have the slightest interest in or understanding of the needs of the 
masses.’ German historical progress was for Mehring inextricably linked with the 
Reformation, but that had nothing to do with the supposed intrinsic ‘Germanness’ of 
Protestantism. The immediate catalyst of the Reformation was Papal exploitation of 
the German principalities.
161
 The reasons Mehring gave for the inability of the 
Germans, though aware of their exploitation, to throw off the Papal yoke, were those 
of a historical materialist: the early modern German economy was too undeveloped 
to have supported the consolidation of a strong central monarchy which could have 
acted against the Papacy. The Germans ‘could only achieve groupings of interests by 
provinces, in other words political disunity…The German Emperors of the Habsburg 
house could not achieve the transformation from a feudal medieval to a modern 
monarchy’. The German ‘vassals’ of the Emperor ‘grew to become almost 
completely independent princes as the logical consequence of the economic fact that 
they were…the representatives at least of provincial centralisation.’ It was ‘this chaos 
of the most varied classes and factions of classes, with their conflicting interests’, 
rather than anything else, which underpinned the conditions in Germany that led to 
the Reformation, which Mehring still described as ‘the rebellion against Rome that 
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 had been simmering in the German nation for decades.’ 162  Mehring grouped the 
parties that would comprise the struggles of the Reformation into three divisions: 
‘conservative Catholicism, bourgeois reformism, and plebeian revolution.’ The latter 
two camps represented ‘the great mass of the nation which rose in a passionate 
rebellion against Papal exploitation.’ He also categorized the groupings of religious 
communities of Jesuitism, Calvinism, and Lutheranism on historical-materialist lines: 
‘Jesuitism was Catholicism reformed on a capitalist basis’, Calvinism was the 
‘bourgeois-capitalist religion’, and Lutheranism ‘was the religion of economically 
backward countries that had been most heavily exploited by Rome, but had the least 
prospects of either annihilating or dominating Rome.’163 The Reformation had been 
both a revolution and a counter-revolution: after the Peasants’ War Luther became ‘a 
crawling servant of the princes’, and the Reformation, ‘after the revolutionary fire 
had been extinguished with the blood of the peasants, became a campaign of robbery 
and plunder by the German princes and their ever growing emancipation from the 
Imperial authority…The masses, the peasants and the town plebeians gained not the 
slightest benefit from the robbery of Church property.’ 
Connolly too regarded the early modern era, specifically the seventeenth century, as 
foundational for Irish history in modernity: ‘Modern Irish History properly 
understood may be said to start with the close of the Williamite Wars in the year 
1691. All the political life of Ireland during the next 200 years draws its colouring 
from and can only be understood in the light of that conflict’.164 His perception of the 
actual significance of the confessional divide in Irish history is indicated by his 
judgement that the conflicts of this period had, objectively speaking, been of no real 
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 concern to the mass of the Irish people on either side who wasted their lives in them; 
the people had failed to seize the opportunity at this time to strike for their freedom 
from England, unsurprisingly, as they were led by the nobility, and not even the 
native Gaelic nobility, but the ‘foreign’ nobility whose claim to ‘their’ land had never 
been legitimate.
165
 In the remainder of this chapter on ‘The Jacobites and the Irish 
People’, Connolly goes on to apply in a summary way they key precept of historical 
materialism to Irish history. Connolly asserts that up to as late as the 1690’s, the 
‘prevailing method of economic production and exchange’ was feudal ownership of 
land. The parties in the war of James and William were two groups of foreign 
feudalists fighting for Irish land. The Irish people had no part in these wars other than 
as ‘cannon fodder’. Connolly continued, downplaying the significance of the 
Catholic-Protestant divide for Irish history, ‘the social system thus firmly rooted in 
the soil of Ireland – and accepted as righteous by the ruling class irrespective of 
religion – was a greater enemy to the prosperity and happiness of the people than any 
legislation religious bigotry could devise.’166 In Connolly’s judgement, the only man 
in Irish history to have ever come close to forging an actual Irish nation out of its 
distinctly unpromising materials had been the eighteenth century revolutionary Wolfe 
Tone. This was because he, Connolly claimed, had ‘built up his hopes upon a 
successful prosecution of a Class War, although those who pretend to imitate him 
today raise up their hands in holy terror at the mere mention of the phrase.’ Tone, he 
continued, ‘was as effective in uniting the democracy of Ireland as the “patriots” of 
our day have been in keeping it separated into warring religious factions.’ 167 
Connolly favoured the United Irishmen above all because as they were, as he titled 
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 his chapter on them, pre-eminently ‘Democrats and Internationalists.’ Connolly’s 
chapter on the nineteenth century Catholic emancipationist Daniel O’Connell was 
titled, by contrast, ‘A Chapter of Horrors’. Connolly found O’Connell to be another 
false patriot, because of his religious ‘bigotry’ and because the country landowner 
‘felt himself to be much more akin to the propertied class of England than to the 
working class of Ireland.’168 Mehring, for his part, also disregarded the idea that the 
Protestant-Catholic wars of sixteenth and seventeenth century Germany were in any 
sense either a national struggle of the Protestant German princes against the Emperor, 
or a Catholic crusade to restore the Imperial unity. His attitude towards Luther, as we 
have seen to say the least un-deferential, certainly distinguished his historiography as 
opposing the Protestant interpretation of German history, but he was equally 
unsympathetic to that which emphasised the Catholic ‘character’ of the Germans. He 
attacked the historical heroes of both sides equally: the great hero of nineteenth 
century Protestant German historiography, Gustavus Adolphus, had been in fact 
‘solely motivated by the economic and political interests of the Swedish 
monarchy…a foreign conqueror.’ The Catholic Emperors of the House of Habsburg 
were simply stooges of the Popes, and their whole Empire had no other foundation 
than its role as defender of the Papacy’s earthly interests. Where Mehring was in 
agreement with the Protestant (and Catholic) historians though was his judgement 
that ‘No great advanced nation has had to suffer comparable destruction, Germany 
was thrown back two hundred years in its development. It took two hundred years to 
regain the economic position it could claim at the beginning of the Thirty Years’ 
War…The last vestiges of the authority of the Emperor and the Empire had 
irrevocably disappeared.’ Nevertheless, this had been ‘a historical necessity, for the 
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 princes represented the centralization of the modern state as far as was at all possible 
under German economic conditions.’169 Without the application of the principles of 
historical materialism to Irish history, Connolly argued, that history ‘is but a welter 
of unrelated facts, a hopeless chaos of sporadic outbreaks, treacheries, intrigues, 
massacres, murders, and purposeless warfare.’ 170  If he scrupulously avoided 
confessionalizing tendencies in his Irish historiography, he often distinguished 
between the ‘authentic’ Irish nation and its ‘Others’ on the basis of ethnicity or 
‘race’. He repeatedly distinguishes between Gaelic Irish and ‘Old English’ or new 
English ‘foreigners’, as if they had throughout their histories between something like 
armed camps constantly in conflict, with no other relations. Indeed, early in the book 
he makes plain his view that his work is a contribution and not a challenge to the 
contemporary ‘Gaelic Revival’.171 If nothing else, the contribution of Connolly and 
Mehring shows that there were historians in Germany and in Ireland during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seeking a national historical paradigm that 
was ‘de-confessionalized’.  
VI 
Historians in both countries considered the significance of religion in the nation’s 
history in both its political and cultural dimensions. There were of course occasional 
exceptions to this rule, but they did not seriously affect the character of the 
‘confessionalized’ historical understandings of the nation as they developed. In both 
countries, either Protestant or Catholicism acted as a ‘Sammlungspunkt’, one of the 
few sources of unity available for potentially differing and even conflicting notes 
within the general nationalist historical narrative. In Germany, the historical role of 
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 Protestantism appeared to offer, at least to Protestant historians, an ideal and 
concrete foundation for modern German culture and state power, expressed in the 
achievement of Luther and the Reformation in subordinating church to state; it had 
formed the intellectual foundation and core for the German significance of Prussia; 
formed the foundation for the modern Kulturnation; and had given expression to a 
distinctively German form of religiosity and Christianity.
172
 In the Franco-Prussian 
War, the Catholic identity of the Second French Empire was stressed; much was 
made of the fact that the doctrine of papal infallibility was promulgated only days 
before Napoleon III’s declaration of war against Prussia.173 Prussia’s victory was 
seen as the conclusion of what had been begun by Luther in 1517, as the historical 
vengeance of the Germans over Rome:
174
 ‘The Battle of the Teutobergerwald, 
Luther’s confrontation with the Catholic Church, the Thirty Years’ War, and the 
Wars of Liberation against Napoleonic France were linked by nineteenth-century 
Protestant historians in a continuous and coherent history that defined the struggle 
with Rome and Catholicism as the most crucial historical force shaping modern 
German identity.’175 From 1870, the subjection of church to state made possible by 
the Reformation could perhaps serve to remind Germans of the days of the early 
medieval empire of the Saxons and Hohenstaufen, which had been the master of 
Popes and of Rome. As in Ireland, where a Catholic-oriented narrative of the 
national past lent support for nationalist militancy, violence done in the wage of the 
nation, so the ‘Protestantization’ of ‘Germanness’ gave a similar effect. It aided the 
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 conceit, particularly popular during the First World War, that the Germans, in 
contrast to their enemies, were truly Christian, and more profoundly so than other 
nations. If the Germans were a chosen people, than France in particular was the great 
enemy against whom they were fighting a war, a nation godless and unbelieving.
176
 
This of course had a vintage going back to the beginning of the nineteenth century 
when the figure of Napoleon had been depicted as a ‘devil and enemy of Christian 
humanity.’177 Friedrich Meinecke, in his 1914 war pamphlet The German Uprising 
of 1914, wrote: ‘In 1813 the service of one’s country became a divine service, 
pursued with truly religious fervour and devotion, and a new dignity of moral 
consecration enveloped the Prussian state as champion of the German nation.’178 The 
First World War was from its beginning presented by nationalists of all shades of 
opinion as yet another existential struggle for the survival of the nation, as an 
‘uprising’ of the nation against its attackers. In this climate the historically 
constructed Protestant nature of the German people could be fully expressed. As 
Doris L. Bergen has put it, ‘The outbreak of war in 1914 might be described as the 
peak of the love affair between German Protestantism and the German nation.’179 
Even writing in 1920’s, Haller could confidently state that ‘Austria, the Catholic 
great power is vanquished’, while ‘the German Reich created by Protestant Prussia, 
though fallen, will rise again.’180 Almost all German historians after 1871 identified 
Christianity and Protestantism as synonymous and in respect of their idea of the 
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 national idea defamed Catholicism as un-German.
181
 In Ireland, few nationalists, 
from the popularisation of Irish national histories in the mid-nineteenth century to 
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 ever denied that Irish Protestants 
were in some sense part of the nation – this would have been difficult if for no other 
reason than the historical examples of notable Protestant nationalists. But at the same 
time it was advantageous for both Catholic and Protestant historians to maintain, to 
one degree or another, the particularly Catholic character of the Irish nation, or at 
least the historical ‘Otherness’ of Protestantism. It was less the fine points of 
Catholic doctrine that made Catholic identity important to the historical narrative 
than the apparent ease with which Irish Catholicism could be presented as a central 
part of the Irish nation’s resistance to persecution and one of the few, if not the only, 
truly continuous element of Irish national life through history. However much they 
may have decried inter-confessional antagonism and its effects in Ireland, 
succeeding generations of Irish nationalists were compelled to ‘co-opt or graft the 
identity of Catholic on to the identity of Irish’.182 The role of the Catholic Church in 
the expansion and preservation of English and British power over the Irish, from the 
twelfth century to the twentieth, was either obscured or explained away. The history 
of Irish Catholicism as the religion of an oppressed minority within an aggressively 
Protestant state (the United Kingdom) but which was also the religion of the majority 
in Ireland did not make its historiographical ‘nationalisation’ particularly difficult. 
From 1922, of course, the historically Catholic character of the Irish nation could be 
expressed institutionally: The highly popular Short History of the Irish People (1921, 
1927), a largely moderate nationalist narrative that became a textbook for Irish 
school pupils for decades to come; was essentially the work of a conservative and 
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 constitutionalist-minded Catholic nationalist. This work accepts, for example, the 
peculiar receptivity of the ancient Irish to Christian revelation, the continuity of Irish 
religious devotion to the Catholic Church, and the ingrained (Catholic) Irish 
disinclination to intolerance: ‘from any desire to persecute persons of other creeds 
for their religious beliefs the Catholics of Ireland have always been singularly 
free.’183 Yet the authors also take care to acknowledge the Protestant contribution, 
especially of Ulster Protestants, particularly to the revolutionary tradition.
184
 Green’s 
History of the Irish State to 1014 (1925) notes for example the importance of the 
image of Saint Patrick and his deeds, such that he became ‘the very embodiment of 
the national soul, its surety and defender’, and the  ‘purity’ of Irish devotion to 
Christianity since its earliest times.
185
 As the notable nationalist politician Justin 
McCarthy noted in his popular Irish history, Patrick ‘found in Ireland a people in 
whose temperament the spirit of veneration had always played a leading part.’186 
Charles Gavan Duffy noted that during this time ‘Ireland may be said to have been a 
Christian Greece, the nurse of science and civilisation.’187 
German Protestant historians, while they prided themselves on Protestantism’s 
entwinement with Bildung, also attributed an explicitly exclusionary cultural 
significance to Protestantism. Like their Irish (often, though not always Catholic) 
counterparts they situated the ‘national’ religion in a discourse of ‘national 
resistance’ – the drive for ‘German freedom’ – from foreign influences and 
oppression (from Rome or France) which culminated in 1871, before experiencing a 
new threat in 1918. As in the Catholic or Catholic-oriented or anti-Protestant 
narrative of Irish history, the Protestant narrative of German history was centred on 
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 notions of ‘redemptive’ ‘struggle and sacrifice’. In a speech before the Prussian 
Upper House in 1873, Bismarck had described his confrontation with the Catholic 
Church as a continuation of that between the Hohenstaufen emperors and the Popes 
of the time.
188
 He, unlike Emperor Henry IV, would never ‘walk to Canossa’. If by 
1914 the German confessional divide had lost much of its earlier rancour
189
 – in 
1916 the conservative Protestant historian Georg von Below had even asserted that 
German Protestants and German Catholics now fought with equal fervour for nation, 
fatherland, Volkstum, and of course, ‘German freedom’190 – the outbreak of war 
nonetheless solidified the identification of Germanness with belligerent 
Protestantism. In any case, Johannes Haller could still maintain in the 1920’s: ‘What 
the world knows as German progress is in essentials of Protestant origin, despite the 
many German Catholics.’191  
In Ireland, the consolidation of ‘pillarized’ interpretations of the national past 
correlated both with the growth of Protestant-Catholic animosity in the nineteenth 
century and to the growing strength of nationalism. The views of the two principal 
Christian communities in Ireland came to be distinguished, as Paul Bew has noted, 
by ‘mutual contempt.’192 Whether or not nationalist historical narratives were ‘to 
blame’ for this, few aimed to seriously challenge the ‘confessionalized’ narrative of 
Irish history. The seal was set on this animosity with the Partition of Ireland in 1922. 
Irish nationalists now had the opportunity of establishing a Catholic Ireland, which 
they duly did. Eamon de Valera’s 1937 Constitution of Ireland explicitly mentioned 
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 the historically ‘special position’ of the Catholic Church in Ireland.193 Even notable 
figures of the ‘Irish-Ireland’ movement that had such influence on figures like 
Pearse, which emphasised culture rather than religion as the determining force in 
Irish history, were often less hesitant to identify Irishness and Catholic identity as 
coterminous than earlier generations had been. Not least, of course, because most of 
the leading proponents of the Gaelic Revival or ‘Irish-Ireland’ movement were 
Catholics. What was more common for Irish historians – and they could be both 
Protestant or Catholic, but were usually the latter – was to represent Protestant as 
synonymous with ‘perfidious Albion’ and the injustices inflicted on the Irish 
throughout history, thereby ‘othering’ Protestantism as not just foreign, but 
implicitly anti-national and a source of violence against the nation in its history. As 
the Irish historian W.F. Butler wrote in 1919, from the seventeenth century in 
Ireland, ‘the test of nationality becomes almost a religious one.’194  
Religion or confessional allegiance became comprehensively nationalized in both 
contexts and in this respect the historical writing of the relationship between nation 
and religion played a dominant role. A nineteenth-century Catholic German historian 
wrote in 1882, ‘our history writing, Protestant as well as Catholic, considers the past 
from the political and religious viewpoint of the present, and finds in them weapons 
for current battles’.195 The ease with which this statement could be applied word for 
word to Irish history writing of the same period, either Protestant or Catholic, is in 
itself striking. Similarly, Lecky might have drawn a few wry glances from a few of 
his German contemporaries with his remark, made with barely concealed 
repugnance, that ‘Ireland is now the only civilised country where public opinion is 
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 governed, not occasionally but habitually, by theological considerations’.196 Writing 
in the 1920’s, the decade of the partition of Ireland between mostly Protestant North 
and mostly Catholic ‘South’, Johannes Haller expressed a view that few Irish 
historians could have disagreed with if applied to their own country’s history: 
‘Nothing has so powerfully influenced the course of German history as this 
difference of religious faith. It is still at work today; indeed it has increased in 
acerbity in recent times. Everyone knows what a pernicious effect it has had on our 
national destinies.’197 As late as 1933 he could maintain that assessments of the 
German Reformation remained confessionally ‘pillarized’ or at least not reconciled, 
that confessional division remained a ‘peculiarity’ of Germany.’ 198  In 1920 the 
author of the official history of the Pan-German League had complained of the 
‘unselige Glaubenspaltung’ that ran through the ‘fatherland’ like a ‘rift’, and 
continued to obscure the meaning and correctness of the pan-German idea.
199
 In both 
Ireland and Germany, from the mid-nineteenth century up to the First World War 
and inter-war period politico-religious conflicts were fought within historiography, 
and the antagonisms present within historiographical arguments reflected not just the 
confessional division within each society, but the contemporary political significance 
of that division for each country. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
The Nation and National Territory in History 
I 
There can be no nation without a ‘homeland’, without ‘national territory’, without a 
‘repository of national history.’1 The narrative of the historical ‘homeland’ supports 
otherwise abstract concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ with an historical and physical 
context: in the national territory, the nation’s ancestral and cultural origins can be 
connected with the contemporary (or anticipated) political activity of the national 
state, and the ‘historical identity’ of the nation’s people. The territorial borders of a 
nation and nation-state become associated with a linking together of past and present 
and a process of delineating lines of inclusion and exclusion. Those ‘spaces that 
come to be inhabited by communities whose experiences and sense of distinctive 
identity’ are sufficiently cohesive to become what has been called by Anthony D. 
Smith ‘ethnoscapes.’2 As a result territory becomes ‘an intrinsic part of the character, 
history, and destiny of the culture community, to be commemorated regularly and 
defended at all costs, lest the “personality” of the ethnic or regional community be 
impugned.’ 3  From this, certain terrains and regions are believed to provide the 
unique and indispensable setting for the events that shaped the community.
4
 
Nationalist elites and intellectuals, historians in particular, mobilize ‘the myths and 
images of a primordial homeland to reinforce the depiction of the nation as an 
ancient community of belonging, an organic singularity “rooted” to a particular 
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 place.’5 The stories that nationalists tell about land and place are many and various, 
ranging from narratives connecting a particular culture to the unique environment 
that produced it, narratives about first occupancy, and ‘blood and soil’ narratives 
about the sacrifices made to people a particular place.
6
 A sense of the nation’s 
rootedness to its soil, its territory, and its attendant particularity was important, even 
among those historians who did not espouse a strictly racialist conception of history. 
Indeed, the historical synthesis of ethnos with territory might be seen as a more 
‘acceptable’ alternative to racial identification, although it could often serve simply 
as another kind of ‘rationalization’ for the same, given the importance of the idea of 
historical ‘rootedness’ within a defined territory.7 This sense of ‘rootedness’, and the 
concept of ‘Heimat’, was of fundamental importance to national thought in 
Germany, particularly in its völkisch variant, but the sense of the nation’s past as 
being linked to a specific narrative of space and place, territory and locality, was 
undoubtedly important in the Irish context as well. As the existing or anticipated 
territorial borders and the historical, cultural, and political boundaries of the state are 
desired by nationalists to be coterminous, nationalist historical narratives have been 
fundamental to establishing nationalist claims on given territories.   
II 
As noted in the first chapter, in both contexts, the fact of the original geographical 
‘peculiarity’ of the nation – Irish insularity, Germany as Mitteleuropa, a land 
between east and west, a land almost without ‘natural’ borders8 – was regarded as a 
most significant element in the nation’s history. The problem of regional identities in 
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 particular was also of great significance for nationalism in both countries. These 
regional allegiances were also conditioned by a strong loyalty toward another nation, 
certainly in the Irish case in Ulster, and as also in the case of Alsace-Lorraine or 
German Silesia. For these reasons, and others, the supposed national-historical 
significance of certain regions was of especial importance in both the Irish and 
German contexts. As much as regional distinctions and identities became 
increasingly considered in the course of the nineteenth century as backward 
anomalies that managed to resist the national idea, they were nonetheless very 
enduring, as acknowledged by their opponents.
9
 While as Celia Applegate puts it, 
‘The devaluation of regions and their pasts in the nineteenth century thus emerged 
naturally alongside the triumph of national historiographies’,10 a regional identity 
could in fact stand as a successful rival to a national one. In the course of the 
nineteenth century historians in Ireland and Germany were confronted with claims 
that the borders of their country were not coterminous with national boundaries, 
claims which in turn required contestation. Historians in both contexts employed the 
common technique of downplaying the significance of any differences in the 
historical experience of contested territories or regions from that of the wider nation. 
They narrated these territories as central to the historical development of these 
nations; as it were, as ‘cockpits’ of their historical development, and denied the 
legitimacy of any regional allegiance (especially if it was linked with professed 
belonging to another nation) that conflicted with allegiance to their nation. 
‘Historical narratives characteristically echoed the homogenizing and centralizing 
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 propensities of the age,’ as Monika Baár argues, ‘by providing historical validation 
for the unification of provinces that were deemed to belong to the national 
territory.’11 Notions of an enduring, unchanged historical claim to certain contested 
territories or regions could thus take primacy over the preferences of the inhabitants 
of these territories as to whether or not they wished to be a part of the German or 
Irish nation. Thus the ‘territorializing’ purposes of historical narratives were often 
linked in both contexts with a conception of the nation, in which a discourse of 
national enmity in relation to the nation’s ‘other(s)’ was fundamental. The 
territorializing dimension of the German nationalist historical narrative was 
markedly affected by the fact that a very great proportion of the German 
Kulturnation had lived for centuries outside of Germany’s core territory, whether 
conceived of as the Holy Roman Empire, the German Confederation, or the 
Kaiserreich. The German communities of eastern Europe – a ‘diaspora’ of sorts, 
perhaps
12
  – formed an extra-territorial part of the German nation, but one which, 
owing to long-standing notions about the geographical imprecision or indeterminacy 
of German borders, was regarded as being of fundamental significance for 
definitions of what ‘Germany’ was. The importance of ‘the East’ to how ideas of 
‘Germanness’ were formulated was fundamental, and particularly important insofar 
as the leading German powers of Prussia and Austria had originated in medieval 
German ‘colonisation’ of and settlement in ‘the East’. The Ostsiedlung was regarded 
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 by nineteenth century writers as a ‘national’ achievement and therefore became a 
central theme in German nationalist thinking about national territory.  
There was of course one particularly important difference with respect to the 
historical ‘nationalization’ of territory in these contexts. The sense of the Germans as 
being a historically expansionist and ‘colonising’ people, in the East’, which of 
course could (and was) used to legitimise modern imperialism and colonialism, did 
not have a counterpart in the Irish context. The Irish had rather been the ‘victims’ of 
expansionism and ‘colonising’ movements, though even this obscures the degree to 
which such inward movements became regarded by some important writers as 
forming a necessary part of the history of the Irish nation, and of course, the reality 
that they had nothing to do with modern nationalism. On the other hand, what is 
interesting about German historical narratives of German expansion in ‘the East’, 
whether it is described as settlement or colonisation is how closely linked they were 
to perceptions over the fundamental meaning of ‘Germanness’, and how ‘the East’ 
was considered both part of German ‘Europa’ and a ‘place apart’. Ultimately, in 
both the Irish and German contexts, narratives on the historical ‘nationalization’ of 
territory were another area for arguments about the cultural and historical identity of 
the German or Irish nation. Though to different degrees, the historical 
‘nationalization’ of Irish or German territory was regarded, due to the circumstances 
of Irish or German history, as a necessary exercise. The role of the global Irish 
diaspora that arose from the mid-nineteenth century with respect to the focus of this 
chapter can be dealt with briefly. It had little apparent importance for how Irish 
historical writers, even those writing from within the diaspora, dealt with the 
historical ‘nationalization’ of Irish territory, of the homeland. The diaspora did not 
substantively challenge the importance of ideas of the significance of Ireland’s 
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 ‘island-ness’ to the definition of Irishness. Whatever the significance of the Irish 
diaspora for Irish nationalist politics, it could play but little role in how Irish 
nationalist writers in Ireland dealt with how the territory of the nation’s homeland 
was historically defined, for example with respect to the problem of ‘Ulster’. It is 
true that for Thomas D’Arcy McGee (who in addition to his Popular History of 
Ireland – written in Canada – and History of the Attempts to Establish the 
Reformation in Ireland also authored a History of the Irish Settlers in North America 
and a Catholic History of North America) and John Mitchel, ‘exile’ or diaspora 
experience over a period of decades in North America was a formative chapter of 
their lives. It was during his North American life that each man wrote the works of 
history which are considered in this thesis. Yet their diaspora experiences were not 
the total sum of their lives, and the essential features of each man’s nationalism had 
been established long before their departures from Ireland. For them, as for others, 
the writing of Irish history was one valuable, even essential way in which they as 
long-time ‘exiles’ could ‘reconnect’ with the homeland and further maintain their 
relevance to nationalism back there. For Mitchel, if not McGee, as far as his Irish-
American audience counted the purpose of the History of Ireland was primarily to 
inspire them to activism ‘of aiding our kinsmen of Ireland in their supreme 
struggle.’13 Enda Delaney has correctly pointed out the that a ‘defining feature of 
Irish Catholic diasporic identity between the Great Famine and the First World War 
was a shared sense of a national past’,14 the polestar of which was the history of the 
homeland more than anything else. It is difficult to judge how immediately important 
diasporic experience was to the writing of McGee’s and Mitchel’s histories. 15 
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 McGee’s Popular History may have been written in British North America, but this 
did not stop the book from earning McGee an enduring place in the literary history 
of Irish nationalism, being particularly important to A.M. Sullivan and his Story of 
Ireland, which should not be underestimated given the enduring popularity and 
circulation of the latter writer and his work.
16
 The Popular History became widely 
used in late nineteenth-century Irish classrooms (in schools run by the nationalistic 
Christian Brothers
17
) and earned him election to the Royal Irish Academy in 1864. 
The same points can be made for John Mitchel’s Irish history, written during his 
American ‘exile’. How a book was read was not necessarily determined by where it 
was written: an Irish reader back home did not need to share McGee’s scepticism 
from the 1850s about the prospects of Irish independence to be satisfied that the 
Popular History fully justified Irish claims to nationhood. Ultimately, however, the 
significance of the ‘diaspora’ experiences of such men to their writing of Irish 
(nationalist) history and historical nationalization of Irish territory, though an 
interesting question, is one beyond the scope of this thesis to answer. The focus in 
this chapter with respect to Irish historical narratives is limited to how these 
historians, wrote the historical narrative of Irish territorial ‘nationness’.  
The historical nationalization of territory involved affirming and denying claims to 
its legitimate ownership and therefore the possession of political power.
18
 Therefore 
it involved in both cases affirming and challenging ‘foundational myths’ associated 
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 with specific territories.
19
 One of those has already been noted in the previous 
chapter: the narrative of the ‘massacre’ of Irish Protestants in Ulster in 1641 which 
justified the rejection of their modern descendants of Irish nationalism. The historical 
claims of certain peoples or states to ‘contested territories’ regarded as essential to 
the nation were ‘written out’ of the national narratives, be it in the case of the Ulster 
Protestants in the Irish context, or in the German context, the Poles of Prussia or the 
people of Alsace-Lorraine with their hybridized French-German cultural differences. 
German historians were constantly vexed by the historical and contemporary 
problem of regional allegiances, or the old nemesis of ‘German particularism’. The 
conflict between Kleindeutsche and Grossdeutsche ideas of ‘Germany’ was one 
between narratives of German history that were centred on regions and territory, and 
in particular the question of whether Prussia or Austria was the more ‘authentically’ 
German. Historians took it upon themselves to argue for the ‘calling’ or ‘leading 
role’ of Prussia or Austria to defend and spearhead German unity, and even after the 
Prussian-led unification of 1871 the historiographical ‘nationalization’ of Prussia and 
Prussian history remained seen as important. The post-1871 ‘German Empire’ was in 
most respects, a ‘prussifizierter Staat’,20 yet the unification of Germany, achieved as 
it was by Prussian military means and the exclusion of Austria from German affairs, 
was by no means universally popular. It still seemed necessary to provide some kind 
of historical legitimation to Prussian leadership of Germany after 1871, and to 
demonstrate the positive importance to Germany of historical Prussian territorial 
expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even after 1918, as well as 
after 1871, it remained necessary to show that ‘Prussia’ and ‘Germany’ were not 
separate, antagonistic entities.  
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 In Ireland, the problems surrounding the historical nationalization of territory 
became centred on one region, ironically the least pro-nationalist: Ulster. It was in 
the later nineteenth century, particularly from the 1880’s, that ‘Ireland’ and ‘Ulster’ 
began to be spoken of as two different entities. The Northern Province and 
particularly the region around Belfast had developed a distinctiveness based on its 
mostly Protestant population, and its industrialized modernity, both of which 
demarcated it from the rest of Ireland. Ulster Protestants, to the extent that they 
regarded themselves as Irish, were opposed to political nationhood. The nationalist-
historical task became not only to argue Ireland’s claim for separation from the 
United Kingdom, but also to argue for the status of Ireland as a single undivided 
country, and against Ulster Protestant claims to be considered as a separate nation or 
otherwise to be excluded from the boundaries of the Irish nation. To accept such 
claims would be to call into question the fundamental notions of what Ireland and 
Irishness meant. At the very least, it was necessary to establish that Ulster had 
possessed no meaningful historical existence separate from the rest of Ireland and to 
show that Ulster Protestant claims to separation could not be legitimated in that way, 
precisely because the notion of a separate Ulster seemed to call into question the 
fundamental tenets of Irish nationalism. A minority of Irish nationalists, as will be 
seen, were more willing to dispense with ‘Ulster’, but their reasons for this reflected 
historical assumptions and arguments about ‘Ulster’ that were widely held.  
German and Irish historians faced differing tasks – historically legitimating 
unification on the one hand, separation of a single national territory on the other – 
but they both involved establishing an historical legitimacy for the territorial claims 
of their nations. Writers in both contexts performed a kind of narrative historical 
mapping of the nation, one that emphasized conflict and loss of land, and the hope of 
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 its regain or redemption. German historians often placed emphasis on the origins of 
Prussia and Austria as German ‘colonies’, as ‘Mark’ territories of the German nation 
outside of the boundaries of the old Reich,
21
 where the peculiarities of German 
history became most strongly defined and where the ‘Volk’ dimension of German 
history supposedly found its strongest expression.
22
 In the Irish nationalist 
conception of history Ulster was presented as having for centuries been the ‘most 
Irish’ part of Ireland, but one that as of modern times needed to be ‘redeemed’ for 
Ireland. ‘Ulster’ was regarded as both the ‘heartland’ and a place ‘out of step’ with 
the ‘natural’ historical development of Ireland – the Irish nation – since the early 
seventeenth century. This idea, which became a conceit, reflected the reality that in 
the course of the nineteenth-century, Irish nationalism had, in its orientation towards 
popular Catholicism and social origins, become an increasingly ‘southern-centric’ 
movement.
23
 While, in general, a sense of the historically-mandated ‘indivisibility’ 
of the national territory would become a fundamental characteristic of the nationalist 
‘world-view’ in both Germany and Ireland, the historical realities made it clear that 
the synthesis of Kulturnation and Staatsnation was a goal beyond realization. The 
difficulties that nationalists in each context had in conceiving of the nation without 
some of its historic ‘contested’ territories would account for many of the more 
negative traits of both nationalisms during the twentieth century, but these were in 
some sense determined by how the national territory had been historically delineated.   
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 III 
It is a contrast in relation to the history of German nationalism that despite the 
apparent significance of the ‘Ulster’ problem, the majority of Irish nationalists in fact 
thought it unnecessary do too much thinking about national territory. The fact of 
Ireland being an island was taken as self-evident proof of where Ireland’s national 
boundaries lay.
24
 In numerous nationalist historical narratives the island of Ireland is 
presented as, to the first historically traceable peoples who settled there – that is, the 
progenitors of the Gaels – as the ‘isle of destiny’, as a promised land, fated to be 
settled, occupied, and fought over by heroic peoples down throughout the ages.
25
 
‘The history of Ireland is as stormy as its [geographic] situation’, was the opening 
sentence of Thomas D’Arcy McGee’s History of the Attempts to Establish the 
Protestant Reformation in Ireland. This was not regarded as undermining the ‘truth’ 
of the nation’s ‘oneness’ by virtue of the island’s ‘oneness’, however. Ireland’s 
insularity and proximity to and relationship with the larger eastern island were to 
McGee two of the three fundamental axes of Irish history.
26
 The sense of Ireland as a 
‘perfect geographical entity’ dovetailed with an emphasis on the separateness of the 
character of Irish history and the Irish people from that of the neighbouring island. 
Alice Stopford Green noted at the outset of Irish Nationality: ‘It is commonly 
accepted that the fortunes of the island and its civilisation must by nature hang on 
those of England. Neither history nor geography allows this theory…The two islands 
had a different history…and developed apart their civilisation.’27 Irish historians, for 
the most part, even if they could not accept the possibility that Ireland was divisible, 
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 accepted more widely the importance of downplaying the obvious regionally-based 
heterogeneity in Irish ‘national’ history. The reality of the history of waves of non-
Irish settlement, particularly in Ulster, had introduced a conflict of different 
historical communities on a single ‘compact’ territory.  
In ‘Germany’, nationalists had from the beginning been confronted with the obvious 
near-absence of clearly identifiable ‘natural’ national borders, particularly in the east 
and west, and the consequences of this for the Germans’ relations with surrounding 
peoples. This was linked with understandings of the Germans as a migratory people 
with a natural ‘Drang nach Osten’ – a nineteenth-century nationalist construct which 
bore little if any relation to the historical realities of medieval settlement and 
migration – extending outside their ‘historic’ ‘core territory’, which introduced 
instability into conceptions of the German nation’s historical territory. Ideas about 
what lay outside present German boundaries, in ‘the East’, often stood at the centre 
of the defining of German national identity.
28
 ‘The East’ became regarded as a 
centuries-old German ‘sphere of influence’ the region where the superiority of 
German Kultur was demonstrated by interactions with the Slavic peoples, and the 
achievements of the medieval Ostsiedlung. Yet it was also regarded as a region in 
which the Germans had long had to struggle for their very existence. If in the Irish 
context the boundaries of the nation seemed to be self-evident, in the German the 
question from the start was ‘Where do they begin?’ and ‘Where do they end?’ The 
question of Germany’s historical boundaries was to prove ‘one of the most 
intractable problems in nineteenth century Germany.’ The reality was, as Abigail 
Green has argued, that older regional allegiances persisted in strength long after 
1871, along with a sense of the artificiality of a German ‘nation-state’ sundered from 
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 Austria.
29
 The question of how to reconcile region and nation into one coherent 
historical narrative was an enduring and inescapable one for German historians. As 
Johannes Haller aptly noted in his Epochs of German History: ‘German history 
begins under the aegis of particularism…Here we have to deal with a fundamental 
trait in the nature of the German people, which has to be reckoned with whether one 
likes it or not.’30 Ranke had regarded the different Stämme and their different states 
as a fundamental constituent of German history, and the esteem with which he held 
these states in the past was reflected in his view that they should be preserved and 
cultivated as true expressions of German nationality.
31
The territorial states had been 
not only the political but also the cultural constituents of modern Germany, forming 
‘a mosaic of divergent historical and cultural heritages’. 32  Regional allegiances 
continued after 1871 to play a central role in the national feeling of Germans from all 
over the new Reich.
33
 The very name Reich for the German nation-state expressed 
non-unitary character. regions.
34
 As in Ireland, certain regions were a potential rival 
for the nation, but could also be seen in more positive terms, as ‘cockpits’ of the 
nation’s historical development. Prussia (in some ways the most un-German part of 
‘Germany’) was seen as both a setting in which the particularities of German 
‘national’ history – such as the confessional divide, the interaction between the 
princely territory and the imperial authority, the Drang nach Osten, the 
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 distinctiveness of Germans as an ‘imperial’ nation, the reality of ‘Germany’ as a 
territorially fragmented nation,
35
 and so on, had realized fullest expression – and as a 
borderland between Germany and ‘the east’, with both positive and negative 
implications. What the ‘insular’ Irish and the ‘borderless’ Germans had had in 
common in their history, however, was a turbulent relationship with their 
neighbouring nations, a history of constant interaction and conflict, the results of 
which for how the national territory and ‘homeland’ was ‘nationalized’ are 
considered in this chapter. 
IV 
In Ireland, as with so many other historical problems, the territorial problems of the 
twentieth century found their roots in the ethno-religious wars of the seventeenth 
century.
36
 The moderate nationalist historian Stephen Gwynn had expressed with a 
single sentence how fundamental had been the confluence of confessional allegiance 
and division of territory along ethno-religious lines in Irish history. In the 
seventeenth century, he wrote, ‘The land was taken from Catholics as Catholics and 
given to Protestants as Protestants.’37 As a result the historical Irish map was one of 
ethno-religious and ‘national’ conflicts recurring through the centuries. The focal 
point of all this had been the region most affected by such conflicts, the region of 
Ulster. The Young Irelander Thomas MacNevin, noting the problematic ‘distance’ of 
Ulster from the rest of Ireland, even in his time, wrote in 1846: ‘it is in Ulster that 
the effects of the Plantation are most striking. The new people have kept aloof from 
the ancient inhabitants; difference of creed, difference of habits, and difference of 
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 tradition…have kept them sundered.’ 38  While for McNevin Ulster ‘participated 
largely in all that made Ireland beautiful, wealthy, and civilised’, the province ‘was a 
well-chosen victim for the passions of conquest, a fit subject for the cupidity of her 
despoilers.’39 This double sense of both the Irishness and foreignness of Ulster, or of 
its ‘captive’ status, would be an important one. The historical character of Ulster as 
having been for centuries the ‘most Irish’ part of Ireland was accentuated, with 
unionist intransigence of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries being regarded as an 
odd and unfortunate interlude, while at other times Ulster was regarded as the part of 
Ireland most ‘damaged’ by British rule, even as irredeemably ‘anglicized’.   
One early example of the attempt to integrate Ulster into the wider Irish historical 
narrative and to accentuate Ulster’s ‘Irishness’ was in John Mitchel’s biography of 
the sixteenth century Ulster leader Hugh O’Neill, a historical hero of nationalist 
Ireland. Here Mitchel attempted to establish a proud historical and Irish national 
identity for the province in the early modern period, shortly prior to the Ulster 
Plantation. In his introduction, Mitchel strikes a conciliatory note, conceding that at 
the very least the Ulster Protestants of non-Irish ancestry possessed ‘now far too old 
a title to be questioned…a deep enough root those planters have struck into the soil 
of Ulster, and it would now be ill striving to un-plant them.’ The divisive historical 
legacy of the ethno-religious divide is contrasted against the possible reconciling 
force of a common allegiance to the national territory, the soil of Ulster and Ireland 
on which Irishmen of all creeds fought and bled for the nation’s dignity and freedom. 
In the biography the entire importance of the Ulster magnate O’Neill was in his 
status as an authentic national leader and hero, and Ulster was presented indeed as 
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 the birthplace of the modern Irish nation.
40
 The power of Ulster in O’Neill’s time 
was the strength of Ireland. He strove to ‘heal the feuds of rival chiefs and out of 
these discordant elements to create and bind together an Irish nation’.41 His demands 
included the ‘entire and undisturbed control by the Irish chiefs over their own 
territories and people.’ For his victories over the English ‘O’Neill was celebrated 
everywhere as the deliverer of his country and the most zealous champion of the 
Catholic religion.’ 42  O’Neill, during his short, glorious Irish career, had made 
himself a threat to English power in Ireland greater than any previously seen.’43 In 
Mitchel’s biography of Ulster’s Irish hero, the most ‘particularist’ province of 
Ireland and in his own time the most ‘anti-national’ had been the first to have 
grasped the essentiality of a conception of Ireland as a single political unit. O’Neill’s 
war ultimately failed, and he chose to live the rest of his days in self-imposed exile 
in Rome rather than submit, but this noble Gaelic prince of Ireland’s last 
unconquered province had for a time all but freed Ireland and united its peoples. As 
O’Neill of Ulster had led and re-defined the Irish nation in his time, so two hundred 
years later would (Protestant) Ulster be the crucible of the first ‘modern’ Irish 
nationalist movement, the ‘patriot’ Volunteer movement of the late eighteenth 
century and the United Irish Society would be the first to recognise that the enemy of 
all Irishmen was Britain, and that only an Ireland of Protestants and Catholics united 
could rid itself of Britain.
44
  
Mitchel’s interest in O’Neill reflected also the influence of the Carlylean ideal of 
heroism on his thinking and writing, and for another reason Ulster’s ‘Britishness’ 
since the seventeenth century was anathema to Mitchel: from the 1840s, Mitchel 
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 developed a strongly anti-modernist, anti-capitalist strain of thinking, entwined with 
his convinced Anglophobia. But Ulster in the nineteenth century, in becoming the 
most ‘British’ part of Ireland, had also become the most industrially and 
economically modern, a place in which heroic warrior princes and noble 
revolutionary intellectuals had no place, even in the popular memory of the majority 
of the populace. This alienation of modern Ulster from Mitchel’s own intellectual 
position made the historical nationalization of Ulster all the more necessary and 
urgent, and for Mitchel as an ‘ecumenical nationalist’ the principal means for this 
task were the Gaelic leader and Catholic champion Hugh O’Neill and the Protestant 
Patriots of the eighteenth century. Mitchel’s biography of O’Neill would exercise a 
definite influence on one of the most canonical texts of Irish nationalist history 
writing, Sullivan’s The Story of Ireland, in which O’Neill is celebrated as a national 
leader, ‘ineradicably Irish, with one unalterable purpose of freeing Ireland from the 
thraldom of English rule.’45 Sullivan described the Ulsterman as leader of ‘one of the 
greatest struggles ever waged against the Anglo-Norman subjugation’.46  As with 
Mitchel, Sullivan represented O’Neill’s return to his native Ulster after a youth spent 
at the English court as the most formative event in his life: ‘the touch of his native 
soil, intercourse with neighbouring Irish chieftains, and the force of sympathy with 
his own people, now surrounding him, were gradually telling upon him.’ 47  In 
Sullivan’s narrative, as in Mitchel’s account, ‘Ulster was the stronghold of the native 
cause’.48 Thomas D’Arcy McGee too dealt with Ulster’s history in a similar manner 
to Mitchel and Sullivan, for example by paralleling the (Catholic) Ulster hero Hugh 
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 O’Neill with the (Protestant) Ulster-based Patriot movement of the eighteenth 
century: ‘from the old headquarters of Hugh O’Neill sent forth anew an unequivocal 
demand for civil and religious liberty.’49  
In his telling of O’Neill’s life, as in Mitchel’s and Sullivan’s, O’Neill progresses 
from being before the 1590s a loyalist of Elizabeth as a result of many years spent at 
the English court, and one who fought for the Queen in Ireland for a time – ‘A 
patriot of Ulster rather than of Ireland’ – to in the space of a few years becoming the 
most formidable single foe the English ever faced in Ireland, an uncrowned king 
even, up to his defeat and self-imposed exile. The Short History of the Irish People 
described Hugh as a ‘National Irish champion’, the first for several centuries.50 
A direct consequence of O’Neill’s rebellion was the Anglo-Scottish plantation of the 
first decades of the seventeenth century, which the Crown adopted as a ‘colonial’ 
solution to its ‘Ulster’ problem. Even W.E.H. Lecky, self-professed Unionist, had 
found something critical to say of the origins of the Ulster Unionist community in 
the Anglo-Scottish Plantation: ‘The new colonists, also planted in Ulster territory, 
though far surpassing the natives in industrial enterprise, were of a class very little 
fitted to raise the moral level of the province, to conciliate a people they despised, or 
to soften the shock of a great calamity.’51 For him also, Ulster had served as a 
cockpit of Irish history, in both positive and often negative ways: while Ulster had 
been the homeland of the eighteenth-century nationalism that Lecky had so admired, 
it had also been the centre of some of the worst chapters of Irish history, from the 
outbreak of the 1641 Rebellion and the ensuing Confederate Wars to the Rebellion 
of 1798. While outside Ulster the former event had possessed the character of a 
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 ‘defensive religious war’, within Ulster the rebellion was ‘speedily disgraced by 
crimes which, though they have been grossly, absurdly, and mendaciously 
exaggerated, were both numerous and horrible.’ We have already seen his rejection 
of the Protestant ‘massacre’ narrative of the 1641 Rebellion, the importance of which 
was its elevation to the historical foundational myth of nineteenth and twentieth 
century Ulster Unionism.
52
 Lecky, going after a more recent working of the Ulster 
Protestant historical narrative, attributed at least a great share of direct responsibility 
for the outbreak of the 1798 Rebellion on the intense persecution within Ulster of 
Catholics by Protestants.
53
 The particularly unsettled history of Ulster in comparison 
to the rest of Ireland, Lecky thought, belied somewhat the historical claims of 
modern Ulster Unionists about their community’s exemplary loyalty to Britain 
compared to the treachery of the Catholic southern Irish.
54
 Insofar as Lecky 
challenged the historical ‘distinctiveness’ of Ulster in relation to the rest of Ireland, 
he did not present Ulster as a kind of historical cockpit of Irish nationality, rather the 
opposite. At the end of the final part of the History he makes clear both his 
disillusionment with the history of British misrule and aversion to conventional 
nationalist pieties: ‘The Union has not made Ireland either a loyal or a united 
country. The two nations that inhabit it still remain distinct.’55  
For others, such as the southern Protestant Standish O’Grady, Ulster’s cultural 
‘leading role’ in the Irish nation and the sense that Ireland had always been one 
indivisible nation, had been realities for many centuries, stretching back even to the 
very beginnings of recorded history. While O’Grady admitted that the Irish ‘never 
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 achieved a vital and stable political unity’, what they had always possessed had been 
a vital ‘ideal of the race’, which gave them a deeper unity. For O’Grady, this was the 
‘dominant conception of the Irish race, as forming a single homogeneous nation’. In 
the ancient and early medieval sources, in ‘ever tending towards the conception of a 
single and uniform national existence’, the leaders of ancient Irish petty-kingdoms 
became national figures. For O’Grady, ‘all the celebrated local traditions of the 
island were swept into the treasure-house of bardic memory’, to become ‘this 
astonishing bardic history of Ireland.’ The special significance of Ulster in 
O’Grady’s history writing was reflected in the idea that Ulster was the place of 
origin not only of many of the great heroes of early Irish history, but also of those 
values and virtues that formed so much of what was great in ‘ethnic’ Irish character, 
such as familial loyalty, aristocratic leadership, and martial valour. From Ulster’s 
past had come some of the most noble and pure elements in Ireland’s history.56 
Ulster occupies a large place in History of Ireland: Critical and Philosophical, 
which is concerned in its ‘political’ dimension with how the embryonic political 
unity of Ireland and the sovereignty of the High King of Ireland developed during 
the pre-medieval period. This development came in fact at the cost of ‘Ulster’s’ 
provincial independence, which had been prized by its rulers, as the province was 
brought firmly into the orbit of ‘southern’ kings who in turn became the paramount 
kings of Ireland.
57
  Nonetheless, what is not doubted is that this was necessary for 
the advancement of pre- and early medieval political unity, in this fashion ‘Ulster’ 
still occupies a central place in the narrative of the development of a unified, all-
island Irish nation, a development of course arrested in the late twelfth century with 
the coming of the first Anglo-Normans. At the turn of the early Middle Ages was 
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 completed ‘the extension into the North of Ireland of the political and military 
authority of the High King.’58  
The ‘main current’ of early Irish history, or ‘ethnic’ Irish history as O’Grady would 
have called it, was the progression of the power and authority of a single kingship 
over the entirety of Ireland – a development in which ‘Ulster’ played its allotted part, 
however regrettable ‘heroic’ Ulster’s decline may have been, and it is in this vein 
that O’Grady concluded History of Ireland: Critical and Philosophical. In History of 
Ireland: Cuchulainn and his Contemporaries, the great Ulster hero is, and dies, as an 
Irish hero, on his death in battle, ‘that pillar of heroism, and that flame of the warlike 
valour of Erin, was extinguished.’ He was ‘the great hero of the Gael.’59 One gets a 
sense in reading O’Grady of ‘ethnic’ Irish history as proceeding from a conflict of 
political unity and regional particularism, arriving at a path of consolidation of the 
former and the apparent development of a unified Irish kingdom along broader 
European lines, up to the rupture of the late twelfth century. Then regional 
particularism regains its position as the High Kingship erodes and becomes 
meaningless. There is a certain parallel here in how German historians conceived of 
their country’s history as being irreducibly formed by constant and recurring conflict 
of national authority with the particularistic allegiances of the various Stämme, in 
which the latter had been ascendant in Germany for a much greater stretch of time 
than the former. As they understood Germany to be a nation composed of many 
Stämme, so O’Grady often wrote of Ireland as a ‘nation of nations’, possessing an 
historical and ‘ethnic’ unity but also an ancient polity that contained within itself the 
potential for disunity and internal ‘particularistic’ conflict.   
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 In discussing how in German nationalist historical thought territory was 
‘nationalized’, how the homeland narrative was constructed, one must give some 
consideration to the concept of ‘Heimat.’ Heinrich Claß, a prominent pan-Germanist 
leader of the Kaiserreich era, opened his Deutsche Geschichte – one of the most 
popular such works of the time – with the question: ‘from where did the men that we 
view as the ancestors of the Germans in the present come? What is their Heimat?’60 
The question was itself a powerful one and had a long tradition in thinking about 
German history. ‘Heimat’, like ‘Volk’, is an enigmatic term which means at its most 
basic ‘homeland’, but carries its own particular connotations of ‘rootedness.61 It was 
a term applied to one’s home village, to one’s province or territorial Vaterland be it 
kingdom, principality, or duchy, or to Germany in its entirety, or to all these places.
62
 
‘Heimat’ evoked the centrality of regionalism and territorial fragmentation in 
German history as well as in any attempt to produce a German historical narrative 
centred on the unified Kulturnation and Staatsnation. ‘For almost two centuries’, 
wrote Celia Applegate, ‘Heimat has been at the centre of a German moral – and by 
extension political – discourse about place, belonging, and identity.’ 63For these 
reasons there was a particular obligation on German historians to at least attempt to 
‘nationalize’ the regions and place the national Heimat above others.64  As Peter 
Blickle has put it, ‘German nationalism and the notion of Heimat have always played 
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 into each other.’ 65  Alon Confino has emphasised the importance of Heimat to 
allowing ‘the Germans’ to think of themselves as a single nation while preserving 
their longer-standing regional identities.
66
 The reverse was also the case: the national 
character and significance of given German region also had to be accentuated and 
narrated. This was even the case with the most powerful of the nineteenth century 
German states, Prussia, particularly because of Prussia’s historical background as a 
part of the ‘German East’. Ranke dealt in much of his writing on German history 
with the relationship between the region and the nation. He wrote extensively on the 
history of Prussia in his German historiographical works from his appointment as 
professor of history at the University of Berlin in 1825 and later to the post of 
official state historiographer of the Kingdom of Prussia, particularly in his Prussian 
History and his biography of Frederick the Great. The central theme of the Prussian 
History, besides any discussion about the relations of regional Heimat and supra-
regional nation in German history, was an account of Prussia’s ascent to a position of 
leadership within the Holy Roman Empire. Prussia had been, Ranke wrote, a most 
invaluable acquisition of territory for the German nation since its medieval 
beginnings.
67
 If Irish historical narratives faced the task of placing ‘Ulster’ and 
‘Ulster’s’ heroes at the centre of the national historical narrative, the dominant 
‘German conception of history’ dealt with the task of placing Prussia and Prussian 
heroes at the centre of the German national story.    
Ranke remarks, in the opening of his History of Prussia, that one of the most 
important forces in German history had been the interrelationship between the 
regions, the territorial states of the Empire – repositories in much of German history 
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 of ‘the freedom of the national genius’ – and the totality of the German nation as a 
political and ‘spiritual’ ‘unity’. The medieval princes, far from being the 
fountainhead of particularism within the Reich, had resisted Imperial despotism and 
defended the Kulturnation. They had spearheaded the Reformation; after the Thirty 
Years’ War they were faced with the duty of opposing ‘the influence which foreign 
states had acquired during the war’ and rebuilding their territories so as to ‘promote 
order and to increase the general welfare and influence of the nation at large.’68 It 
would be Brandenburg-Prussia that would most effectively meet these challenges. 
How, then, in the space of less than two hundred years, the Hohenzollerns had 
progressed from being lords of a peripheral borderland
69
 to the kings of one of the 
leading German states, was the question at hand. Brandenburg-Prussia’s peculiarities 
were owed to its beginnings in the medieval Ostsiedlung, the result being that it had 
been a ‘frontier’ region for much of its history where the ‘peculiarities’ of German 
history were especially apparent.
70
 The German Teutonic Order, which established 
the medieval military state that would become the modern Prussian state, had carved 
out a polity which possessed world-historical as well as national significance: the 
Order spread and defended Christianity in the east as well as Deutschtum.
71
  In the 
wars of religion and the Thirty Years’ War the Hohenzollerns had stood for 
Protestantism and the autonomy of the German lands against Catholic imperial rule, 
and later, through the restoration of their state, ‘the honour of the German name’ 
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 would ‘be restored.’72 The narrative, in which he narrowed the historical focus from 
the Empire to one of the constituent territories that followed the ‘national’ path,73 
charted the reconstruction of the Hohenzollern realm and the unification of its 
constituent territories of Prussia and Brandenburg. This had required the breaking of 
Polish power over the Prussian Duchy and the legacy of ‘provincial ideas’ and 
territorial disunity. Their success in this respect was presented as a ‘rectification’ of 
the losses to Polish rule earlier in the sixteenth century.
74
 In the late seventeenth 
century, when Louis XIV preys upon German territory to expand the borders of 
France, the Hohenzollern ruler makes common cause with his erstwhile enemy, the 
Habsburg sovereign, to defend Germany from the ‘Erbfeind.’75 The Great Elector is 
one of the central ‘heroes’ of Ranke’s Prussian historiography: the re-founder of the 
Hohenzollern state after the Thirty Years’ War, the founder of Brandenburg-Prussia, 
the guarantor of (Protestant) inter-confessional peace, the defender of Germany from 
foreign aggression. The parallels between the historical significance attributed to the 
Great Elector – and later successors such as Frederick the Great – as German 
‘national’ hero (praised by a völkisch nationalist writer in 1920 as the ‘most German’ 
of all the Hohenzollern
76) and Hugh O’Neill as Irish national hero, as rulers whose 
national identity was entwined with their regional identity, are apparent, even if 
Hugh O’Neill’s reign ended in defeat and disaster, while those of the Great Elector 
and, of course, Frederick the Great, most certainly did not.  
The primary focus in the Prussian History is the conditions under which a modern 
state was formed, a state which went on to become the crucible of the modern 
German Empire, a true nation-state. Here, the region, the Prussian Heimat appears 
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 both as the heart of the nation and the nation in microcosm, as in Irish narratives of 
Ulster the province was presented as the historical heartland of the Irish nation. The 
influences of Poland and the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire, such as they were dealt 
with, were that of antagonistic forces which had to be overcome in order to develop a 
unified state out of Brandenburg and Prussia. The ‘borderland’ status of 
Brandenburg-Prussia is downplayed in the narrative the further it progresses; as the 
territory becomes the ‘cockpit’ of modern German history, the political centre of 
‘Germany’ is shifted from the Habsburg Empire to the north-east. The conquest of 
Silesia from the Austrian Empire by Frederick the Great in 1741 is presented as the 
liberation of ‘oppressed [Protestant German] inhabitants.’77 Ranke asserted that had 
it not been for Frederick II and the Prussian state, Germany would have remained in 
the eighteenth century as it had for most of the seventeenth – little more than the 
prey of neighbouring nations.
78
 The selective interpretation of the life and career of a 
great regional leader who becomes a national leader is something common to both 
German and Irish historical narratives, and appears also in treatments of the Irish 
ruler Hugh O’Neill as ‘national hero’ rather than provincial dynast. In Mitchel’s 
narrative that which did not accord with the idea of Hugh O’Neill’s as national hero, 
as ‘the first, for many a century, to conceive and almost realize the grand thought of 
creating a new Irish nation’ – his constant willingness to negotiate for peace with the 
English Crown, his earlier service for Elizabeth I, his ruthlessness towards allies as 
well as enemies – is either downplayed or glossed over. Similarly, Prussian figures 
such as the Great Elector and especially Frederick the Great are presented, to various 
degrees, as forerunners of German nationhood, and such inconvenient facts as the 
latter’s Francophilia were glossed over or dismissed.  
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 Ranke’s account of the history of Prussia, his presentation of the challenges faced by 
the Prussian rulers – territorial disunity, inter-confessional divisions, and so on – and 
how they overcame them, could be seen as a microcosmic account of German 
national history. In his Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation too he 
considered the history of Prussia from the perspective of Prussia’s significance for 
the German nation, at the same time regarding Prussia as an integral part in the 
centuries-old ‘German mission’ of Christianizing and spreading civilising culture in 
the east.
79
 The coming of the Reformation, and later the Teutonic Ordenslands 
reconstitution as the Duchy of Prussia under a Hohenzollern lord – even if under 
vassalage to the King of Poland – are presented as positive developments. The 
vassalage of the new Duchy to the Kingdom of Poland is explained away as an 
acceptable price for the maintenance of ‘the Germanic principle’ in the old 
Ordensland, through ‘a hereditary German sovereignty’. While that part of the 
territory which fell to direct Polish rule ‘had to endure indescribable oppressions’, 
Ducal Prussia ‘gradually became completely German…here was an independent 
centre of German culture, from which the grandest developments of German 
nationality have sprung.’80 Ranke also found Frederick the Great’s achievements for 
the Prussian state to have had immeasurable importance as a service done for the 
German nation. Frederick had ‘worked for the emancipation of the nation’, and 
‘made the Germans proud to have had a hero arise from their midst.’81 
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 Nevertheless, Ranke’s narrative is a relatively balanced one, and certainly did not 
claim for Prussia a transhistorical ‘destiny’ since its origins to unify the Germans. A 
more fitting parallel to the work of such Irish historians as John Mitchel appears in 
the far less sober treatment of Prussia’s origins and role in German ‘national’ history 
appears in Treitschke’s 1862 essay on the history of the Ordensland of the medieval 
Teutonic Knights. This work, often republished, the central passages of which were 
extensively cited by German historians and nationalist publicists for decades after, 
unambiguously linked Prussia’s historical ‘fate’ with that of German unification. 82 
From this work on the Ordensland and the Teutonic Knights were produced and 
popularised various myths which could then fuel an aggressive, belligerent 
nationalism towards Poland and other Slavic countries. In the opening of this work, 
which ‘combined belles-lettres with historical narrative’, 83  the author began by 
deploring what he took as the ignorance of most Germans of great state of the 
Teutonic Knights, the Ordensland, and their feats of conquest and ‘culture-bearing’ 
in ‘the east’.84 For Treitschke, modern Germany had in large part been founded on 
the effects of this movement. There was even something near-mystical about the 
‘Germanness’ of Prussia: ‘A spell rises from the ground which was drenched with 
the noblest German blood in the fight on behalf of the name of Germany’.85 The 
Ordensland of the Teutonic Knights was a medieval ‘ethnic’ community exclusively 
for Germans in the midst of the Empire’s decline into fragmentation and 
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 impotence.
86
  As the Empire declined during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
‘Prussia’ (the Ordensland) alone remained a proud bastion of Germanness.87  As 
Wippermann points out, the synthesis of social-Darwinist ideas with historical events 
gave the ‘Germans as bearers as culture’ theory in this narrative a particularly 
aggressive accent, and remained a popular interpretation for long after Treitschke.
88
 
Treitschke contended that this ‘New Germany’ advanced to ‘political and military 
union with the rest of Germany’, though he then went on to compain that the 
unification of Prussia and Brandenburg had failed to occur centuries before the 
1600s.
89
 For Treitschke, the victory of the Poles over the Teutonic Knights in the 
fifteenth century, starting with the pivotal Battle of Tannenberg, represented the 
beginning of a period where ‘the foundations of decent human behaviour were 
undermined’, of an ‘unnatural state of affairs, where Slavs should rule Germans’. 
The eighteenth-century partitions of Poland in which the Kingdom of Prussia were 
involved became, therefore, not the aggrandisement of a single kingdom at the 
expense of the homogeneous Germanness of the German lands, but the righteous 
restoration of what had been ‘robbed’ from the nation centuries previously. 90 
Treitschke concedes that Prussia was a ‘borderland’, but in his writing too the non-
German aspects of Prussia are ‘written out’ of the story of the rise of Prussia as the 
most ‘authentic’ of all German territories. As a result of Frederick the Great’s victory 
over the old Polish enemy, the Kingdom of Prussia could become a state freed from 
the particularism and fragmentation that characterized the rest of Germany.
91
 Prussia 
had been the first German territory to accept the Reformation and Protestantism, 
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 enabling its progress towards becoming a modern state.
92
 Throughout this work 
Treitschke presented the Teutonic Knights and their Ordensland as the forerunners 
of the German Great Power of Prussia of the present day. He emphasized how in 
contrast to the positive mission of Kulturarbeit of the Teutonic Knights, inspired by 
their German nationality, the Slavs were only united by hatred of the Germans.
93
  
Prussia was certainly not the only historical region of ‘Germany’ that interested 
Treitschke. He had later, around the time of the Franco-Prussian War, written a 
pamphlet dealing with the dispute between French and German nationalists over the 
borderland region of Alsace-Lorraine entitled What We Demand From France, a 
bestseller that ‘illustrates the heart of German Francophobia.’ 94  From the late 
nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, Alsace-Lorraine was the fault line of 
Franco-German relations, a border region between France and the new German state 
during an age of increasing nationalism and a territory which changed hands four 
times between 1870 and 1945. For German nationalists, the people of the territory 
were Germans in language, culture and history, whether they cared to admit it or not. 
The conflict between French and German nationalists over Alsace-Lorraine was one 
not just of competing conceptions of history, but competing conceptions of national 
belonging as well. In the German nationalist mind, it was France that had been the 
oppressor that had for centuries preyed on Germany’s western territory, one that had 
for centuries done everything to keep Germany weak and divided. The events of 
1871 were merely a reversal of this lengthy history. To Treitschke, the region had 
been part of the German political and cultural world of the Empire for centuries 
before its annexation by France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through 
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 the imperial ambitions of Louis XIV.
95
 In light of the region’s cultural heritage and 
deep historical connections to the German lands, they were part of the new German 
Empire by (historical) right. Not only the French claim to Alsace-Lorraine, but the 
possibility of any sense of belonging to Alsace-Lorraine that disregarded the 
province’s place in the German Reich, was void, indeed anathema: 
‘We Germans, who know Germany and France, know better than these unfortunates 
themselves what is good for the people of Elsass, who have remained under the 
misleading influence of the French connection outside the new Germany...we cannot 
permit a German people, thoroughly degraded and debased, to serve against Germany, 
before our eyes, as a vassal of a foreign power...If we neglect our duty, the French will 
act with all that vigorous and passionate hatred which characterizes nations in their 
decay; and will hurl themselves on Elsass in the rage of their reawakened detestation of 
Germany, resolute to crush out every trace of the German nature...The German territory 
which we demand is ours by nature and by history.’
96
 
Here, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine is presented as merely the rectification of 
illegitimate earlier conquests of German territory by, with an aggravated mistrust of 
Germany’s ‘hereditary enemies’, above all France. Accusations of German 
expansionism, therefore, are hypocritical and unjust.
97
 Treitschke’s agenda in this 
pamphlet is more than about merely making arguments for German rule over Alsace-
Lorraine. His attempts to prove the historical ‘Germanness’ of the territory over 
centuries, broken only by a relatively brief French occupation, has as much to do 
with staking claims for a general German dominance over continental Europe as with 
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 any specific territorial claims(s).
98
 Similarly, when German nationalist historians 
looked to the east, the ‘five hundred years’ of Slavic rule in German-held Poland was 
given ‘the role of an interlude.’99 A most important distinction made by Treitschke in 
What We Demand From France was between ‘German Kultur’ and ‘Western 
Civilisation’, which would become particularly popular before and during the First 
World War.
100
 
In his Deutsche Geschichte too Treitschke’s Francophobia and presentation of 
Prussia as the ‘cockpit’ of modern German history found further expression, but here 
also the actual geography of Germany is itself mapped as a history of confrontation 
between Germans and their foreign enemies, and of such central developments in 
German history as the presence of the Protestant-Catholic antagonism. While Prussia 
had been a country forged solely by German deeds, ‘The old German south-eastern 
Mark’, that is Austria, ‘separated from Middle Germany by the powerful Slav realm 
of Bohemia, went its own way early in the Middle Ages’, becoming mired in the 
‘racial compost’ of non-Germanic, Slavic lands.101 In the north, by contrast, was 
found ‘that proud colony of united Germany [Prussia] which had been watered with 
the blood of all the German tribes...The great jumble of people which was Austria 
could never be completely Germanised...it was Prussia alone which could rouse 
Germans to once more become a great nation.’ 102  Thus Prussia’s inalienable 
historical claim to the leadership of Germany, the right to forcibly unite the German 
lands outside the Austrian Empire under the Prussian banner.
103
 Frederick the Great 
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 had achieved the redemption from Poland of lands that had been ‘won from the 
barbarians’, ‘atonement was made for the wrong done to this German land’.104 In 
places Treitschke tellingly slipped into the present tense as he began to hector his 
readers on the dangers of ‘particularism’: ‘We must get rid of the German national 
cancer, the childish petty territorialism...there must be one singly supreme authority 
in the empire’.105 For Treitschke it had been a certainty that Germany had not only 
been the battleground for the other nations of Europe, but its territorial fragmenation 
– to which, he repeatedly made clear, the worthless German princes with the sole 
exception of the Prussian Hohenzollerns had repeatedly been a party – also the 
guarantee of the established state order, as his disgusted reflections on the the 
German Confederation (1815-1866) showed. Only with breaking this old system, 
predicated on ‘the vacillation of the nation between patriotic aspirations and 
particularist traditions’, where ‘everywhere...it was preached as an irrefutable truth 
that particularism was the glory of Germany’, could Germany have become a nation. 
The Confederation had been merely another expression of ‘foreign dominion’.106 Yet 
it must also be remembered that Treitschke’s historical narrative of German territory 
was of course a selective one; it was not intended to underpin territorial claims on 
every region of Europe that had once been part of ‘Germany’ or had been in some 
way linked to ‘Germany’ or populated mostly by Germans. His remarks on the 
racially degraded and ‘mongrelized’ character of the Habsburg Empire were 
designed to justify the exclusion of that territory from the boundaries of the political 
German nation. In this respect, though Treitschke would come to be regarded by 
both adherents and enemies of expansionist völkisch nationalism as one of its 
                                                          
104
 Treitschke History of Germany, I, p. 76.  
105
 Treitschke, History of Germany, I, pp. 359-360; II, p. 92.  
106
 Ibid., pp. 94, 97, 122, 132.  
174
 progenitors and ideologues, he did not agree that it was either the right or in the 
interest of the Kaiserreich to pursue any further expansionist aims within Europe.
107
 
This underlines what we have already seen with respect to our Irish writers: the 
‘nationalization’ of a given historical territory took place within the framework of a 
wider understanding of what in its definition the nation was.  
Historical narratives which aimed to ‘nationalize’ a given region were often written 
by authors who came from the same territory. John Mitchel, of course, was an 
Ulsterman, as would important later figures such as Eoin MacNeill. Individuals such 
as Ranke and Treitschke (both natives of Saxony) were Prussians ‘by choice’. For 
Gustav Freytag, his own background not just as a Prussian but as a native of the 
border region of Silesia, his background as a ‘Kind der Grenze’, was a 
fundamentally important influence in his life. In his memoirs he would express his 
gratitude at having been born Prussian, Protestant, and Silesian. In his writings, 
running throughout his literary career, the Germans’ eastern neighbours are 
consistently presented as inferior and dangerous. The rise of Prussia, a German 
territory carved out on eastern soil, is presented as providential. ‘For two centuries’, 
he wrote, ‘both Germans and foreigners placed their hopes on this new State; equally 
long have Germans and foreigners, first with scorn and then with hatred, called it an 
artificial superstructure...which had unjustifiably intruded itself among the powers of 
Europe.’ Certainly Freytag disagreed that the country was an ‘artificial 
superstructure’, but nonetheless Prussia possessed a ‘peculiar nature’ and had 
engendered ‘a new phase of German character.’108 Prussia, surrounded by enemies, 
was moulded by its precarious position. Thus Prussian expansion toward the east is 
presented in defensive terms, as an act of necessity:  
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 ‘During many hundreds of years the much-divided Germans were confined and injured 
by ambitious neighbours; the great King [Frederick the Great] was the first conqueror 
who extended the German frontier further to the east. A century after his great ancestor 
[the Great Elector] had in vain defended the Rhine fortresses against Louis XIV, he 
again gave the Germans the emphatic admonition, that it was their task to carry laws, 
education, freedom, cultivation, industry into the east of Europe...Frederick William had 
freed the Prussian territories of the Teutonic Order from the Polish suzerainty.’109 
Again, in the restatement of the Germans’ Kultur mission in the east, the non-
German peoples of Prussia are either ‘written out’ of the narrative, or are, at best, 
made merely the passive subjects of this central ‘theme’.110  The two strongest pillars 
of Freytag’s Bilder were, after all, the forces of Protestantism and Prussia, as he 
freely admitted: ‘It is no accident’, he wrote, ‘that it is only easy for a person who is 
both a Protestant and a Prussian to regard the historical development of the last two 
centuries with pride and a cheerful heart.’111 The actions of Frederick the Great had 
throughout his reign exemplified the gradual evolution of the national consciousness 
towards maturity, responsibility, and political unity.
112
 One of the three acts of the 
drama of German history as told in the Bilder had been the moral regeneration of the 
German people under the leadership of the Hohenzollern dynasty.
113
 Earlier in the 
Bilder Freytag had written that the ‘failure’ of ‘the Germans’ to settle the ‘fertile 
territory’ had been a ‘shame on German history…which we still feel today’, as this 
had led to the settlement of ‘the east’ by ‘slavische Stämme’.114 Freytag, for his part, 
romanticised the Ordensland less than others, yet he emphasised strongly its role in 
advancing bürgerliche culture in ‘the East’, and how, whatever its faults, the Order 
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 had left behind itself in history ‘a great, civilised land, a powerful citizenry, and a 
German aristocracy’; it had, in short, laid the medieval foundations for the modern 
Prussian state.
115
 Freytag’s deep pride in the history of the Ostsiedlung, the German 
settlement in Silesia, from which his family had sprung, which unsurprisingly 
coloured deeply his view of the history of ‘the Germans’ in ‘the East’.116 This is 
another example of the tendency displayed by nationalist historians in both contexts 
to merge autobiography or family history with the history of a chosen region, 
whether they were native to that region or not.  
The völkisch nationalist and historical writer Heinrich Claß, in his Deutsche 
Geschichte, had gone further back than other authors, bluntly identifying the eastern 
campaigns of Emperor Otto I (r. 962-973) as ‘Kolonialpolitik’ and the reconquest of 
‘ancient German ethnic territory.’117 He was himself one of the most belligerent 
advocates of German colonial expansion in eastern Europe and globally in extreme 
German nationalist circles in the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic. A former 
student of Treitschke’s, he perceived German history in terms of a contrast between 
the healthy results of territorial expansion and the weakness, division and 
fragmentation resulting from its absence: Germany was surrounded by actual or 
potential enemies and had to subdue them or perish. Claß had agreed with his old 
teacher that the beating heart of German national life had been in the north-east, in 
Prussia.
118
 Otto Hintze, another Prussophile nationalist historian, had in his essay of 
1916 ‘Germany and the World Powers’ outlined the ‘classic’ German nationalist 
historical narrative of the German sense of place.  
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 ‘The principal cause’, he claimed, ‘by which dislike of the Germans is explained...lies in 
the simple fact that we live at the centre of Europe and have more neighbours than any 
other nation...So much feeling of distrust, of fear, of covetousness, of race-antagonism, 
and of a perhaps even sharper enmity of kindred peoples and races, are bound up in our 
thousand year-old history with this sense of nearness...Our geographic destiny is our 
historico-political destiny...we are compelled to maintain an attitude of strength worthy 
of attention, if we wish to to escape being trodden down and crushed in the struggle of 
nations – as unfortunately was our fate for so many centuries.’  
He continued further: ‘...To speak of “Prussia” and “Germany” in antithesis is 
misleading...Prussia’s political spirit has become the spirit of the new German 
Empire.’ 119  With regard to Poland, Hintze re-stated the old conceit about how 
Frederick the Great had merely reclaimed old German territory, motivated above all 
by the requirements of the security of his realm.
120
 Hintze’s essay expressed all of 
the main precepts of the German nationalist historiographical outlook on national 
territory going back to the mid-nineteenth century.
 121
 This historical nationalization 
of German territory, which denied the claims of other peoples to certain territories 
while raising those of the Germans to be inviolable, as a means of advancing 
expansionist claims obviously did not lose attraction after 1918.  
The influence of the writings of such figures as Treitschke and Freytag and others, 
manifested in such publications as the German ‘Intellectuals Manifesto’ of 1915 
which had as one of its demands expansion in those eastern territories ‘cultivated by 
Germans for the last seven hundred years’, and another that Germany destroy ‘the 
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 French menace once and for all’.122 Friedrich von Bernhardi, a former student of 
Treitschke’s, in his belligerent manifesto Germany and the Next War, when dealing 
with ‘Germany’s Historical Mission’, claimed that ‘The Germany of today...is a 
mutilated torso of the old dominions of the Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of 
the German peoples.’123 Thus, for the author, ‘Our first and positive duty consists, 
therefore, in...not surrendering a foot’s breadth of German soil to foreign 
nationalities.’124 He repeated enthusiastically the ‘Borussian’ conceit that part of the 
reason for Prussia’s historical success was that the territory had arisen on the basis of 
conquest rather than piecemeal incorporation, had arisen from a repository of the 
best German stock of the medieval period.
125
 Historical understandings of 
relationships between the region and the nation and their meaning for the latter 
retained a strong hold in the German context long after 1871.  
The same can be said as well for the Irish context, where in the opening decades of 
the twentieth century, the work of Eoin MacNeill, A.S. Green and others extended 
the denial of a potentially ‘anti-national’ historical Ulster distinctiveness backwards 
from the early modern period to the early medieval period and to late antiquity. 
Green had concluded Irish Nationality with the following rallying call: ‘the people of 
Ireland once more claim a government of their own in their native land that shall 
bind together the whole nation of all that live on Irish soil, and create for all a 
common obligation and a common prosperity…The natural union approaches of the 
Irish Nation – the union of all her children that are born under the breadth of her 
                                                          
122
 The Pan-German Programme: The Petition of the Six Associations and the Manifesto of the 
Intellectuals, ed. and trans. E. Bevan (New York, George H. Doran Co., 1915) 
123
 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, trans. A.H. Powles (New York, Longmans, 
1914), p. 76. Friedrich von Bernhardi, Deutschland und der nächste Krieg (VI Aufl., Berlin, J.G. 
Cotta, 1913), p. 82.  
124
 Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, p. 77. Bernhardi, Deutschland, p. 83.  
125
 Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, p. 62. Bernhardi, Deutschland, p. 66.   
179
 skies’.126 In History of the Irish State to 1014 she turned her attention against a 
common argument employed against historical narratives of Irish territorial unity: 
the argument that there had always been in Ireland, stretching back to the country’s 
earliest history, conflict between the territorial kingdoms of the north and the south. 
Green denied this, claiming that there was no such conflict of any significance until 
the first foreign invasions.
127
 In a near echo of Mitchel she added, in reference to 
early Irish history: ‘the nation feeling was here [in the north] more intense...the 
fidelity of the north to the cause of self-government was no less marked in the eighth 
century than in the eighteenth.’128 MacNeill’s account in the final chapter of his 
Phases of Irish History
129
 of the medieval, thirteenth century, ‘national’ ‘Irish rally’ 
against the English, noted that the Irish revival had begun in Ulster.
130
 Even those 
Anglo-Norman and English lords who had gone over to Ireland to conquer Ulster 
had within a few generations become as thoroughly Gaelicized in culture as any of 
the Gaelic Irish, and just as disinclined to obey the commands of English kings and 
viceroys. The Ulster leaders had spearheaded as well the attempt to establish Edward 
Bruce, brother of King Robert I of Scotland, as king of Ireland.
131
 The Irish revival 
of the Middle Ages was throughout its course, driven forward by the Gaelic princes 
of Ulster, in MacNeill’s time the most un-Irish and British part of Ireland. MacNeill, 
himself an Ulsterman, did much to transform his home province into an historical 
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 ‘ethnoscape’ belonging (exclusively) to the Irish nation.132 For MacNeill, to suggest 
that Ulster was not truly a part of the Irish nation was almost to call into question the 
very existence of the Irish nation.  
V 
The immediate post-war period and the early 1920’s was a period of caesura for both 
Germany and Ireland, and critically important for the nationalisms of these countries. 
In this period, and indeed throughout Europe, territorial changes resulting from 
disputed and unpopular treaties in the aftermath of armed conflict stood at the 
epicentre of contemporary political affairs. Germany’s defeat in the world war and 
the subsequent peace settlement left the boundaries of Germany significantly 
truncated compared to what they had been in 1914. The most grievous losses were 
regarded as Alsace-Lorraine and the Saarland in the west (the Rhineland was also 
under Allied military occupation during the 1920’s), northern Schleswig-Holstein, 
and most of the provinces of Posen, West Prussia, and much of Upper Silesia, in the 
east. As a result of the Versailles settlement all of these territories were transferred to 
Germany’s neighbours (mainly France and Poland) and Germany also lost its 
overseas colonies. Germany did however retain parts of Silesia, and East Prussia. A 
further condition of the peace settlement was that any union between Germany and 
the new Austrian Republic was forbidden in perpetuity. This in particular outraged 
public opinion in both Germany and Austria, which was heavily in favour of such a 
union, and saw its prohibition as a hypocritical and vengeful breach of the principle 
of national self-determination encapsulated in President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’. 
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of these events for the history of 
Germany’s brief inter-war democracy. The belligerent, expansionist and racialist 
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 dimensions of German nationalism were greatly magnified by them. On probably no 
other issue were nationalist opinions in Germany, even German public opinion in 
general, so united as in hostility to the territorial changes and a determination that 
they be reversed.
133
 While the basic ideological content of German nationalism 
(excepting perhaps its most extreme manifestations, conditioned as they were by 
distinctively twentieth-century racialist ideas, and of course in fascism) was not 
fundamentally changed by the outcomes of the war, they infused it with a powerful 
sense of grievance that had not been really present since the early nineteenth century.  
The year 1921 had seen the concession of independence for most of the island of 
Ireland, secured through the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the establishment of the Irish 
Free State. Yet this had come at the cost of the partition of the island. Northern 
Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom. The Treaty also preserved 
significant political and constitutional ties between the new Irish state and the 
developing British Commonwealth. Though the Treaty was narrowly ratified by Dail 
Eireann, few of its supporters, either in the nationalist elite or in the wider public, 
were satisfied with it as it stood, accepting it only as providing a ‘stepping stone’ to 
full independence, while its opponents rejected it completely. Within months of the 
Treaty’s signing the Irish Civil War (1922-1923) erupted. Yet the reality was that 
violent opposition to the Treaty was provoked much less by partition – already a fact 
by then – and the precarious position of the northern nationalist Catholic minority 
than the constitutional implications of the Treaty. By no later than 1925 partition had 
been at least grudgingly accepted as a regrettable reality by the Irish state and most 
of Irish public opinion.
134
 In nationalist rhetoric, what now appeared beside or 
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 instead of the emphasis on Ulster’s historic ‘Irishness’ were qualifications to the 
effect that Ulster, and its Unionist inhabitants, at least in modern history, had been 
gravely, perhaps irrevocably ‘damaged’ by British rule and ‘Anglicization’, now 
described by influential nationalists as a new ‘Pale’.135  
This was usually to come after partition, however. P.S. O’Hegarty’s fifty-page 
pamphlet Ulster: A Brief Statement of Fact (1919) may be considered as an exemplar 
of the twentieth century nationalist view of the Ulster question, of both the 
‘moderate’ and ‘advanced’ camps. The book saw the history of the province as being 
shaped by the interactions and conflicts of indigenous and foreign elements, but 
denied the ‘two nations theory’ advanced by opponents of Irish nationalism. The 
pamphlet’s opening sets out clearly its intent: ‘The dawn of history in Ireland finds 
the whole people of Ireland with a common language, common ideals and traditions, 
common social and political institutions, and a common literature.’ From the 
beginning of Irish history Ulster had played a pre-eminent part in national life: ‘In 
that rich and free civilisation the Northern Province was not the least of the 
provinces...[Ulster] was as advanced, and as characteristically Irish, as any of the 
other provinces.’ Ulster, O’Hegarty had asserted, had up to the end of the 
seventeenth century played the leading role in the national struggle against England: 
‘Its [Ulster’s] chiefs kept their independence until 1603...In the four and a half 
centuries since the invasion Ulster had been foremost in the struggle...In almost 
every case in which after the invasion the Irish national instinct tried to express itself 
in unity, the leader was a Prince of Uladh...Ireland’s best brain and her sharpest 
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 spearhead.’136 Yet even when Ulster was colonized from England and Scotland it 
was no more than a century until the national spirit reasserted itself there: ‘In the 
eighteenth century the Gall in Ulster had followed in the footsteps of the Gael, and 
out of Ulster of the Gall, as out of Uladh of the Gael, had come the anti-English 
impulse...The Gall had come to be Irish...with his interest centred in Ireland, his 
feelings centred in Ireland, all his traditions and hopes bound up in Ireland.’137 It was 
if the soil of Ulster itself had an assimilative quality, as did, thought O’Hegarty, the 
qualities of ‘Irishness’. 
In History of the Irish State to 1014, her last major work, Alice Stopford Green had 
added her voice to the argument for the presence in early Irish history of a complex 
system of government based on ranks of kings, headed by the kings of provinces and 
above them to the High King, whose authority extended over the entire country.
138
 
There was in Irish history no necessary opposition between regional allegiance and 
national loyalty; this was a modern fiction brought about by the wrong-headed denial 
of national self-government and independence. Green extolled the regional 
autonomy of Ireland that existed under centuries of Gaelic government, implying 
that it presented an old model for modern federalism or decentralized government. 
What might have been seen as mere territorial fragmentation, a manifestation of the 
political primitiveness of the Gaelic Irish, was in fact demonstration of the freedom-
loving nature of the Gael.’139 Instead of being evidence of backwardness and absence 
of nationality, Gaelic ‘particularism’ is presented as simply the love of freedom that 
seamed with natural all-island patriotism.
140
 The Gaelic Irish system had permitted 
the diversity and autonomy of the regions and provinces that formed the Irish nation 
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 while still providing a common centre for national unity, whereas it had been the 
brute force of English state-building that had forged a rigidly centralized Irish polity 
from the end of the sixteenth century onwards in order to perpetuate English control 
over Ireland. What, then, in Green’s time, was the real source of threat to Irish 
regional identity in the present? An authentic Irish nationalism based on ‘Gaelic’ 
concepts, or British government, which could never be more than indifferent to Irish 
nationality? Green’s contemporary Mary Hayden, in her own history of Ireland 
candidly admitted that ‘particularism’ had been the most important fact about the 
political constitution of Gaelic Ireland since its ancient beginnings until the collapse 
of the Gaelic political and social order at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
Yet in this respect Ireland was not fundamentally different from much of the rest of 
Europe in the same period, where regional particularism and indistinct, changing 
boundaries had been the norm.
141
 That medieval Ireland had been territorially 
fragmented has in itself no significance for modern Ireland, or at least no more than 
would be seen to be the case for any other modern European nation.
142
 Irish 
historians did their best to emphasise the role played by Ulster in national life over 
the course of many centuries and by suggesting that the Gaelic political system 
provided models for that of any modern Irish century, so that Gaelic 
‘decentralization’ appeared as a precursor of federalism, which could have a 
particular appeal in the Irish context. Historical historiographical discussions of 
national territory, in Ireland and Germany, were closely linked with political 
arguments and ideas about the territorial configuration of any Irish state.  
Alsace-Lorraine, which had been transferred to French jurisdiction under the 
territorial provisions of the 1918 peace settlement that had so enraged German 
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 nationalists, was one particular ‘flashpoint’ of nationalist sentiment. As Alsace-
Lorraine had come into the new Reich in 1871 not by its own determination but by 
military annexation, and had been placed under the jurisdiction of Berlin (even 
though not incorporated into the Kingdom of Prussia), the question of Alsace-
Lorraine’s historical national significance for Germany remained to be proven. The 
historian Dietrich Schäfer, another former student of Treitschke’s (and a veteran of 
the Franco-Prussian War), regarded the annexation of the territory, regardless of the 
cultural affiliations of its inhabitants, as quite a simple matter, one of 
‘regaining…what was lost to the Reich by robbery.’143 As for Alsace-Lorraine, as far 
as Schäfer was concerned, it was not possible to speak rightfully of wrongs done to 
France by Germany. Alsace-Lorraine had been continually, from 860 to 1648, in its 
full extent an integral part of the German Reich. It was to be counted as one of the 
great achievements of the medieval emperors that they had conquered the region for 
the ‘deutschen Wesens’.144 Only as a result of the most brutal wrongs done by Louis 
XIV in the second half of the seventeenth century had at least a third of the region’s 
territory been annexed to France.
145
 The annexation was the result of a long chain of 
French crimes and violence, for which not only France’s rulers had been responsible, 
but the whole French Volk. The forty million Germans who had gained victory over 
the Erbfeind could not place the wishes of one and a half million provincials who had 
in any case lived for generations under ‘foreign rule’ above their own needs.146 In 
terms of ‘völkische Zugehörigkeit’, the land was indisputably German, had always 
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 been, and remained so in the present.
147
 For Hermann Oncken, writing in 1922, the 
history of Alsace-Lorraine demonstrated that borderlands, as well as being receptors 
for foreign cultural and intellectual influences, could also stand with the highest zeal 
for the preservation of national particularity, as was the historical rule in the case of 
Alsace-Lorraine.
148
 Oncken, unlike Schäfer,
149
 was a supporter of the Weimar 
Republic, but he too desired the return of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. While the 
domination of French Kultur ultimately meant for the Alsace-Lorrainers only 
subjection, the true freedom conferred by German Kultur would ensure ‘freedom’ 
and ‘individuality’, and the preservation of their ‘historically constituted self.’150 For 
Martin Spahn, Alsace-Lorraine had historically been the western ‘Mark’ of the Reich 
and a borderland between German and French cultures, as opposed to a part of 
France proper. It was the common ‘fate’ of both Germany and France to contest over 
the region.
151
 The question of the ‘Germanness’ of Alsace-Lorraine or any other 
region that had been incorporated into the new Reich or earlier into one of its 
constituent states was linked with perceptions of the German character. For Schäfer, 
for example, generally speaking, charges that the Germans were a nation of 
conquerors was false. The Germans had never been such, and the Ostsiedlungen, 
with the exception only of the Teutonic Order’s conquest and the partitions of 
Poland, had been wholly peaceful movements that had in fact not been driven by the 
Emperors, the great dukes, or the territorial princes; but rather resulted from Slavic 
rulers inviting the ‘culture-bearing’ German settlers into their realms to establish the 
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 ‘Germanic civility’ of urban life and commerce.152 The dismemberment of Poland 
had been justified to prevent further Russian expansion into Europe. In any case, 
Poland by this time, Schäfer argued, was no longer even a national state; the Poles 
themselves had always regarded themselves as simply a ‘Herrenbevölkerung’ ruling 
over a multi-ethnic rabble.
153
 Once again, the historical basis and legitimacy of the 
Polish nation-state is denied, while that of Germany – Prussian-led Germany – is 
presented as inviolable.  
In Haller’s Epochs of German History, the ‘geographical element’ in German history 
and its troubling consequences for Germany in the present had been a running 
thread. Germany’s geographical position in the centre of Europe, was fundamental to 
the nature of German history: ‘the German Reich was brought into existence mainly 
through external influences, almost one might say chance events…Germany’s 
history was from the beginning determined by her geographical situation.’ To Haller, 
‘battle along two fronts has been the constantly recurring theme of German history. 
This is due to Germany’s situation between two great neighbouring peoples that 
differ from her in character, and from whom she is separated by only weak lines of 
demarcation or by none at all.’154 Thus, even from the outset of German history, the 
nation’s possession of certain border regions surrounding the core territory was seen 
as essential to the nation’s survival. For Haller, ‘the tasks of a country are set by 
geography, by its situation and physical character...the constant fact which has 
principally determined political history in all ages is geography.’155 In the German 
case, this maxim manifested itself in Germany’s ‘encirclement’ by actual or potential 
enemies and the absence of clear borders to west and east, and thus the necessity of 
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 expansion, strictly for the purpose of ‘defence’. A weak Germany could only be prey 
for the ambitions of surrounding rulers, the stage on which the game of European 
power politics was played. Had not, after all, the French aimed throughout the 
eighteenth century to make the German princes their permanent vassals, and had 
they not achieved this for a time in the west under Napoleon? Were it not for Prussia, 
‘The state of things first brought about by the Thirty Years’ War, that Germany 
formed the chess-board on which the Great Powers fought out their games, 
threatened to be perpetuated.’  
Haller too ascribed some kind of fated role to Prussia: ‘Expansion or downfall 
seemed to be its motto, and indeed its strange geographical condition seemed to 
prescribe some such guiding principle.’ In this sense, Prussia gave strongest 
expression to how German geography determined German history. On the other 
hand, Haller denied that the Prussian acquisition of Polish territory was either the 
result of a natural historical development or a national policy.
156
 Rather, this 
development had merely been the result of a ‘favourable opportunity.’ Nonetheless, 
it had been a fortunate one: ‘The national movement in Germany needed a state to 
adopt it and take over its aims, and in that event there was no limit to its 
potentialities...At both ends of Europe Prussia stood guard over the most threatened 
outposts, constituted by the sheer necessity of the struggle for existence the 
champion of the whole German race.’157 In the subtext of this lay the certainty that 
what Germany needed in the present was a powerful, national government that could 
re-dedicate itself to the age-old task of defending nation from its enemies, east and 
west. In the wider context of German affairs in the 1920s, and given the popularity 
of his writings, such arguments as those outlined by Haller would prepare much of 
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 the ground intellectually and culturally for later German expansionism. One does not 
need to associate Haller or those who preceded him straightforwardly with Nazism to 
recognise that they contributed to a particular understanding of the German past and 
present that were congruent with extreme forms of nationalism. Likewise, one does 
not need to ‘blame’ certain Irish nationalist historians to recognize that their writings 
shaped the mentalities of Irish nationalists regarding Ulster and Ulster Protestants.  
The fledgling Irish government was itself not averse to irredentist publicising. In 
1923, in what may be regarded as one of the last official noteworthy expressions of 
Irish pan-nationalism by the government of the Irish Free State, the Handbook of the 
Ulster Question was published, which set out to ‘prove’ the ‘fact’ that ‘Ulster’ 
‘belonged’ to the Irish nation. In the introduction the authors claimed: ‘From the 
historical section of the book it is clear that the real cause of division in Ulster was 
not a difference of race but a difference of religion, and that this religious difference 
was persistently exploited by persons and parties whose interests demanded the 
frustration of the forces continuously making for national unity.’158 In contrast to 
ethnic differences, religious differences could be dismissed as the hangover of a 
troubled past caused by unjust government which should not frustrate the principle 
of national self-determination. Those opposed to the full exercise of national self-
determination were either foreigners or the proxies of foreigners. From the outset the 
possibility of the Ulster Protestants lying outside of the boundaries of the Irish 
nation, or constituting a nation of their own, is denied. The Handbook refutes any 
notion of ethnic or ‘racial’ difference between the inhabitants of North-East Ulster 
and the rest of Ireland, even by resorting to its own racial categorizations, as with the 
claim that, ‘The Anglo-Saxon element in Ulster is of microscopic dimension.’ The 
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 settlers of the seventeenth-century Plantation of Ulster had been almost entirely 
Scottish, therefore Gaelic. The authors of the Handbook criticised Ulster Protestants 
for assuming that Ulster’s history began with the seventeenth century Plantation –  
‘To rule twentieth-century issues by seventeenth-century precedents is to block the 
road to any hope of progress’ – even as they argued that the history of Ulster going 
back to its earliest recorded origins was of greater significance. The writers added, 
appropriately: ‘The best defence of the Planters, if not of the Plantation, is that 
penned by John Mitchel, a man of their own blood, in the preface to his Life of Aodh 
O’Neill’. The writers of the Handbook argued for a continuous ‘movement towards 
unity’ that ‘was part of a process which had been at work in Ireland since the day 
when the Norman invaders became “more Irish than the Irish”’, 159  a process 
frustrated and delayed only by the effects of English and later British misrule. The 
point is continued later on with more assertion: ‘The apostles of the theory of a 
homogeneous Six County area, with a separate national consciousness, are forced to 
distort and obscure the facts’. It is claimed that ‘A nation is a living 
organism…shaped first by geographical conditions, then by history, then by a sense 
of common interests and purposes.’ The ‘Ulster problem’ clearly challenged all these 
conceptions of the nation by denying Ireland’s ‘natural’ unity as an island, the 
possibility of a common historical experience, and the political unity provided by 
common interests and purposes. The historical-political section ends with the 
assertion that ‘Ireland as a whole is a nation, and North-East Ulster is merely a small 
portion of Ireland which for the moment refuses to assent to the political 
implications of that nationhood.’160 Whatever one thinks of the respective merits of 
the Versailles settlement and the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the arguments made by Irish 
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 opponents of partition and German revanchists were hardly very dissimilar, if we 
consider how they were focused on a kind of selective history that dismissed the 
historical experiences of communities that rejected their place in the Irish or German 
nation as irrelevant.   
For the most part Irish nationalists simply could not admit even the possible justice 
of Ulster Unionist objections. P.S. O’Hegarty, therefore, for all his admiration for the 
historical role played by Ulster within Irish national history and his claims that there 
could be no ‘Ireland without the north’, no Irish nation without the northern 
Protestant tradition included,
161
 wrote in Ulster: A Brief Statement of Fact:  
‘If the Unionists of Ulster should refuse to recognize their Irish citizenship, they can 
only do so by proclaiming themselves a colony…And in that case they have no rights in 
Ireland, being merely a colony which has not succeeded in ousting, or conquering, the 
original inhabitants. Rights in a country are dependent upon citizenship, and where 
citizenship is denied, and its obligations refused, there are no rights. Aliens in a country, 
not adopting its nationality, have no rights…No claim to separation from Ireland can be 
substantiated by any section of the Irish people: it can only be made by a foreign colony, 
alien to the soil, deriving its authority from an external force and basing its claim upon 
force. No such claim can, or ever will, be entertained by the Irish people.’162  
A refusal to recognize the claims of the northern Protestant unionists to separateness, 
and the presentation of them as a colonial garrison and foreign intruder impeding the 
path to unity and independence, allowed nationalists to remain certain of the 
correctness of their understanding of the problem. Ulster Unionists, as was 
maintained or implied by some, were merely traitors to their own history who had 
forfeited any legitimate claim to be considered the rightful possessors of the 
province. The historical attachments of unionists to this territory, the Ulster 
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 Protestants or ‘Ulster Scots’, were considered to be inferior or conditional.163 It was 
as if the strivings of a minority of northern Protestants in the late eighteenth, the 
nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries to Irish legislative independence had 
invalidated any modern northern claim whatsoever to separation from the rest of the 
country.
164
 O’Hegarty reiterated: ‘The pro-Union, anti-Nationalist temper of the 
Ulster Unionists is an artificial temper, and it is the antithesis of the more natural 
temper evolved by their forefathers in the eighteenth century.’ 165  ‘England’ had 
sundered the cultural and geographical integrity of the Irish nation in order to 
maintain its presence; the Ulster Protestants were at best mere dupes and proxies.
166
 
To Aodh de Blacam, writing in 1921, while the Ulster Unionist may have been a 
‘perverted Irishman’, he was still an Irishman, and even if he were a foreigner it 
would not matter, since ‘the growth of a foreign population on a corner of the 
nation’s soil does not give that corner the right to secede’,167 regardless of how long 
that population had been established. Sean Milroy, parliamentarian and advisor to 
the Irish government on the north during the time of the boundary discussions had 
said: ‘The most militant stand of Ireland against absorption by the English, and the 
one which was last to be subdued, was that of Ulster.’168 In the same publication 
Eoin MacNeill submitted similar remarks, conflating the question of partition with 
that of ethnic kinship: ‘The idea that the Ulster Protestants are racially distinct from 
the Catholics…does not stand the test of inquiry…history shows this present 
sentiment is the outcome of the persistent and unscrupulous policy of British 
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 Statesmen, pursued solely in “the English interest.”’169 In an essay published in 1922 
Milroy had earlier claimed that: ‘To call this area Ulster is to betray an ignorance of 
the subject and to reveal a dishonest purpose. It is only a section of the province of 
Ulster and has no basis historic, political, economic or religious to warrant its being 
regarded as a unit’.170 The fact that Ulster had been the last of the four provinces to 
be conquered by England, at the end of the sixteenth century, was seen as almost 
trans-historically relevant.
171
 In 1925 Green wrote in her History of the Irish State, 
optimistically if nothing else: ‘The loyalty of the old Irish to a nation of diverse 
peoples, made one by their fidelity to the land that bore them…has remained among 
the Irish people the most generous in its inspiration and in the breadth of its 
fellowship.’172 Thus it could be dismissed as ‘one of the shibboleths of latter-day 
unionism’, that Ulster had always expressed ‘devoted loyalty’ to Britain, since ‘the 
most cursory knowledge of history disposes of this contention as a pure fallacy.’173 
In order to defend the notion of a common historical experience for all the people of 
Ireland, that of any separate one for Ulster is denied and disparaged as a political 
myth. This, of course, became a political myth of its own, one based in part on the 
distinctive (though not wholly separate) modern historical experiences of the south 
and west, which undergirded a pastoral and Catholic-oriented nationalism in which 
the Protestant aristocracy and rural gentry had played an important role in originating 
and developing. The true sense of Irishness reposed in the ‘plain people’ of Ireland, 
above all in the rural expanses of the west and the south – where Gaelic language 
and culture had endured longest – in people who could trace their ‘authentically’ 
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 Irish ancestry back over the course of many centuries. They had remained unsullied 
by Anglicization, which had infested the north-east and caused the Ulster Protestants 
to ‘forget’ their Irishness, all this was particularly fundamental to some nationalists 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Gaelic Revival.
174
 In no way was 
the inability to accept partition limited merely to ‘advanced nationalists’. John 
Redmond (1856-1918), foremost representative of the non-militant, non-separatist, 
constitutional nationalist tradition from the beginning of the twentieth century to its 
eclipse in 1918, had made clear in 1913, that ‘The two-nation theory is to us an 
abomination and a blasphemy.’175 A reasonable consequence of such thinking could 
be found in statements made by Michael Collins in 1921: ‘the medieval Pale finds its 
present-day counterpart in Belfast and its surrounding country. All that must be 
redeemed for Ireland…North-east Ulster had been created and maintained not for her 
own advantage, but to uphold Britain’s policy’. To Collins the whole concept of 
‘Northern Ireland’, resulting from the unjust Anglicization of over a million Irish 
people, was an oddity. His solution was ‘to impregnate our northern countrymen 
with our national outlook’, for ‘the tendency of the sentiment in the North-East, 
when not interfered with, was national, and in favour of freedom and unity.’176  
A German parallel to the Irish government’s Handbook was Friedrich Meinecke’s 
brief, twenty-five page pamphlet Geschichte der links-rheinischen Gebietsfragen 
(History of the Questions Regarding the Left Bank of the Rhine), written in 1918 in 
protest against the decision by the Allies to transfer Alsace-Lorraine, and also 
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 against further French territorial ambitions (as Meinecke claimed) against Germany. 
He began uncompromisingly: ‘When Germany incorporated Elsaß and a part of 
Lothringen in 1871…she was firmly convinced that it was her sacred duty to win 
back two peoples originally and essentially of German race, peoples which were a 
part of the old Empire and which had been torn from it by various historical 
misfortunes.’ He accused France of ‘attempting by means of historical arguments’ – 
false ones – ‘to limit and to annul the consequential application of the free right of 
self-determination.’ French historical claims to German territory were ‘dubious and 
uncertain’ if not ‘purely arbitrary’.177 At this point Meinecke gave full rein to his ire: 
‘All the questions in dispute today arise from the ancient desire of France – a desire 
which had already begun to manifest itself during the later Middle Ages – to seize 
the frontier of the Rhine and thereby tear communities which are purely German in 
blood, in speech, and in national sentiment out of their natural relation to the rest of 
their people!’ Alsace-Lorraine had been, Meinecke maintained, since the year 1500 – 
if not earlier – one of the strongest bastions of German culture. The only reason the 
territory had ever been a part of France was because of the belligerent and unjustified 
expansion of French rulers. Meinecke described the period of Alsace-Lorraine’s 
incorporation in the French state as one of ‘great misfortune’ for ‘the German 
Elsassian’, who had been ‘forced further and further away from a vital connection 
with the great community of German civilisation. He confidently asserted that the 
‘New Germany’ would ‘have nothing in common with the spirit of national 
intolerance’, while making clear that ‘neither can she endure to see children of her 
own blood torn from her side.’ He concluded, ‘an irreparable wrong was committed 
against German Elsaß and Lothringen when they were forced under the dominion of 
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 a foreign nation and alienated from the great body of German civilisation 
(Meinecke’s emphasis). This wrong must not be committed again.’178 In reading 
Meinecke’s pamphlet against the Handbook of the Ulster Question or, say, 
O’Hegarty’s Ulster pamphlet, we can see that while the names of contested 
territories in Europe may have been different, the nationalist historical discourse on 
contested territories had a particular form, centring on the themes of the injustice of 
the ‘other’, the inviolability of the nation’s territory and a ‘writing out’ of regional 
affiliations and loyalties as illegitimate or in some way illusory. 
Yet for some, even if only a minority, of Irish nationalists Ulster was practically a 
hopeless case. D.P. Moran, for one, who saw Irishness, ‘Gaelicism’ – ‘the 
foundation of Ireland is the Gael, and the Gael must be the element that absorbs’179 – 
and Catholicity as being coterminous, regarded Ulster Protestants in general as an 
alien entity apparently impervious to assimilation.
180
 He once claimed, in his 
typically provocative way, that given their history the Ulster Protestants ‘ought…to 
be grateful to the Irish nation for being willing to adopt them.’ He added: ‘We 
believe that most of these people are not Irish: they are in relation to Ireland as 
foreign as born Englishmen…’181 The descendants of planters and immigrants had 
never attained a normal, natural relationship with their host country.
182
 Yet still, 
despite these statements to the effect that the Ulster Unionists were ‘resident aliens’ 
he too refused to accept that they had any right to choose to separate themselves 
from the Irish nation; they were a fundamentally rootless people who owed their 
position merely to Britain’s might who might still be assimilated one day by an Irish 
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 nation ‘re-Gaelicized’. For Moran’s close colleague the essayist Arthur Clery the 
people of Ulster in general (even Catholics), were so corrupted by Anglicization that 
it would be utterly senseless for the (southern) Irish nation to try and incorporate 
them. Their ‘bad pedigree’ as the ‘descendants of colonists’ was what accounted for 
their rejection of the Irish nation.
183
 Douglas Hyde, founder of the Gaelic League, 
speaking as early as 1891 on the theme of how Ulster Protestants had failed to accept 
their place within the Irish nation as the descendants of earlier foreign settlers had 
done centuries before, had aid of ‘Ulster’ that it was a place ‘where the Gaelic race 
was expelled and the land planted with aliens, whom our dear mother Erin, 
assimilative as she is, has hitherto found it difficult to absorb’.184 Again, examples of 
how the historical narrative of Irish national territory permitted pragmatic acceptance 
of the reality of partition whilst at the same time enabling the denial that there was 
any legitimacy, historical or otherwise, in the refusal of Ulster Protestants to accept 
their place in the Irish nation. The perceptions of figures such as Moran of Ulster are 
reflective of a turn-of-the-twentieth-century reaction against older precepts of 
Irishness that had been owed to Protestant intellectuals from the early nineteenth 
century onwards like O’Grady.185 O’Grady, who associated the far-reaching political 
and social changes taking place in the Ireland of his time with the loss of ‘heroic’ 
values sought to embed himself and his community firmly within the Irish nation 
through turning to ‘heroic’ conceptions of Irish nationality, and found them in 
particular, as we have seen, in historical narratives of the great Ulster leader 
Cuchulainn. This is but one example of how certain perceptions of Ulster, its 
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 historical terrains and its historic significance were defined by the increasing 
‘southern-centricity’ of Irish nationalism up to the start of the twentieth century. 186  
German historians were always deeply concerned with the peculiarity of Germany’s 
geographical position and the prevalence and strength of regional allegiances in the 
German lands. Since the days of Arndt, the ‘father’ of German nationalism, they had 
been vexed by the task of delineating Germany’s boundaries, the extent of the 
national territory. The continued contemporary relevance of territorial changes for 
the Germans was also pertinent. The ‘East’ as both territorial region or sphere of 
influence and cultural space held particular importance, as we have seen, for German 
national self-understanding, regarded as both one of the crucibles of the German 
cultural and political nation yet also as the frontier of the nation and where it was at 
most risk from foreign threats. This was reflected in how both historiographical 
supporters and opponents of Prussia thought and wrote about the history of that 
territory, and there is a parallel here in Irish nationalist historical understandings of 
‘the North’ and that region’s place in Irish history. In Ireland, the nation’s borders 
did not become a real political issue until the first decades of the twentieth century; 
in Germany, they had always been a problem, indeed a European one. The story of 
Germany’s history was narrated as one of contest between the aspirations and 
concerns of Germans, and those of the Germans’ many neighbours, particularly the 
French to the west and the Slavs to the east and south.  The indistinctness of German 
borders made numerous regions battlegrounds for German historians, including 
Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, Bohemia, and areas of Prussia, while in 
Ireland, the problem of contested territory was centred on Ulster. In the German 
                                                          
186
 This was aptly expressed in the formalistic, legal terms of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution 
of 1937, which laid explicit claim to the territory of Northern Ireland, while making it clear that until 
such time as reunification happened, the Irish state’s authority would stop at the border – kulturnation 
and staatsnation would remain ‘apart’.    
199
 context, even more so, the problem of defining national territory was always central 
to the instability that continually affected nationalism. Germany’s boundaries had 
been so variable throughout history that historians and historical writers felt more 
than justified in making claims that were sometimes explicitly irredentist and 
belligerent. The territorial integrity of other nations and the territorial identity of 
certain historic regional groups was often denied, these communities ‘written out’ of 
Germany’s national story, while any and all threats towards Germany’s historic 
territorial integrity was regarded simply as an unconcealed aggressive attack on the 
Germany by the nation’s ‘hereditary enemies’ in east and west. Historians in 
Germany and Ireland, nationalist and otherwise, were ultimately no more able to 
serve the problem of contested territories than nationalist geographers, linguists, 
ethnographers or politicians. However much they tried, they could not render 
cultural borders into political borders.
187
 They wrote in the context of political 
realities – very different ones in the two countries – which they had little role in 
effecting or changing. Yet, however impotent their writings may have been in this 
respect, they nonetheless played a major role in influencing and communicating 
public policy and opinion, and furthermore, historians’ reflections on the nation’s 
historical territory were intimately linked with the fundamental ideas of what it 
meant to speak of the German nation or the Irish nation. To take only one dimension 
of this, the historical nationalization of territory in these contexts was evidently 
linked to the question of how the nation was to be defined; whether in primarily 
‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ terms. Discussions of the nation’s historical territory often belied 
the assumption or claim that ‘race’ or ‘race thinking’ counted for little or nothing. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
Historical ‘Self’ and historical ‘Other’: ‘Race’, Descent, and National Enmity in 
the Nation’s History 
I 
In the course of the nineteenth century, political language became suffused with 
racial idioms and distinctions, as did historical narratives of the nation.
1
 If these 
narratives worked to define who was to be included within the nation, they also had 
the function of defining who and what was to be excluded. National communities 
often define other groups as the negation of their own self-image, with ‘history’ 
being a most powerful means of framing this definition.
2
 ‘Having an enemy’, it has 
been argued, ‘is important not only to define our identity but also to provide an 
obstacle against which to measure our system of values and, in seeking to overcome 
it, to demonstrate our own worth.’3 ‘Race thinking’ in reference to the past not only 
defined the nation’s character, but also to the definition of the nation’s ‘Others’, and 
to ideas of national enmity. This was something significant to nationalist historical 
narratives throughout Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and in 
the contexts of Germany and Ireland. In both Ireland and Germany the demarcation 
of the national community vis-à-vis external others was entwined with internal 
delineations against certain social, linguistic, cultural, or religious groups whose 
traditions and customs made them seem in some way alien to the core community.
4
 
The act of ‘Othering’, the ways in which German and Irish nationalists, including 
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 nationalist historians – as in every country in Europe during the age of nationalism – 
had as much to do with indirectly defining the national community itself as with 
defining what was not of that community. The importance of the ‘Other’ for the 
nation’s own historical self-image shall become particularly apparent, for example, 
in how German and Irish nationalist historians dealt with the problem of cultural 
mixing and change in the nation’s history. Those harmful characteristics ascribed to 
the nations’ ‘Others’ in this respect were more often than not reflections about how 
the Irish or German nation was characterized. Yet for all its ‘othering’ usefulness, 
‘race’ was not always accepted as a particularly meaningful category of the nation’s 
history. ‘Race’ could be considered as another manifestation of ‘nation’ and could 
accentuate the nation’s distinctiveness. 5  However, ‘race’ was itself historically 
contingent and variable and the very malleability of the concept was problematic – 
exactly how was the significance of ‘race’ as an actor in the nation’s historical past 
to be judged? To which extent was ‘race’ a determining factor in the development of 
cultural communities? Was a nation’s ‘racial’ character immutable or changeable? 
Such questions were central for the application of ‘race thinking’ to nationalist 
history in these contexts as well as others.   
The abstract and constructed nature of the concept of ‘race’, which was used to 
denote different things sometimes at the same time, throws up many problems of 
definition.
6
 From the beginnings of its usage(s), ‘the term “race” was highly unstable 
and was applied with a staggering imprecision.’7 In simple terms, understandings of 
race may be broadly distinguished between those that view races as fixed, objective 
‘biological’ categories of common descent defined by common physical 
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 characteristics, with ‘scientific’ grounding; and those that found the ‘meaning’ of 
‘race’ primarily in common attitudes, morals, political ideas, cultural characteristics, 
historical peculiarities and of course national identity.
8
 But, again, the line between 
these understandings was always blurry at best, and ultimately, all such terms as 
‘nation’, ‘Volk’, and ‘race’ are at their most basic level related ‘boundary-
demarcating collective concepts’. 9  For the purpose of this discussion, the latter, 
‘culture-oriented’ notion of ‘race’ is employed, ‘race’ as a group of people(s) united 
not just by ancestry but by history and cultural traits and experiences. The concept of 
Volk might be regarded, as Leerssen has put it, as ‘the socio-political manifestation 
of race’.10 The narratives under consideration here are replete with discussions of 
‘race’, ‘Volk’, and ‘people’; but considered usually in the sense of historically-
formed cultural communities generally coterminous with nations. It is for this reason 
that the question of ‘race’ in the nation’s history – however ambiguously defined the 
concept – was important, because ‘race’ was regarded as a kind of philosophical 
element in national history.   
II 
In both the Irish and German contexts ‘race’ (understood in the above, ‘cultural’ 
sense) and ‘nation’ existed in a complicated relationship. Historical conceptions of a 
German ‘racial’ identity or heritage were potentially useful in providing a focal point 
for ‘natural’ German historical unity in the midst of political disunity and 
fragmentation. The early Germanic Frühzeit, for example, however historically 
distant it was, appeared to some nationalists to offer a counterpoint to those periods 
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 of medieval, early modern and modern German history which had been defined by 
such points of conflict as religious, political, and regional differences, or an 
‘archetypal state of national originality’, in which Germanness had been ‘pure and 
unadulterated’.11 The ‘founders’ of the modern German national idea, Fichte, Jahn, 
and Arndt, had each given the Volk concept centrality in their thinking, outlining ‘a 
moral philosophy of Deutschtum’.12  If Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation 
amounted to a moral appeal for the renewal of the German nation, it was based in 
such notions as that the Germans of the present were defined in relation to the 
Germanen of the distant past, their progenitors.
13
 In contrasting ‘Germanic’ 
(Germans, Scandinavians, Dutch, Anglo-Saxons) and Romanized ‘Latin’ peoples, 
and presenting the history of Europe as a theatre of conflict between them, the basis 
for ‘racial’ interpretations of ‘national’ history was laid.14  
On the other hand, notions of German racial commonality still did not necessarily 
substantiate arguments for a German nation-state. Whatever moral or historical 
philosophies of Deutschtum may have had to say, while all (ethnic) Germans may 
have been racially Germanic, not all racially Germanic peoples had belonged to the 
historical German nation. It could not be seriously maintained either that German 
culture had not been formatively developed through interaction with those of other 
peoples. The difficulty in attempting to ‘nationalize’ Germanness as ‘race’ – as was 
likewise the case in the Irish context – lay not just in demonstrating the homogeneity 
of ‘the Germans’ in the present as a single historical community (the Germans were, 
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 after all, up to 1871, a people of many different ‘tribes’ or Stämme), but in how to 
present German (or Irish) ‘racial character’ as a cohering force in the nation’s 
history.
15
 In the generations after Fichte and Arndt, many varied German histories 
were repeatedly faced with determining ‘how, exactly, the historical imagination 
should construct “Germany”.’ 16  German historians were consistent, however, in 
defining the nation by reference to a discourse of national enmity – i.e. ‘we’ are not 
what ‘they’ are, indeed ‘we’ are superior to ‘them’ – directed predominantly against 
neighbouring nations. Yet this same sense of superiority was also to a great deal the 
result of a historical narrative of centuries of German disunity, weakness and 
powerlessness in the face of other, more dominant nations and this context accounted 
for much of what constituted German nationalist ‘race thinking’. The same was the 
case, to a significant degree, in the Irish context. If most Irish nationalists generally 
disagreed over the particulars of ‘Irishness’, most could agree that Irishness was 
defined in contrast to the character of the nation’s ‘Other’: ‘England’ or Britain (the 
terms were used practically interchangeably). The sense that there was, to quote 
Ranke, an essential ‘secret something’ about Irishness that was always somehow 
there, did much to define attitudes towards the problem of the Ulster Unionist 
community. If this group really was not Irish in some essential way, then it could 
only be ‘foreign’, the outpost of another nation on Irish soil. To define the nation’s 
historical identity in the sense of an irreducible ‘character’ or antagonism towards 
another nation ruled out opting in or out of one’s own nation.   
In the Irish context, applying conceptions of an Irish ‘race’ to Irish history, even 
from a nationalist standpoint, was inherently difficult and ambiguous, since not even 
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 within the most ‘Gaelicized’ narrative of Irish history it could not be disputed that 
the Irish were a product of a number of different ethno-cultural elements with 
different origins, throughout their history.
17
 Conceptions of ‘the Irish race’ existed 
both synonymously with the idea of the historical Irish nation, or in veiled contest 
with it. The question of how to reconcile the notion of an Irish ‘race’ with the reality 
of the different historical ethno-cultural communities that had developed within 
Ireland was never really solved. The ethnic substance of ‘the Irish race’ – primarily 
the Irish language and much of traditional Gaelic culture – seemed to have largely 
disappeared or entered a moribund state by the mid-nineteenth century, yet in a 
period where ideas about national distinctiveness were so closely linked to ideas 
about ‘racial’ distinctiveness, some form of the latter had to be ‘invented’ or 
‘recovered’ for Ireland and the Irish. The reality that the Irish had throughout their 
history been repeatedly ‘racialized’ to their disadvantage by their historical ‘Other’ 
made an Irish (national) racial discourse all the more important and necessary. Irish 
historical writers were faced with two basis positions: the Irish were a race in the 
sense of being a perennially continuous community of ‘Celt’ or ‘Gael’ into which 
other identities had to be assimilated or rejected; or they were the result of the 
joining of a number of different historical ‘kin-groups’ over the course of centuries 
These two basic positions, insufficient as each was in itself, were actually often 
blurred together. As in the German context, ‘race thinking’ with respect to Irish 
nationalist history writing had much to do with attempting to escape a divided and 
divisive past. Some of the most notable and eloquent exponents of ‘the Irish race’ 
would include (as will be seen) those Protestant intellectuals who employed an 
historical vision of the Gaelic past and Gaelic culture as a potential means of 
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 integrating more deeply their community into the course of Irish history. ‘Race’ in 
the nation’s history could be used to solve a contemporary ‘crisis’ of identity whilst 
simultaneously underlining the ethnic heterogeneity running through Irish history 
that inescapably influenced discussions about the Irish race. For this reason 
Protestant intellectuals devoted perhaps more consideration to the question of the 
Irish ‘race’ than many of their Catholic counterparts, who could largely ‘take for 
granted’ their own ‘racial identity’. As in Germany, and in most countries throughout 
Europe during the period, nationalist ideas of race generally often ended up being 
directed against the established political and state order. While Irish national 
historians often claimed that the ‘racialization’ of Irish history had long been a 
British imposition designed to dismiss Irish claims to nationhood, they would 
respond with their own versions of this narrative designed to have the opposing 
effect. ‘Race thinking’ in German nationalism could be mobilized against both the 
pre-1871 German political order and the post-1871 Kaiserreich, on the grounds for 
example of the latter’s ‘exclusion’ of millions of Germans from its boundaries. Much 
of the impetus behind the rise of völkisch nationalism in Germany from the last 
decade of the nineteenth century had been the dissatisfaction of extreme nationalists 
with the policies of the state. In that sense völkisch nationalism, despite a position of 
influence within government circles wholly out of proportion to its numbers and a 
strongly middle-class social profile; may be described as having been hostile to the 
‘official’ nationalism of the new German ‘nation-state’.18 The founding principle of 
völkisch nationalism was a ‘racial’ understanding of nationality in both the ‘cultural’ 
and ‘biological’ senses, coupled with a certainty that it was neither desirable nor 
possible for the German nation-state to accept non-Germans as citizens. Yet völkisch 
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 nationalism, despite Germany’s indisputable ‘great power’ status, was contained 
within itself a certainty that the nation as opposed to the state was in a condition of 
decline, of degeneration, and that the ‘national’ state had to be fundamentally 
changed to truly be ‘national’. In Ireland at the turn of the twentieth century, a sense 
that Irishness had to its detriment become exclusively associated with liberal politics 
and that the very existence of the Irish nation was in peril, underpinned a broad 
cultural nationalist movement known as ‘Irish-Ireland’ which centred on linked 
programmes of the ‘Gaelicization’ and ‘de-Anglicization’ of the Irish nation, and a 
sense of a ‘battle of civilisations’ between ‘Ireland’ and ‘Britain’. As Aodh de 
Blacam put it, ‘It is not to be supposed that Gaelicism is a narrow racial cause…We 
merely mean that the Gael is the normal national type, and that divergence of that 
type is a mark of foreign influence, interests or allegiance.’19 With the rise of these 
newer forms of nationalism in Ireland and Germany, historical narratives became 
increasingly ‘racialized’, in the sense that the nation’s history was centred more on 
the ‘authentic’ Irish and Germans, their role in history, and the ‘mission’ of their 
modern ‘descendants’ to ‘save’ the modern nation.  
So narratives of ‘race’ could offer a trans-historical, cultural underpinning for ‘the 
nation’, valuable where the reality of continuous political nationhood over the course 
of centuries was sparing or absent.
20
 Yet the question of how ‘race’ or ‘race 
thinking’ was to be historically and politically instrumentalized for nationalist goals 
was a complex one. Inevitably, the definition of the historical German or Irish ‘self’ 
was linked that with that of an ethnic ‘Other’. In the Irish context, England or 
Britain; in the German, by contrast there were numerous possible ‘Others’, notably 
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 France, the Slavic East, ‘Romanism’, and of course (though not always) ‘Jewry’.21 
France, especially, was regarded as a nation that had always profited from German 
particularism, weakness and disunity, going back to 1648 and earlier, indeed, as 
Germany’s Erbfeind, the ‘hereditary enemy’. The Slavic peoples long possessed a 
status of ‘Otherness’ going back to the medieval origins of the ‘national narrative’, 
entwined with the German image of the east and the ‘Drang nach Osten’. Jews, to 
the extent that they appeared in major German national historical narratives as 
having any real significance, occupied their own particular place, where their 
rootedness and communal and intellectual links to foreign nations, particularly in 
‘the east’, were emphasized. They were also presented as an ethno-cultural source of 
‘German particularism’.  
Finally, the ‘Othering’ function of ‘race’ discourses in national history, and its 
facility in conferring a kind of pseudo-philosophical content to the nation’s history, 
meant that an aggrandizing focus on the achievements, potentialities, and character 
of one’s (‘national’) race in history could be couched in terms of a trans-historical 
‘national mission’ with the nation seen to represent and embody certain values 
throughout its history.
22
 The nation could for example be represented as the 
repository of an ideal (‘racially’-grounded) type or ideal of nationality or national 
consciousness throughout history, often interacting in a kind of dialectical conflict 
with those of the ‘Others’, or as a ‘martyr’ nation.23 ‘In the hyperbole of discourse on 
ethnic difference and conflict’, argues R.V. Comerford, ‘culture is regularly further 
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 magnified into “civilisation”’, 24  and nationalistic claims raised of cultural pre-
eminence in European history that had later been ‘suppressed’ and ‘denied’. This 
inevitably meant that whatever significance ‘race’ had in the historical narrative, it 
implicitly had an exclusionary, dividing, ‘othering’ potential within the nation, 
inasmuch as national identities were seen as singular and exclusive and in relations 
of conflict to one another.  
III 
If Young Ireland represented the beginning of modern Irish nationalism, then the 
problem of the relationship between ‘race’ or ‘race thinking’ and ‘nation’ was 
present from the start within Irish nationalism. Thomas Davis and other leading 
Young Irelanders were of course members of a community who sought to recover an 
ancient Gaelic culture that seemed to be in terminal decline and which they regarded 
as the foundation stone of any revived Irish nation. The first issue of the Nation 
recorded its founders’ aspiration for the unification of the ‘Celtic’ and ‘Anglo-Irish’ 
peoples of Ireland. It would seem, then, that from the start the Young Irelanders felt 
compelled to deny that there was any such thing as a single Irish race, understood in 
terms of ancestry and descent. Yet Young Ireland nationalism was predicated on the 
belief that only one particular Irish culture, namely a revived Gaelic culture purged 
of English influences could be the basis of any true Irish nation, also as the only 
force which could unify the different cultural and religious communities of Ireland. 
The corollary of this was a deep-seated Anglophobia that expressed the contradiction 
between a pluralist conception of the Irishness and the importance of ‘othering’ a 
nation and culture that had itself contributed much to the creation of one of the 
ethnic communities of Ireland.   
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 In the nineteenth century, Young Ireland’s project of the revival of ‘Irishness’ had as 
its starting point contesting against a discourse which had traditionally been 
employed against the Irish ‘race’ for centuries, to emphasise and ‘prove’ the fact of 
Hibernian inferiority and by implication the justification for English and British 
sovereignty in Ireland. Young Irelanders wanted to refute such perceptions, but to a 
significant degree this became almost inevitably about simply reversing common 
value judgements of the Irish, presenting them as positive rather than negative 
attributes. The ‘othering’ of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ as bloodthirsty, cruel, irreligious and 
possessing no cultural worth of his own that had not been gained or stolen from by 
other peoples, followed on almost logically. Nationalists in Ireland were after all 
working within ‘the framework of a highly contested intellectual discourse that often 
represented racial and national characteristics as fixed and immutable’, and which 
pervaded nineteenth century European culture.
25
 Like their European contemporaries 
Irish nationalists attributed special qualities of virtue to their nation that were not 
manifested by others. So John Mitchel referred to the ‘deep religion and boundless 
wealth of…golden glories of Tradition’,26 that distinguished the ‘Irish race’, and in 
the first instance he meant by this the Gaelic Irish. He referred fondly to the 
‘generosity, levity, impetuosity, and recklessness which have marked the Celtic race 
since the beginning.’27 Mitchel’s idea of what characterised the ‘Irish race’ was, like 
that of his fellow ‘non-Gaelic’ Protestant Thomas Davis, apparently strictly cultural 
in nature, not necessarily linked to ancestry or having a Gaelic name (or even being 
able to speak Irish), so that this ‘racial’ identity is abstracted into forming the 
character of a whole nation, or at least for those willing to extol their Irishness and of 
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 course, the Irish national cause.
28
 While extolling the nature of ‘the Celt’, Mitchel 
seems at times to almost gloss over the historical facts of the reality of ethnic 
heterogeneity in Ireland and the violent circumstances of its origins.
29
 For Mitchel, 
‘race’ appears in Irish history as a set of cultural characteristics and a principle by 
which to distinguish Irishness from Englishness or Britishness rather than as a fixed 
category of belonging based on blood. However, the historical relationships 
underpinning ‘race’ in modern Ireland, if dwelled upon for too long, could 
undermine the message of nationalist solidarity among present-day Irishmen.  
Mitchel, as with other Young Irelanders, including Davis, developed a schema of 
Ireland’s history which represented the unification and coalescence of the different 
ancestral communities of Ireland into a single nation with its own unique 
distinctiveness – grounded in the Gaelic cultural heritage – as not only the most 
important feature of Ireland’s history, but also the desired outcome of Ireland’s 
historical development. The implicit contradiction in how this composite, developing 
‘Irish race’ – within which ‘the Celts’ were the central stem – was sharply 
demarcated from its ethnic and historical ‘Other’, the ‘Norman’ or ‘Saxon’ race 
which had itself contributed to the making of the composite Irish nation was never 
really resolved. Yet to the Young Irelanders at least, culture was seen as offering a 
way out of this quandary: the superiority of Gaelic culture was emphasised, both its 
originality and its ‘universal’ quality: the ‘Gaelicization’ of medieval Norman and 
Saxons who supposedly became ‘more Irish than the Irish themselves’ was seen as 
proving this superiority.
30
 In contrast to their modern descendants, they had 
recognized the superiority of Gaelic culture over their own, and allowed themselves 
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 to be absorbed within that culture. Nonetheless, ‘the Celt’ was the leitmotif of 
Thomas Davis’s writings, and he was constantly caught between his celebration of 
the Celtic origins of the Irish and his assurances that Irishness depended less on 
ancestry than on sentiment, or that it did not depend on ancestry at all.
31
 The grounds 
on and the extent to which he was prepared to ‘other’ the ‘Saxon’ and ‘Norman’ 
suggested, however, that he regarded descent as a still relevant criterion of 
nationality? The Nation consistently characterized ‘the English’, both past and 
present, as ‘the Saxon’ or ‘the Norman’, as callous, greedy, bloodthirsty, pitiful and 
oppressive, and lacking in true culture of his own. The exceptions to this habit, 
where those of recognizably ‘Norman’ or ‘Anglo-Saxon’ heritage are celebrated, 
tends unsurprisingly to be when representatives of these groups become part of the 
‘national’ story. Thus Davis celebrates the mixed Gaelic and Old English 
composition of the ‘patriot parliament’ of 1689, the ‘racially’ plural character of the 
assembly, precisely because of his claim that ‘No parliament…sat here before or 
since, so national in composition and conduct.’ 32  The seventeenth-century 
descendants of the medieval ‘Normans’ and ‘Saxons’ who had come to Ireland as 
invaders had become Irish by, if nothing else, virtue of their rejection of England. In 
an essay written by Davis on Henry Grattan, the eighteenth century Protestant leader 
of the ‘Patriot’ movement and nineteenth century ‘nationalist’ hero, which is 
unsparing in its acclamation of Grattan, he sidesteps the matter of Grattan’s ‘race’.33 
Grattan’s ‘Britishness’, his ‘Anglo-Irishness’, is practically glossed over in this 
instance by Davis, he is claimed as a national champion by virtue of his ‘enmity’ 
towards British imperialism, which is regarded as manifestation of his Irish ‘racial’ 
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 character.
34
 As difficult as it may have been for Young Irelanders to reconcile the 
contradictions of their conception of the Irish ‘race’, a ‘racialized’ discourse was 
essential, not least because it underpinned the ‘Othering’ discourse of an irreducible 
Irish-English dichotomy. A fundamental reason for the whole Young Ireland 
enterprise was a sense that the Irish were becoming irredeemably Anglicized, and 
that this was a shameful, dishonourable condition.
35
 The sentiment ‘that in 
Anglicizing ourselves wholesale we have thrown away the best claim which we have 
upon the world’s recognition of us as a separate nationality’ would be a central tenet 
of subsequent Irish nationalists.
36
 Statements such as this one reflect an Irish variant 
of a pan-European discourse of ‘degeneracy’ and a contest of nationalities. 
The Young Ireland narrative underlined Mitchel’s later History of Ireland. If in his 
biography of Hugh O’Neill he had celebrated the Gaelic heritage of the Irish nation 
and nationalism, in his later History he wished to celebrate both the Anglo-Irish 
contribution to ‘Irishness’ and the Gaelic heritage. The ‘goal’ of Ireland’s historical 
development was for him as well the dissolution of ‘racial’ distinctions within 
Ireland while expounding the cultural gulf between Ireland and Britain. This is made 
possible through pan-Irish enmity towards Britain. Mitchel sought to explain how 
during the eighteenth century the two ‘races’ in Ireland, ‘Gaelic’ and ‘New English’ 
– he even conceded that there were, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, not only two races in Ireland, but also, effectively, two nations as well
37
 – 
were able to amalgamate, so he thought. Those who had scorned the mass of the 
Irish nation, indeed their own Irishness sometimes, manifested it in their rejection of 
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 Britain. It was the responsibility of the modern ‘English in Ireland’, like their 
medieval forebears, to prove their place in the nation through voluntary assimilation 
and dedication to the nation’s cause against the ‘Erbfeind.’ The nationalism of 
Mitchel’s people, the liberal Protestant Irish, had originated in the erstwhile 
‘colonists’ choosing to finally identify their interests with those of the mass of the 
nation.
38
 In steering away from straightforward identification of nation with blood 
descent – ‘in truth it had become very difficult to determine the ethnological 
distinction between the inhabitants of this island’39 – Mitchel lays emphasis instead 
on the ‘composite Irish character’ that formed towards the end of the eighteenth 
century. The ‘patriots’ of the period manifested their Irishness in their ‘hostility’ to 
‘England’. 40  Nonetheless Mitchel’s approach towards ‘race’ in his History also 
demonstrated – as did comments on ‘the ancient and irremovable feeling of 
Englishmen, and the contemptuous falsehood of their estimate of the Irish people’41 
– that in general the structure of his History was firmly rooted in an England vs. 
Ireland dichotomy. In an ‘Othering’ discourse based on assumptions of essentially 
perennial and immutable ‘characteristics’ underpinning the histories of nations, the 
overarching theme of Irish history in Mitchel’s History was an unrelenting centuries-
old conflict between ‘Ireland’ and ‘England’, one started and perpetuated by English 
malevolence. Mitchel’s History, his body of writing in general, ranked among the 
most popular and influential in the canon of Irish nationalist writing. Its appeal lay in 
the simplicity of its message: since the first conflicts of Irish and English, it had been 
the mission of the latter to oppress, exploit, and destroy the Irish nation. ‘England’ 
had shown the Irish nothing but tyranny and oppression; they were wholly lacking in 
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 any of the cultural virtues of other peoples, they cared for nothing but their own 
ends, for which they were willing to destroy an entire nation. Even worse, they had 
actually succeeded in degrading the Irish to the point that the latter actually needed 
to be taught, in spite of their history, to hate England.
42
 Mitchel would have agreed 
fully with Daniel O’Connell’s comment, which is repeated like a refrain throughout 
the latter’s own essay on Irish history, that ‘No people on the face of the earth were 
ever treated with such cruelty as the Irish.’43 It was absurd to think that the Irish 
nation would be willing and able to commit itself to the cause of freedom if it failed 
to understand the true nature of its enemy. The History provided a compelling 
example of how ‘race’ and the ‘Othering’ of the nation’s enemy could be employed 
in a nationalist historical narrative. One’s own nation could also be historically and 
‘racially’ defined through writing about the history of that nation’s ‘Other’ or its 
historical characteristics and deeds, without having to go into much detail about the 
more difficult matter of how the nation defined its own culture, its own ‘character’.  
IV 
The tendency to apply ‘race thinking’ and in particular racialized ‘Othering’ was a 
characteristic that provided a point of commonality for otherwise very different 
specimens of nationalist historiography. The function that Anglophobia fulfilled in 
Irish nationalist history writing was fulfilled in the German context by a hostility 
towards France and the French role in German history as Germany’s ‘Other’. This 
was apparent in such highly respectable works of historiography as Heinrich von 
Sybel’s four-volume History of the French Revolution. Here, in tandem with putting 
the Revolution on historical trial, Sybel engaged in an ‘othering’ of the French nation 
in general, its mind, character, and history. Sybel’s comment in the preface that there 
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 had hitherto been no study of the Revolution from a perspective of German affairs 
was not a mere passing historiographical reflection.
44
 The French Revolution had 
been of the most fundamental importance for the ‘Entstehung’ of a popular (political 
as well as culture) sense of ‘Germanness’ and definitions of German national self-
understanding. This work of Sybel’s, like Mitchel’s, is replete with ‘othering’ of the 
nation’s Erbfeind, obviously directed at the French but also at the Slavs, the Poles in 
particular. In a chapter in the first volume of the History he remarked, for example, 
of the historical relationship between Poles and Germans: ‘…on the Eastern frontier 
of the Empire, the Prussian State arose in the contest for German nationality, and 
religious freedom; and in the most complete external and internal antagonism to 
Poland. The enmity lay in the very nature of things’.45 Mutual enmity was inherent 
and natural in the history of Germany and Germany’s neighbours, as in Mitchel’s 
narrative of Irish history, the whole story of the nation’s relations with ‘the Other’ is 
reduced to one of enmity, one about the contest for nationality. Prussia, the crucible 
of German nationality since at least the sixteenth century, had been forced to stand 
alone against Germany’s ‘hereditary enemies’ to east and west: ‘having liberated 
Eastern Germany from Poland, undertook, almost single-handed, to support the West 
of Germany against the oppressor of Europe – Louis XIV.’46 What the French had 
produced in their revolution, the founding event of their modern nation, had been, in 
Sybel’s final judgement, a distillation of all the worst elements of the historical 
French ‘racial character’. The Revolution ‘declared war…against all moral laws 
whatever, and thereby unfitted itself to fulfil its infinitely important mission…and 
crushes instead of fulfilling the claims of our national life.’ The source of the 
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 aberrant course of the French Revolution lay primarily in the character of French 
society. The French had never even been in their nature a democratic, republican 
people.
47
 While the ancient Germans and their ‘descendants’ the German people, had 
known true freedom – the Germans had initially interpreted the Revolution as an 
expression of Germanic thought
48
 – the French people had always been ruled by 
tyrants. There is a parallel here to the distinction made by the Young Irelanders and 
later nationalists – freedom and solidarity-loving Irish people lived in a liberal state 
while Britons were in bondage – and ‘the English’ – yoked together throughout their 
history through brute force and violence. The French Republic, Sybel claimed, had 
degenerated into a tyrannical Empire because the spirit of Louis XIV, of true French 
history, could not be extinguished. Sybel’s perception of ‘France’ was not so much 
different from that of Ernst Moritz Arndt in 1814, who described French history as 
being that of Paris and the royal court, appropriately enough given the innate 
servility of the French people.
49
 Whatever virtues the French may have possessed, 
they were also superficial and arrogant and prone to unwarranted, ‘un-German’ 
hubris. Where the German Wesen demonstrated a drive towards the independence 
and particularity of the self and the people, that of the French demonstrated one 
towards the compulsion of an imposed (flawed) sense of equality; Germanic 
‘freedom’ was contrasted with a French obsession with ‘levelling.’ The French had 
forgotten that ‘nature, which has set out the peculiarities of each nation, will not 
allow its creations to be abused as tools of human ambition’, 50  and had been 
reminded of this at their great cost. Sybel, living and writing in a time when it 
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 seemed that Germans would soon be faced with the task of national governance; 
wanted to stress that the French in particular were no model for the Germans for how 
to build a successful nation-state,
51
 that revolutionary change was antithetical to the 
historical character of the Germans. By deconstructing the foundational event of 
modern French national history Sybel presented France as a country fundamentally 
sundered from its history, undermining French claims for leadership of Europe in the 
present. The implication was that the Germans had preserved more of their past and 
were therefore more able to claim themselves as an authentic nation. Even if he did 
not go so far as to claim that it had been Prussia’s role or right to unite and lead 
Germany since its own beginnings, Sybel, in placing Prussia at the centre of the 
Germans’ historical experience of the Revolution, he advanced Prussian claims to 
the leadership of Germany in the present; and by comparing the Habsburgs to the 
Bourbon dynasty, he denied Austrian claims to the same.
52
 Francophobia and 
conservative hostility to revolution are entwined by Sybel in this work.
53
 The pivot 
of European history appeared to turn on conflict of nationalities, more specifically 
turned on German-French and German-Slav contest; the Germans had a historic right 
be a great power but this could not be bought freely. The dichotomy of ‘the ideas of 
1789’ against ‘the ideas of 1914’ rooted in ‘French ideas’ and ‘German ideas’, 
respectively, that became so popular during the Great War, finds ‘respectable’ 
antecedents in such texts as Sybel’s Geschichte der Revolutionszeit.   
From the early nineteenth century to well into the twentieth, Franco-German 
‘hereditary enmity’ was a most popular theme for German historians interested in 
comparing ‘national characters’ and examining that of the Germans, not least 
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 because it seemed to be a perennial theme of German history.
54
 ‘France’ and 
‘Germany’ were seen as archetypes of very differing courses of historical 
development: state and nation had become congruent in France in the early medieval 
period, in Germany this did not happen, as was generally agreed, until 1871.
55
 
Indeed, such was the importance of ‘France’ to the German national(ist) historical 
self-understanding as it developed during the nineteenth century that it united 
otherwise differing and indeed conflicting strands of German historical writing.
56
 
Johannes Janssen, for example, who differed from the likes of Sybel and Treitschke 
in so many respects, authored in 1883 a brief tract on Frankreichs Rheingelüste und 
deutsch-feindliche Politik in früheren Jahrhunderten, which he opened with the 
theme of France’s constant territorial predations over nearly a millennium on 
Germany’s western boundary, ancient French enmity towards the Germans.57 Here 
too German ‘national’ history is anchored within a narrative of a past defined by 
‘natural’ ethnic conflict between two discrete and antithetical nations. As Mitchel 
and many other writers did of the English, Sybel and many other German writers 
directed a litany of charges against the French and narrated them as the nemesis of 
the Germans throughout history, constructing a pseudo-philosophical and Manichean 
narrative out of the ‘racial’ conflict between the nation and its other. So one 
particular book which ran to at least five editions (first published in 1872) written by 
T.D. Sullivan, A.M. Sullivan’s brother, entitled The Story of England, contained 
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 such remarks as the following, from which might be gleaned the book’s tone: ‘The 
historical truth of the matter is that the Irish were an organized, civilised, and 
educated nation several centuries before the English emerged from barbarism; that 
Ireland was a school of learning and piety when England was a swamp of ignorance 
and scene of brutal disorder; and that Irishmen were a free and victorious race when 
Englishmen were conquered and enslaved.’58  
The ‘othering’ of France from ‘Germany’ reached perhaps its crescendo (at least in 
the nineteenth century) in the writing of Treitschke. France is represented throughout 
history by Treitschke not only as a source of ‘anti-national’ influences on Germany, 
and naked aggression, but as a thoroughly degenerate nation (this was particular 
apparent in his What We Demand From France). Indeed, for Treitschke, the whole 
project of German political nation-building was in an important sense about the 
overcoming of the French revolutionary tradition.
59
 In France’s eighteenth-century 
age of glory under Louis XIV, Germany had been helpless to resist French political 
hegemony and cultural influence. Even after, from the time of the Revolution, 
France remained a malignant influence.
60
 A sense of deep insecurity about the 
cohesion of the German nation and the prospects of revival of reviled ‘German 
particularism’ permeated Treitschke’s writings, and it is partly in this context that the 
French appear as such a corrosive influence. In both the Irish and German contexts, 
there was a particular attitude towards cultural amalgamation: assimilation of foreign 
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 cultures and communities into the German or Irish nation to the extent that this 
‘proved’ the nation’s greatness was regarded quite positively, while dissolution of 
‘Germanness’ or ‘Irishness’ into foreign cultures was not. In the Irish context, the 
voluntary (supposed) assimilation of successive waves of foreigners into Gaelic 
culture and society featured very prominently, indeed was a staple of the nationalist 
historical narrative, from which was derived the conceit of the innate strength and 
the superiority of native Irish culture. In the German context, too, the medieval 
advancement of German culture and its adoption in the east in the middle ages was 
obviously regarded as evidence of German superiority, and even Treitschke 
celebrated the Germans’ ‘innate’ ability to assimilate the best of foreign cultures and 
to thus develop an intrinsic ‘understanding’ of other peoples.61 The Germans had 
been ‘endowed with a natural understanding of the Latin world’, had brought ‘the 
Romance nationalities’ into existence, had been the bearers of inherited civilisation, 
demonstrating a greater understanding of and receptivity to the ‘essence’ of other 
cultures than any other people.
62
 On the other hand, unfortunately, Germans had 
displayed in their history a tendency to adopt foreign customs and practices rather 
than uphold their own, even those of inferior peoples, such as the Slavic nations.
63
 
As in Irish narratives, the adoption by Germans of or their assimilation into foreign 
cultures was presented in negative terms.
64
 After 1648, particularly, during the nadir 
of their history the Germans had supposedly, ‘accustomed themselves to look on 
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 their fatherland with the eyes of the stranger’, 65  a tendency they had not fully 
overcome by 1871, Treitschke thought.
66
  
Treitschke’s arguments about the Jews, in particular, illustrated that while the 
assimilation of certain cultural elements by the Germans had been beneficial to an 
extent, others would always be merely a source of national degeneration. Unless ‘our 
Jewish fellow-citizens make up their minds to be Germans without reservation’, he 
stated in his pamphlet A Word On Our Jewish Question an ‘era of German Jewish 
mixed culture’ would ‘follow after thousands of years of Germanic morality.’67 His 
view of the threat posed by ‘Jewishness’ was linked directly with his evaluation of 
the historical conditions of the German people: the Jews were dangerous to the 
German nation not only because of their own qualities, but because the ‘energetic 
national pride’ that could resist their influence was, in Treitschke’s judgement, rather 
lacking among Germans.
68
 If Jews wanted to truly be Germans, they must 
necessarily assimilate and renounce completely all aspects of their Jewish heritage.
69
 
Treitschke addressed ‘the Jewish question’ in national terms that shaded racial 
expressions, employing a discourse of national enmity which was also directed 
within the parameters of the nation: his antisemitism was nationalist rather than 
racist, first and foremost. His perceptions of ‘the Jewish question’ seem to have as 
much to do with his view of ‘Germanness’ as anything else. 70  To complete the 
picture, Treitschke associates Jewishness with Frenchness, ‘the Jew’ ‘was chiefly 
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 attracted towards the French [nation]…from a sense of inner kinship’.71 The Jews 
were fundamentally, unless they assimilated, an invariably corrosive influence on 
national life.
72
 Their history proved that ‘if a national culture could not succeed in 
creating a national state, then it could not claim a timeless right to existence.’ In his 
Deutsche Geschichte, sidestepping the obvious novelty of the new German nation-
state, Treitschke projected the recent state-building abilities of the Germans back 
into centuries of history and crowed over the failures of other nations in that respect, 
including the Poles.
73
 Treitschke’s view of the Jews was to be, to varying degrees, 
the prevailing view in German national historiography in the decades after him.
74
 On 
the other hand, while sometimes employing ‘racialized’ discourses, at other times 
Treitschke indicated a certain scepticism towards ‘race’ as a historical category.75 In 
his Politics he frankly admitted the imaginary nature of ‘blood relationships’76 and 
the possible benefits of cultural amalgamation (as long as any amalgamation was 
driven by the Germans themselves). In the modern age of the nation, however, such 
peoples as the French, Slavs, and Jews had nothing of worth to add to 
‘Germanness’. 77  National greatness in the modern age required homogeneity of 
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 nationality, of Volk, and a congruence of nationality and polity. He was ultimately 
convinced that, the Germans were ‘not to be confounded with any other people, 
although the frontiers of Germany have undergone so many changes in history.’78 In 
the second volume of Treitschke’s Politics, in the chapter on ‘The Reich’ we can 
glimpse his association of Francophobia with his hostility to revolutionary change in 
Germany history as something basically ‘un-German’.79  
Mitchel, Sybel, and Treitschke present quite similar ideas about national enmity and 
its relation to the nation’s own ‘racial’ identity, such as the naturalness and necessity 
of enmity between nations, a characterization of their own nation as the defender of 
‘freedom’ against oppression, and a characterization of the nation’s ‘Other’ as 
irredeemably ‘alien’. W.E.H. Lecky presents a counterpoint, since he aimed to take a 
studiously moderate, even sceptical tone when dealing with ‘race’ in Irish history. In 
his History of Ireland he downplayed the significance of ‘race’ in terms of a simple 
dichotomy of ‘Celtic’ Irish vs. ‘Saxon’ English, considering it to be of a ‘wholly 
superficial’ kind. He claimed: ‘although the Celtic element has contributed 
something to the peculiar development of Irish character and history, the part which 
it has played in later Irish history has been greatly exaggerated.’80  
However, Lecky’s own ‘racial’ identity, that of the Irishman of British and Protestant 
descent, his consciousness of his particular origin and his community’s role in Irish 
history and its relations with the ‘native’ Irish, the problems for a national narrative 
associated with a history of cultural amalgamation within the nation, played itself out 
elsewhere in earlier formative writing. In Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland Lecky 
had maintained the presence of ‘profound difference in national type, character and 
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 interests that separates the Irish from the English people’. Here he sought most 
clearly to amalgamate the two great strands of his historical thinking: a certainty that 
history was driven by laws with a belief that in certain circumstances notable 
individuals could ‘direct’ this process. ‘There were, indeed’, he continued, ‘two 
distinct nations in Ireland, differing in race and creed, and in a great degree language, 
opposed to each other in interests, sympathies, and traditions’.81 In the 1861 edition 
of the work, writing of early eighteenth century Ireland, Lecky expressed a view that 
he would come to later reject in the History: ‘The two religions mark the lines of the 
antagonism but do not seem to have been the cause of it. The war was one of races 
and not of creeds.’82 The first volume of Leaders is largely a great tribute to Lecky’s 
hero of Irish history, the eighteenth-century Protestant politician Henry Grattan, who 
in Lecky’s writing bears all the noblest qualities of the that group,83 including a 
devoted loyalty to his Irish nationality alongside a fidelity to the connection of the 
common Crown between Ireland and Britain, in the context of the Empire as a kind 
of ‘joint enterprise’.84 He is consistently praised for displaying ‘the compatibility of 
an ardent love of independence with a devoted attachment to the connection’85 of the 
Crowns of Britain and Ireland. For Lecky, Grattan was the foremost representative of 
Lecky’s own (ethnic) ‘imagined community’, the patriotic Irish gentry, and in his 
own time he longed for some new Grattan: ‘They [the eighteenth-century Protestant 
Irish] valued the Irish Parliament not merely as the centre and organ of a strong 
national feeling, but also as an instrument for keeping the government of Ireland in 
the hands of the Irish gentry…the Irish Parliament was on the whole a vigilant and 
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 intelligent guardian of the material interests of the country.’86 Lecky’s own patriotism 
and conception of Irishness was always deeply entwined with his own Anglo-
Irishness, and more importantly a judgement that this community comprised the 
natural and best leadership of the Irish nation. He would have certainly disputed with 
Mitchel that Grattan was in any way a ‘Celt’, he rejected anti-English sentiment as 
part of any Irish nationalism. This is made clearer in comparing Lecky’s mini-
biography of Grattan with that of Daniel O’Connell, the foremost ‘Celt’ of his day, 
which comprised the entirety of the second volume of the 1903 revised edition of 
Leaders. Lecky represents O’Connell as firmly rooted in a community and ancestry 
that was practically the antithesis of Grattan’s.87 Yet even ‘with all the impulsiveness, 
the quickness, the tact, and the versatility of the Celtic temperament’, wrote Lecky, 
‘O’Connell combined most eminently other qualities which are more commonly 
associated with the Teutonic type…a steady ambition, never losing sight of its aim; a 
firm, practical grasp of the realities of things’. 88  Evidently O’Connell’s more 
estimable qualities, to Lecky, were the less ‘Celtic’ or more ‘Teutonic’ ones, and he 
noted that the latter’s ‘great services he rendered to his country’ had to be balanced 
against ‘the fearful elements of discord and turbulence he evoked’, such that ‘it may 
be questioned whether his life was a blessing or a curse to Ireland.’89 Lecky’s life and 
politics, for the most part, straddled the worlds of Young Ireland patriotism and the 
unionism of most of the Protestant ‘Ascendancy’, a conflicted position was 
represented by the contrasts of Grattan and O’Connell. Though he regarded the 
moderate constitutionalist and anti-revolutionary Grattan as the exemplar of the 
patriotic Irishman, Lecky also knew that the Protestant community had provided 
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 some of Ireland’s most determined revolutionaries. But such men are not dealt with, 
except perhaps as secondary actors, in Leaders. This ‘Anglo-Irish’/‘Gaelic Irish’ 
contrast apparent in Leaders itself threw into light one of the perennial problems 
facing those who wished to write a unifying national historical narrative in Ireland, 
the continued presence of ‘racial’ distinctions, even in the highest and most refined 
levels of national life. Lecky knew very well that the ‘Celtic’ masses he was 
defending from Froude’s calumnies were more than ever alienated from the Crown 
and Empire. The majority of the Protestant gentry scorned, thanks in no small 
measure to Ireland’s post-1800 history, their own Irishness. While in certain passages 
in his History Lecky downplayed the importance of ‘race’ and a Celtic-Saxon 
dichotomy in Irish history he still possessed honed awareness of the ‘battle of 
civilizations’ within Ireland. While Lecky may have been inspired by elements of 
Young Ireland patriotism as a young man, his Grattan-O’Connell comparison in 
Leaders showed that ‘race’ could hardly be a unifying element in the Irish ‘national’ 
historical narrative for him. As Lecky demonstrated, Irish historians, unlike German 
historians, could not engage in ethnic ‘othering’ without in some way making at least 
an implicit point about the nature of communal relations within the bounds of the 
Irish nation. In the German context, ethnic ‘othering’ was generally applied to those 
considered to have no real place in the nation anyway, such as Slavs, Jews, and of 
course, the French.    
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 VI 
In Lecky’s judgement – and as expressed in his Leaders of Public Opinion – the 
histories of ‘diseased’ nations like the Irish inevitably resulted in biography,90 the 
study of a small number of men who expressed the life of the nation in their own 
time. In the absence of political continuity and nation-statehood the ‘character’ of the 
nation could be and was often expressed in these contexts in the biographies of its 
leading historical figures. The use of biography also allowed authors to project onto 
that which they were studying their own prejudices and opinions more easily, made 
it easier to incorporate a perspective of ‘race’ of one kind or another into the national 
historical narrative. The role of ‘character’, both collective and individual, the latter 
varying from heroism in battle to leadership in politics, supposedly represented the 
inherent nature of a people and provided narrative interest to emphasis on the 
strength and role of nations. A focus on historical personages gave discussions of 
‘race’ in history a greater grounding and also provided a measure by which to judge 
the significance of ‘race’ in history. This tied into another important element in 
German national historiography specifically, alluded to above: the conception of the 
Volk, the völkisch idea. The primary importance of this conception, as George Mosse 
argued, was that it ‘signified the union of a group of people with a transcendental 
“essence”.’ The concept of ‘Volk’ represented: ‘man’s innermost nature, and 
represented the source of his creativity, his depth of feeling, his individuality’.91 
While not all völkisch ‘thinkers’ were historians, nor all German historians 
especially interested in the Volk, much of the importance of the concept lay in its 
usefulness as a source of historical continuity and emblem of historical 
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 distinctiveness, national peculiarity. If one may distinguish between an ubiquitous 
discourse of Volk as something synonymous with ‘nation’, and a more developed 
völkisch ideology or belief system, it is apparent that in the former sense, many 
mainstream nationalist historians such as Treitschke and Freytag thought about 
German history in terms of the ‘Volk’, and at least regarded völkisch rhetoric with 
some importance. In the Geschichte des alldeutschen Verbandes, a publication of the 
Pan-German League, these men were plainly regarded as early exponents of the pan-
German or völkisch idea.
92
 ‘Rootedness’ was something constantly invoked’ by 
völkisch writers: ‘In the völkisch interpretation of history, the Volk was a historical 
unit that had come down to the present from a far and distant past…the Volk that had 
endured for centuries could not be destroyed nor permanently subjugated.’93 This 
sense of antiquity ‘conveyed the connotation of youth, of the moment of inception, 
when the pure, unadulterated, heroic and virtuous qualities of the Volk had been first 
thrust forth into history.’ The aspirations of the modern Volk would have to be re-
identified with its heroic past, ‘Sybel had reaffirmed this imperative when he wrote 
that a nation had to cherish its historical ties, otherwise its Volk would come to 
resemble a tree deprived of its roots.’94 As the history of Germany was clearly not 
that of a continuous nation-state, the point of departure for German history seemed to 
be necessarily the ‘national’ community of the Germans, from its origins – and their 
struggle with different Völker, struggle and enmity was central to this conception of 
history – from here sprung the substance of all history, on this nations and states 
arose.
95
 To consider the individual characteristics that defined the ‘Volk’: rootedness, 
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 originality, endurance, antiquity, heroism; all these motifs can be found to be 
attributed to historical narratives of the ‘Irish race’, though the word Volk itself is 
distinctively German. As Johann Gustav Droysen expressed it, the Volk idea ‘is a 
result of history, and it organises its own existence…Without the idea human 
existence would not have an essential direction. The idea of the Volk is the constant, 
unifying, form-giving force, but it is not original, it is built on historical 
development. It does not remain the same, it is moving in history.’96 What is absent 
from this particular description of Volk are any of the ‘racial’ notions expressed in 
terms of ‘blood’ and ‘heredity’ advanced by later völkisch theorists.  
The historical category of the Volk, and its relation to the individual, stand at the 
centre of Gustav Freytag’s Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit:  
‘The course of life of a nation consists in the ceaseless working of the individual on the 
collective people, and the people on the individual…Spirit, nature, character are 
influenced and directed by and through political life, and the part which the individual 
has in the state gives him the highest honour, the most manly fortune…The clearest eye 
and the most ingenious judgement of the individual is contracted in comparison with the 
great unity of the people.’97  
The Völker were the actors of history on which nations and states arose and fell, and 
their nature was expressed in certain historical personalities within them, and in 
Freytag’s narrative, not only great personages, but ‘the people’ in general. Freytag 
sought to integrate the dimension of German history defined by emperors, kings, 
princes, and high politics with that defined by the sufferings and strivings of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Deutschen Reich, 1890-1944 (New York, Campus, 2009), pp. 179, 183. Echternkamp, Der Aufstieg, 
p. 337.  
96
 Quoted in Frey and Jordan, ‘National Historians and the Discourse of the Other’, in The Contested 
Nation, p. 202.  
97
 Freytag, Pictures of German Life in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century, I, pp. 1, 3. Freytag, 
Bilder, V, pp. 1-3.  
231
 German people as a whole.
98
 In the first volume he claimed: ‘in the soul of every 
man one may also find in miniature an image of the personality of the nation.’ 
Freytag’s interest in ‘the German people’ – more specifically the patriotic and 
Protestant Bürgertum – was underpinned by his conviction that their cultural unity 
had in fact long existed, since the Reformation, and provided the basis of any 
German political unity.
99
 The ‘story’ of German history centred on the development 
of a national German citizenship and cultural community, on the basis of the unity of 
the Volk.
100
 The corollary of this inner development was the Germans’ journey 
towards the overcoming of foreign influences and foreign domination. Freytag, 
linking ancient, early modern, and recent past into a single, seamless nationalist 
narrative which incorporated the role of ‘the Other’, asserted: ‘From the time [of 
Martin Luther] to the march of the German volunteers against Napoleon, the German 
spirit carried on a great defensive war against foreign influence, which issuing from 
Rome well-nigh overwhelmed those who had once been the conquerors of the 
Roman Empire.’ 101  Here Freytag ‘others’ both Catholicism and Frenchness, and 
asserts the two as synonymous. As Luther united the Germans in opposition to 
Rome,
102
 Frederick the Great renewed the great mission of the Germans first began 
under the great medieval emperors ‘to carry laws, education, freedom, cultivation, 
industry into the east of Europe.’103 The German Volk was consistently contrasted 
with the over-refined, effete, morally degenerate Latin peoples, and the barbaric and 
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 nation-less Slavic peoples (Freytag’s own family hailed from Germany’s eastern 
‘frontier’), a dichotomy which was presented as a fundamental, trans-historical truth. 
Though Germans had not always prevailed over the Slavs at every turn, they still 
possessed what the Slavs lacked, they key to their historical survival and flourishing 
as a nation: a greater Kultur. So it had been since the days of the first King of 
Germany, Henry, and the first German Holy Roman Emperor, his son Otto.
104
 In the 
Bilder, some of the most important events in German history appear to be caused or 
take place in direct response to ‘foreign influences’. ‘The fate of Germany was 
decided by the election of Charles V’, Freytag argued, in reference to Germany’s 
early modern history, and Charles was ‘least of all a German’. In the nineteenth 
century, it was France above all:  
‘Again did evil arise from France, and again did a new life spring from struggle against 
the enemy. It was not the first time that that country had inflicted deep wounds on 
German national strength, and had unintentionally awakened a new power which 
victoriously arrested her progress…For the German this period in the life of his nation 
has special significance. It was the first time that for many centuries political enthusiasm 
had burst forth in bright flames among the people.’105  
The rise of German national feeling was the consequence not only of French 
aggression against Germany, but the ‘natural’ enmity of the two peoples. In 
Freytag’s narrative, the ‘great men’ were significant as studies of the German Volk, 
and the most important were Luther, Gustavus Adolphus (sixteenth century King of 
Sweden), and Frederick the Great. The difficulties of presenting Gustavus, a foreign 
king who had been willing to subordinate German interests to Sweden’s, and had 
even acted in concert with the French – the Erbfeind – and the Papacy were resolved 
by emphasising instead his heroic role as the saviour of Protestantism from the 
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 aggression of the Habsburgs. Protestant Christendom had found its greatest 
expression among the Germans, and, of course, Gustavus possessed Germanic 
ancestry through his Gothic forebears. While Gustavus was a Germanic ruler, the 
Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, a ‘Spaniard’, had enlisted the aid of every foreign 
nation in Europe in the service of its goal of yoking Protestant Germany to Catholic 
rule.
106
 In employing Gustavus’s Germanic ‘racial’ origins in the service of 
rendering continuity and cohesion to German ‘national’ history, Freytag identified 
Gustavus as a predecessor of and model for the dynasty which would eventually 
forge the German nation anew, the Hohenzollerns, along with identifying 
Protestantism as fundamentally German. The application of ‘Deutschtum’ as a means 
of ‘explaining’ German history is not at all limited to particular periods, rather, it is a 
recurring theme, fittingly given Freytag’s intent to chart the course of the 
‘Volksseele’ throughout the course of German history. In an early passage discussing 
the ancient Germanen encountered by Tacitus Freytag asserts that the Germans of 
the nineteenth century present were fundamentally the descendants of the ancient 
Germanen.
107
 This heritage was ‘indestructible’ and made the modern German 
Wesen as original as it was in its earliest origins, and had accounted for the Germans’ 
ability to assimilate other peoples into their Kulturnation.
108
 Freytag leaves no doubt 
that the Romans regarded the ancient Germans as a great race, manly, freedom-
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 loving, and proud.
109
 The Germanen of antiquity, the ancestors of the modern 
Germans, were a Volk of unbounded ‘Lebenskraft’.110 
For Treitschke too Luther was a near-unrivalled hero of German history, not simply 
because he had broken the chains of Rome over the Germans, but because in him 
was concentrated all that was virtuous about the German nation. Treitschke did not 
accept that Gustavus Adolphus’s ‘foreignness’ necessarily counted against him, 
because he was at least indisputably of Germanic descent, a ‘Goth’, and in 
Treitschke’s account keenly aware of this: ‘He [Gustavus Adolphus] rejoiced to 
know that in his own veins ran pure the blood of Gothic heroes.’ Gustavus had done 
the German nation an inestimable service in defending it from the predations of the 
Habsburgs even though his ultimate aim may have been the expansion of his own 
kingdom. Treitschke, like Freytag, ‘nationalized’ Gustavus Adolphus primarily by 
presenting him as of Germanic descent and as the heroic defender of the Protestant 
(and essentially Germanic) Reformation, therefore making him a great Germanic 
historical personality.
111
 With the rise of Frederick the Great, modern Germany had 
finally gained ‘a heroic figure upon which the whole nation could gaze with 
wondering admiration…which…forced the Germans to believe once again in the 
wonders of the heroic age…he restored truth to a place of honour in German 
statecraft, as of old had done Martin Luther in the spheres of German thought and 
belief.’112  In a single passage, Treitschke brings these three great Germanic and 
national heroes together into a continuity of the manifestation of ‘Deutschtum’ 
throughout the centuries. There is a parallel in the Irish context, where in the writings 
of Young Irelanders and Mitchel and popular Catholic writers like Sullivan and 
                                                          
109
 Freytag, Bilder, I, p. 51.  
110
 Ibid., p. 95.  
111
 Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Gustavus Adolphus and Germany’s Freedom’, pp. 261, 266, 286.    
112
 Treitschke, History of Germany, I, pp. 57, 58.   
235
 McGee, the different generations of Irish ‘national’ heroes from the Catholic warrior 
prince Hugh O’Neill to the Protestant patriots of the eighteenth century were 
integrated into a single historical thread defined by their ‘nationalism’. In McGee’s 
Popular History, we find the following depiction of Hugh O’Neill, towards the end 
of his war against the English Crown as assuming the status of a ruler of Ireland in 
the manner of the old High Kings, and accepted as such by both Gaelic and ‘Old 
English’ lords. 113  In Sullivan’s Story of Ireland Hugh O’Neill represents the 
embodiment of ‘the last struggle of the ancient native rule to sustain itself against the 
conquerors’. The chapter dealing with O’Neill’s war in Sullivan’s narrative is 
revealingly titled: ‘How Hugh formed a Great National Confederacy and built a 
Nation once more on Irish soil’.114 Henry Grattan, that scion of Protestant Anglo-
Ireland, appears perhaps surprisingly in a quite favourable light in McGee’s History, 
there is no doubt left that ‘he was an Irishman, proud and fond of his country, and a 
sincere lover of the largest religious liberty.’115 As Lecky and Mitchel had done with 
the Protestant Irish patriots such as Grattan and Wolfe Tone, Treitschke narrated 
Frederick as representing the dawning of a new age; as the heir of previous fighters 
for ‘German freedom’ against foreign enemies, be they French, Poles, or Germany’s 
enemies in the Habsburg Empire. ‘In the mouth of Frederick’, wrote Treitschke, ‘the 
old and greatly misused expression “German freedom” acquired a new and nobler 
meaning…it was to signify the formation of a great German power which should 
defend the fatherland’. Even when he was not acting out his historically-ordained 
tasks, Frederick was no less an authentic patriot and his well-known preference for 
French culture was downplayed or simply presented as a strange oddity, an anomaly 
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 resulting from Germany’s historical subjection to and penetration by foreign 
influences since the Thirty Years’ War.116 Treitschke’s ‘Germanization’ of Frederick 
and Prussia and the Prussian dynasty represents how a discourse of ‘Volk’ or 
‘Deutschtum’ presupposing cultural and political unity was employed in his 
narrative. The ways in which, in both contexts, particular individuals were 
incorporated into the nationalist historical narrative underlines how ‘race’ or Volk 
and ‘race thinking’ were subordinated to the definition of the nation rather than the 
other way around. Gustavus Adolphus was a German hero as much because of his 
deeds done for the Protestant German nation as his purported ancestry. The 
Habsburg dynasty, though of Germanic ancestry, and had ‘othered’ themselves from 
the nation, in view of Kleindeutsche writers, primarily because of their Catholicism. 
Irishmen of English ancestry and Gaelic provincial dynasts alike were elevated to 
heroic status because of their supposed enmity towards England. It was the ‘moral’ 
or ‘philosophical’ function of ‘race’ as a means for expressing national ‘enmity’ that 
occluded the inconsistencies brought up by thinking about ‘national’ history in terms 
of descent and ancestry.   
Freytag’s Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit was one of the most important 
German nationalist historical narratives within which the Volk was the central 
concept. From 1878 to 1881, one of the most important such narratives produced in 
an Irish context, was the three-part History of Ireland of Standish James O’Grady 
(1846-1928), one of ‘the most enigmatic and influential figures of late-nineteenth 
century Irish cultural history’. In contrast to Freytag, O’Grady did not attempt to 
survey the entire span of Irish history; rather his interest was focused on the pre-
medieval and early medieval periods of that history. O’Grady too, however, placed 
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 the heroism and virtue of the people, the Irish people, at the centre of his histories. 
His ambiguous politics aside, O’Grady would still come to have a significant 
influence on such diverse individuals as Yeats, AE Russell, and Patrick Pearse 
(though it took him a long while to achieve real success – his historical works, in a 
marked contrast to Freytag’s, were commercially unsuccessful and little-noted on 
publication), and become regarded as the ‘Father of the Celtic Revival’.117 O’Grady 
rejected a sharp distinction between history and literature; or rather he simply did not 
believe the two to be antithetical. What mattered to him was ‘the essential qualities 
of historical characters and the nature of the impression which they made on their 
contemporaries.’ If this is somewhat reminiscent of Freytag’s predominant concern 
in his not with high politics and diplomacy but the ‘lived experience’ of ‘the people’, 
Freytag would have wholly rejected O’Grady’s reluctance to distinguish between 
historiography and literature.
118
 In the simplest terms, the first volume of History of 
Ireland, the introductory essay notwithstanding, reads more like  literature while the 
second, pointedly titled History of Ireland: Critical and Philosophical, reads much 
more like the work of an author determined to be taken seriously as an historian. 
O’Grady admitted in the preface to History of Ireland: Critical and Philosophical, 
that while the first volume had been written with the intent of ‘bringing remote times 
and men vividly before the mind’s eye, and within the reach of common human 
sympathies’, the second offered ‘an altogether different order of historical 
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 composition...critical, not constructive or imaginative.’119 O’Grady had written: ‘To 
express the whole nature of a race or nation, the artist needs that absolute freedom 
which is only supplied by a complete escape from positive history and unyielding 
despotic fact.’120 ‘In history’, he repeated, ‘there must be sympathy, imagination, 
creation.’121 In this way only could that supreme form of civilisation, ‘the ideal of the 
race’, be realised. 122  O’Grady saw the historian’s task as grasping the inner 
significance of events to create a unifying event. On the other hand, in the same 
essay he argued fervently for the historical veracity of his source material.
123
 
O’Grady’s ‘ideal of the race’, so forcibly expressed in the ancient and early medieval 
bardic literature which first ignited his interest in Irish history, could ameliorate the 
effect of the manifest failure of the Irish to achieve stable and lasting political unity 
throughout their history.
124
 The result of his aim was, so argues one scholar, the first 
notable ‘popular interpretation of Ireland’s mythical past.’ 125  As noted in the 
previous chapter, the mythical warrior hero CúChulainn, of whom O’Grady wrote a 
great deal, served as the embodiment of the heroic Irish of the distant past who were 
the centre of his History of Ireland.  
As Freytag did in his Bilder, O’Grady wrote history not only to create an inspiring 
national narrative, to inspire the modern Irish towards the ‘recovery’ of ancient noble 
and heroic ideas and to extol the pre-eminence of these ancestors among the peoples 
of Europe, but to situate his own particular community within the Irish historical 
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 narrative. O’Grady’s historical writing centred on the heroic times of Irish antiquity 
and ancient heroes, the ‘kings, the chieftains, and knights of the heroic age of 
Ireland.’126 This preoccupation was itself characteristically modern: he wanted to 
demonstrate that the Irish had always been at least capable of uniting under a 
‘national’ leadership characterized by intelligence and beneficence, even if they had 
generally failed to do so.
127
 In O’Grady’s recurrent concern with the warrior ethos or 
martial values we find an Irish counterpart to the ‘ideal of masculinity’ present in 
contemporary continental Europe explicated by Mosse, itself an appeal for personal 
and national regeneration.
128
 O’Grady, like Lecky, regarded the Protestant 
aristocracy and gentry as the natural leadership stratum of Irish society, but was 
equally conscious of the ‘alienation’ of much of this community from its own 
Irishness during the course of the nineteenth century. His romantic form of history, 
centred on the recovery of heroic values and virtuous elite leadership, on ‘an 
imaginative reconstruction of the past which would thrill the blood’, was if anything 
directed more to this readership than any other.
129
 In choosing not to write about 
those historical periods which had formed the divisions present in modern Irish life, 
O’Grady went back as far as the pre-Christian period, though this was necessarily in 
large part an ‘imaginative’ exercise. For O’Grady, Irish history did not begin with 
the coming of Saint Patrick. ‘Foreigners are surprised’, he wrote, ‘to find the Irish 
claim for their own country an antiquity and a history prior to that of neighbouring 
countries’, and that, uniquely, ‘The indigenous history of the surrounding nations 
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 commences with the Christian ages – that of Ireland runs back into the pre-
Christian.’ What remained preserved, throughout the ruptured course of Irish history, 
were timeless virtues of ‘warlike prowess, physical beauty, generosity, hospitality, a 
love of family and nation, and all those attributes which constituted the heroic 
character’.130 These attributes were part of an enduring ‘racial’ identity and heritage, 
which in the present men of various ancestries could possess. O’Grady’s Irish past 
was a mirror for the present generation, regardless of political position:
131
 ‘The 
gigantic conceptions of heroism and strength, with which the forefront of Irish 
history is thronged, prove the great future of this race and land, of which the mere 
contemplation of the actual results of time might even cause the patriot to despair.’132 
Anyone of whatever political persuasion who wanted information on the heritage of 
Gaelic Ireland and could not read Gaelic would likely have turned to O’Grady’s 
writing.
133
 As in Freytag’s Bilder, in O’Grady’s History certain historical 
personages, and even (in O’Grady’s case) mythical ones, such as CúChulainn the 
‘Hound of Ulster’, have the significance of illustrating certain historical life-patterns 
themselves indicative of the political and social order that produced them.
134
 
O’Grady saw that the only way to free ‘Irishness’ from the divisive and narrowing 
influence of confessional allegiance was to relocate how it was to be defined through 
a narrative on the ‘racial’ character and virtues of the unsullied Irish of the distant 
past. This is not fundamentally unlike how Freytag wrote the Bilder in order to 
defend the claim of the Protestant (preferably North German) Bildungsbürgertum to 
be the cradle and substance of the modern German nation. Tatlock has shown that 
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 whatever Freytag asserted about the integrity of his Bilder as historiography, he took 
an explicitly subjective view of history, with his sources carefully selected to 
undergird his conception of German history as the flourishing of the Bürgertum.
135
 
Historiography as having a specific contemporary purpose was a point of 
commonality for the romantic O’Grady and the realist historian Freytag. There are 
also parallels between O’Grady’s writing and that of other German writers. 
In applying ‘race thinking’ to Irish history, O’Grady’s focus was of course on ‘race’ 
as a politico-cultural idea rather than a notion of fixed ancestries of blood. He 
claimed early Ireland as the homeland and the final repository of the ideal of chivalry 
and the warrior ethos of Europe.
136
 In situating his ancient Irish within a wider 
European context, that of the declining Western Roman Empire, he asserted, rather 
like Dahn did of the ancient Germanen, that it had been these Celts, rather than the 
degenerate Latins, who had comprised its vital lifeblood.
137
 As Dahn in his historical 
epic Struggle for Rome claimed that the Empire foundered on the onslaughts of the 
Germanic tribes, O’Grady maintained that the Irish brought about its ruin when they 
swept into Britannia and Gaul as conquerors, subjugating the degenerate Romanized 
native populations with ease. Dahn and O’Grady, in their narratives, shared disdain 
for Roman Christianity: it had been a force for disunity and had weakened the 
original cultural vitality of the peoples it reached.
138
 Even so, while ancient ‘Britain’ 
fell to pieces under repeated foreign onslaughts, there had arisen in Ireland from this 
time a conception of national solidarity manifested in the High Kingship. O’Grady 
seems to undermine here a stock-in-trade anti-Irish argument; that the Irish, not 
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 having experienced the benefits of civility conferred by Roman rule, had been 
conditioned for backwardness and barbarity. In an article published in the English 
Historical Review in 1889 O’Grady asserted confidently that ‘The history of Ireland 
in the eleventh and twelfth centuries is the history of a race evolving its 
monarchy.’139 This interpretation subverted the notion that Gaelic Ireland had always 
merely ‘the scene of wasteful tribal confusions…girt by a little illuminated fringe of 
Danish order and civilisation.
’140
 In History of Ireland he refers rather to the strivings 
of a nation ‘fulfilling its part in the great national confraternity of the world.’  
O’Grady’s contrasting of Celtic, Irish heroism in history, even in the distant past, 
with British or Anglo-Saxon degeneracy, and his aspiration for a modern return to 
such heroic values were leitmotifs of his historical writing. A transitional figure in 
many respects, O’Grady sought to provide a potentially inclusive history for the 
divided Ireland of his day based on an idealized distant past, and his historical 
notability lay much less in his immediate popularity (which was lacking), than in his 
influence on the like of Yeats, and the power of his Irish warrior narrative to fin-de-
siécle Irish nationalism.
141
 
O’Grady’s History of Ireland and interest in ancient history as the locus of national 
history owes much in terms of the broader cultural background to the work of a 
German historian published a generation before. In 1835 the renowned Romantic 
historian and linguistic scholar Jacob Grimm had published the three-volume 
Teutonic Mythology, which, despite its name, was a comprehensive history of 
Germanic antiquity. There are interesting parallels between O’Grady’s work and this 
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 one. In this work Grimm had sought the historical roots of Germanness in the 
distant, pre-medieval past, and had an ambiguous outlook on the specific political 
nationalism of the 1840s and 1850s, distrusting, as he and his brother Wilhelm 
Grimm were, of Prussian claims to represent the German nation.
142
 The first part of 
Teutonic Mythology was concerned with the religious world of the Germanen, the 
second and third with their mythical outlook, and view of nature and the afterlife. 
The material in which the Grimms were interested and which formed the basis of this 
work included myth, legend, epic narrative, folk tales, rituals, laws, and most of all, 
the history of the Germanic languages. As O’Grady would, Grimm pointed out that 
in the early medieval period the coming of Christianity had actually meant cultural 
dilution and subjection to a foreign philosophy, culture, and power, in the form of 
Rome.
143
 He emphasized how invaluable were historical accounts from the pre-
medieval period, in the German context, the Germania of Tacitus.
144
 In the preface 
of the second edition to Teutonic Mythology, Grimm criticized the dismissive 
tendencies of German scholars when it came to the study of the Germanen on their 
own terms.
145
 To Grimm, ‘to deny the reality of this mythology is as much as to 
impugn the high antiquity and continuity of our language: to every nation a belief in 
gods was as necessary as language.’146 Nothing could have been further from the 
truth than the idea that whole centuries of pre-medieval German history were filled 
with ‘soulless barbarism’. Rather, ‘one has only to recognise the mild and manly 
spirit of our higher antiquity in the power and purity of the national laws’. With a 
statement that seems to foreshadow O’Grady, Grimm wrote, ‘the popular tradition of 
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 today hangs by threads which ultimately link it without a break to ancient times.’147 
It was essential that this tradition be understood on its own terms, on its own merit, 
and not adulterated in any way by the application of foreign concepts or 
prejudices.
148
 Yet no national tradition could truly be regarded as ‘pure’: ‘Every 
nation seems instigated by nature to isolate itself, to keep itself untouched by foreign 
ingredients’, and yet, ‘nations border upon nations, and peaceful intercourse or war 
blend their destinies into one. From their combinations will come unexpected results, 
whose gain deserves to be weighed against the loss entailed by the suppression of the 
domestic elements.’ Grimm, like O’Grady, also thought to compare the Germanen 
favourably with other peoples: ‘All that is left to us of the Celtic religion, even in 
stray fragments, bespeaks a more finished mental culture than is to be found in 
German or Norse mythology…But in respect of genius and epic matter our 
memorials are incomparably superior.’149 Like O’Grady would Grimm emphasised 
the Christianity throughout Europe was from the start of every conversion 
commingled with earlier mythologies, which irrevocably shaped the character of 
individual ‘national’ variations of Christianity. 150  For Grimm, all the evidence 
supplied by serious and fair study of German mythology demonstrated that the 
Germanen had been a fundamentally virtuous people, rich soil from which a nation 
could grow.
 151
 Their religious rites, for example, had made it both necessary and 
natural that the Reformation would begin in German-speaking Europe.
152
 Their 
ancient texts and traditions had been comparable to anything produced by the ancient 
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 Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans.
153
 Concluding the lengthy preface, Grimm wrote, 
‘Having observed that her Language, Laws, and Antiquities were greatly underrated, 
I was wishful to exalt my native land.’ 154 With such thinking O’Grady would no 
doubt have found himself in full agreement; his histories could not have been written 
had it not been for Romanticism. Even if the Grimms had not had to deal with the 
same kind of cultural ambivalence that O’Grady would, for Jacob Grimm, his own 
engagement with the German past had been born out of an enduring sense of the 
‘shame and humiliation’ inflicted on Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century by the French occupation. The importance of the past, in this regard, was 
that it could serve as an ‘invisible defensive umbrella against the enemy’s 
arrogance.’ 155  Jacob Grimm had of course been a central figure in German 
Romanticism, and fully believed in the importance of intuition in the recovery of the 
distant past, given its ‘otherness’. The past’s ‘otherness’ demanded ‘scholarly 
reconstruction’ in order to serve ‘the revitalization of indigenous identity in the 
present.’ In the study of the ancient past was to be found ‘the communal being of 
Germanic culture.’156   
The confluence of history and literature in the synthesis of a national narrative 
centred on a narrative of Volk or entwining of race and nation identifiable in 
O’Grady, and to a lesser extent in Freytag, is also present in one of the most popular 
German historical narrative ever to employ the concept of the Volk, Felix Dahn’s 
immensely popular historical novel Kampf um Rom (Struggle for Rome), which 
reached one hundred and ten editions by 1918.
157
 Kampf um Rom centred on the 
conflict of the Gothic Kingdom of Italy and the Byzantine Empire of Emperor 
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 Justinian at the dawn of the medieval period.
158
 The purpose of the narrative 
however was a critique of the inadequacies of the Germans in the present, lacking as 
they were those marks of distinction that were to be celebrated in their Gothic 
‘ancestors’159 – as with O’Grady, there is a contrast between ancient virtue and 
modern decadence – warn them against the errors of disunity and anti-national 
cosmopolitanism that had led to the downfall of the Goths – again, similarly to 
O’Grady who intended his work to be a unifying narrative – and sound a rallying cry 
for a national revival – once again, this was central to O’Grady’s purpose. Written 
just after Italian unification, the book expressed Dahn’s hopes for German 
unification. Throughout the text war and struggle, the contest of ‘nations’ for 
survival, and indeed for supremacy over each other, are praised as essential to the 
forging of great nations.
160
 Dahn’s praise of the Germans’ ‘ancestors’, his narrative 
of early German history and the völkisch leitmotif of his writing made him a hero to 
the völkisch movement.
161
 Perhaps no single figure of such popularity did more to 
characterize and define the Germanenbild of his time as Dahn.
162
 
The book is from the outset suffused with a discourse of national enmity: Italians are 
‘deadly enemies’; Greeks (Byzantines) are ‘despicable’, a ‘race of vipers’. The 
‘Romanized’ and Hellenized’ tendencies of the Goths in Italy represent their 
degeneration. For this decline to be reversed a revival of ‘nationality’ was needed. 
Fidelity to one’s own race and nationality is presented as ‘the highest sentiment of 
the human heart’, and ‘the strongest power in the human soul.’ It was better that the 
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 Goths should die glorious in battle against their enemies than to become like them.
163
 
To compound his image of Roman villainy, Dahn even has a Jewish character 
express admiration and gratitude to the fair and just Goths for bringing an end to the 
incomparable tyranny of the Romans.
164
 Repeatedly, cultural mixing is portrayed as 
unnatural and damaging, the Goths’ decline is linked repeatedly with their habitation 
in Italy, a foreign land, among foreigners.
165
 However, perhaps the greatest villain in 
the story is actually a Goth, the cowardly and treacherous Theodahad; who conspires 
with the Romans to betray his people to the Emperor, so that his family might be 
permitted to rule in Italy.
166
 Conflict among nationalities is natural and not to be 
condemned; what is abhorrent is betrayal of one’s own people, which, pointedly, 
included ‘miscegenation’ for Dahn, which weakens the ‘purity’ of one’s own race.167 
In the second volume, the Goths, unsupported by their fellow Germanic peoples, are 
defeated by the Byzantines, who invade Italy. This conquest is presented as such a 
tyranny that the Goths and Italians are finally united in opposition as a result.
168
 Yet 
this is still an unnatural combination, and in the end the Goths are ultimately 
defeated. In the course of the final volume, Dahn introduced the character of the 
Norse king Harald, who serves as a kind of voice of conscience for the Gothic 
protagonists, his racial kindred. He upbraids them for their continued Romanized 
tendencies and reminds them that they will always be strangers in Italy. So, 
unsurprisingly, after their final defeat the last remaining Goths choose to leave Italy, 
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 with the help of the Norsemen returning to their natural and true home in the 
North.
169
 Even though the Goths are defeated, the ‘race’, through a shedding of 
foreign ways, survives, and may yet be revived. O’Grady and Dahn both regarded 
the personages that drove their narratives – the ancient Irish warrior heroes and kings 
for O’Grady, the Goths and their enemies for Dahn – as essentially historical, but 
they become in these works characters intended to impart ideas and values that had 
everything to do with modern nationalism rather than actual early Irish or early 
German culture and society.  
One would only need to substitute every use of the word ‘Goth’ in the Struggle for 
Rome for ‘German’ to understand its significance and utility for German nationalism. 
A demand and claim is put forth by Dahn in this narrative for the all-encompassing 
willingness of the German to suffer and sacrifice for the nation. A perspective which 
justified the employment of all means for the preservation and strengthening and 
preservation of the national Volkstum is elevated to the level of foundation for all 
political action.
170
 The abandonment of the Goths by other Germanen, who stand on 
the side of the Byzantines, is presented as a cause of the Goths’ defeat; the 
Byzantines owed their victory only to the might of Germanic warriors who fought 
for them, degenerated as they may have been. The other side of this claim is, 
therefore, that no foreign enemy can succeed in destroying or subjugating the 
Germans out of its own power, so long as the Germans hold together and remember 
their common nationality, a conceit that goes back to Arndt, if not further, and one 
                                                          
169
 Here also is an illustration of the typically völkisch emphasis on the centrality of nation’s native 
land for its historical identity, but also an example of the broader historiographical nationalist 
tendency to unite ‘race’ and ‘national territory’, or to present the nation and its geographical setting as 
fundamentally indivisible. 
170
 Wahl, Die Religion des deutschen Nationalismus, pp. 71, 75.  
249
 which long retained currency, in pan-German, völkisch circles.
171
 A bourgeois 
nationalist self-consciousness and set of virtues, which would have been entirely 
foreign to the actual late antiquity/early medieval Goths whom Dahn admired, was 
carefully delineated. The work, for all its pretence in representing actual historical 
events, projects in an imagined historical space the desires, hopes, dreams, and fears 
of a nineteenth-century bourgeois nationalist, as was so common in nineteenth-
century national historical narrative in general. As with O’Grady’s work, in Struggle 
for Rome, history seems to be the product and sum of individual achievements and 
sacrifices – and therefore able to be repeated and replicated.172 Dahn nonetheless 
remained convinced that the fundamental structure of his book could stand the test of 
serious scholarly question and examination, in terms of its ‘authenticity’. He was 
convinced of the fundamental distinction between historiography and literature 
apparently evidenced in his work. He does not share however Freytag’s confident 
liberal sense of optimism and of inevitable progress, of history as possessing a 
teleological progression; rather, history is a sequence of rise and decline and 
inevitable degeneration from greatness and loss of heroic values.
173
 The same sense 
of history as cycle of rise, degeneracy, and fall, is present in Standish O’Grady’s 
historical thought and was a common inheritance of both nationalist historiographies. 
IX 
In the twentieth century, the entwined discourses of ‘race’ in the nation’s history and 
of national enmity, as well as the ambiguous view of cultural amalgamation 
remained enduring, particularly, of course, in the context of open violent conflict. 
The continued importance of the Franco-German antagonism and attendant discourse 
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 of national enmity running through Sybel’s and Treitschke’s writings is borne out in 
the beginning of one of Johannes Haller’s most important and popular works, written 
in 1930: ‘It is a frequent occurrence in the life of nations, almost the rule, that 
neighbours are not friends…we must expect to see them play their parts on the scene 
of history as permanent opponents.’ This is the opening of France and Germany: 
The History of One Thousand Years (Tausend Jahre deutsch-französischer 
Beziehungen).
174
 Haller’s starting point in this work was a judgement that the 
connections between France and Germany, so close were they; made it possible and 
appropriate to speak for both nations of an intertwined fate, going all the way back to 
the two nations’ common origins in Charlemagne’s empire. Yet not, however, of a 
common or entwined fortune; rather, the fortunes of the French and German nations 
changed and varied as befitting the two nations’ position as permanent, or at the very 
least historical, opponents. When France’s power and prestige rose, Germany’s fell; 
when Germany’s rose, France’s fell. Beginning the narrative, Haller staked an 
‘Arndtian’ claim of Germany rather than France manifesting greater, more direct 
continuity with the Carolingian Empire. After the fall of that Empire, it was its 
eastern half which remained Germanic, whereas the western half was absorbed into 
the alien and inferior population of what became France. Herein the French and 
German nations came into existence, and ‘Thus for about a thousand years the 
German and the French nations have been contrasted and have stood as opposites.’ It 
was natural that ‘From the very first day of the existence of a German realm and a 
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 French realm they were antagonistic to each other’.175 From around 1250 ‘the roles 
of the two countries were exchanged: Germany occupied the place hitherto 
belonging to France…she abdicated as a great Power for centuries, while the French 
kingdom…became the leading Power in Europe.’176 To Haller, then as always, ‘The 
French believe in certain old traditions, attaching hopes and wishes to them that can 
only be fulfilled at the expense of Germany.’177 This became clear again, and with 
more force than ever before, hundreds of years later, in the aftermath of the Thirty 
Years’ War, when Louis XIV stood as a kind of overlord over a ruined Germany, 
free to annex western regions as he saw fit. It was from this time, Haller claimed, 
that ‘The seed of Franco-German hereditary enmity had sprung up (Haller’s 
emphasis).’178 French influence over Germany remained powerful and as always 
anti-national until the rise of Prussia. Still, a truly national German animosity 
towards France remained in the distant future, and the nadir of German history was 
reached in the Napoleonic conquest, as Haller makes clear, when the German people 
and their worthless rulers (with the exception of the King of Prussia) meekly 
accepted Napoleon’s supremacy over Germany. Haller too saw an essential 
continuity between the imperial ambitions of Louis XIV and those of Napoleon. He 
too held the entire French nation responsible for Germany’s abasement: ‘The great 
mass of the nation…had no objection to the conquests, and especially those on 
German soil’, they ‘were nothing but the complete fulfilment of the very old national 
idea that the dominion of Europe was due to the French by virtue of their origin.’179 
While French expansion into Germany had been motivated by age-old imperial 
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 ideas, later German conquest of French territory – the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 
– were motivated by nothing more than the need to erect a bulwark to defend 
Germany from future French threats.
180
  
Prussia’s victory in 1870 had changed the course of Franco-German history: no 
longer would Germany’s fortunes be, as they had been since the mid-thirteenth 
century, subject to the whims of France. Yet little was changed within the French 
nation, so that ‘In 1914, too, its [France’s] war aims were the same as they had been 
at all times during the last three centuries.’ This was the enduring continuity of the 
Franco-German relationship, the hereditary enmity, throughout history.
181
 It was 
fitting enough that Haller admitted that he wrote the work precisely to inspire young 
German patriotic readers to revise the boundaries set by the Treaty of Versailles.
182
 
In his foreword he made clear that it was not his intention in the book to contribute 
to ‘gelehrte Forschung’, but rather to demonstrate to German readers ‘the fact’ that 
France had in its attitude to Germany always been motivated by the same drive for 
conquest and domination.
183
 In Epochs of German History Haller had displayed an 
obvious concern with ‘the Volk’ as historical actor:  
‘the character of a people, its innate qualities and defects and the limits of its capacity 
are revealed in the course of its centuries of active life, of achievement and failure… if 
the nature and character of a people undergo modification, is it not then above all that it 
becomes an imperative duty for anyone who has to do with the nation as it is to 
recognize these changes and trace them to their origin?’184  
In this work Haller often decried the absence of a strong and popular spirit of 
nationality in German history, especially amongst German rulers, itself cause and 
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 effect of historical German political impotence. Yet this did not negate his judgement 
that some historical conception of Germanness (in the sense of Volk) was natural and 
necessary for any nation, that such was undermined without some underlying sense 
of ethnic commonality and unity.  
In the Irish context in the early twentieth century, historians continued to advance 
implicitly racialized discourses while disputing the value of racial categorizations or 
distinctions (‘race’ understood in the ‘biological’ sense), grappling with the problem 
of cultural amalgamation while advancing a discourse of national enmity. Eoin 
MacNeill, who was strongly opposed to ‘biological’ notions of race that were so 
current in Europe in his time, claimed that ‘every people has two distinct lines of 
descent – by blood and by tradition’, while asserting that what was called a ‘race’ 
was often really ‘a mixture of various races…though not in every case the same 
proportions.’185 He conceded the potential benefits of assimilation of diverse cultural 
elements for one’s own nation, for this tendency was true of every people ‘that has 
developed and maintained a distinctive nationality…Herein lies the justification of 
nationality, of intense, distinctive, and highly developed nationality. In it resides the 
elemental power of transformation.’ Such notions are themselves evocative of at least 
implicit claims of a national ‘character’ that was in some respects superior to others. 
He continued: ‘In every intense and distinctive development of a nation, there dwells 
the actuality or potentiality of some great gift to the common good of 
mankind…With all the singularity of [Ireland’s] insular character, it maintained the 
fullest intercourse with other countries…among all this world-intercourse grew up 
the most intense national consciousness.’ On the one hand, cultural amalgamation 
demonstrates the innate vitality of the culture and Volk that is driving the 
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 amalgamation, while on the other it opens the door to the possible dilution of the 
nation’s original culture. Successive waves of newcomers had all, for better or worse, 
become ‘part of the Irish body politic.’ 186  They were usually little more than 
marauders without any sense of a nationality of their own – in Ireland the Normans 
did not even display that talent for state-building that distinguished them elsewhere – 
and so they too soon embraced a true national culture, that of the native Gaelic 
Irish,
187
 a judgement which would be echoed in subsequent years by the historian 
Edmund Curtis when he commented that ‘The race-indifference of the Norman was 
one of his greatest assets.’188 MacNeill’s colleague Green agreed: ‘It is evident that 
the Norman settlers found a civilisation and culture in which they could adapt 
themselves.’ Curtis again concurred: ‘In the clash of the two civilisations, it was the 
Irish world alone which moved. The native princes, though content politically with 
their local lordships, aspired to rebuild the common culture of the whole race’.189 
However Green displayed some willingness to give the non-Irish a certain amount of 
credit, as well: ‘The Norman-French may claim the credit of the only effort ever 
made to offer to the Irish terms of intellectual partnership, and accepting Irish 
civilisation as valid to lead the way to a fraternal union.’190 The later middle ages had 
witnessed ‘the rise of a genuine Anglo-Irish civilisation, in which both races were 
gradually united in a common patriotism.’ 191  MacNeill, meanwhile practically 
omitted the Hibernicized ‘Old English’ from his essay on the medieval ‘Irish Rally’, 
and to the extent that they were featured, they were generally represented as 
opponents of the ‘national’ revival, though he concedes that the stubborn race pride 
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 of the Gaelic princes also played a part,
192
 another judgement which would be echoed 
by Curtis: ‘The race-pride and over-fed memories of the Irish kings were to be in the 
end their doom.’193 For Green and MacNeill, there was no single Irish ‘race’ – in any 
‘biological’ or ‘scientific’ sense – that corresponded with the Irish nation. MacNeill, 
in his work Celtic Ireland, described it as ‘folly’ to judge the achievements and 
failures of a people ‘as the inevitable consequences of immutable racial character’, 
which was ‘but the habit of a people, that can be changed as a vesture.’ Nothing in 
national history, he repeated, ‘is explained by mere heredity. Acquired habits, events, 
institutions, education, external associations, can degenerate and regenerate a 
nation.’194  The parallels with MacNeill’s contemporary, who was less reticent in 
employing rhetoric of ‘race’ and ‘racial’ difference, are apparent. He and Green 
consistently maintained that the most important basis of Irishness was common 
fidelity to the land of Ireland. However this conception was clearly bound up with 
numerous value judgements, moral judgements, which determined what did and did 
not belong within the boundaries of Irishness. This was intended to be an inclusive 
rather than exclusive conception, even if at the same time it regarded ‘authentic’ 
Gaelic Irish culture as the stem of nation.’195 Green had made a great deal of the 
distinction between Gaelic and Roman conceptions of state and politics as 
fundamentally different, the former based on true liberty, the latter compulsion and 
brute force (and inherited by the ‘Teutonic’ peoples, such as the Anglo-Saxons), 
which was ‘opposed to their [the Gaels’] whole habit of thought and genius.’196 
Green points out the incorporation of foreign elements could be regarded positively 
to the extent that it brought some benefit to the nation; but it is usually the same 
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 foreign elements that are blamed for national failures and decline in history. The 
nineteenth century Irish nationalist historian and Dominican priest Father T.N. Burke 
had employed a telling metaphor when making his judgement on the nature of ‘race’ 
and cultural amalgamation in Irish history: ‘If you throw a poisonous snake into the 
grass of Ireland, he will be sweetened, so as to lose his poison, or else he will die.’ 
Burke continued, ‘Even the English people, when they landed, were not two hundred 
and fifty years in the land until they were part of it…And so, any evil that we have in 
Ireland, is only a temporary and a passing evil, if we are only faithful to our 
traditions, and to the history of our country.’197 MacNeill was for his part that the 
history of Ireland presented something quite unique: ‘Ancient Ireland’, he wrote in 
Celtic Ireland, ‘has a singular place in the history of Europe….In ancient Ireland 
alone we find the autobiography of a people who came into history not shaped in the 
mould of the complex East, nor forced to accept the law of Imperial Rome’. 198 He 
also strongly distinguished between ‘nation’ and ‘state’: ‘A nation is a species of the 
genus civilisation; a state is a species of the genus government.’199 The state had no 
legitimacy unless it defended and served the civilisation of the people, whether it 
called itself ‘national’ or not. While MacNeill may have believed that a nation was a 
‘brotherhood of adoption as well as of blood’, he gave short shrift to the ‘Anglo-
Irish’ contribution to the idea of the Irish nation, believing that the eighteenth century 
Protestant nationalists were false models for those of his day. The Irish had to 
recover their Gaelic past, traditions, and modes of thought.
200
 For this reason, among 
others, he rejected the straightforward identification of ‘nationhood’ and ‘statehood’ 
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 that seemed to have become a cardinal belief in ‘official’ Irish nationalism, even as 
he shared the desire for an Irish state. He certainly made efforts to assure his readers 
that medieval Ireland before 1175 had known a unified and cohesive political system 
of its own that could at least be regarded as a state in embryo. Furthermore this 
political apparatus had been at least as sophisticated and considerable older than, any 
other in Europe.
201
 MacNeill, respected historian and scholar, devout Catholic, had 
the greatest claim to the paternity of ‘Irish-Irelandism’, even if he rejected its 
excesses. MacNeill’s ‘anti-English cultural attitudes spilled over naturally into anti-
imperialism in politics.’ 202 The cultured Anglophobia of the scholar MacNeill had its 
counterpart in the aggressive pamphlet writing of the Irish-Ireland ideologue D.P. 
Moran. He wrote of the immediate need for a cultural rather than a political 
revolution to sweep away the damaging legacy of what he saw as more than a 
hundred years of false Anglo-Irish patriotism which had forgotten the native culture 
and risked turning the entire nationalist project into a hollow and contradictory 
illusion.
203
 For Moran, the revolutionary tradition of the eighteenth century had 
consisted in so much pretentious cant that threw the Irish nation into muddle-headed 
confusion, and had ever since ‘imposed itself upon the people as a thing embodying 
all the attributes of Irish nationality.’204 The Irish Irelanders and the Gaelic League 
sought a ‘revolution’ which would in fact be the rejection and reversal of centuries of 
Anglicization and the revival of Ireland’s ancient Gaelic cultural heritage. Moran 
launched a powerful critique of the whole ‘revolutionary’ project of the eighteenth 
century which had acted as a lodestone for the political world-view of most 
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 nineteenth century nationalists. This, Moran thought, had cut the Irish off from their 
true history and Anglicized them just as if not more than anything done by centuries 
of English misrule. As Moran’s contemporary, the Gaelic League leader Douglas 
Hyde, put it, the Irish people were breaking a cultural unity which had defined their 
national existence and could be traced back ‘nearly eighteen hundred years’, with the 
result that the people were ‘cut off from the past, yet scarcely in touch with the 
present.’205 The project of ‘de-Anglicization’ would amount to a revolution in itself, 
but one actually worth pursuing and furthermore truly Irish. Historians in the German 
context also engaged in the same kind of exercises for their own country’s history 
and their people’s historical interactions with foreign elements. They all saw no 
apparent contradiction between the incorporation of foreign elements into the native 
culture to the extent that it strengthened that culture, and unceasing ‘national’ 
struggle for freedom against the same countries from which these elements 
originated. Even if Moran’s views were not universally shared, for such notable 
figures as Michael Collins, who imbibed most of their history from Davis, Mitchel, 
MacNeill and Green it was apparent that only a government ‘completely Irish in race’ 
commands the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Irish people, and by implication, the 
completely Irish are defined as Gaelic and Catholic.
206
 English culture and English 
styles of governance were inherently unsuited to the Irish people. ‘The extent to 
which’, Collins wrote, ‘we become free in fact and secure our freedom will be the 
extent to which we become Gaels again…We have to build up a new civilisation on 
the foundations of the old.’207  He appealed to his readers ‘to reconstruct our ancient 
civilisation…to avoid the errors, the miseries, the dangers, into which other nations, 
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 with their false civilisations, have fallen.’208 A popular history published in 1921, at 
the height of the Irish independence struggle, The Story of the Irish Race, accepts 
fully the confluence of ‘race’ and ‘nation’ and the nation’s (authentic) history. The 
author presents the history of English and British rule in Ireland as in essence a 
campaign of attempts to ‘annihilate’ the Irish race.209 The emphasis is on seeking out 
and resurrecting the ‘authentic mind’ and morality of the Gael.210 If, as Edmund 
Curtis, Professor of History at Trinity College, wrote around the same time that ‘the 
time has come when every race strain of Ireland will be blended into one complete 
but many coloured tapestry’,211 the understanding was that the thickest threads of the 
tapestry were those woven from Ireland’s Gaelic culture. In any case, Curtis’s views 
generally stood at the more moderate end of Irish nationalism. 
X 
In Ireland, the historical conception of ‘race’ in relation to the nation was always 
caught between notions of an Irish originality and distinctiveness and the reality of 
different ethno-cultural communities in Ireland. In Germany, during the course of the 
nineteenth century, originality came to be regarded in terms of continuity and purity, 
and an increasingly uneasy attitude towards foreign influences and cultural mixing. 
The development of völkisch thought towards the end of the nineteenth century 
marked the completion of a transition towards a much more exclusionary form of 
nationalism that synthesised pseudo-scientific notions of ‘blood’ purity with 
historical narratives on cultural purity and superiority. The basis of this variant of 
nationalism had been formed in large part by earlier ‘mainstream’ nationalist 
historical narratives, as völkisch nationalists themselves claimed. In general terms, 
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 the Irish historical narrative with respect to ‘race’ was distinguished by a tension 
between two conceptions. On the one hand, inclusion in the historical Irish nation 
was taken to be independent of one’s actual ancestral descent. On the other, Irishness 
was implicitly assumed to be synonymous with the Gaelic heritage, or more 
importantly, a sincere, often uncompromising and absolute rejection of the cultural 
and ethnic manifestations of Englishness or Britishness. The Protestant had made 
important contributions to the definition of Irishness, yet the place of this community 
within the nation was not always readily accepted. Protestant pseudo-nationalism 
obscured the reality that ‘the foundation of Ireland is the Gael, and the Gael must be 
the element that absorbs’, had ‘put a few more nails in the coffin of the Gael.’212 The 
movement from Young Ireland to the more exclusivist ‘Irish-Ireland’ may be said to 
mirror developments in Germany, where a (relatively speaking) more ‘cosmopolitan’ 
form of nationalism earlier in the century, sympathetic in some cases to the claims of 
other nations adjoining Germany lost ground to one openly supremacist and hostile 
to ‘Others’, onto the rise of integral and later völkisch and ‘pan-German’ 
nationalisms, which prided themselves on violent exclusivity.
213
 Though the 
historical background to ‘the nation’s’ encounters with other cultures was clearly 
different in these contexts, ultimately, as a result of nationalist conceptions of 
history, modern nationalist attitudes towards the nation’s ‘racial’ and cultural 
‘character’ were shaped by a view of the incommensurability of national identities.   
It must never be forgotten that ‘race’ is itself a construct. Yet the weaving of ‘race’ 
into the national historical narrative was necessarily a different enterprise in the Irish 
context given the Irish historical experience. Germany had in its history never 
experienced the kind of internal migration and waves of ‘colonial’-style settlement 
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 of different ‘racial’ groups into the country that had occurred in Ireland. Germans 
may have had their different tribes, but they were all Germanic. In the Irish context, 
attempts to historically synthesise ‘race’ and ‘nation’ were sometimes part of the 
endeavour of self-consciously Anglo-Irish intellectuals to secure their place in the 
nation by laying claim to and celebrating an ancient Irish heritage. On the other 
hand, racialized ‘Othering’ served largely the same purposes in both contexts, 
offering an axis point for national unity, but one that could still disadvantage certain 
groups within the putative nation. The problem of cultural amalgamation was also 
dealt with similarly in both contexts – if it strengthened one’s own nation in some 
way, it was acceptable, if not, it was the penetration of foreign influences. The state 
as an expression of nationality or Volk had a greater significance for German 
historians than it generally did for their Irish counterparts; for whom the history of 
the state in Ireland, with perhaps some brief interruptions, was generally that of an 
oppressive and foreign rule. For Dietrich Schäfer, for example, there was no doubt 
that the course of German history was defined by the history of the development of 
the German ‘Staatswesens’: the development of the German nation and the ‘German 
state’ were in this sense indistinguishable.214 Johannes Haller’s historical concept of 
the German nation was so dependent on the existence of the Reich that, at best, there 
could only be a rather ambiguous meeting of Volk (or race) and nation in German 
history.
215
 The absence of ‘the Jews’ as a theme in Irish national historical 
narrative(s) is another obvious point of difference. There simply was no minority 
community in the Irish context that carried the role of ‘the Jews’ in the German 
context. The Ulster Protestants were an internal ‘Other’, but still not comparable. In 
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 respect of the ‘Othering’ of those nations to which ‘the Germans’ were opposed, the 
Jews figured less prominently then such historical enemies as the French, the Slavs, 
or the ancient Romans. To the extent that Jews were dealt with and regarded as a 
meaningful actor in German history, however, they were usually made the ‘Other’, 
as a source of cultural contamination, degradation, and fragmentation, an anti-
national element and a particularly insidious one at that, given their own unique 
history of ‘rootlessness’ and ability to insinuate themselves into other nations.216 Yet 
a form of antisemitism grounded on historical narratives and cultural and intellectual 
prejudices, on a historical dialectic of Deutschtum and Judentum,
217
 was certainly no 
less popular and dangerous than a form of antisemitism grounded upon ‘biological 
racism’, however, and would become an important resource of völkisch antisemitism 
and nationalism. Still, in the historical narratives, the more enduring and more 
powerful threat appears as France, the Slavic east, and the Latin south, for these 
sources had for centuries posed a real threat to the very existence of German 
nationality and statehood. For Wolfgang Wippermann, German anti-Slavism was a 
remarkable compound of an exaggerated sense of German superiority and a deep-
rooted fear that the ‘Slavic horde’ would one day overrun Germany, and was 
entwined with views of German history in ‘the east’.218 In both contexts, the question 
of ‘race’ in the nation’s history, and associated discourses of national enmity were 
represented through a selection and appraisal of important historical personages, 
usually ‘great’ men. As Treitschke put it in his essay on Gustavus Adolphus, ‘To 
nations, as to men of genius, there comes an hour in which an inner voice speaks to 
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 them, saying, “Now or never shalt thou manifest thy best, thy most individual, 
qualities to the world.”’219 In associating the national story in whole or in part with 
great historical figures the path was smoothed towards the understanding of history 
as judgement of history. The national narrative became also a kind of cultural-racial 
bildungsroman, as for example in Freytag’s Bilder, a work ‘of growth and moral 
transformation’, in which historical development is conceived in terms of ‘moral 
growth both for the individual and the collective psyche’.220 The drama of particular 
individuals’ lives becomes that of the nation in a particular era, be it struggle against 
a foreign ‘Other’, cultural renaissance, or the forging of unity. The negative qualities 
that were ascribed to ‘the Other’ were usually those that were denied to be the 
present in the German or Irish nation, a signal of the importance of ‘the Other’, even 
if only implicit, for the nation’s self-definition. A sense that Irishness or Germanness 
contained within it an ideal, historically-defined conception of freedom superior to 
that of other nations was another parallel between the two contexts. There is also a 
sense in both contexts that while nations are historically contingent and variable, the 
‘principle’ of nationality is of considerable age, along with the ‘nature’ and character 
of these ‘racial’ communities of origin that constitute nations. It is unsurprising that 
both Haller and Freytag, as Germans who came from regions in which Germans 
lived in close proximity with Slavs, framed their views as historians about 
‘Germanness’ and the importance of ‘race’ in German history in terms that raised 
conflict of ‘races’ as a determining historical principle. In Ireland, historians such as 
Lecky – part of a community that had for centuries formed cultural interface and 
been formed from cultural amalgamation – also expressed how cultural ‘liminality’ 
informed Irish historical writing about ‘race’. In his Leaders of Public Opinion 
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 Lecky seemed to take very seriously the ‘racial’ differences of Irish and English, yet 
in the Irish sections of the History of England and the History of Ireland he 
downplayed the ‘racial element’ in Irish history, but Leaders and History had been 
written far apart, at different stages of Lecky’s political and intellectual 
development, and expressed rather differing purposes. McNeill, though eschewing 
with distaste ideas of nationality based simply on blood kinship, clearly held an idea 
of ‘unsullied’ Irishness founded on the Gaelic heritage. For Standish O’Grady, of 
Gaelic descent yet more a part of ‘Anglo-Ireland’, the Irish ‘race’ was the leitmotif 
of his historical writings, yet it seems to express primarily a (desired) community of 
heroic values rather than of ‘blood’. In both contexts, the act of ‘Othering’ was 
presumed to be able to do something to heal over the greatest social, cultural, and 
intellectual ‘fault-line’ of Irish and German society at the time, namely the 
confessional division. Protestant and Catholic German and historians could and did 
find common ground in (if nothing else) a shared anti-French and anti-Slav 
sentiment and general certainty of German cultural superiority. In Ireland, we find 
notable Protestant figures such as Standish O’Grady and the younger W.E.H. Lecky 
expressing a certain amount of disdain for or dissatisfaction with ‘the English’ that 
brought them closer to Catholic contemporaries than they otherwise would have 
been. Ultimately, this underlines how the application of the category of ‘race’ to 
national history was part of a wider narrative designed to support a particular overall 
view of the nation. For this reason German historians saw no apparent inconsistency 
in claiming a Swedish king as one of their great heroes while dismissing the 
Habsburg dynasty as a group of mongrelized foreigners. Thus Irish historians could 
both affirm that Irishness was not dependent on ancestry as such while also affirming 
that one could not be truly Irish without adhering to a certain historical idea of the 
265
 same. However, the unifying effect of ‘Othering’ where the confessional conflict 
was undoubtedly more powerful in the Germany than Ireland, where a very sizeable 
portion of Irish society rejected out of hand any vision of Irish nationality based 
upon or closely linked to Anglophobia and the ‘connection’ with Britain. Though 
‘racial’ identifications of the nation’s historical identity could confirm as well as 
undermine the confessionalization of historical identity, ‘racial thought’ or the 
‘ethnicization of the national past offered perhaps the most powerful and ‘profound’ 
alternative to Protestant- or Catholic-influenced conceptions of ‘true’ Irishness and 
‘true’ Germanness.  
It is ironic perhaps that it was precisely these different inconsistencies in how ‘race’ 
or ‘national character’ were brought into the national narrative that in fact underlay 
the centrality, the fundamental importance of ‘the other’, in both contexts. Historians 
in both contexts assumed that the nation, owing to its cultural heritage, possessed a 
capability for self-government, and a distinct and virtuous idea of nationality to 
offer, which had been suppressed and denied by the national ‘Other’, but remained 
existent.
221
 The sense of the nation as beset by an implacable, dangerous enemy 
became important to the mental world-view of nationalists in both countries. The 
‘racialized’ discourse of national enmity worked to obscure the inconsistencies and 
problems of synthesising ‘race’ into the national historical narrative. In this sense, 
this ‘Othering’ was possibly the most important function of ‘race’. Ultimately, 
however much ‘race’ in national historical narratives in these contexts tended to be a 
very hazy thing, its significance was indisputable and lasting. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
Connections – The Comparative and the Transnational 
I 
This study has been concerned with discovering and explaining the commonalities in 
different traditions of national history writing through comparison of two such 
traditions. It disputes ‘exceptionalist’ interpretations of these traditions, while 
accepting that this self-perception was important for those who produced and 
popularized such historiographies. Any attempt to understand the nature of 
nationalist historiography in Europe demands the systematic investigation of 
similarity and difference between manifestations of this historiography, which 
developed separately and each of which were concerned with separate histories. 
However, nationalist history writing was also transnational, and this study is 
implicitly and necessarily transnational as well as comparative. Historians and 
historical writers, as part of the European ‘Republic of Letters’, judged the historical 
and historiographical tradition and worth of their own nation relationally, in 
comparison to that of others.
1
 The work of national historians was never read only in 
their own countries; these books were read throughout Europe, not only informing 
‘outside’ views of a given nation’s history, but influencing the way historians in 
other countries considered their own nation’s history.  
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 II 
These two approaches, comparative and transnational, should be regarded as 
complementary, yet they are not quite the same thing.
2
 In simple terms, transnational 
history is concerned primarily with the movement and exchange of ideas, cultural 
and technological products, and of course people and their lived experiences, rather 
than articulating and attempting to systematically explain similarity and difference. 
The transnational dimension is understood here primarily as lending further weight 
to this comparative study. The many political, cultural, and intellectual facets of 
nationalism, not least that of the writing of national history, have always been 
transnational in the sense of being a pan-European, ‘supranational’ phenomenon.3 
Though the unit of study when dealing with nationalism is of course ‘the nation’,4 
transnational history enriches comparisons by reminding historians that they are 
possible and important: the writing of national history has been a ‘common 
language’ in Europe and beyond up to the present day. The reception of such foreign 
components and models for national history varied between comprehensive 
adoption, selective appropriation, and self-conscious rejection.
5
 Irish historians, at 
least the more scholarly-minded, were conversant with European (including German) 
historiographical trends, read and collected these books. The study of early and early 
medieval Ireland was critically influenced by the work of German historical scholars, 
as was recognised by Irish scholars. The work of Eoin MacNeill, to take one 
particularly notable example, was deeply indebted to the scholarship of numerous 
German Celtic scholars who did much to bring the ‘ancestors’ of the modern Irish 
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 into the historical light of the present, in the most positive terms.
6
 Douglas Hyde, 
founder of the Gaelic League, central figure in the Gaelic revival, and first President 
of Ireland, also acknowledged the invaluable contribution of German scholars.
7
  The 
work of Heinrich Zimmer is referenced at length in MacNeill’s Phases of Irish 
History, and the author goes on to note with satisfaction in the chapter on ‘Ireland’s 
Golden Age’, the interest held by German scholarship in the Irish (Celtic) past. In 
contrast to such scholarship he contrasted, in a veiled swipe at English historians, the 
error-filled polemical writing of defenders of Anglo-Norman feudalism in Ireland.
8
 
As early as 1814 the Brothers Grimm had published a volume of Irish myths and 
legends entitled Irische Elfenmärchen (albeit their translations were from English 
translations from the original Irish), acquainting German readers with what would 
come to be an invaluable part of the intellectual and cultural repository of Irish 
cultural nationalism. The German reviewer of Edmund Curtis’s History of Medieval 
Ireland from 1110 to 1513 (1925) in Historische Zeitschrift praised the work for its 
overall wissenschaftliche treatment of its subject; though Curtis was no less 
nationalist in his perspective of Irish history for this.
9
 Even if they were only limited 
in number, there were prominent German historians and historical writers who wrote 
about Ireland in ways that suggested sensitivity to Ireland’s separate national 
historical experience, even if they were not always supportive of modern Irish claims 
to national statehood. Irish historians familiar with German scholarship regarded 
German historians not only as being at the cutting edge of historical study but as 
pioneers in the exploration of early medieval Irish history. The German university 
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 model attracted some interest in Ireland during the nineteenth century among 
members of the Catholic elite, who were interested, even if only briefly, in the 
possibility of its application in Ireland.
10
 
A common referent by which German and Irish nationalist historians measured the 
value of their historiographies, at least in much of the nineteenth century, was the 
idea of ‘England’. It seems paradoxical, though is nonetheless the case, that although 
‘England’ was conceived of as the ‘Other’ of Ireland, there was an important debt to 
what were regarded as ‘English’ ‘norms’ of nationhood in Irish nationalist thought, 
as was also the case with respect to German perceptions of England.
11
 Of course the 
nature of the historical relationship between Ireland and England and between 
Germany (or, more correctly, the German polities of central Europe) and England 
was fundamentally different for both countries. The same went for the relationship of 
Irish and German historical writing to English historical writing. For German 
historians English historiography was one potential model to accept, reject, and 
refashion.
12
 For Irish historians, however, of whatever political standpoint this 
historiography was formative not just because the histories of Ireland and England 
(later Britain) were linked in fundamental ways, but because the writing of Irish 
national history (as opposed to writing it merely as an adjunct of English history) 
was in an equally important sense about challenging and neutralizing prevailing 
English accounts of Irish history. Nonetheless, a transnational commonality between 
Ireland and Germany in this period is that ideas of ‘England’ were fundamentally 
important to national self-perception in both Germany and Ireland, and this was 
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 reflected in nationalist history writing as well. Nineteenth-century Britain was 
perceived throughout Europe as the archetypically successful modern nation-state. 
‘Anglocentric’ ideas of what it meant to be a politically constituted nation, whether 
accepted or rejected (and it was possible for individuals to do both at the same time) 
shaped nationalism in Europe nowhere more so than in Ireland and Germany.
13
      
III 
A number of nineteenth century ‘British’ historians – including Buckle, Macaulay, 
Froude, Carlyle, Scott and others – became formative influences for conceptions of 
how national history was to be written in both Ireland and Germany. But the 
‘British’ influence in fact went back to the eighteenth century, to Burke and Hume in 
particular.
14
 The German translation of Reflections on the Revolution in France had 
been particularly popular at a time when French armies were occupying Germany.
15
 
The circumstances of this German reception of Burke reminds us that the origins of 
German nationalist history writing had arisen in the same context as that of German 
nationalism more broadly, the Napoleonic occupation of Germany,
16
 and that 
German historians too were concerned with disputing foreign judgements of their 
nation’s history. German advances in the historiographical science were linked to 
notions of German cultural superiority and the overcoming of the (above all 
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 political) backwardness of Germany in relation to the ‘great nations’ of western 
Europe. Ranke himself had remarked ‘that historical studies grew out of German 
opposition to the absolute rule of Napoleonic ideas.’17 Ulrich Muhlack argues that it 
was, at least in the first half of the nineteenth century, a commonplace among 
German historians that ‘German historiography should learn from the national 
historiography of the French and the English’. 18  The comparison with British 
precedents was particularly important and lasting: the ‘chorus of praise for English 
models, especially political models,’ reached its highest crescendo in Germany in the 
mid-nineteenth century.
19
 
In Ireland the development of the writing of historiography could hardly have run 
independently of the history of the island’s political and cultural relationship with 
the neighbouring island. The first historical conceptualizations of the Irish nation, 
written in the seventeenth century by Catholic scholars such as Geoffrey Keating had 
been in the context of the consolidation of English government over Ireland and had 
been concerned not just with establishing the distinctness, but also the moral and 
historical superiority, of Ireland. A selective prizing of the Gaelic Irish past remained 
a common characteristic of various patriotic and nationalist movements henceforth, 
irrespective of their political standpoints. The nineteenth-century historical enquiries 
of Young Ireland were firmly rooted in this tradition, and remained concerned with 
freeing Irish history from the shadow imposed by Britain. We have noted the 
significance of Froude’s Hibernophobic Irish historiography to Lecky and his Irish 
historiography, the ultimate result being a work that was ‘the better because more 
thorough and scientific…an original history of eighteenth-century Ireland.’ A more 
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 positive (defining) influence for Lecky had been that of Henry Thomas Buckle’s 
intellectual-cum-cultural history, the History of Civilization in England (1857).
20
 
Buckle’s conception of history in terms of the primacy of development and changes 
of intellectual processes over long periods had been formative for Lecky. Buckle 
also elicited quite a reaction in German circles as well, even if it was generally only 
harsh criticism. Johann Gustav Droysen, in a coruscating essay pointedly entitled 
‘The Elevation of History to the Rank of a Science’, tore into Buckle, judging that 
his work was ‘well-adapted to remind us how very unclear, contradictory and beset 
with arbitrary opinions the foundations of our science are’.21 Thomas Carlyle was 
another figure of commanding (and common) importance particularly in his 
moralistic, cyclical perspective of history and his emphasis on heroic individuals as a 
force in history.
22
 His inordinate admiration for Oliver Cromwell
23
 and often 
contemptuous attitude to the Irish notwithstanding, Carlyle had been an important 
influence on the leading Young Irelanders, particularly John Mitchel. Mitchel 
dismissed (as Treitschke also would in his later years) Macaulay’s History as utterly 
transparent in its political inclinations and glorification of contemporary England. 
Throughout his life he held a Carlylean abhorrence of modern, utilitarian, industrial 
society and the attendant loss of heroism.
24
 Young Ireland ‘shared Carlyle’s 
scepticism about theories of progress that defined Ireland backward in time relative 
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 to a norm of national development defined by Britain.’25 On Lecky, also, Carlyle’s 
moralistic outlook on history had a guiding effect.
26
 Richard English has pointed out 
that Carlyle’s assertion: ‘The wisdom, the heroic worth of our past, we can recover’, 
finds its echo in Thomas Davis’s arguments about the necessity of saving all that 
remained of the past.
27
 Carlyle’s interest in Germany and role in introducing English 
readers to the principles of German historiography and philosophy as well as his 
authorship of a monumental biography of Frederick the Great, are also well-
known.
28
 Carlyle may have been deeply authoritarian in his thinking, anti-
democratic, and prone to a racialist reading of history, but he was also ‘one of the 
most important outside influences upon the development of Irish nationalist ideas’,29 
and through Carlyle, the Young Irelanders were naturally further exposed to broader 
European, particularly German currents.  
Whether or not England was the ‘birthplace’ of nationalism,30 certain English ‘norms 
of nationhood’ as expressed in historical writing, whether positively or negatively 
received, had a direct influence on historicist thought on the nation in both Germany 
and Ireland. In Germany, particularly during the early nineteenth century but all the 
way to its last decade, if not indeed longer
31
 – despite the growing Anglophobia of 
German nationalists towards the end of the century – Britain was held up as a prime 
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 model of the successful nation-state.
32
 England or Britain, having served as a point 
of orientation for German intellectuals since the eighteenth century,
33
 was long seen 
as a frame of reference or model by which to compare Germany’s historical 
development towards nationhood. G.G. Gervinus, at the closing of his Introduction 
to the History of the Nineteenth Century (1853), wrote: ‘The history of Germany 
from the time of the Reformation has followed the same regular course, though 
slower, than that of England or France…If England, as we have said before, passed 
through different phases of her development in various degrees of perfection, the 
same progress, although in another way, has taken place in Germany.’34 Gervinus 
also shared ‘the common view that “the original Germanic constitution was 
developed best among the Anglo-Saxons”’.35  For Ranke too, Britain and France 
provided a ‘norm’ of national development in history.36 Of all the national histories 
Ranke studied and wrote, England’s exhibited more than any other that sought-after 
centuries-old continuity of political nationhood.
37
 Ranke noted the English 
propensity towards conservatism and continuity, which reflected their Germanic 
ancestry.
38
 English history, as Ranke noted at the end of his History, was ‘a history 
of one piece,’ from its early beginning to British imperial glory of the nineteenth 
century.
39
 As McClelland noted:  
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 ‘Germans probably felt more sense of kinship with the English than any other people in 
Europe…To a remarkable extent, German thinkers defined German national 
characteristics not in contrast, but in comparison to the English, by seeking the 
similarities rather than the differences…the German fascination for England, like the 
later turn against her, was bound up in the first stirrings of German national 
consciousness.’40  
German reception of Burke was given its own adaptation, whereby ‘it stressed the 
remote past and the essential continuity of English history into the present. 
Discontinuities…were minimized to make England appear as the living model of 
slow, organic change-within-continuity.’41 The success of Anglo-Saxon England was 
posited as ‘evidence’ for the unique state-building abilities and greatness of the 
Germanic peoples; as vindicating the idea of ‘Germanic freedom’.  
It seems unsurprising that given the depth of this ‘love affair’ with England or rather 
their image of it, that when German historians turned away from English models and 
examples, they did so with equal fervour. Heinrich von Treitschke, notwithstanding a 
typical Anglophilia in earlier life,
42
 heaped coruscating scorn on England and the 
English, on ‘perfidious Albion’, as an older man. This was of course historically 
flavoured: ‘The hypocritical Englishman, with the Bible in one hand and a pipe in 
the other, possesses no redeeming qualities’, he knew no honour or any ‘distinction 
of right and wrong.’43 An Anglophobic Irish nationalist of the same period would 
have agreed. Charles Gavan Duffy put it typically in remarks printed in both his 
history-cum-memoir magnum opus, Young Ireland: A Fragment of Irish History 
(1880) and his later introduction to Davis’s The Patriot Parliament: ‘English writers 
are in general agreed that the paramount nation exhibited singular wisdom and 
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 benevolence. Through constantly changing and troubled times they were always 
right; right when they did in Ireland the exact reverse of what they were accustomed 
to at home; right, by a singular good fortune when they set aside rules of morality 
and justice, which elsewhere are of permanent authority.’44  Elsewhere he wrote: 
‘some generous English historians can recognise in resistance, continuing through so 
many generations in Ireland, only a turbulence and discontent native to the Celtic 
race. In the case of any other country they would probably feel no insuperable 
difficulty in understanding why the dominion of strangers was odious, or why the 
desire to overthrow it was regarded as honourable and praiseworthy.’ 45  In his 
Deutsche Geschichte Treitschke had added, focusing again on the motif of English 
hypocrisy: ‘In the halls of Parliament, one heard only shameless British commercial 
morality, which, with the Bible in the right and hand and the opium pipe in the left, 
spreads the benefits of civilization around the world.’46 In his Politics, he charged 
that it was the English who were full of national prejudices, guilty of chaining 
Europe in a latent status of permanent warfare in order to serve their own selfish 
ends. Erich Marcks would claim in 1910 that: ‘A German no longer studies England 
as he had once done: in order to learn from her directly, in order to imitate her. In 
some things he will wish to learn from England against England. We no longer 
believe in the simple transferability even of that which is worthy of emulation.’47 
The apogee of German nationalist Anglophobia was reached (in the period under 
consideration) during the First World War. In an essay on ‘The Spirit of German 
Kultur’ published in Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, the Berlin theologian Ernst 
Troeltsch asserted that ‘This Kultur war [against Germany] is primarily the work of 
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 England, in whose political intrigues against Germany it has long been easily 
recognizable’, and that among the English the feeling of national superiority, and 
indeed supremacy, of the English right to dominate the world and determine the 
character of civilisation, was practically universal.
48
 In an article for the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung written in September 1914 Johannes Haller described ‘England’ simply as 
‘truly our most deadly enemy.’ 49  Eduard Meyer (brother of Kuno) paid special 
attention to Irish history in his England: seine staatliche und politische Entwicklung 
und der Krieg gegen Deutschland (1915); arguing that Ireland offered evidence of 
English hypocrisy and self-deception, and presented a brief survey of Irish history 
that would have been quite agreeable to an Irish nationalist. He referred to the Irish 
Jacobite War of the seventeenth century as a ‘national uprising of the Irish for the 
restoration of their freedom’, sharply criticised Lord Macaulay’s presentation of 
seventeenth century Irish history while positively appraising that of Ranke – ‘the 
correct outlook briefly and correctly formulated’ – and wrote (approvingly) that 
‘embittered hate and determination to restore the right of the people to decide its own 
fate fills the breast of every Irishman’. The Irish, he claimed, in contrast to the 
English and their false patriotism, truly possessed a fatherland.
50
 In the following 
year, in his introduction to George Chatterton-Hill’s Irland und seine Bedeutung für 
Europa (1916),
51
 Eduard Meyer referred to Ireland’s ‘glorious national and cultural 
past’, pointed out the important role Germans had played and continued to play in 
the writing of Irish history, asserted that English misgovernment in Ireland and their 
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 national egoism showed ‘the true face of the English’, and for his German readers 
pointed out that Ireland offered a testimony to the fate the Germans could likely 
expect if they were defeated by England.
52
 For their part, intellectual leaders of the 
Irish separatist movement of 1916-1921, such as Patrick Pearse were utterly 
convinced of the reality of a transhistorical gulf between English and Irish cultures, 
between Englishness and Irishness, even as they denied (as they had to) the many 
interactions of the two histories and cultures that did not fit neatly in their narrative.  
The variances in the German and Irish nationalist attitudes towards ‘England’ had 
their parallels, though their inner contradictions were more strongly distilled in the 
Irish case. The first Irish nationalists, of the late eighteenth century, were in most 
respects a creation of or ‘Anglo-Irish’ culture in Ireland, with a discourse of their 
rights as ‘English subjects’. Yet the ‘Anglo-Irishman’ who would prove to be the 
most famous of Irish republican revolutionaries, Wolfe Tone, would name hatred of 
England as central to his political credo. Young Irelanders in the nineteenth century 
perceived themselves as the direct heir of the ‘Patriot’ and United Irish movements. 
Thomas Davis too had been, up to 1838, considered by some contemporaries as 
‘more like a young Englishman than a young Irishman.’ As Robert Kee puts it, ‘It 
was the very sense of provincialism thrust upon him by his country of birth that he 
felt undignified and that he set out to overcome by elevating it into a sense of [Irish] 
nationality.’ 53  It is noteworthy that in their admiration for such institutions and 
precedents as the Catholic Confederation of the 1640’s, the Patriot Parliament of 
1689, and Grattan’s Parliament and constitution, the Young Irelanders anchored their 
nationalism in that ‘very English’ institution, parliamentary government and 
constitutional monarchy. Daniel O’Connell perhaps summed up unwittingly some of 
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 the inner peculiarities of Irish nationalism, at least in its relationship with and 
perception of ‘England’, in comments made in a public address of 1843: ‘there shall 
be no bargain, no compromise with England – we shall take nothing but Repeal, and 
a Parliament in College Green.’ The parliament O’Connell demanded was of course 
a restoration of ‘Grattan’s Parliament’ under the sovereignty of the ‘English’ 
monarch – but with, importantly, Catholic and thus perhaps in some sense ‘Gaelic’ 
representation. Young Ireland’s basic political goal was always, like O’Connell’s the 
repeal of the legislative union and the re-establishment of an Irish parliament akin to 
that of 1782, under the common Crown – and later, among more radical members, of 
a republic along European or American lines – not of any kind of revived Gaelic 
polity. This is not to say, of course, that Young Irelanders did not attempt to ground 
their demands for a future Irish legislature on past Irish precedents, nor is it to 
downplay the importance to Young Ireland and other nationalists of source traditions 
such as the Gaelic idea, or that of Anglophobia or the republican tradition, or to 
claim that Irish nationalism was unwittingly created by Britain or defined only by 
what it was against. Yet even in its prized historical heritage Irish nationalism was 
from its beginnings indebted to ‘anglicized’ ideas of good government and political 
nationhood, as adapted in Ireland and Irish circumstances. Perhaps this could only 
have been the case given the nature of the historical relationship between Ireland and 
England, but it never meant that Irish nationalists were prepared to concede that 
Ireland was anything less than a nation in its own right, and a nation gravely and 
repeatedly wounded down throughout the centuries by ‘England’. Even A.M. 
Sullivan in his The Story of Ireland, as we have seen, equated the ancient Gaelic 
polity with contemporary parliamentary government – of the Westminster type – in 
280
 order to give weight to the Irish historical claim for nationhood.
54
 It may be said that 
all this was simply another indication of the ‘transnational’ character of ‘national 
thought’ as it developed across Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century.55 
The communication of ideas, inspirations and ideals that constituted the spread and 
propagation of national ideologies crossed borders and frontiers.
56
 It was necessary 
for aspirant and emerging nations such as the Irish and German ones to prove their 
merit, in comparison to established nations that were European and global powers. 
Monika Baár has argued that: ‘The self-asserting strategies inherent in the self-
congratulatory rhetoric of established nations and those intrinsic to the rhetoric of 
non-dominant nations made recourse to the same criteria.’57 Germany and Ireland, 
then, as ‘belated nations’ were clearly two countries where the content of 
nationalism as well as the nature of national historical writing was strongly 
influenced – though of course unequally – by perceptions of ‘England’.   
While the literary cross-currents between Germany and Ireland may have been much 
less dense than those between Germany and Britain, and between Ireland and 
Britain, this is not to say that there were none. Though up to the late eighteenth 
century, ‘Ireland had been largely an unknown quality’ among German writers, the 
nineteenth century, particularly the first half, saw a growing interest in Ireland.
58
 
Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831), in his time a leading German classical 
historian, wrote on British misgovernment in Ireland and of the necessity for 
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 Catholic Emancipation.
59
 German interest in Irish affairs probably peaked between 
the 1820s and c. 1840, during the career of Daniel O’Connell. In the early decades of 
the century, when censorship was prevalent in the German states, political argument 
was often only possible by way of commentary on foreign affairs, thus there was an 
interest in events in Ireland.
60
 It has recently been stated by Eoin Bourke that 
‘…even a small and troubled country like Ireland could become not only an object of 
pity but also in some respects a political and social model’, even if only a model of 
what not to become, for German observers. As the Prussian historian Friedrich 
Raumer, who visited Britain and Ireland, and was generally sympathetic to Britain, 
put it, ‘Ireland is the most deplorable example in recent history of the world of a 
great and noble people labouring for centuries under such injustice and obtuseness, 
and also of all the highly ordained forms of constitution frequently being divested of 
all substance by the farce of partisanship and prejudice.’ Nineteenth-century German 
travel writers, even when repelled by much of what they witnessed in Ireland, were 
occasionally struck by apparent similarities between conditions of the common 
people in Ireland and the German states.
61
 German historical writing on Ireland in 
the nineteenth century was also influenced by the confessional biases of individual 
authors; a reflection of how interpretation of other nations is often conditioned by the 
definition of one’s own nation (and vice versa – the definition of national ‘Self’ and 
national ‘Other’ is inevitably transnational). The publicist, politician and historian 
Jakob Venedey (1805-1871) published in 1844 Irland, a two-part work comprised of 
a ‘Geschichte des irischen Volkes’ up the 1830’s, and a commentary on 
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 contemporary Irish affairs and the career of O’Connell, whom he greatly admired.62 
This work has been described as ‘undoubtedly the most knowledgeable and 
thoughtful contemporary commentary on the Irish Question’63 by a German writer. 
Venedey, believing that no wissenschaftliche history of Ireland had hitherto been 
written, set out to make a contribution of his own to the infant field of Irish national 
history writing – and the result was a text that could be added to the canon of 
nineteenth century Irish nationalist literature. In writing on the contemporary state of 
Ireland, Venedey compared the administration of the country directly with that of 
other countries, including the German territorial states, not to Ireland’s favour, 
though the blame lay with the manner in which England had misgoverned Ireland. 
He compared the justifications made for the English as to why they should rule 
Ireland with those made for the French as why they should possess the German 
Rhineland. He interpreted the medieval English expansion into Ireland as a drive to 
‘Germanize’ Ireland – but he saw this not as meaning the annihilation or subjugation 
of the Gaelic Irish but rather the establishment of ‘Recht’ and ‘Ordnung’ in Ireland, a 
task in which the English had manifestly failed. The English, however, for all their 
‘Germanic’ nature throughout their history had woefully failed to establish Recht and 
Ordnung in Ireland. Venedey even described the process by which the medieval 
Anglo-Normans became ‘ipsis Hibernis hiberniores’ – accepting one of the oldest 
stock-in-trade arguments of Irish nationalist writers – as ‘das Gottesgericht der 
Geschichte’. In coming to the period of the Reformation, Venedey commented, in 
what might be called a typically German conflation of religious allegiance and 
national identity: ‘It is more than a coincidence, that the Reformation did not 
                                                          
62
 O’Neill, Ireland and Germany, pp. 133-134.    
63
 Bourke, ‘Poor Green Erin’, p. 422.  
283
 overstep the boundaries of the Germanic peoples.’64 On the other hand, he sees in the 
Irish rejection of the Reformation and adherence to Catholicism a natural 
consequence of their misrule by England over centuries, and argued that ‘The Irish 
temperament contradicts the spirit of persecution…the Irish are devout but also 
highly intelligent.’ In his work, Venedey offered a conclusion that no Irish 
nationalist of the time would have disagreed with: ‘Ireland’s future, however, 
depends on the reconciliation of the Old Irish and New Irish, and if it does not 
succeed in one way or another then Ireland – the whole of Ireland, both north and 
south – will head once more towards an epoch of destruction and barbarism.’65 
Venedey aside, as the nineteenth century progressed, German historical writers 
became less interested in Ireland, and the ones who wrote about the country were 
generally less sympathetic to Irish claims of nationhood or were only engaged in 
Ireland to the degree that Irish matters held relevance for English or German 
affairs.
66
 Yet given the importance of German perspectives of ‘England’ for 
constructions of ‘Germanness’ writing about Ireland in the context of the historical 
evaluation of ‘England’ had a significance in thinking about how the German nation 
should order its affairs. In 1847, Heinrich von Sybel had written a lengthy essay on 
‘Edmund Burke und Irland’ (Burke was a centrally important figure in Sybel’s 
intellectual formation). Sybel offered another overview of Irish history up to the 
nineteenth century that would have been quite agreeable to Irish nationalists, even if 
his political conclusions as to Ireland’s contemporary state differed deeply from 
theirs. The medieval English colonists, Sybel wrote, had treated the native Irish as if 
they were wild animals and had denied them all rights, before they had in turn been 
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 brought low by the oppression of English monarchs. The extension of the 
Reformation to Ireland had brought the Gaelic Irish and the ‘Old English’ together, 
before they were both subjected to a new ‘hateful slavery.’ The rebellions of the 
seventeenth century were followed by ‘terrible subjugation’ and ‘horrible defeat’ 
(‘furchtbare Unterwerfung’ and entsetzliche Niederlage’) and finally a political 
settlement that was ‘without equal in hatefulness and hardness.’ Once again, 
England’s Irish subjects were treated with despotism and exploitation. The Protestant 
patriot movement of the eighteenth century he described as a ‘Volksbewegung’, and 
he gave a positive appraisal to the steps taken by ‘Grattan’s Parliament’ to alleviate 
the Penal Laws that oppressed the Catholic masses of Ireland.
67
 However, Sybel also 
believed that the Union had since its enactment been a positive development, and 
expressed little sympathy for present Irish nationalist political demands.  
We have noted earlier the importance of English history to Ranke’s scholarship, yet 
Ranke had also, as has been argued recently by Andreas Boldt, demonstrated an 
often sympathetic understanding of the special nature of Irish history in his History 
of England, treating Ireland as a nation in its own right rather than merely an 
extension of England: for example, he viewed the synthesis of Catholicism and 
national consciousness in Ireland as something essentially unique in Europe, and 
judged that ‘the great religious and political strife in which Europe was engaged [in 
the seventeenth century] found its fullest expression in Ireland.’68 He even gave a 
fair, or at the least a reasonable hearing to the Rebellion of 1641: ‘the national 
religious constitution which the Scots had attained by their example induced the Irish 
to attempt the same thing, but in the Catholic sense appropriate to their cause. No 
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 doubt the old Irish antipathy of the natives against the Saxons was stimulated 
thereby; how could it be otherwise?’69 The Irish commitment to the Jacobite cause, 
the recognition of James II, and the convening of the ‘patriot parliament’, was in 
essence a national one: ‘When the elements of which a state is composed tear 
themselves asunder, and each of them awakens to a consciousness of its own distinct 
existence, how utterly fruitless is the endeavour to establish and maintain peace with 
them!’ The war in Ireland, unlike in Protestant Scotland, assumed the characteristics 
of an early modern ‘clash of civilisations’: ‘the object aimed at in Ireland was the 
complete transformation of the mode of government which had previously existed’.70 
Boldt has gone so far as to claim that Ranke was responsible for ‘effectively creating 
modern Irish historiography’,71 though it may well be argued that he overstates his 
case, since not even Lecky, probably the most scholarly of nineteenth century Irish 
historians, had given much obeisance to Ranke.
72
 On the other hand, even if Ranke 
had little influence in historiography of Ireland, he was a sufficiently well-known 
figure to be awarded an honorary doctorate by Trinity College, in 1865, which was 
the first such honour he received from a non-German institution.
73
 In 1886 – the year 
in which Gladstone tabled the First Home Rule Bill – in England und Irland: Eine 
zeitgemässe Betrachtung, the völkisch writer Hermann von Pfister, a nationalist 
writer who was incidentally one of the first German scholars to assert that the term 
‘völkisch’ was synonymous for ‘national’,74 argued that the German people had in 
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 many regards good grounds to follow closely the development of affairs in ‘that 
unfortunate island’. For not only had Ireland ‘played a role in our earliest history, but 
Ireland called also for the sympathy of continental Europe, the country forming an 
important part in the ‘general state of society’. Writing of the devastation inflicted on 
Ireland in the seventeenth century in the context of the wars of the period he added; 
‘What one Christian Volk did in inflicting such unspeakable suffering on another 
defies all description.’ By the end of the century ‘Ireland, bleeding out of a thousand 
wounds’, lay completely under the power of England. The mass of the Irish people 
were reduced in their own country to the status of ‘tenants and labourers completely 
without rights’ and for a hundred years ‘this yoke in its unbearable form’ 
beleaguered Ireland.
75
 The Irish, for their part held out of their own conviction 
strongly to the faith of their ancestors with ‘genuine moral courage.’ 76  Pfister 
regarded England as an inalienable ally of Germany and English strength as the 
ultimate guardian of Germany against its continental enemies, but was sure that 
England’s future strength could only be secured by reconciliation with Ireland.77  
Naturally, the period of 1914 to 1918 and the 1920’s produced a renewed interest in 
Ireland, Irish nationalism, and the possibility of Irish-German co-operation, with the 
publication of much historical-political literature of a polemical kind. More 
sympathetic nineteenth-century German historians such as Ranke and Venedey had 
defended the ‘Irish nation’ from the label of barbarity or the charge that the Irish did 
not truly constitute a nation of their own. Even those historians who viewed Ireland 
as constituting in the present an integral part of the United Kingdom credited the 
country for its role in the civilising of Central Europe in the early Middle Ages, 
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 during the reign of Charlemagne, for example. In 1916, the Austrian linguist and 
scholar of Celtic languages, Julius Pokorny (1887-1970), a long-time and staunch 
supporter of Irish nationalism, who believed that Germans and Celts were akin to 
each other as fellow ‘Aryans’, published Irland in 1916, a strongly nationalist Irish 
history, first translated into English for Irish readers in 1933, and which had been 
widely praised in the German press. This book, as Pokorny’s biographer states, aside 
from being totally one-sided, was one of the few books on Irish history by German 
writers that had not been written ‘through an Anglo-centric filter.’78 He, along with 
such figures as Kuno Meyer and Thurneysen wished to reverse prevailing 
Hibernophobic stereotypes of the Irish, emphasizing the civilising influence of Irish 
culture on early medieval Europe and the culpability of the English in destroying this 
great culture.
79
 During the 1920’s and 1930’s, particularly but not exclusively 
amongst more hard-line strains of German nationalist thinking, interest in Ireland 
persisted, and in certain hands German völkisch thought was even applied to the 
course of Irish history:
80
 ‘Identification with a small, oppressed people that was 
fighting against a great empire was, in the eyes of conservatives, easily transferred to 
the situation of defeated Germany.’81 The interest of German academics in Ireland 
and in Gaelic culture was valued by early Irish governments as well as, with the 
publication of Thurneysen’s Irische Helden- und Königssagen bis zum 17. 
Jahrhundert financed in 1921 by Dáil Eireann. The Irish government was also 
involved in the financing of Pokorny’s Die älteste Lyrik der grünen Insel in 1923.  
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 In Ireland in the nineteenth century, both The Nation and the Dublin University 
Magazine had been at the forefront of the translation and popularization of German 
literature for Irish audiences. The founders of both publications were attracted by the 
special prominence that literature appeared to hold in German national life. The 
Young Irelander James Clarence Mangan became widely known for his efforts in the 
translation and popularization of German literature, and Davis had distinguished his 
1840 speech to the Historical Society of Trinity College, Dublin with references to 
Herder and Lessing. In the second issue of the Young Ireland journal The Nation a 
writer remarked that ‘some of the greatest works that have ever seen the light have, 
within the last few years, been published in Germany and France.’82 The German 
example of a national literature developed out of the shadow of a foreign oppressor 
(France) was also present. In the twentieth century, as Irish nationalism advanced 
towards demands for full cultural and political separation from Britain, influential 
figures such as Arthur Griffith and George ‘AE’ Russell were important Irish 
nationalist admirers of Germany. Irish nationalist papers, particular more Catholic-
accented ones, during the First World War extolled ‘German earthy patriotism and 
high-spirited idealism’ in contrast to English decadence. The Catholic (nationalist) 
cleric Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan (1852-1913), who became a highly popular 
writer and indeed a literary ‘celebrity’, was an ardent admirer of German ‘Kultur’.83 
The noted Irish nationalist Roger Casement praised ‘the honesty and integrity of the 
German mind, the strength of the German intellect, the skill of the German hand and 
brain, the justice and vigour of German law, the intensity of German culture, science, 
education and social development’, and concluded from all this that: the world of 
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 European life needs today, as it needed in the days of a decadent Roman world 
empire, the coming of another Goth, the coming of the Teuton.’84  
IV 
In viewing the transnational operations of the multi-directional ‘English’ influence in 
these countries we may get a better idea of just how much we can speak of a 
‘common European path’ for the intellectual development of ‘national thought’ in 
modern Europe. The interpretation of Irish historiography as being practically 
wholly isolated from wider European trends in the nineteenth century, and the 
conclusion that German historians were either ignorant of Ireland or did not care to 
write about Irish affairs, certainly do not tell the whole story of the transnational 
links between these two countries during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
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 CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
As Paul Lawrence notes in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, ‘a 
satisfactory answer to the question: “how does history writing inform nationalism?” 
has yet to be supplied.’1 This thesis has sought to contribute towards answering that 
question, focusing upon how the drive to understand ‘the nation’ influenced the 
writing of history, and how historical thought and writing in turn shaped 
understandings of ‘the nation’. The historical ‘master narrative’ of the nation 
continues to excite and influence historiographical argument in each of these 
countries, where nationalism has had a difficult history and where it continues to 
shape society. In 1975, a leading German historian, Thomas Nipperdey, condemned 
another leading German historian, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, as ‘Treitschke redivivus’, in 
a review of the latter’s work on the Kaiserreich. In 1989, in Ireland’s leading 
historical journal Irish Historical Studies, the historian Brendan Bradshaw levelled a 
strong criticism against the ‘excessive’ revisionism of Irish historiography, which he 
believed purposely glossed over the ‘tragic’ dimension of that history. He called for 
a return to an ‘emancipatory’ understanding of the nation’s past, in order, he 
admitted, ‘to recover the vision of its two great luminaries, Eoin McNeill and 
Edmund Curtis’.2 Not surprisingly, Bradshaw’s appeal attracted much criticism. The 
point is that up to the present, fundamentally differing and perhaps even 
incompatible ideas of what it is to write the nation’s past continue to affect German 
and Irish historiography. This thesis has argued that the representation of Irish and 
German ‘national’ histories was in many respects quite similar. Historians in both 
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 contexts proceeded from a sense of their nation as possessing a fractured past, a 
‘belated’ or ‘arrested’ development, a past of historical weakness vis-à-vis its 
powerful neighbours, the absence of a nation-state since the Middle Ages or even 
earlier, and manifesting serious religious and regional heterogeneities. The thesis has 
aimed to show that the enterprise of nationalist history writing in these two 
countries, as different as they and their historical experiences were, was nonetheless 
driven by parallel concerns and took parallel forms of discourse and narrative. In 
particular, the project of producing a more or less hegemonic national historical 
narrative in Germany and Ireland was fraught with difficulty in four fundamentally 
important areas: establishing a narrative of origins that could historically mandate 
nation-statehood, overcoming the legacy of the confessional divide, integrating 
historicist ‘race thinking’ and historical narratives of the nation, and historically 
mandating the territorial outline of the nation. The differences in the historical 
experiences of Germany and Ireland are apparent, the one as almost the inverted 
‘mirror image’ of the other – the one a geographically peripheral actor, the other the 
‘crossroads’ nation of Europe, the two fifty years apart in the achievement of nation-
statehood – notwithstanding, historical writers in both countries were, in how they 
viewed the significance of history writing for shared a basic common idea. It is of 
course correct to say that differing trajectories of historiographical development are 
important, yet it can also be said that the Irish case fitted into a broader European 
pattern of mostly amateur and popularizing historiography, and examples such as 
Lecky, MacNeill and Green attest to the gradual development occurring in Irish 
history writing before the consolidation of the profession. The claims made within 
the German tradition to scholarly supremacy, as should be clear by now, were 
sometimes not much more than that. As much as a ‘bilateral’ comparison can, this 
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 one broadly lends supports to the proposition put forward by historians in recent 
years, stated in the introduction, on the idea of a distinctively European form of 
nationalist history writing.   
It is immediately striking that all of the historians dealt with here, were, to some 
extent, political actors in their respective countries: all of them were somehow 
involved, to some extent, in important political arguments and controversies of their 
own times. In this way, in addition to their work as historians, they all had a place in 
the debates and events that framed and influenced nationalist politics in Ireland and 
Germany, however moderate or passionate their own nationalist allegiances may 
have been. In this sense, many, indeed most of the historians dealt with here were, in 
a very real sense, nation-builders in their respective countries, intimately connected 
with the politics of nationalism in Ireland and Germany. In Germany as well as 
Ireland, history writing was essentially and inescapably political; as Donal 
McCartney put it with respect to Ireland: ‘had the historical notions been other than 
they were, the history of Ireland in the nineteenth century must have been other than 
it was – so inseparable are historical myths and political reality.’3 In fact, in the Irish 
context in particular, probably more so than in Germany where alternative poles of 
national identification were more present and more tenable, identification with a 
particular narrative of the Irish past came to be the determining factor in 
identification with the Irish nation, perhaps more so than any other.  
The writers of nationalist historical narratives in the contexts of Ireland and Germany 
were faced with the difficult task of reconciling the evidently repeated revolutionary 
upheavals their nations had experienced in their histories with the continuity-
constructing dimension of their form of history writing. With one noteworthy 
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 exception (John Mitchel), none of these individuals were amenable to revolution as a 
means of effecting political change in the present (many of them had become 
alienated from youthful radicalism in their later years, when they wrote their ‘great 
works’ of history). It was important to them to show that the foundational events in 
their respective nations’ histories, even if they could be considered as ruptures and 
upheavals, were firmly situated within a narrative that extended back to the nation’s 
earliest origins. One means of ensuring this, often employed by the historians 
considered here was ‘Othering’ along ‘racial’ lines, assuming the deep historical 
existence of changeable but still fundamentally constant ‘national characters’. Most 
of the historians considered here had a broadly optimistic view of the inevitability of 
the political nation, though there were exceptions. For Lecky, the hope of a 
progressive Irish historical development seemed to have practically died out at the 
end of the eighteenth century as an ultimately failed constitutional ‘revolution’ gave 
way to a violent and destructive attempted one. The Catholic German historians who 
rejected the historical assumptions of the ‘kleindeutsche’ narrative and continued to 
adhere to a positive interpretation of Germany’s ‘imperial’ past were in a sense on 
the ‘losing’ side. Germany was conceived more of as a benevolent and peaceful 
‘Kulturträger’ 4  motivated only by intentions to ‘reclaim’ territories that had 
‘originally’ been German. The distinctive imperial polity that had ruled over German 
during the medieval period was, as we have seen, regarded by numerous German 
historians as having been responsible for the ‘arrested development’ of German 
‘national’ history. Of course this is not to deny the violent sentiments of figures such 
as Treitschke in particular, who saw German empire in ‘the East’ as both just and 
historically necessary, and which were remembered and put to use by völkisch and 
                                                          
4
 Wolfgang Wippermann, Die deutschen und der Osten: Feindbild und Traumland (Primus, 
Darmstadt, 2007), p. 123. Faulenbach, Die Ideologie des deutschen Weges, p. 81.  
294
 pan-Germanist groups to ultimately horrific effect. Nonetheless the German self-
image communicated by these German writers was of a fundamentally freedom-
loving nation, indeed one with a ‘special’ understanding of the true nature of 
freedom (such notions were particularly widespread and attractive, as noted, during 
the First World War). This did much to account for the aggressively defensive accent 
of popular German nationalism particularly during the inter-war period. The Irish 
writers considered here, almost needless to say, almost all considered imperialism as 
– again, with justification – fundamentally unjust and a curse on Irish historical 
development. Imperialism was something that had been done to and not by the Irish. 
Even if this was a point that could be sustained, the Irish habit of historical thought 
demanded the dismissal of all claims made by and on behalf of the Protestant north-
east corner of the nation to separateness, and justified this in such a way as to lend 
support to violent nationalism. In both contexts, the significance attributed to 
religion and the problem of inter-confessional division in the nation’s history 
increased possibilities of internal exclusion while also sharpening the moralistic 
claims of nationalism in either country. All of the principal actors considered here 
were politically conservative (meant primarily in the ‘socio-economic’ sense), and 
held a certain religious outlook to be central to their historiographical endeavours 
and to history writing in general, even if they denied or opposed confessional 
sectarianism on their part. In both contexts, the ‘professionalization’ of national 
history writing was closely linked with medieval historiography in particular, as the 
search for reliable, historically authentic primary sources upon which a national 
history could be built was directed towards the earliest period in which such sources 
could be found, the Middle Ages. In both contexts, again, as we have seen the 
relationship between ‘scientific’ and ‘amateur’ forms of national historiography was 
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 a complex and often porous one. On the other hand, ‘un-scientific’ historiography 
maintained dominance in Ireland for far longer than in Germany; or, 
‘professionalization’ came much later, and this naturally influenced the way Irish 
history was written: generally speaking, with far less attention to developed ideas 
about the correct practice of historical research, and lacking much in the way of an 
institutionalized academic context. Irish historians could rarely rival their German 
counterparts in the production of huge, truly comprehensive, multi-volume histories. 
Yet the German ‘way’ of historiography, a point of pride for Germans in general, 
which in reality had always developed within the context of political developments 
and was, especially from the mid-nineteenth century, very closely linked to political 
partisanship, itself became a kind of dogma, jealously guarding ownership over the 
German national story from ‘outsider’ narratives. 5 Even the most ‘scientific’ of 
historians, regardless of their milieu, could and did feel a ‘wholehearted 
identification with their subject matter’, 6  which historians of today would find 
problematic, to say the least. Indeed, Ranke’s ‘most distinguished’ pupil, Heinrich 
von Sybel, turned away from his master’s ‘bloodless’ form of historiography and had 
demanded that historians stand their ground on such ‘earth-shattering questions’ as 
nations and nationality. It is also interesting that some of the most successful 
historians came to have an influence among groups that they themselves rejected 
strongly. For example, W.E.H. Lecky, by the time of writing his Irish historiography 
an opponent of political Irish nationalism, came to be cited in the arguments of such 
luminaries of Irish separatist nationalism as Erskine Childers and Arthur Griffith, 
while Treitschke became a hero figure of sorts for just those racist, pan-Germanist, 
völkisch nationalists he had regarded as a potential threat to the stability of the 
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 Kaiserreich. Alexander Martin Sullivan, who held no pretentions to being a mere 
scholar, was hardly more open about the political purpose of his history than 
Treitschke the university historian was. The German historical novelist Felix Dahn 
believed himself to be dealing not only with historical events and personages, but 
with an early medieval forerunner of the modern German nation of his time and 
place. Standish O’Grady sought to ‘imaginatively’ reconstruct the ancient Irish 
world, but even he could never reject the drive towards and demands for 
authenticity, as shown by the differences between History of Ireland: The Heroic 
Period and History of Ireland: Critical and Philosophical. Gustav Freytag wrote 
self-consciously as a ‘proper’ historian, but he chose to do so by inserting, 
throughout his Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit, narrativised ‘character 
sketches’ carefully plucked and adapted from German history. The point is that the 
meaning of a text is often mediated, determined by its readers, and the most 
important books are often those which are most (intentionally or not) misunderstood. 
Once again, it is notable that the most influential of these historians became so not 
because of any innovative ambitions which they may have held, but because of their 
‘masterful and appealing style’,7 an ability to appeal to an already present group of 
readers while at the same time ‘guiding’ those readers towards certain judgements of 
national history. Importantly, whatever the nuances of their arguments, none of these 
historians questioned the idea that nations, because they existed, were entitled to 
self-determination, to political sovereignty, to actualize themselves politically. This 
meant that their historical arguments, even if they were sceptical towards nationalism 
or certain variants for specific reasons, could still be pressed into the service of 
nationalist argumentation. Even Lecky, for example, did not reject the principle of 
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 nationalism as such – such an exemplary liberal hardly could – which in practice 
meant the idea that a nation had a right to determine its own affairs. Of course, 
sometimes when national historians wrote the histories of nations to which they felt 
antagonistic, they were compelled to deny certain of their political claims, but this 
was because they conflicted with the claims of their own nation rather than because 
they were opposed to the principles of nationalism. What all these historians would 
have agreed upon was that the nation was a moral principle and a moral community: 
its characteristics under certain situations may have left much to be desired, but the 
principle of the nation was an ethical and moral one.  
The first chapter established the importance of origins narratives in the German and 
Irish contexts, specifically the foundational epochs of the early medieval period and 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and their significance for how the nation 
came to be historically defined. The second chapter drew attention to the centrality 
of antagonistic confessional interpretations of the nation’s history in each context 
and how the national historical narrative became closely identified with the 
Protestant interpretation in the German context and the Catholic interpretation in the 
Irish context. The third chapter drew attention to the relationship between ‘race’ and 
nation in nationalist history writing in both countries and established that while 
‘race’ seemed to serve as a ready-made criterion for national difference, it did not 
necessarily easily merge with nationalism in either context. Yet the ‘racialized’ 
discourse of national enmity worked to at least obscure the inconsistencies and 
problems of synthesising ‘race’ into the national historical narrative in its facility for 
‘Othering’. The final thematic chapter dealt with the historical nationalization of 
territory, or the territorialisation of the nation’s history, and the linked issue of 
regionalist challenges to the delineation of a nationalist historical narrative and 
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 identity in Germany and Ireland. The survey chapter on ‘connections’ aimed to draw 
out the ‘transnationality’ of nationalism in which the efforts of nationalist historians 
of both Germany and Ireland were enmeshed. The depth of Irish historians’ 
engagement with ‘the nation’ as historical and contemporary presence places Irish 
history during this period firmly within the mainstream of European history. Indeed, 
much of what made Irish history distinctive, certainly in the minds of the Irish 
historians dealt with here, seemed to make that history appear far more similar in 
character to the history of central and eastern European nations than to the histories 
of Ireland’s near neighbours. Ireland, on the other hand, provided a ‘case study’, 
unique in ‘Western Europe’, for the effects on ‘national’ progress and development 
of the  same historical ‘facts’ which had defined so much of central European 
history. If nothing else this study makes clear that at least one supposed ‘peculiarity’ 
of Irish historiography, the enduring and central importance of the religious and 
political affiliations of those who wrote it, affiliations that were entwined with each 
other, was in fact nothing of the sort.
8
 Nothing, indeed, ‘is more international than 
the construction of national identities.’9  
On the significance of national historiography to nationalism, this comparative study 
has confirmed nothing so much as the reality that since ‘the nation’ first became 
understood as a primary political principle, nations have been both ‘constructed’ and 
more importantly, ‘zones of conflict’. This study has demonstrated that, contrary to 
the most basic principle of nationalism, attempts to construct a single, dominant 
historical narrative of the nation which could provide an accepted ‘definition’ of the 
nation were practically beyond realisation. The act of creating a nationalist historical 
narrative presupposed the emphasis and elision of certain events and occurrences in 
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 the nation’s history, and above all interpretations of events and occurrences, which 
identified with a certain idea of what it meant to be Irish or German and therefore 
excluded, to one degree or another, either implicitly or explicitly, certain groups. Too 
many Germans, too many Irishmen, were unable to accept Renan’s dictum that 
sometimes it was necessary to forget as well as to remember. This inevitably brought 
forth counter-conceptions of the nation’s history and its ‘definition’, which in turn 
made the ‘dominant’ conception of each more adamantine in its certainty, even to the 
point of myopia. It is a further irony that the ‘fault lines’ of national history, in both 
contexts, often lay upon those cultural resources regarded as most integral to national 
identity, in particular religious or confessional identity, and ethnicity or at any rate a 
sense of common ancestry. In both countries, religious identity could not but be 
integral to constructions of national history, but this clashed with the reality of the 
deep confessional divisions that underlay modern German or Irish society. In the 
Irish context, attempts to construct a single historical Irishness clashed with the 
particular multi-ethnic origins of Irish society as it was. Though this was not so 
much an issue in the German context, the preoccupation with historically defining a 
single ‘pure’ ‘Germanness’, rooted in racial thinking of the later nineteenth century, 
promised to bedevil ‘the Germans’’ relations with other peoples in Europe, as it most 
certainly did. That the comparative method has been conspicuously underused in 
Irish history and historiography scarcely needs assertion and elaboration; the value 
of this particular comparison is lies in making clear just how much the context and 
processes of the development of ‘national thought’ in Ireland paralleled the same in 
continental European societies, in this case, what became the German Empire in 
1871, and a German republic in 1918. As well as also throwing light on a historical 
phenomenon that played a central role in German history – nationalism or ‘national 
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 thought’ – this comparison may hopefully enrich further study of the relation of 
German delineations of national self-understanding to those of societies in western 
Europe outside of the classic comparators of France and Britain (often, in actual 
practice, England). This comparison has shown that there is a strong argument to be 
made for the presence of a ‘general template’ of national historiography in this era, 
characteristically, as we have seen in this comparison, manifested in a narrative 
structured around three major phases: the ancient and early medieval ‘golden age’ of 
national unity, freedom, and cultural flourishing, the later medieval period associated 
with decline and a loss of liberty and unity, and a subsequent period (or periods) 
typified by the struggle for the restoration of liberty and unity, often the early 
modern era.
10
 With respect to the relationship between nationalism and the state, it 
appears that for even those historians who defined statehood as essential to the full 
realization of nationhood, the actual achievement of nation-statehood did not 
necessarily create the nation anew. For völkisch historians in Germany – and if one 
thinks of ‘völkisch’ more as a discourse than a closed ideology, we must include 
‘mainstream’ historians such as Treitschke and Freytag for whom, at least, völkisch 
rhetoric was of some importance – and ‘Irish-Ireland’ historians, in particular, that 
statehood meant nothing unless it was established on the ‘true’ historic nation, 
whether it was the German Volk or Gaelic Ireland. Further, maybe more importantly, 
achievement of ‘national’ statehood, whether in 1871 or 1922, did not fundamentally 
change the content and emphases of historical narratives that had formed and 
developed earlier, rather statehood was (necessarily) ‘historicized’ as best as it could 
be to augment the ‘nationalization’ of the new nation-state.   
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 What does this thesis and its conclusions have to offer to the continuing debates on 
the ‘nature’ and origins of nationalism, the modernity or deeper ‘ancestry’ of 
nationalism, and the significance of the ‘ethnic’ dimension of nationalism? The 
significance attributed to historians in nationalism would seem, certainly at first 
sight, to lend support to interpretations stressing the ‘objective’ importance of 
‘myths and memories of the nation’, or ‘memories, values, myths, symbols, and 
traditions’,11 and ethnic heritages to nationalism. Yet the internal heterogeneity of 
individual national historiographies certainly seems to demonstrate that the history 
of nationalism is as Hutchinson has written, a history of conflicts over competing 
narratives that seek to define ‘national’ communities, that nations are ‘zones of 
conflict’.12 This brings us to another point: we must not forget or downplay the ways 
in which nationalist historians have themselves been willing to deliberately ‘re-
define’ certain ‘myths and memories’, highlight some and obscure or attack others, 
and to downplay or dismiss as well as emphasize the importance of ethnic heritages. 
Nationalism is something distinctively modern, which requires a society that can be 
mobilized on a mass basis, and the appeal to the nation’s past in the service of 
political aims is likewise part of the “modern” discourse of nationalism’. It is 
precisely the modern discourse of nationalism that redefines this or that ‘national’ 
symbol as such, so that what matters is not its existence but the meaning given to it 
in the age of nationalism. So the significance of history writing to nationalism can 
just as well, if not better, be explained with reference to those interpretations which 
emphasise the ‘inventive’ characteristics of the development of nationalism. Even 
when writing within a particular cultural heritage long predating them, modern 
national historians have defined ‘the nation’ in ways that would have seemed 
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 incomprehensible to members of the pre-modern ‘ethnic cores’ that formed ‘their’ 
nation in the modern era. This is at least implicitly accepted by Hutchinson in his 
arguments that ‘nations are modern political entities, created by nationalists who 
employ historical revivals in order to overthrow ethnic traditionalists.’ National 
historiography might be called ‘Janus-faced’, (selectively) approaching aspects of 
the nation’s ‘ethnic heritage’ to provide it with a new form of legitimation, whilst at 
the same time constantly putting that past to the service of the fundamentally modern 
goal of national self-determination, and the recognition of that right. Ten years prior 
to the writing of this thesis, Konrad Jarausch and Martin Geyer published an 
important work on the ‘shattered pasts’ of German history, focusing in particular on 
the dimension of the history of German nationalism. This thesis has shown that in 
countries such as Germany and Ireland, where there were many ‘shattered pasts’, 
history writing was indispensable for nationalism, yet could never ultimately solve 
the problems with which it was confronted, and indeed sometimes aggravated old 
and created new ones. ‘Nationalist genealogies [of the nation] are’, as Özkirimli 
argues, highly complex constructs which, despite their claim to offer linearity and 
continuity, are marred by ambiguity, discontinuity, and disruption...the choices of 
the nationalist discourse are actually the sedimented and contingent outcomes’ of 
continuous argument over the definition of ‘the nation’.13 
This thesis was written at a time when both Germany and Ireland, very different 
countries located in the centre and on the periphery of Europe respectively, entered 
into a period in which events occurring early in the last century will be widely 
remembered, commemorated, and held up to further study, all of which will be 
significant for future understandings of the modern German and Irish past in these 
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 countries. This thesis has attempted to hold up a light not only to the ways in which 
historians have understood their tasks and the histories of their nations; but the 
irreducible importance, for better or worse, of how the histories of nations are 
written, and what this means for nations in their modern present. Nationalism is 
meaningless, quite simply unthinkable, without a specific form of historical 
investigation, representation and narrative that displays certain fundamental general 
features in different ‘national’ contexts. If history is sometimes a nightmare from 
which nations struggle to awake, to paraphrase Stephen Dedalus, we must 
understand as best as we can the deep and enduring significance of the relationship 
between ‘history’ and ‘the nation’.  
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 Appendix – ‘Dramatis Personae’ 
Dahn, Felix Ludwig Julius 
Felix Ludwig Julius Dahn was born in February 1834 in Hamburg in a family of 
mixed Franco-German descent, and died in 1912. He studied law and philosophy at 
Munich and Berlin, held positions at Munich, Wuerzberg, and Königsberg, and later 
in life was a leading member of the Alldeutscher Verband, the Pan-German League. 
His more important academic works included the multi-volume Prehistory of the 
Germanic and Roman Peoples (1883) and The Germanic Kings (1861-1911). 
However, he was most well-known for his extremely popular historical novel Ein 
Kampf um Rom (1876, later published in English in three volumes as A Struggle for 
Rome). Dahn’s status as a respected historian makes Ein Kampf um Rom – a 
fictionalized account of historical events which incorporated numerous historical 
facts – an important source for considering the importance of historiography for the 
development of German nationalism during the late nineteenth century. In his final 
years he took a prominent role in the campaign for the building of the 
Völkerschlachtdenkmals in Leipzig to commemorate the centenary of the ‘Battle of 
the Nations’ in 1813. 
D’Arcy McGee, Thomas 
Thomas D’Arcy McGee was born in April, 1825 to a Catholic family. In 1842, aged 
seventeen, he sailed to the United States via Quebec, where he worked for the Boston 
Pilot, an influential Irish-American newspaper. A few years later he returned to 
Ireland where he became politically active and edited the Young Ireland newspaper 
The Nation. He participated in the ill-fated Young Ireland ‘Rebellion’ of 1848 and 
escaped arrest on potential treason charges by fleeing back to the United States. Here 
he resumed his journalistic career. However, he became disillusioned with American 
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 life and politics and moved to Canada in 1857. McGee worked energetically 
throughout the remainder of his life for the development of a unified and 
autonomous Canadian nation, within the British Empire, becoming one of the 
‘Fathers of the Canadian Confederation’. McGee, though he would come to reject 
revolutionary republicanism, certainly never discarded his own Irish nationalism, 
and his devotion to Catholicism, his equation of Irishness with Catholicity, also 
became more pronounced in his later years. McGee’s characteristically strident 
denouncements of revolutionary Irish republicanism in later life led to his death by 
assassination in Ottawa in April 1868, at the age of forty-two. His principal 
publications were History of the Attempts to Establish the Protestant Reformation in 
Ireland, The Catholic History of North America, and the two-volume Popular 
History of Ireland: From the Earliest Times to the Emancipation of the Catholics. 
This work was published to great critical acclaim on both sides of the Atlantic in 
1863, earning McGee unanimous election to the Royal Irish Academy in 1864. The 
work deeply influenced subsequent Irish historical writing, most notable Sullivan’s 
Story of Ireland, and both through this and in its own right achieved a significant 
popular influence in Ireland.  
See David A. Wilson, Thomas D’Arcy McGee, Volume One: Passion, Reason and 
Politics, 1825-1857 (London, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), and idem, 
Thomas D’Arcy McGee, Volume Two: The Extreme Moderate 1857-1868 (London, 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011) 
 
Davis, Thomas Osborne 
Thomas Osborne Davis was born in October 1814. He studied Law at Trinity 
College, receiving his degree in 1836, and being called to the Irish Bar in 1838. 
Between 1841 and early 1842 he published historical and contemporary essays in the 
Citizen (later the Dublin Monthly Magazine). It is likely that Davis would have been 
aware of wider European, including German, influences from English translations of 
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 German books and pieces on Germany that appeared in such publications as the 
Dublin University Magazine. Davis was involved with the Repeal campaign of 
Daniel O’Connell, though he would become disillusioned with the latter’s politics. 
He was a co-founder of The Nation in 1844. Davis died at the age of thirty, in 1845. 
Davis’s principal works, in addition to various historical essays and ballads 
published in The Nation and the songs A Nation Once Again and The Lament for 
Owen Roe O’Neill, included The Patriot Parliament of 1689 (1843), Letters of a 
Protestant on Repeal (five letters originally published in The Nation between 1842 
and 1843, edited by his contemporary Thomas F. Meagher and re-published in 
1847), Literary and Historical Essays (edited by C.G. Duffy and published in 1846). 
An edited collection of his poems appeared in 1846, and two of his prose writings 
edited by T.W. Rolleston in 1890 and 1914. Arthur Griffith produced another edition 
of Davis’s work in 1914, and a centenary edition appeared in 1945. Davis produced a 
small number of scattered notes which indicate an intention to embark upon a 
biography of Wolfe Tone, an intention never realised. Davis’s understanding of the 
nature of history may be gleaned from introductory comments to one of his 
Addresses: ‘If you would influence the future, you must know the past…philosophy 
may be the compass, but history is the chart of the politician. Feeling and ambition 
urge us to study our native history’.  
See Helen F. Mulvey, Thomas Davis and Ireland: A Biographical Study 
(Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 2003) 
 
Freytag, Gustav 
 
Gustav Freytag was born in July 1816 in Kreuzberg, Prussian Silesia. He studied 
philology at Breslau and Berlin, and already as a young man was ‘repelled’ by 
Ranke’s scientific and objective approach to history. This determination to write a 
different kind of history would determine the course of his career as a historian. 
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 Freytag never achieved much academic distinction, but nevertheless became one of 
nineteenth-century Germany’s most famed historians and writers. In respect of his 
literary achievements, his 1855 novel Soll und Haben brought him great success. 
From 1867 to 1870 Freytag was a deputy in the National Liberal Party in the 
Prussian Reichstag, but later became disillusioned with the policies of Bismarck. 
Freytag’s five volume Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit (1859-1867) was one 
of the most popular historical works of the nineteenth-century Germany. Though a 
self-consciously popular and cultural-historical work composed largely of a number 
of ‘vignettes’ of ‘ordinary Germans’ in the nation’s early modern and late modern 
history, it was  highly-regarded by contemporary German historians in the 
universities, particularly by Freytag’s friend and correspondent Heinrich von 
Treitschke, because of its nationalistic, pro-Prussian and Protestant accent. Freytag 
and Treitschke shared, along with Heinrich von Sybel, a deep distrust of and 
opposition to Ranke’s species of ‘bloodless’ history. It is fitting, then, that in the 
closing passage of the entire Bilder, Freytag claimed the historian’s right to make 
sense of the past in terms of the necessities and challenges of the present. In 1872, he 
began Die Ahnen, a series of historical novels which ran to six volumes. The Bilder 
was soon translated and published in English as Pictures of the German Past. 
Freytag remained active in Prussian and German political life in the years after the 
unification. He died in 1895.  
See Larry L. Ping, Gustav Freytag and the Prussian Gospel: Novels, Liberalism, and 
History (Oxford, Peter Lang, 2006) 
 
Green, Alice Stopford 
 
Alice Stopford Green was one of the foremost historians and nationalists of early 
twentieth-century Ireland. She was born in May, 1847, in Kells, County Meath. 
From 1874 to 1877 she lived in London, and married the notable English historian 
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 J.R. Green. The marriage was short-lived, J.R. died in 1883, but during this time she 
aided him in the writing of his Short History of the English People and would 
oversee re-publication of the work after his death. Green did not become an Irish 
historical writer and nationalist until the 1890’s, and her intellectual influences as 
Irish historian would centre on Eoin MacNeill and W.E.H. Lecky. The two 
historians, the university scholar MacNeill and the proficient amateur Green became 
something of an unofficial partnership. Green saw her task as having as much to do 
with presenting MacNeill’s scholarly researches in a readable form to a broad public 
as with presenting her own study and judgement, and Green’s manuscripts were 
closely read by MacNeill. She was also vocal in her opposition to British policy in 
South Africa during the Boer Wars and the Congo Reform movement. Her first 
major work on Irish history, The Making of Ireland and its Undoing, was published 
in 1908, a social and cultural history of medieval Ireland.. Her most popular work 
was Irish Nationality (1911), a short volume dedicated to ‘The Memory of the Irish 
Dead’, in which she surveyed Irish history from ancient times to the nineteenth 
century, through a nationalist lens. Green, being of Protestant background, besides 
other Irish nationalist activities, took seriously efforts to make Home Rule more 
palatable to Ulster Unionists. She supported the Irish nationalist movement during 
the War of Independence but was not a ‘doctrinaire’ republican, and became one of 
the first Senators of the Irish Free State. Her other major works on Irish history in 
addition to the above-mentioned works were The Old Irish World (1912), and 
History of the Irish State to 1014 (1925), and in the last years of her life she worked 
on history textbooks for the new Irish Free State.  
See Lawrence L. McBride, ‘Alice Stopford Green’, in Encyclopedia of Historians 
and Historical Writing, Volume I, ed. K. Boyd (London, Fitzroy-Dearborn, 1999) 
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 Haller, Johannes 
 
Johannes Haller was born was born in October 1865 in Russian Estonia to an ethnic 
German family. The German community in Estonia existed at this time under the 
pressure of St. Petersburg’s ‘Russification’ policies, towards which Haller would 
later recall experiencing a ‘physical resistance’. His writings as a historian were 
constantly concerned with the conflicts of different nations; he would believe that the 
essence of history was at root nothing other than the struggle of nations for 
existence. Another important legacy of his Baltic background had been his 
perception of the Germans as an ‘aristocratic’, or ‘ruling’ people, and attendant 
scepticism of democracy and parliamentary government, which were ‘western 
ideas’. He had studied history at the University of Tartu in Estonia and later 
continued his studies in Berlin and Heidelberg. Between 1892 and 1897 he worked 
for the Prussian Historical Institute in Rome, at Marburg, and then at the University 
of Giessen, 1904-1913. Haller dealt mainly with the medieval history of Germany 
and France, as well as the history of the Papacy. A great admirer of Bismarck, during 
the First World War he had called for far-reaching annexations of Russian territory. 
His single-volume Epochen der deutschen Geschichte, first published in 1923 at the 
height of Germany’s post-Versailles abasement proved to be his most popular, 
widely-read work, and it is unmistakably nationalist and opposed to the settlement 
which founded the Weimar Republic. Though later editions of Epochen der 
deutschen Geschichte would be marked by Haller’s eventual movement towards 
National Socialism, and though he had been one of the few German historians to 
immediately and enthusiastically greet the Nazi ‘Machtergreifung’ in 1933; Haller 
had in fact long been sceptical of the more racially-deterministic völkisch 
assessments of German history. His Tausend Jahre deutsch-französischer 
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 Beziehungen, first published in 1932, was another popular work which achieved a 
wide circulation. With Germany’s defeat in 1945 his faith in Nazism and the 
certainties of German nationalism in general had collapsed.  
See Peter Lambert, ‘Johannes Haller’, Encyclopaedia of Historians and Historical 
Writing, volume I, ed. K. Boyd (London, Fitzroy-Dearborn, 1999)    
Janssen, Johannes 
Johannes Janssen was born in Westphalia, in April 1829, to a staunchly Catholic 
family in a mostly Protestant region. He was educated at the universities of Münster, 
Bonn, and Berlin, as well as the Catholic University of Leuven, afterwards gaining a 
position at Frankfurt-am-Main. He was ordained as a Catholic priest in 1860, became 
a Prussian parliamentary deputy in 1875, and in 1880 received the appointment of 
domestic prelate to Pope Leo XIII. As a result of the Kulturkampf in particular, he 
became a determined critic of Bismarck and the Prussian government, and a stout 
supporter of the ultramontane party in the Church, besides his membership in the 
Catholic Zentrum Party. He died in Frankfurt in December 1891. He was most well-
known for his Geschichte des deutschen Volkes seitdem Ausgang des Mittelalters 
(eight volumes, 1878-1894), later translated into English and published from 1896, 
which enjoyed ‘phenomenal’ success, running to fifteen editions between 1876 and 
1890. In preferring to concentrate on Kulturgeschichte, in the preface to the fifteenth 
edition he described his aim ‘to depict the German national life in all its varying 
conditions, and stages, and phases of destiny.’ Geschichte des deutschen Volkes 
ignited an historiographical controversy given its strongly supposedly anti-Protestant 
as well as pro-Catholic arguments and the author’s active involvement in Catholic 
politics. One of Janssen’s antagonists, Max Lenz, disputed his whole claim to be a 
historian. Though Janssen’s Geschichte was by no means simplistic or one-sided, it 
did tend to favour a Catholic-oriented narrative of German history. In this as well as 
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 his Catholic identity, Janssen was, despite his success in book sales, an ‘outsider’ in 
German historiography.  
See John Tonkin, ‘Johannes Janssen’, Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical 
Writing, volume I, ed. K. Boyd (London, Fitzroy-Dearborn, 1999) 
 
Lecky, W.E.H. 
William Edward Hartpole Lecky was born in March, 1838, in Dublin. His father was 
a landowner and minor gentleman descended from seventeenth-century English 
settlers. He was studied at Trinity College, Dublin, from where he graduated BA in 
1859 and MA in 1863. At Trinity he had become impressed with the patriot and 
nationalist movements of the late eighteenth century as well as with some of the 
ideas of Thomas Davis. In 1861 Lecky published his first book, Leaders of Public 
Opinion in Ireland, a brief sketch of the lives and work of Jonathan Swift, Henry 
Flood, Henry Grattan and Daniel O’Connell. Two surveys of intellectual history 
followed: A History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe (two 
volumes, 1865), and A History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne 
(two volumes, 1869). Lecky then devoted himself to his History of England during 
the Eighteenth Century (eight volumes, 1878-1890). It is worth noting that enough of 
the book was concerned with Irish affairs to justify the subsequent publication of its 
sections on Irish history as a separate five-volume History of Ireland in the 
Eighteenth Century. While Lecky never lost his intellectual belief in the justness of 
Irish patriotism, nor abandoned his judgment that the Act of Union had failed 
Ireland, he opposed the Home Rule movement, which he regarded as a plebeian 
movement with little in common with the respectable nationalism of the eighteenth-
century gentry and aristocracy. In this sense his opposition to Irish self-government 
had much to do with a deep pessimism about the state of Irish society and politics in 
the late nineteenth century. Nonetheless, Lecky became regarded as one of the 
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 foremost nineteenth-century advocates of Irish nationalism, a reputation that 
persisted into the twentieth century among members of the independence movement. 
W.E. Gladstone, no less, gave Lecky’s History much of the credit for his own 
certainty of the historical justice of the cause of Irish Home Rule. Lecky’s academic 
honours included the degree of LL.D. from Dublin, St Andrews’ and Glasgow, the 
degree of D.C.L. from Oxford and the degree of Litt.D. from Cambridge. In 1894 he 
was elected corresponding member of the Institute of France, though he turned down 
a chair in history at Oxford, expressing his life-long aversion to the practice of 
academic history. A volume of Lecky’s Historical and Political Essays was 
published posthumously in 1908. The Lecky Chair of Irish History at Trinity 
College, Dublin, was established in 1913.  
See Benedikt Stuchtey, ‘W.E.H. Lecky’, Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical 
Writing, volume I, ed. K. Boyd (London, Fitzroy-Dearborn, 1999) 
 
MacNeill, Eoin 
Eoin (or John) MacNeill, who has been described as ‘the father of the modern study 
of early Irish medieval history’, was born in May 1867 to a northern Catholic family. 
He was a founding member of the cultural nationalist organization the Gaelic 
League, in 1893, and edited its first publication, the Gaelic Journal. In later years he 
would lead the politicization of the League. In 1908 he gained an appointment to 
University College, Dublin, as Professor of Early Irish history. Through the Gaelic 
League MacNeill deepened his involvement in political nationalism. He was the first 
to call for the formation of a nationalist militia dedicated to the implementation of a 
Home Rule settlement, was instrumental in the organization of this force, and 
became one of its first leaders. However, he was strictly opposed to the idea of an 
armed rebellion except in the case of a British attempt to suppress the movement. 
For this reason, he actively opposed the plans made for an uprising in 1916, though 
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 this did not fatally weaken his status in the nationalist elite, on the political side of 
the movement. In any case MacNeill himself was arrested after the Rising, court-
martialed and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released from prison in 1917 
and was elected as a Sinn Fein M.P. in the 1918 general election. In line with Sinn 
Féin policy, he refused to take his seat in the British House of Commons and sat 
instead in the newly-convened Dáil Éireann. In 1921 he supported the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty, and in 1922 attended the Irish Race Convention in Paris. Following the 
establishment of the Irish Free State, he became Minister for Education in its first 
government, a crucial development in the birth of the new state. In 1924 MacNeill 
represented the Irish government on the Boundary Commission set up to renegotiate 
the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. He aimed to do so 
conscientiously, but was nonetheless an ineffective negotiator, and the 
Commission’s activity did not result in any significant redrawing of the border. He 
also resigned on 24
th
 November 1925 as Minister for Education, a position unrelated 
to his work on the Commission. He lost his Dáil seat at the June 1927 election and 
never returned to politics, and devoted himself to scholarship once more and later 
became Chairman of the Irish Manuscripts Commission. He died in Dublin of 
natural causes at the age of seventy-eight. An essayist primarily, his most important 
works included Phases of Irish History, Celtic Ireland, and a study of St. Patrick.  
See Michael Tierney, Eoin MacNeill: Scholar and Man of Action, 1867-1945 
(Oxford Clarendon Press, 1980) 
 
Mitchel, John 
 
John Mitchel was born in November 1815 in Ulster. From his father, a Presbyterian 
and later Unitarian clergyman, he gained early exposure to ideas of religious 
tolerance and support for Irish nationalism. At the age of four, he began a classical 
education, and went up to Trinity College in 1830, taking his degree in 1834. He 
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 declined a career as a minister, becoming a bank clerk and later a lawyer. It was 
towards the end of the 1830’s that he became involved in O’Connell’s repeal 
campaign. Mitchel began to write for The Nation in 1843, and it was with Davis’s 
encouragement that he wrote his first book, his biography of Hugh O’Neill. After 
Davis’s death Mitchel joined the editorial staff of The Nation. From this time on, in 
1845, he threw himself wholly into nationalist activity, and wrote many historical 
and political articles and reviews. It was during his time at The Nation that he struck 
up an unlikely friendship with Thomas Carlyle. Mitchel’s witnessing of the horrors 
of the Great Famine, and what he saw as ‘genocidal’ policy of the British 
government enraged him, driving him towards incitement to rebellion. He left The 
Nation, dissatisfied with what he saw as the over-pacific attitude of his collaborators, 
and founded The United Irishman, where his writing against the government became 
increasingly subversive. After he began to openly incite rebellion in February and 
March of 1848, Mitchel was charged with sedition and later treason-felony in April, 
being found guilty by what was widely-known to be ‘packed’ jury. Mitchel was 
sentenced to transportation for fourteen years, sent first to Bermuda and later to 
Tasmania. In 1853 he made his escape to America, where he resumed his literary 
career. His revolutionary Irish nationalism and Anglophobia unchecked, he founded 
The Citizen newspaper in New York. In The Last Conquest of Ireland (Perhaps), of 
1861, Mitchel laid down in writing his view that the effects of the Great Famine had 
been exacerbated by a deliberate and genocidal British plan to decimate the 
population of Ireland. During the American Civil War Mitchel was an ardent 
supporter of the Confederacy. Mitchel was able to return in Ireland in 1875 and even 
secured election as MP twice, though each time the vote was invalidated on the 
grounds that he was a convicted felon. In any event he died that same year. Mitchel 
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 was not a subtle writer, but nonetheless an eloquent and effective one, particularly 
when he wrote to attack the character or views of an opponent. His principal 
historical and political writings include The Life and Times of Aodh O’Neill, An 
Apology for the British Government in Ireland, Jail Journal, The Crusade of the 
Period, The Last Conquest of Ireland (Perhaps), and the History of Ireland from the 
Treaty of Limerick to the Present Time. 
See Bryan P. McGovern, John Mitchel: Irish Nationalist, Southern Secessionist 
(Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 2009) 
 
O’Grady, Standish James 
Standish James O’Grady was born in September, 1846, in rural western County 
Cork. His father was a Protestant clergyman, and he was a cousin of Standish Hayes 
O’Grady, a noted figure in the recovery and study of Celtic literature. The O’Grady’s 
were a large, old, and notable aristocratic and gentry family in Cork, and the given 
name ‘Standish’ was apparently something of a family tradition. Standish James 
followed his father to Trinity College, though he found himself temperamentally 
unsuited to a career in the Church and qualified as a barrister in 1872, yet rarely 
practiced. His life-long interest was in writing. His reading of the eighteenth century 
General History of Ireland by Sylvester O’Halloran sparked an interest in Irish 
history that had previously been absent. His writings on Irish history were 
unconventional – though in some senses quite ahead of their time – and attracted 
little commercial success, though would come to have a profoundly important 
influence on W.B. Yeats, AE Russell, and others, leading him to be regarded as the 
‘Father of the Celtic Revival’. This was surprising in the sense that O’Grady was 
admittedly ignorant of the Gaelic language and reliant on translations. Though 
O’Grady was too basically conservative to be a political nationalist, his imaginative 
recovery of the heroic ancient and early medieval Irish past accounted for his 
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 importance among more ‘advanced’ nationalists. He was prepared to discuss politics 
with nationalists rather than dismiss them as disloyal malcontents, and he held a high 
opinion of the Irish nationalist leader Charles Parnell. O’Grady’s principal works in 
addition to his journalistic output and a number of historical novels included his 
Story of Ireland, History of Ireland: The Heroic Period, and Cuchulainn and his 
Contemporaries, and History of Ireland: Critical and Philosophical. It was in this 
latter work in particular where O’Grady sought to expound his idea of history.  
See Michael McAteer, Standish O’Grady, AE and Yeats: History, Politics, and 
Culture (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2002) 
 
Sullivan, Alexander Martin 
 
Alexander Martin Sullivan (known as ‘A.M.’) was born in County Cork in 1830. 
Entering into journalism in 1850, Sullivan became assistant editor of The Nation in 
1855, and subsequently editor and proprietor. From 1861 to 1884, in conjunction 
with his brother T.D., he made The Nation into one of the most influential forces in 
Irish nationalism. While Sullivan was a devotee of Young Ireland, the paper was 
steered under his leadership towards a strongly Catholic-oriented nationalism that 
differed markedly from the paper’s original ethos. He later entered into a legal career 
in order to support his family, and was called to the Irish bar and made QC in 1881. 
As a barrister he defended Irish nationalists such as William O’Brien during sedition 
trials. He was elected MP as a Home Rule for two different constituencies in 1874 
and 1880. He left politics in 1882 owing to ill health. In earlier years he had been a 
nationalist representative on the Dublin Corporation, and had been instrumental in 
the erection of the Grattan and O’Connell Monuments in Dublin. As a moderate 
nationalist of the constitutional stamp, Sullivan opposed violence and attempts at 
insurrection mainly on the grounds of their being counter-productive and ineffective, 
but he retained a personal sympathy for nationalists of varying hues. Despite his 
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 lifelong activism for the nationalist cause, Sullivan is an obscure figure today. 
Though not a trained historian, Sullivan authored one of the most popular and 
widely-read nationalist histories of the nineteenth (and twentieth) centuries), The 
Story of Ireland. He died in 1884 at the age of fifty-four. 
T.D. Sullivan, Memoir of A.M. Sullivan (Dublin, 1885) 
Ranke, Leopold von 
Leopold von Ranke was born in December 1795 to a Lutheran family in what was 
then the Electorate of Saxony. In 1814, he entered the University of Leipzig, to study 
Classics and theology. During this time he also became an expert in philology and 
the translation of classical authors into German. At this time he showed little interest 
in works of modern history, however, he had come to adulthood during the 
Napoleonic Wars and as a result his historical studies had begun to develop in 
conscious opposition to ‘the dictatorship of Napoleonic ideas.’ Beginning with his 
first book in 1824, the Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 
1494 bis 1514 (History of the Latin and Teutonic Peoples from 1494 to 1514), Ranke 
showed his determination to writer history on a European scale and to investigate the 
roots of modern European civilization. The book is best remembered for Ranke’s 
comment that the task of the historian was ‘to show what actually happened’ (‘wie es 
eigentlich gewesen’). Ranke’s statement that history should embrace this principle is 
still taken by many historians as a foundational principle. There has been much 
debate over the precise meaning of this phrase. Ranke certainly never meant, as has 
been assumed, that the historian should only document facts without offering any 
reasoned any interpretation of these facts. Ranke rather meant that the historian 
should both discover the facts and find the ‘essences’ behind them. Under this view, 
Ranke’s principle had been to ‘show what essentially happened’. Following the 
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 success of his first work, Ranke was given a position in the University of Berlin and 
later became the official Historiographer of Prussia, in 1841. In 1831 he had founded 
the Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift. In 1849, Ranke published Neun Bücher 
preussicher Geschichte (published in English as Memoirs of the House of 
Brandenburg and History of Prussia, during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries), in which he examined the fortunes of the Hohenzollern dynasty and state 
from the Middle Ages to the reign of Frederick the Great. His most popular work 
was Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation, written in the 1840’s. After 
his retirement from academic life in 1871, Ranke continued to write on a variety of 
subjects relating to German history, and in 1880 started his six-volume 
Weltgeschichte, which began with ancient Egypt and the Israelites. By the time of 
Ranke’s death in Berlin in 1886, at the age of 90, he had reached only the 1100s, 
though his assistants later used his notes to continue up to 1453.  
Ranke, given his basic conservatism and position in the Prussian bureaucracy was 
not a political nationalist in favour of unification, and did not greet unification with 
any especial enthusiasm. His extensive study of other national histories in Europe 
besides Germany’s makes clear that he was no narrow ‘chauvinist’. Nevertheless his 
idea of the special moral character of each state may be said with more justification 
to have possessed a nationalist inflection. His Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der 
Reformation (though it does not deal solely with the early modern history of the 
modern ‘German lands’), was one of the few works of Ranke that was acclaimed by 
such historians as Treitschke and Sybel, for its nationalist accent. If Ranke was not in 
his own time regarded as primarily a German national historian, his successors were 
bolder in placing his dictates in the service of historiographical nationalism. The 
entirety of Ranke’s prodigious output, the Gesammelte Werke, runs to fifty-four 
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 volumes, nine of which comprise his last major work. In addition to his major works, 
other important works included Serbische Revolution (1829), Fürsten und Völker 
von Süd-Europa im sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert, Die römischen 
Paepste in den letzten vier Jahrhunderten, and Hardenberg und die Geschichte des 
preussischen Staates von 1793 bis 1813.  
Helen Liebel-Weckowicz, ‘Leopold von Ranke’, Encyclopedia of Historians and 
Historical Writing, volume I (London, Fitzroy-Dearborn, 1999) 
 
Spahn, Martin 
 
Martin Spahn was born in March 1875 in East Prussia. He was the oldest son of 
Peter Spahn, leader of the Catholic Zentrum Party in the Reichstag. He studied 
history at the universities of Bonn, Berlin and Innsbruck. By 1901, at the age of 
twenty-six, he gained a professorship at Bonn but was then quickly invited to move 
on to the University of Straßburg. Spahn was for his own part not an ultramontane, 
but until the 1920’s one of the ‘Reform Catholics’ who wanted German Catholics to 
take a renewed and greater part in the political and intellectual life of the new 
German nation-state, accepting the fact of unification under the leadership of 
Prussia. Spahn had, for example, taken a sceptical and critical stance towards 
Janssen’s Geschichte des deutschen Volkes that was well-received by Protestant 
historians. In 1920 he moved on to a position at Cologne, but by 1924 devoted 
himself full-time to his duties as a Reichstag deputy. Between 1908 and 1918 he was 
a Straßburg councillor, for the Zentrum Party between 1912 and 1918, and between 
1910 and 1912 he was also a Reichstag deputy for Zentrum. In 1921 he joined the 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei and later went over to the NSDAP in 1933, where he 
remained as a Reichstag deputy until 1945. In the 1920’s and 1930’s he authored 
various revisionist and irredentist historical and political tracts. Spahn’s most 
important works included Verfassungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Herzogtums 
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 Pommern von 1478 bis 1625 (1896/1897), a biography of Otto von Bismarck first 
published in 1915, Mitteleuropa und das deutsche Volk (1925), and a collection of 
essays published in 1934 entitled Für den Reichsgedanken. He also authored a 
number of essays dealing with German historical subjects for the Catholic 
Encyclopedia. Spahn died in May 1945 in northern Austria. 
Gabrielle Clemens, Martin Spahn und der Rechtskatholizismus in der Weimar 
Republik  (Mainz, 1983) 
 
Sybel, Heinrich Karl Ludolf von 
 
Heinrich Karl Ludolf von Sybel was born in December 1817 in Düsseldorf, in a 
Protestant family long-established in Westphalia which had included theologians and 
pastors. His father was a jurist, and had been a civil servant under both the French 
and the Prussians, before being raised in 1831 into the Prussian hereditary nobility. 
Sybel was educated at Berlin, and was subsequently said to have been Ranke’s most 
distinguished pupil. In starting his career as a medieval historian, his first major 
work was the Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges, an English version of which was 
published in 1861. This work was followed by a study on The Origins of the German 
Kingship. In 1844 he first became an opponent of Catholic ultramontanism, and then 
moved to the University of Marburg. During his time here he became involved in 
politics, winning a seat at in the Hessian Landtag. He witnessed events of the year 
1848 in Frankfurt, but did not succeed in getting elected to the 
Nationalversammlung. From this time he became a convinced supporter of a 
kleindeutschland solution, the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, and 
his experience of the events of 1848 were decisive in turning him towards the study 
of modern history. His Geschichte der deutschen Revolutionszeit, 1789-1800, the 
fruit of nearly thirty years of work altogether, was first published in English between 
1867 and 1869. The work contained important reflections on German history and on 
356
 the nation in general as historical actor and contemporary ideal, with comparisons on 
the historical character and development of the French and German peoples. In 1859 
Sybel established the Historische Zeitschrift, the first dedicated historical journal and 
the model for all subsequent similar publications in Europe and beyond. In 1861, 
Sybel moved from Munich to Bonn in the Prussian Rhineland, where he remained 
until 1875. While at Bonn he became an active member of the Prussian Lower 
House. In 1875 he was appointed by Bismarck to run the Prussian State Archives, 
and commissioned to write a history of the establishment of the Kaiserreich. This 
became his crowning and last major work, with its suggestive title, Die Begründung 
des deutschen Reiches durch Wilhelm I (1889-1894). In his career Sybel aimed to 
provide a nationalistic interpretation of German history with a foundation of 
scholarship and authenticity. He espoused a conception of history at the centre of 
which stood the ‘Geschichte und Succession der Völker’. In addition to his major 
works, some of Sybel’s numerous political and historiographical essays were 
collected and published as Kleine historische Schriften, Vorträge und Aufsätze, and 
Vorträge und Abhandlungen.  
See R.F. Southard, ‘Heinrich von Sybel’, Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical 
Writing, volume I, ed. K. Boyd (London, Fitzroy-Dearborn, 1999) 
 
Treitschke, Heinrich Gotthard von 
 
Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke was born in Dresden in September 1834. His 
father was a high-ranking officer of the Saxon army. After studying at Leipzig and 
Bonn, and publishing an article on ‘The Foundations of English Liberty’ in 
Preussische Jahrbücher in 1859 and submitting his doctoral dissertation that year, he 
began lecturing on history and politics at Leipzig. He became very popular with his 
students but his pro-Prussian leanings, and hostility to the Saxon government, made 
it impossible for him to continue a career there. By 1863 he became a professor at 
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 Freiburg, and in 1866, the year of the Austro-Prussian War, he moved to Berlin, 
became a Prussian subject, gained a post at the Humboldt University (over the 
objections of Ranke, who lobbied against the appointment) and became editor of 
Preussische Jahrbücher. In 1871 he became a deputy of the new German Reichstag, 
and for the rest of his life remained an important figure in German public life. As a 
political figure he strongly supported repressive Prussian legislation against 
Socialists, Poles, and Catholics and championed colonial expansion, a cause in 
which he developed a strong Anglophobia. Treitschke was particularly regarded by 
the Prussian political elite, if not always by his fellow historians, and his lectures at 
Berlin became something of a ‘training ground’ for the generation of nationalists 
who came to maturity during the Kaiserreich.  
Treitschke’s devotion to the German nation rang clear in all his historical works, not 
least in his principal work, the five-volume Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten 
Jahrhundert (1879-1895). He also wrote a number of biographical and historical 
essays, which were published in Historische und Politische Aufsätze, Zehn Jahre 
deutscher Kämpfe, and Deutsche Kämpfe, Neue Folge. Not all of his historical and 
political output was concerned solely with Germany, some articles dealt with other 
countries, but all tended to seam with his own nationalist assumptions and 
preconceptions, and were often concerned with what lessons the historical 
experiences, good or bad, of other countries could provide for the Germans. Among 
the more notable of Treitschke’s individual essays included What We Demand From 
France and an essay from 1862 on the history of the medieval Teutonic Knights and 
Ordensland in medieval Prussia. He died in April 1896 aged sixty-two.  
Yeong-Han Cheong, ‘Heinrich von Treitschke’, Encyclopedia of Historians and 
Historical Writing, volume I, ed. K. Boyd (London, Fitzroy-Dearborn, 1999) 
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